Elmar Bijlsma

You are correct, but sadly this will not stop me calling every Russian .50 a DShK.

But is it?  The fabled - and fun to shoot at long range - .50 BMG isn't itself .50 cal (.500 of an inch).  The bullet is .510" in diameter; the ".50" comes from the land-to-land diameter of the barrel.

Okay, so if the 12.7x108 bullet is the same as the .50BMG (12.7x99) then we can still call it, colloquially,  a "fifty" - but it isn't the same.  The bullet is .511" diameter, which, if stuffed into a .50BMG case would cause serious overpressure and likely barrel / breach failure immediately or soon.

Is there a cartridge with a bullet that is actually .500"?  Yes - at least the .500 S&W Magnum and .50AE, both pistol cartridges.
 

Very interesting analogy but not quite there to my mind.  The cargo cult as you outline is an emulation without actual capability behind it - it looks like an airfield built by people with no idea how an airfield works.  I do not believe the Russian military is in this camp…well at least not at the start of this thing.
The Russian military has capability and capacity but they appear to be set up to prosecute a war from the 1990s or even the Cold War.  Their military doctrine, training and even metrics of success are all from a bygone era.  Take this military and drop it into 1991 and we are talking a very different outcome.   The UA would not have access to real time full spectrum C4ISR or digitally supported targeting…no one really did.  Even in the Gulf War only about 10% of munitions were PGM.  No HIMARs, no UAS, ATGMs definitely last gen, so maybe TOW but that system was not going to dominate the battlefield.  No, if this was 30 years ago we would likely be supporting an insurgency across the Polish border.
We see videos of training goons hitting each other and calling it training, Google some old Marine corp training videos from the 80s, we were not that much more sophisticated at times.   No, the issue isn’t that Russia does not have military capability or is pretending, it is that is not learning fast enough what modern warfare actually looks like.  Further it keeps doubling down on old metrics of success - mass, terrorizing civilians and holding territory.  It keeps building for that and fighting for that.  This is very similar to the deadlocks of WW1 where “just one more push” and we will win.  We mock but we saw this same logic in places like Iraq and Afghanistan - “if we kill just one more XX leader, they will fold”.  So we are by no means immune.
I do not think Russia is a cargo cult (which is a brilliant piece of history btw), I think they are a military fighting for the wrong war.  The narratives we have heard for months coming from Russia social media reinforce this…they cannot see it, they do not understand why they are losing.  Mobilization was supposed to cure everything by throwing more mass at the problem, when it is clear that will not work.  Then tac nukes, which won’t work even if they do use them.  Oh wait, “stop the restraint” and conduct a blitz terror campaign against Ukrainian civilians like it is 1940.  Even those obstacle belts - which look professionally constructed btw- are an old way of thinking that I am not even sure will work even if they build enough of them.
 These are all symptoms that Russia simply doesn’t not even know what it doesn’t know at this point.  Better news is that they appear wed to their doctrine so learning will happen very slowly.  What is very important is that Ukraine and the West do not give them time to learn.  I suspect it is too late to be honest, and has been since early days.  The learning that needed to happen was 5 years ago so that they could invest in a competitive C4ISR system instead of retooling an old one and blowing money on T14s and hypersonic-whatever-those-BS-systems-were-supposed-to-do.
It is interesting that this war is not just a collision of wills, it is a collision of collective learning.

There's a better cut of it on reddit that shows the ammo bin eating a round, the TC chucks it soon after. btw, keep watching that DShK until the end. TC owes his life to that hunk off metal twice over.
https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/yb1th2/russian_towed_artillery_convoy_runs_straight_into/
 
Oh, and I've been holding on to a video clip for the last few weeks. Seems now is the time to post it:
"I am giving up,
I've had enough,
I can't keep this up,
you've got Mylove".
Pretty much the thinking of the Russians at Kherson, I'll bet.

You are correct, but sadly this will not stop me calling every Russian .50 a DShK.

There's a better cut of it on reddit that shows the ammo bin eating a round, the TC chucks it soon after. btw, keep watching that DShK until the end. TC owes his life to that hunk off metal twice over.
https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/yb1th2/russian_towed_artillery_convoy_runs_straight_into/
 
Oh, and I've been holding on to a video clip for the last few weeks. Seems now is the time to post it:
"I am giving up,
I've had enough,
I can't keep this up,
you've got Mylove".
Pretty much the thinking of the Russians at Kherson, I'll bet.

T-80 uses an NSVT, not DShK, but it is a good video.

The cargo cult idea is also reinforced by how things went at the start of the conflict.  Ukraine was equipped largely with the same equipment as Russia, and a similar military legacy from the USSR until around 2014.  After 2014, Ukraine seems to have recognized the limitations of their history and gotten a great deal of outside help in training at apparently all levels from tactical to strategic.  That training, plus a health extra dose of small arms (particularly ATGMs) from the west, enabled them to bring the Russian attack to a standstill fairly quickly and then turn things around.

Not at all. That, to my knowledge, implies a fancy facade where the the actuality is much less impressive. But it's still a military, just weaker then expected.
Cargo cults, for those that don't know, are a Pacific island phenomenon where the natives build imitation airfields and the like in the hopes of inviting back the bountiful supplies the US Army, Navy and Air Force dumped on their islands during WW2, who built similar bases. They don't really understand what airfields do, but they build something shaped like one.
 
And that is why I prefer to use cargo cult.
The Russian Armed Forces seem to have build something akin to what won them the Great Patriotic War in the quasi-religious hopes that victory returns to them, without fully understanding what it is they are supposed to do with it.  Push onwards to Kiev, because that is what Zhukov would have done. Mass artillery bombardments because it worked for Rokossovsky. Logistics? Stalin never paid attention to that either.
They have this thing called an army but they don't really understand how it works and how to use it. Hence, cargo cult.

Not at all. That, to my knowledge, implies a fancy facade where the the actuality is much less impressive. But it's still a military, just weaker then expected.
Cargo cults, for those that don't know, are a Pacific island phenomenon where the natives build imitation airfields and the like in the hopes of inviting back the bountiful supplies the US Army, Navy and Air Force dumped on their islands during WW2, who built similar bases. They don't really understand what airfields do, but they build something shaped like one.
 
And that is why I prefer to use cargo cult.
The Russian Armed Forces seem to have build something akin to what won them the Great Patriotic War in the quasi-religious hopes that victory returns to them, without fully understanding what it is they are supposed to do with it.  Push onwards to Kiev, because that is what Zhukov would have done. Mass artillery bombardments because it worked for Rokossovsky. Logistics? Stalin never paid attention to that either.
They have this thing called an army but they don't really understand how it works and how to use it. Hence, cargo cult.

Not at all. That, to my knowledge, implies a fancy facade where the the actuality is much less impressive. But it's still a military, just weaker then expected.
Cargo cults, for those that don't know, are a Pacific island phenomenon where the natives build imitation airfields and the like in the hopes of inviting back the bountiful supplies the US Army, Navy and Air Force dumped on their islands during WW2, who built similar bases. They don't really understand what airfields do, but they build something shaped like one.
 
And that is why I prefer to use cargo cult.
The Russian Armed Forces seem to have build something akin to what won them the Great Patriotic War in the quasi-religious hopes that victory returns to them, without fully understanding what it is they are supposed to do with it.  Push onwards to Kiev, because that is what Zhukov would have done. Mass artillery bombardments because it worked for Rokossovsky. Logistics? Stalin never paid attention to that either.
They have this thing called an army but they don't really understand how it works and how to use it. Hence, cargo cult.

Not at all. That, to my knowledge, implies a fancy facade where the the actuality is much less impressive. But it's still a military, just weaker then expected.
Cargo cults, for those that don't know, are a Pacific island phenomenon where the natives build imitation airfields and the like in the hopes of inviting back the bountiful supplies the US Army, Navy and Air Force dumped on their islands during WW2, who built similar bases. They don't really understand what airfields do, but they build something shaped like one.
 
And that is why I prefer to use cargo cult.
The Russian Armed Forces seem to have build something akin to what won them the Great Patriotic War in the quasi-religious hopes that victory returns to them, without fully understanding what it is they are supposed to do with it.  Push onwards to Kiev, because that is what Zhukov would have done. Mass artillery bombardments because it worked for Rokossovsky. Logistics? Stalin never paid attention to that either.
They have this thing called an army but they don't really understand how it works and how to use it. Hence, cargo cult.

Not at all. That, to my knowledge, implies a fancy facade where the the actuality is much less impressive. But it's still a military, just weaker then expected.
Cargo cults, for those that don't know, are a Pacific island phenomenon where the natives build imitation airfields and the like in the hopes of inviting back the bountiful supplies the US Army, Navy and Air Force dumped on their islands during WW2, who built similar bases. They don't really understand what airfields do, but they build something shaped like one.
 
And that is why I prefer to use cargo cult.
The Russian Armed Forces seem to have build something akin to what won them the Great Patriotic War in the quasi-religious hopes that victory returns to them, without fully understanding what it is they are supposed to do with it.  Push onwards to Kiev, because that is what Zhukov would have done. Mass artillery bombardments because it worked for Rokossovsky. Logistics? Stalin never paid attention to that either.
They have this thing called an army but they don't really understand how it works and how to use it. Hence, cargo cult.

Not at all. That, to my knowledge, implies a fancy facade where the the actuality is much less impressive. But it's still a military, just weaker then expected.
Cargo cults, for those that don't know, are a Pacific island phenomenon where the natives build imitation airfields and the like in the hopes of inviting back the bountiful supplies the US Army, Navy and Air Force dumped on their islands during WW2, who built similar bases. They don't really understand what airfields do, but they build something shaped like one.
 
And that is why I prefer to use cargo cult.
The Russian Armed Forces seem to have build something akin to what won them the Great Patriotic War in the quasi-religious hopes that victory returns to them, without fully understanding what it is they are supposed to do with it.  Push onwards to Kiev, because that is what Zhukov would have done. Mass artillery bombardments because it worked for Rokossovsky. Logistics? Stalin never paid attention to that either.
They have this thing called an army but they don't really understand how it works and how to use it. Hence, cargo cult.

I've said it before, and I enjoyed saying it sufficiently that I will repeat myself:
The Russian army is less a military and more a cargo cult. They do things that look military if not examined too closely, but is mostly them going through the motions to make the victory in The Great Patriotic War manifest itself again.
From these lizard teeth (not so much dragon now, I think) to dumping bewildered Mobniks at the front without giving them so much as a clue as to what to do next. It is all seemingly about appearance more than capability.

Given MI6 is running the whole show, he ought to know!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCcph9srHSw&t=4333s

There is an interesting interview with Polish volunteer sergeant fighting in Ukraine. It is one and a half month old and unfortunatelly no ENG subtitles are available, but there are interesting tactical and organizational details from the ground that are nevertheless relevant and worth to share here. Some are already known, but since he is unusually vocal (within Opsec) plus has a lot of practice it may be worth to bring them on this board:
1.The guy serves as platoon commander (practically down to 12 men + 5 absent) from April. His men are in Separate Special Battalion serving as "Battle Detachment" (re: all kind of missions including SF ones) subordinated to one of the regular brigades, probably mainly at Kharkiv front (undisclosed).

2. Those multinational experienced guys (US, Frenchmen, Poles, Ukrainians and several others) have clearly very different tasks than most common infantry fighting in the trenches- they serve as "fire brigade" in case Russians attacks will brake through. They see periods of very intense fighting, much more than most common soldiers. Interestingly, he claims it is common practice to form such ad hoc local QRF at the brigade and sometimes battalion level. After some time such units are treated as "specialists", taken out of regular order of battle and if having good reputation may be "borrowed" to other brigades for special tasks. Thus they are almost constantly in fight, experiencing problems with fatigue and lack of sleep.

3. Their equipment reflects that- he started with AK 74, but know uses Grot rifle and M14 for sniper tasks, good quality vests and uniforms. He claims many soldiers he served with, including Americans, will prefer those weapons to M4's that are also in use but have reputation of being too fragile in frontline conditions, difficult to keep clean and prone to jamming. He says US M67 granades are also used, but have 5-sec. delay that is way too long in battlefield conditions (mind- probably assaults), so most soldiers in line prefer old F1. It is interesting that he participated in some "water-environment" sabotage missions deep behind enemy lines (planting explosives) armed chiefly with his 9mm pistol.
Entire platoon also have two sets of NVG's for entire unit, which they found very lucky to have- common soldiers rarely have such items.

4. Battlefield effectiveness of AT weapons is also widely different from theoretical. AT-4's serve at max. 150 m but usually closer, NLAW's 6-800 m (platoon get a lot of NLAW's but they had no spare batteries, which shocked soldiers who considered it a sabotage on behalf of "unmentioned" provider state; it almost get them killed). Team's sole Javelin set is effective up to 1500m in practice, but only if line of vision is unobstructed, and similarly they have great problem possessing only pair of batteries- thus they need to allow armour get closer than theoretical range. Infantry is rather vulnarable to RU tanks, since they improved tactics to "shoot and scoot" from 2kms afar, behind practical range of a Javelin: "Unlike at early campaigns, they rarely go into open and creatively use cover and concealment now, preferring their famous carrousel tactics."

5. His and other platoons often do infiltration tactics; it is also visibly different between regular Ukrainians units and Territorial Defence that former prefer aggresive forms of defences- active patrolling, inflitrations, ambushes etc. while latter stick to their trenches, which they nonetheless hold valiantly. His platoon would penetrate several kms deep inside enemy lines on fairly regular basis. They usually move by pickups and technicals- after engagement they instantly mount them and drive at very high speeds, which is dangerous by itself [I also heard from several other accounts that number of common driving accidents due to enforced speed is very high in this war, especially directly behind the front]. Also despite many people demanding Ukrainians getting on the offensive (material was recorded before it) he says this small tactic is exteremely costly for Russians, so we should not expect in this war "massess of armour that will break the front, which will lead to nothing, them being sorrounded and suffering extra casualties". Instead they kill Russians at very high rate every day, devastate their logistics and only later will be able to penetrate the front [Nice practical translation of @TheCaptain theories about "attrition to manouvre" and internal fractures that lead to RU collapse].

6. As a rule they were often outnumbered and almost always outgunned; it stand out that front is often very thinly manned and soldiers dispersed, like a weak team solely holding even large village. Russians also visibly improved their tactic over time- they tried night infiltration, learned how to sneak over the minefields and tried to lure his team in the open. Still, his opinion on them as soldiers is low. There are very detailed desciptions of small unit actions, for example when his platoon defended a village against Russian assault for two sleepless nights, resulting only in 29 eliminated Russians and BMP.

7. Very high regard for Ukrainian determination- especially in June, he says army was basically holding only on its morale and sheer middle finger energy. Even "QRF" elite units in his sector lacked any heavy weapons except several rusty RPG's, they were constantly observed by several drones at once and subjected to constant artillery barrage. Still, they usually defeated muscovite assaults. In one such actions they were aided on flank with 7-man Ukrainian recon team from HQ, armed only with small weapons that successfully stand against armoured assault. Visible recogntition of morale as deciding factor here; for example cases of wounded soldiers leaving hospitals to join collegues at the front are common.

8.Very often they participated in "emergency" missions to plug the whole or counterattack; in one of such they have 17 men to stop expected massive assault of entire BTG and were suddenly joined by colonel, who took rifle and manned the trench with them (attack didn't came in the end). High opinion of Ukrainian officers, who usually share the same burden as common soldiers, in contrast to Russian practices. Also international troops who get this far are only crack volunteers with right psyche determined to stay in the fight- despite witnessing fires no NATO soldier ever ecnountered they get used to this situation and learned how to behave. He notes that other volunteers, not less professional, brave or skilled in direct combat, simply did not have nerves to be in this kind of war and left [another common thrope- even long wartime service in NATO armies did not provide them with adequate experience against heavy fires].

9. This soldier, just as many other volunteers and Ukrainians, is visibly shocked by bestiality of Russian way of war- it is beyond just Bucha and Irpien, but in every village and town atrocities are common, there are also often civilians lying dead in countryside or murdered on roads. He descibes a situation when Russians purposfully shoot passing cars but initially targeting only backseats. Drivers speed up to escape, they take the turn and meet a hidden defence point when they are frontally gunned down in group. This way many cars created a barricade from vehicles and dead civilians that blocked the road in case of Ukrainian advance. Such behaviour of course only stiffened Ukrainian morale.

Ok, sorry for long post. There is another interview with sgt. Krzysztof X that came out several days ago when he give details of offensive in Kharkiv, if you will be interested I may sum up his experiences.

Ukrainians enjoying some back and forth between Russian arty and spotter.
 
Half a kilometre off. Yeah... I'd be a bit upset too, as there's no telling which 500m it's going to be off by next time.

Ukrainians enjoying some back and forth between Russian arty and spotter.
 
Half a kilometre off. Yeah... I'd be a bit upset too, as there's no telling which 500m it's going to be off by next time.

In the category of "we are very lucky they are so F-ing stupid" (not a category designed to narrow things down, I admit) we have this:
Yes, those do appear to be ERA blocks attached to the cab of a truck.
Not entirely sure what he thinks it will do for him.

I think this infographic (not mine) shows the effect a tactical nuke would have:

In the category of "we are very lucky they are so F-ing stupid" (not a category designed to narrow things down, I admit) we have this:
Yes, those do appear to be ERA blocks attached to the cab of a truck.
Not entirely sure what he thinks it will do for him.

In the category of "we are very lucky they are so F-ing stupid" (not a category designed to narrow things down, I admit) we have this:
Yes, those do appear to be ERA blocks attached to the cab of a truck.
Not entirely sure what he thinks it will do for him.

In the category of "we are very lucky they are so F-ing stupid" (not a category designed to narrow things down, I admit) we have this:
Yes, those do appear to be ERA blocks attached to the cab of a truck.
Not entirely sure what he thinks it will do for him.

Logistically a massive effort.  It has been awhile and my old tables are in boxes but SWAG is for 1000m of a single line of what they are doing in that picture, and they need to do 3-5 of these in depth to really make anything close to a Maginot/Siegfried line:
- roughly 2000 dragons teeth, likely coming in at a ton apiece.
- somewhere between 1500-3000 AT mines depending on density.  At the high end that is about 27000 kgs or 13 tons.
- at least a line or two of AP mines.
- barbwire and defensive stores - a lot.
- gas and supplies for engineers doing all the digging
That is for a single km and a single belt.  Multiply times 3 at least per km to make a full belt.  They are doing 10kms according to the tweet, and they will need to do 100s of kms.  So for example to do 100km of full belt = roughly 1.5 million AT mines, which is about 13,500 tons of munitions in mines alone.  And we have not factored in concrete emplacements, bunkers or anything really elaborate.