The Road Ahead - Operation Bagration

[Battlefront.com]

No plans to change the pivot behavior. An explicit simulation of back/forth track breaking is too much work for too little gain. Speeding it up is not necessarily justifiable either. As mentioned above, there are other factors which unfairly benefit armor (there are others that unfairly benefit infantry, guns, off map stuff, etc.). So it's a balance we have to be careful to maintain. And that balance is mostly aimed at countering the player's inherent unrealistic ability to micromanage individual units as well as micromanage coordination.

In short... if we sped up rotation speed, without doing anything else, AFVs would start to look like terminators with near instant, precise responses to threats which would benefit from rotation.

Steve

[John Kettler]

Steve,

What a shame! Historically, the Germans could turn in place, while the Sherman had to execute a fairly wide radius turn. And if we're not modeling, say, drive train reliability issues, I'm not asking that track breakage be modeled, either.

As noted before, the inability to pivot at any sort of reasonable speed really sticks it to the various assault guns, greatly increasing their vulnerability to practically every antitank direct fire threat out there. Consequently, this removes a big chunk of their combat utility, when in reality, they were potent threats. Likewise, unless trying to lift trails and pivot a Pak 43/41 or similar beast, swiftly pivoting an antitank gun shouldn't be that big a deal, nor require the considerable time it does. You're already well aware of the whole turning around the gun nonsense to take it out of battery, also readily demonstrable as being unnecessary.

If you're worried about micromanaged turns and coordination for tanks and such, why not put some fuzzy logic windage into the equation, maybe keying it to factors already present in the game (skill status, morale, fatigue, fanaticism, etc.)?

I think if you're worried about the infantry to armor balance, perhaps the thing to do would be to incorporate the real spotting problems a buttoned tank has, not to mention the difficulties hearing anything in a roaring, clanking beast. I previously presented the visibility diagrams the Germans came up with for a T-34/76 and suggested a quick way, via graph paper and a cookie cutter depiction, to give infantry a proper chance in close combat with tanks. As it stands, the tank has a slew of unrealistic advantages over infantry, yet the U.S. Army's own tests found a buttoned tank to be only half as combat effective as an unbuttoned one. That's why the Abrams has the kind of hatch it does for the TC. Overhead protection while still being head out for spotting. Tanks are also running wild because not only do they spot far better and more quickly than they actually did when buttoned, but they are able near instantly to open fire, too. Seems to me that if something's broken, that's a big one.

And while, you're worried about players taking unfair advantage of firing Panzerfaust/Panzerschreck and bazooka from structures, we're concerned that our infantry has been substantially gutted, particularly since the tanks not only are super capable, very nearly omniscient, and lightning quick, but can engage infantry to the top of the highest building even if parked on the doorstep!

ARMOR magazine had well-reasoned articles and diagrams showing just how bad things were with our current systems for engaging high targets in MOUT and showed the effect elevation limits imposed. It was seriously eye-opening. Essentially, for the M1, forget anything over two stories high at typical MOUT ranges.

Yet, through logic I fail to get, modeling elevation on the one hand and depression,which directly translates into AFV exposure when firing downhill and is a big advantage something like an M10 has over a tank, doesn't seem to matter. I submit it does, affects modeling of key interactions in the game, and permits the use of ridiculous ahistorical capabilities and tactics. If traverse modeling is important (and was one of the things that blew me away in CMBO, watching the StuG III's barrel follow the target), then why not the other two critical aspects of direct fire gunnery? Am not asking for cant modeling!

I see Operation Bagration as an opportunity to fix a number of key disconnects in CMx2. Fixing them would greatly improve the quality of the new game/sim through restoration of historically correct battlefield dynamics, promote the use of proper tactics, teach the appropriate tactical lessons, reward players for using their forces the right way and, as usual, mercilessly punish errors. Am hoping you'll really seriously consider addressing the issues I've raised here.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Markus86]

I see Operation Bagration as an opportunity to fix a number of key disconnects in CMx2. Fixing them would greatly improve the quality of the new game/sim through restoration of historically correct battlefield dynamics, promote the use of proper tactics, teach the appropriate tactical lessons, reward players for using their forces the right way and, as usual, mercilessly punish errors. Am hoping you'll really seriously consider addressing the issues I've raised here.

I couldn't have said it any better.

[Childress]

Steve,

I see Operation Bagration as an opportunity to fix a number of key disconnects in CMx2. Fixing them would greatly improve the quality of the new game/sim through restoration of historically correct battlefield dynamics, promote the use of proper tactics, teach the appropriate tactical lessons, reward players for using their forces the right way and, as usual, mercilessly punish errors. Am hoping you'll really seriously consider addressing the issues I've raised here.

Pretty grim assessment there, JK.

[Sublime]

JK you do realize you're coming off pretty condescending right now? "You're worried about tank/infantry balance? Just incorporate the cookie cutter / fuzzy logic stuff I did. Worried about that? Do this. etc etc"

You do realize you're not talking to idiots or newbies to game making and if many of these issues were so easy to fix they'd already be done?

The tank pivot issue really isn't that crucial. Stugs still turn pretty quick. It does seem that you decided to adopt an issue and make it your personal project to be implemented. I can understand the passion, but after all you were basically told 'no.' Not how can John Kettler fix the armor - infantry problem in a post.' I can think of many issues that take precedence, or are outright bugs. Other things, that may need to be looked at such as AT mines, or the ability of panicked/shaken tank crews recovering in 1-2 turns since 2.01.

[John Kettler]

Markus86,

I try to state things clearly. Do I succeed? Not as much as I'd like!

Childress,

Am uncertain as to whether your response is an observation, agreement or disagreement. Please clarify.

Sublime,

Such was NOT my intent. I was in the moment and writing fluidly. Time and again, Steve's made it quite apparent that he wants not mere rants, but rather, reasoned explanations of the issues as seen by the person raising them, together with potential solutions, if available.

I've done exactly that. I've clearly identified a series of what I (and others here evidently) consider real issues that affect gameplay, immersion and, to some degree, fidelity to the period. I've taken the time to do the research, present the evidence and propose what I feel are reasonable solutions to the problems I outlined. Whether those solutions a) bear attempting inclusion and are doable, forms another discussion altogether.

As for being told "no," how many times have people refused to give up when their ideas didn't first meet a friendly reception, and how much richer is humanity for their tenacity? As those things go, this isn't even small potatoes, but it is significant to some of us. If you're dealing with a woman intimately, "no" is an immediate flag on the play, but in sales, it's merely the beginning of the discussion!

I may or may not ultimately bring Steve to my/(some of us) point of view, but that doesn't mean I shouldn't try. Nor was it clear from his reply that fixing pivoting wasn't doable. Instead, he directly related it to not turning tanks into Terminators, which is why I said what I did.

I think the approach I suggested solves the problems I detailed while restoring realistic performance to the tanks. If you make it hard to spot from buttoned tanks, then it becomes harder to acquire targets, at which point, once a Spot occurs, then there should be a probabilistic/fuzzy logic determined delay between when the tank gets the Spot and when it can shoot.

Further, if the cookie cutter or some other approach were implemented, then infantry could get inside the tank's main gun depression limit and have a real go at it, as opposed to being butchered inside such limits as the norm. I'm not asking for the sun, the moon and the stars here, merely a reasonably accurate depiction of period battlefield dynamics and force interactions. Am afraid we're not there yet, and I'm trying to get us there. Also, I think fixing this stuff is important in terms of selling the game to an informed would-be purchaser.

I agree that tanks shouldn't be able to waltz through AT minefields or for crews to bounce back so quickly, though obviously, there are exceptions. Big difference between a detracked tank and one that's just had APHE slam through the armor and explode!

To me, StuGs seem to pivot slowly indeed, so much so they often lose firing opportunities on a crossing target, and I don't mean an M18 Hellcat. I can't speak to 2.01 issues, since I'm temporarily still running 1.11, but if 2.01 is causing significant issues, and has lost ground in those areas relative to 2.0 or 1.11, then it needs to be addressed.

I'm trying to deal with core issues, but this is very much a resource-limited problem. Life would be simpler in some ways if BFC had more cash flow and more staff to handle things, but bigness creates its own issues, some potential company killers. EA, for example lost hundreds of millions last quarter and can ill afford another like it. BFC has no room for such a disaster and must ever juggle all the balls, preferably dropping none. Considering the survival rate for small businesses and the typically grim fiscal situation for small game companies, I'd say it's succeeding admirably--which is why we're having this discussion in the first place! We all want a great new game, but we differ considerably on what it should be and how to get there.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Childress]

Childress,

Am uncertain as to whether your response is an observation, agreement or disagreement. Please clarify.

Puzzled. Your comments were rather negative and sweeping. Are you alleging that CM2 is an epic fail? Is your point that the world would be the better without it? Or were you just venting, expressing your version of 'tough love'.

[John Kettler]

Childress,

I never thought of it as tough love, but I guess that's a fair characterization. Put it this way, if I didn't care, I wouldn't bother to put in the very real time and effort it takes to mount such a complex series of arguments. I see Op Bagration as a chance to sort out some, to me at least, pressing issues. And they won't be addressed if they aren't raised and the cogent points well argued. I believe the time to raise them is now, while things are theoretically in the formative stage. At the very least, I'd like to be able to get back where we were in CMx1 as far as MOUT. I'd like to see fire return, but I know this is already in the works, so haven't raised it here. Mines seem to have real issues, but Sublime's heading that push, I guess. I do, though, recall stacking minefields to increase the kill probability in CMx1. I much preferred trenches and foxholes in CMx1, and I think they're broken in CMx2 (my kingdom for slit trenches as in Manner Gegen Panzer), but again, are already supposed to get some BFC love. Nor am I happy with the gun situation, which historically could be and were uncrewed, with the men sheltering until the barrage lifted. What tank crews can do, gun crews should also be able to do and more easily. This clip shows the concept nicely. Dare we hope BFC will treat guns and HMGs as vehicles?

This particular problem has been with us since the CMBO Beta, for I vividly recall being stuck in the Invitational Tourney with a useless Ma Deuce which I couldn't uncrew, couldn't move because of casualties and made tasty fare for Fionn when he caught it. That said, infantry guns were vastly easier to run and easier to hide in CMx1 than they are here. I forget the ROW battle, but I had multiple 88s firing from trees on a hillside and got off a bunch of shots before counterfire was ever attempted, and that's with Borg spotting, despite its real limitations. Spotting's now better, but the complexity gives me a headache, though I'm no longer completely lost, just intermittently.

I think many things that were easy in CMx1 have become real issues in CMx2, not least of which is how our former understanding of cover and concealment has undergone a radical, and still painful, set of changes, which we don't yet properly understand. In turn, the individual soldier modeling, while fantastic in its own way, has exposed the real importance of the granularity of terrain, of the importance of somehow depicting microrelief. So many of these issues are interrelated, but if the core ones work, then we're in relatively good shape. The problem, as I see it, though, is there are crossed wires and breakdowns in how certain things interact with others. Am trying to uncross the wires and get the combat gearing, if you will, to mesh properly. Also, we're now in the vexed position of BFC's having to put a LOT of time and effort into the visuals, and that means less is available for under the hood stuff. Can't eat your cake...

I don't expect any kind of mass rush to some notional (and highly unlikely) "John Kettler is right!" bandwagon. Instead, I seek to shed some light on areas in which I think important work remains yet to be done, done so we have a better, more realistic and approachable game/sim system than is presently, in my view, the case. I can but try.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Battlefront.com]

What a shame! Historically, the Germans could turn in place, while the Sherman had to execute a fairly wide radius turn.

Not really true. Panthers and Tigers, as well as those built upon those chassis, could neutral turn. The others could not. So you have to keep in mind you're talking about a very small subset of German AFVs here. Which means your comment "the inability to pivot at any sort of reasonable speed really sticks it to the various assault guns" is wrong. Unless you're talking about Jagdpanthers and Jagdtigers only since they are the only turretless German vehicles which had neutral steering capabilites.

The Brits, on the other hand, had neutral steering in pretty much all tanks. Funny I don't see you advocating for them

And if we're not modeling, say, drive train reliability issues, I'm not asking that track breakage be modeled, either.

If we allow super fast zero radius turns, then we would have to simulate a chance that they fail in a spectacular way. At least if we want to improve realism of turning radius capabilities. And if we do that, we had better write some extremely good TacAI or people will not be happy when their Tiger II does a needless zero radius turn in soft ground and winds up immobilized.

I'll say this again... the balance is pretty good the way it is. We see no need to change and therefore change is not on the menu.

As someone with tracked vehicle driving experience, one can get pretty close to zero turn speed without neutral steering for most situations most of the time. Zero radius turns generally only have a significant benefit when:

1. Terrain is REALLY tight and therefore turning space is not available for an easy realignment. In CM all vehicles, even wheeled ones, turn in place so this issue is pretty much moot.

2. You have to make a very big alignment change and speed matters. I can change the angle of the nose of a vehicle up to 45 deg just as fast as someone with neutral steering. But 90 degrees and more ? Yeah, neutral steering will beat me on that count every time.

So the question comes down to what it always does whenever we discuss this. Comparing theoretical advantages with real world ones. In most situations most of the time when a vehicle is sitting still neutral steering is either not needed or significantly better than vehicles without. And of course it's totally irrelevant for vehicles on the move. Which means only a minority of times a minority of vehicles may actually benefit from a neutral steer maneuver. And of those, probably a minority of times will it actually make a difference. There's probably 100 improvements to CM that would yield better realism more consistently and broadly than neutral steering. Hence why we aren't touching it.

Steve

[Sublime]

JK as far as Im concerned no one is heading any push. You can advocate or do anything you want. I wasnt trying to come across unduly hostile, but it seemed a bit.. overbearing of you considering as far as I know you do not know how to program the CMx2 code to tell BFC what may or may not be ridiculously easy to code.

The main gun depression thing is a key example - trust me I agree I wish it was solved. However Steve made a pretty compelling argument as to how insane that would be on the TacAI and the CPU limits in game. Im not gonna argue with the programmers of the game over what should or should not be easy to program. Im not a programmer.

As far as mines having serious issues... Let me clarify. AT mines in my experience, if any type of tank is driven over them on slow, will not immobilize or destroy them. Just moderate track damage. Does not seem right at all.

As far as recrewing, I havent conducted tests (nor with the AT mines) however I will say I've noticed this in several games, and others have too. Tank crews bail in a panic, and are willing to jump back in the tanks within 2-3 minutes. Before it'd take perhaps 5-10.

[Battlefront.com]

Im not gonna argue with the programmers of the game over what should or should not be easy to program. Im not a programmer.

That's the smart approach, even if you are a programmer Peanut gallery programmers not only routinely don't know what they are talking about (because they've never programmed a game), but they can chuck their ideas out without any consideration of knock-on effects, budgetary considerations, or what other competing interests there might be. We, on the other hand, have no such luxury. And non-programmers expressing their thoughts on what is easy or not should just save their wrists some typing irritation and not bother.

The axiom most people would be wise to adopt is "if it were necessary for the sim to hold together, good from a player's standpoint, and easy to do chances are Battlefront would have already done it by now. If they haven't, then it's probably either not necessary, not good for the game, not easy to do, or all three".

As far as mines having serious issues... Let me clarify. AT mines in my experience, if any type of tank is driven over them on slow, will not immobilize or destroy them. Just moderate track damage. Does not seem right at all.

Nope, not right at all. Now THAT was easy to fix. Already included with CMFI v1.10 and will be in the next CMBN patch.

As far as recrewing, I havent conducted tests (nor with the AT mines) however I will say I've noticed this in several games, and others have too. Tank crews bail in a panic, and are willing to jump back in the tanks within 2-3 minutes. Before it'd take perhaps 5-10.

Possible, though I haven't heard that one before. We did make some changes to crew morale behavior at some point and maybe that had an unintended side effect. Because I doubt anybody thought it was a good idea to have crews MORE willing to do something.

Steve

[John Kettler]

Steve,

Nice zing, but I don't even have all the British Sherman Marks down yet, let alone the other things! I do know a Crusader, from a Cromwell, from a Churchill, so that's a start. Regarding the pivoting, Manner Gegen Panzer showed a T-34/76 stop, then execute around a 90 degree track pivot, using the one track braked, the other turning method. Four seconds. Granted, it's more challenging with a bigger, heavier tank, but what started this issue for me was the inability of the StuG III (and, of course, lots of other casemated AFVs) to pivot fast enough to react to a flank threat or deal with a crossing target. Tank hull pointing logic is also a factor in Tiger 1 utilization, where the historical accounts speak of the Tigers turning quickly into a threat so as not to be taken in the flank. For the record, at no time in either the CMBN Demo or the game proper have I had one in play, so I have no dog in the hunt and am dealing with that issue from a military-technical perspective.

Would think the pivoting with a braked track would be doable, but while I've briefly commanded a tracked AFV (M60A5 for seeker tests), I've never driven one. You have driven a tracked vehicle. I've seen depictions showing a Sherman's turn radius, and I've read the gripes of our tank crews where they complained about what the German tanks were doing that they couldn't, basically turn around without moving from the spot. What I don't get is why the Sherman couldn't do exactly the one track pivot we saw the T-34/76 execute?

Sublime,

Steve could give me the code, and all I'd have would be code. The last computer language I studied was FORTRAN. Somewhere amid all my recent posts I've said several times that what looks doable may not be, especially in light of competing demands for time, money and personnel.

Turning now to mines, based on what you've told me, something is badly broken in AT mines. Mines are simple creatures. If you feed them what they want (a predefined pressure, tilt rod angular displacement, magnetic signature, etc.) then they go Boom! The explosive force will have exactly the same brisance (shattering effect) as before, the tracks and lower running gear will still be subjected to torques and other stresses for which they weren't designed, floor plates may buckle and fail under the blast load, but it has squat all to do with speed. The only logic I can see for the present implementation is some notion that damage is proportional to speed. Granted, there may well be more suspension damage (high speed track flailing, perhaps) if the AFV's rolling smartly along, but that is a secondary consideration here. Speed matters not to the mines. And it certainly shouldn't in modeling their PKh (Probability of Kill, given a hit). PKh should be the same at a dead crawl as at full speed. Either that or somebody, say ArgusEye, needs to provide a detailed explanation of why that isn't the case. The only exception I can think of would be to argue that at low speed what's happening is that the tank's spotting and avoiding the mines, a notion I consider to be a dubious proposition at best. Naturally, I now see, after writing the above, that Steve has said AT mines will be fixed. Good!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sublime]

Thats awesome to know about the mines.

For what it's worth Steve it's very anecdotal evidence on my part. I never ran tests, I just saw it happen with my opponents tanks in a game, and then it happened with me and my crews later in the same game, and now in another PBEM. What's interesting was I observed my opponents Tiger, and Puma crews do it, plus my Canadian Firefly, and now American Sherman 75. So wide variety of forces, experience, vehicles, etc.

Though, it is a subjective experience and not enough to prove anything wrong, I would add that's how I 'discovered' the problem with the AT mines. And in fact it was in the same QB I originally noticed the recrewing issue.

P.S. thats even if Im the original spotter of the bug. Still you gotta love BFC's approach to customer input. I still like to think I'm personally responsible for the idea of MG bursts being randomized being adopted... I dont care about credit though, I like to think I helped contribute to something I love, especially since I dont make maps or scenarios. Plus I still remember when BFC offered to put peoples last names into the game way back in like 99 - everytime I have a squad leader or officer named Clark it makes me smile. (though unfortunately my name is so common it's doubtful it wouldn't have been included anyways..)

[Battlefront.com]

Here's how pivoting works with a tracked vehicle that has no neutral steering capability. As a driver I always have two options. I can lock up one track and drive forward, pivoting me in the direction of the locked track, or I can lock up one track and drive in reverse, pivoting me in the opposite direction of the locked track. Which one to use depends on what's around the vehicle.

Rotation speed and turn radius relies heavily on ground conditions, mechanical fitness (good brake bands, good brake drums, properly adjusted control rods, etc.), vehicle gearing, and track length. Other factors such as slope and angle of approach have an effect as well. Same thing with obstacles like stumps, heavy shrubbery, etc. The less ideal each is, the slower the rotation and the larger the radius.

Fortunately a good tracked vehicle driver understands the limitations of a single track brake turn when either speed or radius is a factor. With practice and experience comes radically different capabilities. Specifically through back and forth action of alternating which track is braked and the direction of travel.

With this technique I can turn my tracked vehicles close to that of a zero radius turn. And by that I mean I can quickly turn my vehicle 360 deg without significant extra space requirements. Though I can't recall ever having to actually do more than about 180 (I can usually do this on a path that is only 2x as wide as my vehicle is long. I can do it in narrower confines, but

). Usually I need this technique for taking a hard turn or correcting for a trailer 3x longer than my vehicle on a trail. Since I am almost always driving in dense forest (or like last year a forest's worth of stumps) this sort of thing is something I do on a regular basis.

As I said in my previous posts, there is a difference between an actual advantage and a theoretical one. In most battlefield situations I don't think a zero turn capability is much of an advantage (at least with WW2 technology... I have a different opinion about modern AFVs).

Having said that... would I theoretically welcome a zero turn capability when I'm out in the woods? Hell yes. If for no other reason than it would be fun But how often would I really need it and yield results that would be greatly different from what I have now? Not very often. Plus, I care about the damage I'm doing to the ground under me and zero turn means a ton more damage. Add to that the mechanical negatives and the two mean that in reality I do not want zero turn capability.

As I've said, this isn't a big enough issue to divert development resources towards explicitly addressing. It just isn't.

Steve

[Buzz]

I don't own a "tracked vehicle" but I know a game programmer who does

"With this technique I can turn my tracked vehicles close to that of a zero radius turn. And by that I mean I can quickly turn my vehicle 360 deg without significant extra space requirements."

Now I want to own a "tracked vehicle"

".... I care about the damage I'm doing to the ground under me...."

Green "tracked vehicle" owner too

Does this technique work for CMFI Gustav Line "tracked vehicles"...

I am about to find out.. on a Sunday night no less!

Fire Me UP Scotty!

Thanks Steve & Battlefront

[MikeyD]

Does this technique work for CMFI Gustav Line "tracked vehicles"...

Monsters like Elephant especially, you may find it quicker to have them do a classic automobile '3 point turn' (forward-back-forward) than to give a 'face' command and watch them slooowly pivot through a 180 degree turn. Spw 251 half tracks aren't the greatest pivot turners either.

[John Kettler]

Steve,

I thought you sold your M29? I had the chance this weekend at Warbirds Over Addison (Cavanagh Flying Museum) to see a sort of Easy 8 run on a concrete flight apron. Brother Ed, when asked about track pivoting, said it was forbidden to reverse and turn at once, for fear of track breakage. With all those planes nearby full of avgas (among them two Wildcats, two Warhawks and one of two fling Zero fighters), maybe basic safety was also an issue. What I did see, though were some stutter steps in which the track started to bunch while changing gears. I think that the track wasn't properly tensioned, since I've not seen that before on other moving tracked AFVs I've been around.

There is a superb discussion of the vexed tank pivoting issue in Panzers At War, by Green and Green. In it, in characterizing the Panther in particular, it describes the issues, equipment limitations, speeds at which certain things could and couldn't be done and both the German and the Allied technical views. Begins on page 87.

http://tinyurl.com/9wu8ykr

Here's a good piece on the problems detecting targets from tanks. I find it very much on point.

This from the Sherman article at www.canadiansoldier.com It covers many grog goodies, to include the Firefly intro date in Italy, which was November 1944.

(Fair Use)

All tanks of this period shared a number of inherent weaknesses. The crewmen inside a tank were half blind. Narrow vision slits and optical instruments with a limited field of view were their eye on the battlefield. Spotting the usually well-concealed enemy machine-guns against which the infantry demanded the tanks' help was not easy, especially when the tank was pitching and rolling as it moved. Enemy anti-tank guns presented similar problems of detection, and for most of the war German anti-tank guns were capable of destroying British (and Canadian) tanks at ranges of many hundreds of yards. British (and Canadian) tanks could not hope to prosper unless those guns were identified and dealt with.'

Not only were tank crewmen half-blind in their steel shells, they were half-deaf too. No man sat more than a few feet from the engine. Its noise quite overwhelmed the reports of firearms and explosions that might otherwise have helped to compensate for limited vision. Slow to detect danger, tanks were also slow to react when they did. Even the lightes tank was a clumsy device. It could not fall flat on the ground, stop, start or change direction in a split second, as a man could. A rut in a track might be enough to protect a man from direct fire; a tank required at least ten feet of depth. From his rut, an infantryman could see and hear what was happening on the battlefield around him with far less hindrance than a tank commander. Although the latter might put his head out of the turret, silhouetted against the sky he presented an irresistible target to enemy snipers. If he eluded that peril and spotted a target, traversing the main gun took precious seconds. Whereas a rifleman or light machine-gunner could have his weapon pointing towards a target almost immediately.

In areas where the tank was weak - sensory perception and agility - the infantryman on the ground was strong. Fire-power and bullet-resistance, faculties in which the tank was strong, were weak links for the infantryman. Place, p.130"

(Fair Use)

Regards,

John Kettler

[Baneman]

...

All tanks of this period shared a number of inherent weaknesses. The crewmen inside a tank were half blind. Narrow vision slits and optical instruments with a limited field of view were their eye on the battlefield. Spotting the usually well-concealed enemy machine-guns against which the infantry demanded the tanks' help was not easy, especially when the tank was pitching and rolling as it moved. Enemy anti-tank guns presented similar problems of detection, and for most of the war German anti-tank guns were capable of destroying British (and Canadian) tanks at ranges of many hundreds of yards. British (and Canadian) tanks could not hope to prosper unless those guns were identified and dealt with.'

Not only were tank crewmen half-blind in their steel shells, they were half-deaf too. No man sat more than a few feet from the engine. Its noise quite overwhelmed the reports of firearms and explosions that might otherwise have helped to compensate for limited vision. Slow to detect danger, tanks were also slow to react when they did. Even the lightes tank was a clumsy device. It could not fall flat on the ground, stop, start or change direction in a split second, as a man could. A rut in a track might be enough to protect a man from direct fire; a tank required at least ten feet of depth. From his rut, an infantryman could see and hear what was happening on the battlefield around him with far less hindrance than a tank commander. Although the latter might put his head out of the turret, silhouetted against the sky he presented an irresistible target to enemy snipers. If he eluded that peril and spotted a target, traversing the main gun took precious seconds. Whereas a rifleman or light machine-gunner could have his weapon pointing towards a target almost immediately.

...

Oh how I wish this was true.

In a current battle I've just run 2 infantry out of smoke about 35m away from a buttoned Sherman. They ran up to a hedge about 30m from it ( idea being to get fausts going ). Now the buttoned Sherman has lost its TC and I've been pounding it with HE from a Stug ( because the Stug can see the patch of ground it's sitting on, but not it ).

Nevertheless, the Sherman sees the infantry within about 3 seconds, turns its turret ( they are side on ) and shoots them both with the coax. Only after the first guy is hit does the 2nd infantryman see it.

So, buttoned tanks still have spider-sense. Grrrr

[John Kettler]

Baneman,

This issue very much needs fixing, and it's vital it be done before Op Bagration comes out. Why? Doctrinally, Russian tanks always fight buttoned! This is part of how the Germans were able to get those close assault kills. It was true during the GPW, it was true during the Cold War, and it's true now. Maneuvers were controlled through signal flags, which had a special small roof port through which they were extended.

http://www.rkka.ru/uniform/files/btv5.htm

Radio gradually got introduced, but to this day, Russian tanks have signal flags for radio silent maneuver control during the approach march. In CMBB, the T-34s were depicted as running around unbuttoned in order to communicate, but that's not how it worked. Here is a fairly well-know pic of a T-34/76 column on the approach march. You can tell it's that because the TCs are all hatch open and exposed. Note the signal flags.

The German training films are entirely correct in depicting the tank quarry as buttoned up going into battle.

Ref your unfortunate situation, I well remember CMBO, in which a zapped TC put a tank out of business for a time. That variety of brain drain was very tough on a crew's morale!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Vark]

Have the legions of CM grogonauts run any tests to prove this theory, or is it anecdotal? I certainly am surprised at how quickly my Chally II's pick up close range infantry, which seems at odds to the stories told by an ex-Chally II commander I work with.

[Buzz]

Monsters like Elephant especially, you may find it quicker to have them do a classic automobile '3 point turn' (forward-back-forward) than to give a 'face' command and watch them slooowly pivot through a 180 degree turn. Spw 251 half tracks aren't the greatest pivot turners either.

Guidance for "tracked vehicles" much appreciated

[Battlefront.com]

Yup, I did sell off all my Weasels (I had 8 in various stages, only a M29C and a T24 running). However, I still have a 1960s Bombardier J5 which I use quite often. I've asked some pretty challenging things of that vehicle and it's always delivered. Well, except for the time that I had to get the engine rebuilt because the crank shaft stripped... but at 40+ years old one does have to make allowances

I don't argue that AFVs in CM still show too many instances of exceptional situational awareness. Unfortunately the "fix" for this is extremely difficult to do without unbalancing other aspects. The last time we hammered on situational awareness took about 1 month of development and testing time. Big improvement over what was there before, but there's still opportunities for further improvements.

Steve

[Buzz]

Just wondering... how many CM players have actually driven an AFV of any vintage? I have never been in an AFV much less owned / played with "researched" one. Yes there are always opportunities for further improvements. Part of what keeps gaming and the forum chat enjoyable.

[Baneman]

Just wondering... how many CM players have actually driven an AFV of any vintage? I have never been in an AFV much less owned / played with "researched" one. Yes there are always opportunities for further improvements. Part of what keeps gaming and the forum chat enjoyable.

I've never even been inside one, but have always wanted to, simply to understand the kind of space inside.

...

I don't argue that AFVs in CM still show too many instances of exceptional situational awareness. Unfortunately the "fix" for this is extremely difficult to do without unbalancing other aspects. The last time we hammered on situational awareness took about 1 month of development and testing time. Big improvement over what was there before, but there's still opportunities for further improvements.

Steve

Well, I'm glad to hear that you're still working on it (more). Here's hoping you get a spare month or two to hammer at it again soon ( yeah, right GL's out one day and people are asking about MG, lol - do you guys even get to sleep ? )

[Broadsword56]

We all posed for our Mike Dukakis helmet-wearing shots in the turrets at the end.

NOTE!!! There was more to this post but I, you're humbled moderator, unfortunately nuked it by mistake. Multitasking with distractions can have ramifications. Gah... sorry about that! Steve (Battlefront.com)