Bil Hardenberger

https://youtu.be/Ai5bvbwqDU8
 
A Combat Mission Fortress Italy story, using Bil Hardenberger's excellent C2 Hard Cat Rules v2I.
 
For those of you who like to take game accuracy/authenticity to the next level, I highly recommend you give Bil's rules a run out. They make the game far more challenging by, amongst other things, removing the player's ability to react to situations that the troops on the ground would be unaware of.
 
I will be producing these DARs as I play the game, so I'm as unaware of the outcome as you will be!
 
Feedback appreciated, as always
 
Drew

They were arrogant, and for good reason... what they did as a team against massive odds along the Chir River is legendary. They definitely provide a good model to base a defense against long odds. Balck is one of my inspirations and favorite Generals from WW2.

Now, now this gentleman has presented a very coherent strategy on how to decisively lose the next Cold War/strategic competition.  This will guarantee a US hard power contraction, which means soft power will be right behind it - I mean why invest in the US on many levels if they refuse to actually “get involved”? What value is US diplomacy if security means America only?  This is right up the alley of a certain political figure that it could be ripped from one of his speeches. 
And into these vacuums other powers are going to quickly pivot - they already have.  With their increased influence investment in the US will start to dry up - deals will be cut to ensure it, as will supply chains and consumption.  In a few years the US dollar will no longer be the global reserve currency.  This will pretty much set up the West for fracture as Europe will figure out pretty quick that it has been largely abandoned to its own devices.  A whole lotta nations in the Indo-Pac are going to also bail.
I mean the logical extension of Step 1 is China can invade Taiwan, North Korea into South Korea, India and Pakistan can totally blow up.  Screw Ukraine. Russia can pretty much do whatever it wants. US out of NATO - because that entire thing rides on allied intervention, so Europe is on its own. 5 EYES is gone.  Forget global cooperation on trans-regional crime and terrorism because unless it happens in the US - “not our problem”.
In fact this is so monumentally stupid that of course people who are looking for easy answers in a very complex and frightening world are gravitating towards it.  I mean the entire deal that keeps the US on top  is built in global stability backed not only by the US dollar but also carrier groups - so it is entirely logical that if you pull those groups back and let them float only 200 miles off the US coastline that US global influence will remain extant.  The US can probably drastically reduce defence spending and focus on building walls though.
Here is a crazy idea: if the US does not step up and in to keep some sort of order on this planet, someone else will. The US does not get to withdraw into fortress North America (while choking out immigration with a declining birth rate) and remain a global economic superpower.  Hard power backs soft- that US dollar as much as whatever the US is selling (or more importantly, buying).  At least 3 generations of Americans had that one figured out, but now for some reason people have totally forgotten.  
Regardless, thankfully these complete amateurs are not running the show, yet.
 

Short answer to a very good question - nothing viable.  To shorten this war dramatically - like in a month, NATO would need to establish air supremacy (and sea control of the Black Sea but let’s stay focused).  If the Ukrainian had that then I believe that land power mass would work again.  This would include an epic history making SEAD campaign linked to a C-ISR campaign, again of historic scope and scale.  It would include strikes into Russia at air and C4ISR infrastructure, followed by massive strikes on Russian logistics and strategic capacity.
Without that, this war will continue to unfold at its current speed…until it can go fast.  And we all know that is not going to happen unless there is a major strategic shift.
The West could supply the UA with 1000 tanks but they would need a lot of logistical support and literally years to train up crews/units/formations at that scale.  Essentially I strongly suspect that we are pumping about as much into Ukraine as they can realistically absorb and support.  We could definitely up the scales in some areas like deep strike but I suspect there is a logic for that one too.
People do not want to believe just how hard and how long it takes to build a fighting formation that can do a deliberate assault.  This is near the high water mark of land warfare - maybe only amphib or heavy airborne is a higher bar.  So the penny packets we are seeing being pushed in are not like there are 500 trained crews waiting for western tanks and we are only sending 100.  There are likely only enough crews for the tanks we are sending and the force generation pipeline is only so wide.
So this is going to take time and a lot of effort, and sacrifice.  No shortcuts, no magic US bullets (we have spent a lot of these already).  But my money is still on a UA breakthrough and breakout in the spring/summer.  There will likely be another Russian operational collapse, or two.  And then we will have to see what Phase VI brings.  I get everyone being edgy but I cannot stress how much of warfare is exactly this, sitting around waiting while listening to artillery.  You gotta breathe through it and be patient cause it will get exciting enough, soon enough.

Man that really highlights the issue at play here.  The US is more than a nation of 360-odd million.  It is an idea.  An idea that despite it flaws, contradictions and even occasional hypocrisy that the western world signed up for because it resonated.  We all took the idea and made it our own.  It was bigger than a political system.  It spoke to themes of liberty, representation, security, justice and equality.  We built a global order to oppose Communism around this big idea.  That is what this war is really about - the defence of that idea.  
Supporting Ukraine is simply the right thing to do.  It is about pushing back a genocidal bully and declaring to any and all that would think about trying this “Hey, this is our idea and we are going to defend it.  You are not attacking Ukraine, you are attacking our idea”.

I am still on the fence on the infantry note.  We have definitely seen a re-emergence (or perhaps just a re confirmation) of the role and value of light fast moving infantry on the UA side, particularly in the defence.  However for the RA we were thinking that “if only the BTGs had more infantry…silly Russians”.  However, in this last phase (phase IV) Russia definitely had the infantry advantage in the areas of its assaults, and it did not lead them to success.
In that (and I am sure it will be famous after the war) “battle for the T” the RA had significant infantry advantage and were still at a loss.  The infantry could not do its primary job of “taking and holding ground via closing with and destroying the enemy” despite numerical advantages.  This leads to an immediate question - if the amount of infantry the Russians threw at Bakhmut was not enough, how much infantry do you really need now?
While the UA with smaller forces have continually been successful despite having less infantry.  Back to Phase I and II, based on what we have seen in Bakhmut I am not convinced that more infantry or that even better combined arms coordination would have made that much of a difference when the main enemy of mass - artillery- still has information dominance.
From what we have seen, more empowered infantry is definitely a lesson learned; however, it is the nature of that empowerment that has been deterministic in this war.

A lot to unpack in that video. Very nice Battle Drill display.

Not to be "that guy".. but the proper designation for this UAV is MQ-9.  
 

The guy manning that DShK has played his Vlad the Loader card!

as @The_Capt said "all roads lead to CMCW"

These are precisely the sort of articles that were common in the months before the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives. Maybe it's true, maybe not...but that's exactly what I'd want in the press while if I were planning a Ukrainian offensive.

The guy manning that DShK has played his Vlad the Loader card!

Mounted assault on a Russian trench line:
 

FPV view of UKR assault group, following behind BMP-1 in attack on RUS positions. Some dead and surrendered Russians at the end.
 

Lancet against Stormer
... and likely Excalibur against Buk M2 or even M3 
PS. Excalibur against Osa
 

I think you have that backwards, Tbh.
  If your true prize is Melitopol then you don't want the MoD paying any attention there,  at all. You want to make it easy for them to make a mistake and misdirect their reserves posture,  ie to the North.
So you could push hard back into Luhansk,  encouraging the Ivan to fight there as its CoG is just south,  at Donetsk. 
But you also amp up corroding the logistics infrastructure around Melitopol. This both "softens"  the target and encourages the MoD to naturally focus and develop its LoCs further north, shifting yet more personell and gear up there. 
Once committed up there then you hit to Melitopol,  right to the coast. 
 

Where were Steve, Elvis and Bil that week? And what was all that seawater doing in the scenario folder?

Ref Bahkmut... Well I know almost nothing about the real situation and I'm not military but.. The folks leading this defense are the same officer cadres that defeated Kyiv, retook Kherson, led the Kharkiv offensive, crushed the Siversky-Donets crossing,  etc.  They've fought the Ivan every inch of the Bakhmut AO so far without the defending forces falling apart, and any actual retreat seems like it'll be controlled and careful. 
My bet is on Ukraine. 
 

There is potential for some very interesting Pacific war situations.. Khalkhin Gol and the early war from 1935 up to 1942-43 has some very interesting situations, the Japanese fought the Soviets, the Brits and Commonwealth, and the US.. how can that not be enticing? But this is not my area of expertise, and thus not really on my radar as a subject, though I do think there would be a market for it... if done right.
Bil 

A response from Mick Ryan regarding the reports of the Russians modifying their assault tactics
Basically, he's comparing it to the German Stormtroopers of 1918 and positing that without changes to the operational level it won't make that much of a big picture difference. If there is no capability to exploit, then 'chopping a hole' as Ludendorff called it will lead to nothing. And he doubts that RA will be able to create the capability as it's not just equipment that would be needed, but training, changes to doctrine etc, etc. which is difficult at the best of times, let alone in a war. And of course the Ukrainian have a say as well.

As I said above, assault detachments have been establishing inside existing brigades/regiments, so they subordinated to own brigade/regimental HQs. This is just usual combined battalions with assault functions. 

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

Warren, as an old school maneuverist and die-hard Boyd School mission command advocate this was a very interesting write up. Probably my favorite post of yours in the entire thread. You have actually given me some things to think about, rare for you.   
The future of the tactical and operational battlefield is an exciting thing. We are lucky to have something like Combat Mission to enable experimentation.
Bil

Warren, as an old school maneuverist and die-hard Boyd School mission command advocate this was a very interesting write up. Probably my favorite post of yours in the entire thread. You have actually given me some things to think about, rare for you.   
The future of the tactical and operational battlefield is an exciting thing. We are lucky to have something like Combat Mission to enable experimentation.
Bil

There are significant caveats to this, no? Does not Ukraine fight (and fought) the way it does out of sheer necessity, not just pre-war doctrine?
It seems that Russia fought in its original style in many ways due to its large pre-war vehicle park. Howebver a year of destruction has eroded that park and Russia does not seem capable of overmatching the current Rate Of Attrition, so is forced into tactical adjustments. Very soon (if not already in motion) they will be force to change their operational formatting. In fact, I suspect this is actually underway with the effective abandonment of the BTG model and the readjustment of force back into the classic (and larger) more resilient formations.
An all-western force by its own internal definition, would not operate under the same pressures, fail-points and stressors as the ZSU did at the start, no? A modern, integrated and fully implemented NATO style force (if that's what we're implying here) could not have struggled vis a vis this Russian invasion. If the ZSU, for all its faults, weaknesses (and even outright treason in its ranks) was able to both hold and throw back multiple Russian axis then surely a NATO force would have tripled that effect? The sheer quantity of quality equipment and matching doctrine, training from trench level to 40,000 ft up top would have done enormous damage extremely quickly. The Ukes are kicking some serious *** with just dribbles of our gear, They're using the stuff in the way it was intended, designed and doctrined for and slaughtering Russians with it every day- but you think an all-western approach might have struggled? 
I do fully agree, institutional blind spots abound in Western militaries, indeed all militaries because they are institutions. It's inevitable and inherent in the nature of the beast.
But there are blind spots and just plain blind.