acrashb

I (too) can see Ukraine choosing not to attack in strength anywhere as long as Russia has sufficient assets to throw against such an attack - and turn it into a bloody grind. Why would they? Lot's of things been doing 'splodey stuff in Russia's rear lately, making Russians die for their country without Ukrainians joining them. 

Like you say, if you can take out the enemy in a piecemeal fashion why force a decisive engagement?. Especially when the enemy seems to be looking for the latter. Reminds me of 'emptiness and fullness' written by some old Chinese man which features here on a somewhat regular basis ;-).
Of course ending the war sooner has merits of its own, but given the context I'd say 'more haste less speed' applies.

Further analysis of the Amnesty International debacle:
https://nationalpost.com/opinion/adam-zivo-amnesty-international-ignores-reality-to-manufacture-ukrainian-war-crimes
"...Rovera arrived in eastern Ukraine not to investigate facts on the ground, but rather to bend them to a preordained conclusion."
At university, when AI was fully and laser-focused on prisoners of conscience, I volunteered and handed out pamphlets.  In the last roughly ten years AI has strayed and adopted an anti-Western bias, now, or again, shown to be simple prejudice.  If anything good comes from this it will be their collapse as a publicly credible organization.
 

Further analysis of the Amnesty International debacle:
https://nationalpost.com/opinion/adam-zivo-amnesty-international-ignores-reality-to-manufacture-ukrainian-war-crimes
"...Rovera arrived in eastern Ukraine not to investigate facts on the ground, but rather to bend them to a preordained conclusion."
At university, when AI was fully and laser-focused on prisoners of conscience, I volunteered and handed out pamphlets.  In the last roughly ten years AI has strayed and adopted an anti-Western bias, now, or again, shown to be simple prejudice.  If anything good comes from this it will be their collapse as a publicly credible organization.
 

Wasn't there a girl who could start fires with her mind?
Oh wait, squirrels...what about squirrels?
Seriously - none of these really add up based on the scope and scale of damage done.

Amnesty reminds me of Wikileaks somewhat. They went from being an organization of conscience (one to could argue) to being hijacked and manipulated by people with an agenda. In the end Wikileaks was pretty much a Russian troll farm.

In general, the situation is quite tense, food and fuel prices are constantly rising. In the first months of the war, our government kept the value of the national currency against the US dollar. But in the last month, the hryvnia was released into free fall and declared that the old prices for the dollar would no longer exist. Prices for literally all groups of goods began to rise noticeably.
Despite all this, the mood of the people is quite calm. I expected that during the war it would be much harder in the rear. So thanks to our Western allies for economic assistance

That's a bit unfair, and we don't know enough to determine if it is correct.
If someone does repeated mag dumps, which happens in panicked or semi-panicked or simply incompetent suppressive fire, in an AK-47  the front handguard will eventually smoke and burn.  Do the same thing on an M-16 FOW and the gas tube will melt and explode.  Also, both gun's barrels will be ruined (particularly in the important throat area) and at best will be dramatically inaccurate afterwards.  Does this mean they aren't suited to modern war, or were they used in an unapproved and unreasonable manner?
So the PzH 2000's were either abused or, as you say, inadequately designed (or perhaps manufactured).  But we don't know which.  You can bet the designers know and are either developing modifications right now or pushing additional training recommendations.
 

There is German article
 

So, I've been reading Ian Toll's Pacific Trilogy, and in "Twilight of the Gods", he writes this:
By contrast, according to Wylie, a cumulative operational strategy does not involve territorial offensives and pitched battles, but a "less perceptible minute accumulation of little items piling one on top of the other, until at some unknown point, the mass of calculated actions may be large enough to be critical". It weaponizes the logic of "death by a thousand cuts." In the Pacific, cumulative strategies chipped away at the economic and political foundations of Japan's imperial empire. It struck me that the Russians appear to have adopted what Toll calls a "sequentialist" strategy: "we will march to Kiev 100 yards of dirt at a time", while the Ukranians appear to have adopted a cumulativist strategy: "we will degrade the Russian ability to make war until it collapses".
I think that analysis broadly harmonizes with The_Capt's description of warfare as decision space shaping. A sequentialist attack changes the decision space (the US capture of Saipan, for example, or the Japanese capture of Borneo), but cumulativist strategies (building a metric crapton of escort carriers; destroying the Japanese merchant marine) lead to breakthroughs and shorten the overall war by undeciding things and forcing bad decisions on the part of the adversary.
In many ways it feels like the Russians are duplicating Japan's WWII playbook while the Ukrainians are duplicating that of the Allies.

I am moving slowly but surely. Here is a map for Maryinka battle. Maryinka settlement is located on another end of RU offensive. You undoubtedly heard many claims about it like 2/3 are captured or almost captured and so on. Well, let's look closer. This time I will use Google Earth. It is less pleasing for my eyes, but it does show terrain and in the case of Maryinka it is important.

The red line is the approximate border before the war. Yellow dashed line is the contested area where major fighting is happening. As far as I understand assault groups of both sides infiltrate contested area and engage each other often with arty. But to define what is generally happening we can use several notable features.
On the right just in front of the border line there is farm fully under RU control from 6-Aug. There are just several hundred meters between the farm and RU forward positions and 10 days between start of offensive and statement of full control. The dominant feature that controls the eastern part of the village is the landfill of the former Shchurovo Mine.
According to RU sources the landfill was always in UKR hands. So, nobody really knows how RU almost captured Maryinka without capturing the landfill. Well, possibly they infiltrated several assault groups in to several places in contested area, declared Maryinka is almost captured and then got killed (see insert from sample video).
However, we have an interesting development. Yesterday, two weeks after start of the offensive RU stated they captured position at the landfill and were moving toward the center. But I need a definite statement that the landfill is captured because I know how RU propaganda works. Let's wait and see.
Last is checkpoint Maryinka. There is no any information about it. So, we can assume RU did not reach it at all.  This should give you an idea how RU is progressing at both ends of the offensive. 

I think they may have to update those warning labels on cigarettes.

Ukraine has a very good reason to lie... and you stated it yourself... keeping RU uncertain about what hit Novofederovka. As long as they don't know they don't know how to react or where it might be safe. I wish the countries sending stuff would be more discrete about what they're sending - it would be much more effective if RU didn't know what might be coming.
About Novofedorivka, earlier today CNN said something about a railroad station hit near there, on a critical rail line RU had recently put back in service. So many another ammo train? Surprised we haven't seen any photos from that one yet.

To see Anzio and Sothampton dock with such heart rending clarity, yet fail so miserably when children and partners now, again, face the same bottomless agony. 
 
Sic transit gloria mundi…
 
 

His integrity is Under Siege. What an irrelevant has been.

So far we are getting reports from civilians, and they do indeed need fresh pairs of pants. Tourist season in Crimea is closed. 

This

  You are describing a war of attrition, or exhaustion in which Russia is able to trade "ammo" for UA "people" - Russia has "endless ammo"; UA does not have endless "people" = Bad outcome for Ukraine in the long run.  Would be true if that were the entire picture.  Points:
 - It isn't about Russian "ammo", it is about Russian indirect fire capability.  An ocean of 152 ammo is useless if one does not have the trains and trucks to move it, the guns and gunners to fire it, and the ISR to direct it.  And lets not forget the assets to protect the entire system.  That systems ability to translate solid materials into effective kinetic energy, and then apply that energy to a target is not solely a question of "Russian ammo".  Through that lens, and we have heard anecdotes of how bad Russian logistics are getting, the Russian attrition picture does not look so good.
- The graphic above is half the picture, there is a Ukrainian one going the other way - they are in collision.  So as the Russians dry-hump their way, about 100m per day (and this has been consistent since Severdonetsk), the theory is that - just like WW1 - that "one more push" will cause the UA to break.  Then the Russians can get back to doing what they do best; stringing mechanized forces without enough infantry, logistics and air cover along 100km advances, so that the UA can cut them to pieces because RA density becomes so shallow that the UA gains defensive manoeuvre in depth (go Russia!).  This is "Effect" space, an the problem from the Russian side is becoming unsolvable.  That ocean of 152mm ammo has a very low probability of delivering the Effects, Decision or Outcomes because it is too slow, and even if it leads to "fast" the Russians are worse prepared for that than they were in Feb.
- The biggest missing piece in all this is the one thing the Russians can afford the least, and that is time.   There is a perception in the West that "We have all the watches but Russia has all the time" - we see our greatest fears in our opponent and a long drawn out stalemate scares us cause that is how we got burnt in Afghanistan (and Iraq to some extent).  Truth is that Russia does not have the time.  Why?  Because everyday they lose is one more day for the UA to get stronger, larger and better. With every shipment of support from the west, every training serial and further ISR integration the hill Russia has to climb gets steeper.  Finally, back to that nasty Will thing, Ukrainian Will does not appear to be going anywhere because it is shored up by national power and stunning levels of unity, which for the Ukraine is growing via western support. 
Russian Will is held together by an autocrat and his cronies who have been adept at lying, suppressing freedom, and generally greasy dealings.  All built on an economy that is making some ominous sounds, and a war machine that has already had to regress in order to stay in the game.  From where I sit I think we might be at the end of the road for RA operational offensive capability - they never really came out of the operational pause of Jul, I am not sure they can.
What we are all waiting for is the UA to solve the Riddle of the Modern Operational Offensive, if it can be solved under these conditions.  I suspect it can but the UA are waiting for their moment, patience in your opponent is a bad sign as it means they have the initiative.
In summary, I think the RA is doing everything it can with what it has because "the boss is watching" - but it is not enough, it will never be enough, Russia broke their best chance for victory in this thing back in Feb-March.  The theories that Russian pundits have about EU falling apart in the winter, US presidents coming in and cutting off Ukraine, NATO collapsing are sounding more and more desperate...all the while the UA is poking and pinching, waiting for its moment.  
 

Welcome, Maciej, to the swelling ranks of CM's elite Polish brigade! 🇵🇱🇵🇱🇵🇱
I won't repeat my post above, but I'll venture to guess that UKR losses have NOT run 200 KIA per day for at least 6 weeks now, if indeed they ever did.  And the Russians definitely aren't giving better than they get.
...I know this sounds awfully trite, but as you know of course, the only way to kill and maim enemy infantry in bulk day-by-day is to be spotting and shelling concentrations of them, preferably on the move and up front, in range of your mortars and direct fire ordnance (not just your heavy guns).
And the main way to force them to concentrate that way is by concentrating your own forces. On the move and up front. Bite and hold / 'grab the belt', or by other methods (probes, infiltration). Which is costly.
...That's why almost by definition, an attacker generally loses a lot more than a defender, unless he can achieve a payoff in terms of a rout or encirclement. The latter appear to be fairly few in number since February, thanks to generally superior Ukrainian tactical mobility (not tied to AFVs), NCO initiative and situational awareness.
Arithmetic on the Frontier, FWIW.....

What do you make of the Russian claims that the UKR forces are suffering significantly heavier losses than the RUS in the Donbass fight? This claim is being repeatedly made, at least by Strelkov.
If this is correct, then the automatic assumption that RUS attacks are "frontal and costly", i.e. costly because they are frontal should be changed somewhat. They certainly are slow and require huge expenditure of ammunition, but if they protect RUS infantry, which is their most precious resource at the moment, this change of tactics is not evidence of stupidity, but quite reasonable adaptation. As opposed to men, RUS post-soviet stockpiles of 152mm ammunition are an almost unlimited and almost free (except transportation costs) asset.
AFAIK, this is possible, the "bite and hold" tactics of 1917 (which I see as almost direct analogue, exchaning observation baloons for drones)  did inflict more casualties on the Germans than on the British, and the Germans found no direct counter to them. Their indirect counter was to take advantage of the slowness of this method and prepare a counteroffensive, which is a whole different kettle of fish; as far as I can see, the UKR have yet to find a method to deal with RUS defensive artillery concentrations which would allow them to attack in the face of determined RUS opposition. On the other hand, Strelkov does not directly see the extent of UKR casualties and probably relies on RUS reports. He may be completely wrong.
What do you guys think?

HARM is inertially guided with terminal radar-seeking. It doesn't need a lock to be fired.

http://www.ausairpower.net/API-AGM-88-HARM.html
Based on the wreckage, it is also the AGM-88D, which has GPS guidance supplementing the inertial guidance. This allows it to accurately hit radar emitters even after they have been turned off.

 
 

The reason RU offensive is weak is lack of manpower.
LDNR forces are spent.

Yes - and you need to have two wires in the cable and your arrow points must hit & stick to the plus and minus pole of the battery long enough to discharge the battery. Did I mention that the cable must have a certain thickness else they melt or it takes too long?
If you manage to do THAT, you could as well just put a normal arrow through the battery. That does discharge it, too.

An EW gun could indeed fry the motor control. That leads to an uncontrolled flight. This could be anything between dropping out of the sky or skyrocketing to god knows. I guess that happened.

Really hoping this is true!
 

Why would any non-native opfor a/c be wired and certified for any live native weapons?

That is physically impossible. Utter BS.

No tongue in cheek required. A few years ago this was - briefly - explored as a serious option. It turns out its reasonably easy to train them to do this, but they'll only do it once. Trying to stop the blades with your legs is a powerful disincentive ...