Vanir Ausf B

An AVRE with a 3-man crew is a one shot weapon because there is no one to reload the petard mortar. The 6-man unified crew was a deliberate choice to ensure a fully-functional vehicle without having to buy a separate unit.

Kofman: 
https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/hold-build-and-strike-a-vision-for-rebuilding-ukraines-advantage-in-2024/

About the tunnel- seem it is admittedly  badass operation. Here sum up from one of better analytical accounts, with translated excerpts from Russian TG sources:
Awdjijwka - Tunnel. Discovered by RUS about three months ago. Partially flooded and buried, it was cleared by technical and sapper units. At the end, we had to dig through and create an exit - a very narrow one. The technical tunnel has a diameter of about one and a half meters, so you can only move around it by crouching. According to rumors, several RUS have already suffocated in the pipe and one person committed suicide. Up to 300 people could pass through the tunnel at one time.   17/01/2024 Everything is prepared, the walking time of over 2 kilometers, the routes of UKR patrols and their numbers. RUS special units quietly prepared a bridgehead, the so-called safety buffer. The UKR 110th Brigade was surprised and probably did not even know where the RUS had come from and why there were so many of them. Losing position around the restaurant was only a matter of time. "They immediately told me that I could say goodbye to the large backpack. I realized that if I leave my backpack at the unloading point, I will never see it again, there is always something to eat in the backpacks. To whom is war and to whom is mother loved..."   20/01/2024 On that day, UKR learned about the existence of the tunnel, as the Rus had already occupied private houses at the fork of Soborna, Sportivna and Czernyszewska streets Additionally, 2 Battalions were brought from reserve and a new defense line was created. At the same time, a counterattack began, aimed at driving RUS out of this bag. "We moved in a group, the commander stopped us every 20-30 meters. Thank God, the commander encountered the same problems as me - shortness of breath. Otherwise, I would most likely simply not survive and suffocate or have a stroke. It looks like. You walk 20 meters, dragging a bag behind you, which is already half wet with water and therefore twice as heavy. Then they start having slight cramps in their legs and they don't want to walk. Legs wet up to the waist. You touch and walk another twenty meters, you're out of breath again, your legs and spine hurt, you don't want to go, three hundred times in a row anyway. It's about 1,200 meters to the landfall point.   22-23/01/2024 UKR conducts a large counterattack and secures the area of the former restaurant, but they fail to expel RUS from the tunnel area and the streets of the residential district. The houses are defended only by infantry, about 200 RUS soldiers. They are trying to evacuate and deliver ammunition through the now famous tunnel. "At the end of the tunnel, we are waiting for the guide on a string. We waited about an hour for him to come. You can't go out with a machine gun and a backpack. One person helps. You give him a backpack and a machine gun and into the hole vertically up, to a height of two meters, you climb stairs made of boxes on which you can only lean with your leg. You climb out by pulling yourself up on your hands through a narrow circular opening less than 90 cm in diameter.   25/01/2024. For me it's a stalemate. RUS is defending, and UKR cannot counteract much. Elements of the 110th Brigade and tanks of the 116th Zakhar Brigade attempt to push the RUS infantry away from the residential area. On the other hand, in the south, the UKR is engaged in heavy fighting in the area of the station and Dubrava and the Tsarska Ohota complex. If it turns out that 40,000 RUS are waiting for a signal to attack, it is difficult to predict what will happen in the next two weeks.      

It doesn't matter. If forum predictions are correct unmanned/autonomous is going to solve everyone's recruitment problems.

For sure there will be huge demand for those skills, but if you're not paying for machine gunners, tanks crews and fighter pilots that should free money for a smaller number of technical specialists, at least enough to compete with the private sector.

While approach to Russian propaganda is reasonable, this time I think false flag option is not even remotely plausible. Il-76 is valuable military asset they are short of; if they want to stage an accident in order to hide murdered POW's they have dozens different ways (at this point they don't care about them anyway to even hide such fact). Also military aircraft as potentiall "negative MH370" to show West perfidy is very weak explanation; they would use civilian airliner for it.
Thus we are here with 3 plausible causes:
1.Something accidently blow off on the board, regardless if indeed Ukrianian prisoners were there or not.
2. Somebody in Russian air defence made mistake- rather unlikely, it's close to Belgorod airport and big, slow moving transport has very different signal and look than fastmovers that could potentially come from Ukraine.
3. Indeed Ukrainian work, by longe range AA asset or somebody with Manpad.
3rd seems most logical as for now. The question regarding Ukrianian prisoners seems murky now, and if they indeed were there, officials from AFU responsible for mission will likely prefer to keep it quiet, as question of prisoners seems rather touchy in Ukrainian society now.
It's also not impossible it has nothing to do with any swap and Russians simply routinely carry dozen or so POW in their planes as hostages; that would fit them frankly. Simple solution to several problems at once.

Latest on Avdiivka and Helicopters Operations.
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1749922739467477072
1/ By late 2023, Frontelligence Insight noted a stabilized situation in Avdiivka. However, recent developments have worsened the situation for Ukrainian troops, especially in the southern residential area.
2/ While the northern part of Avdiivka is shielded by the AKHZ (industrial buildings), the southern area is comprised of one to two-story houses susceptible to artillery fire. If unable to capture the area, russians erase it with artillery, deploy infantry, and seize the rubble.
3/ The visible artillery strikes, moving from the outskirts to residential areas, indicate the shift. Eventually, the damage makes defense challenging. The same problem extends to nearby multi-story apartment buildings targeted by previous Russian FAB hits.
4/ The situation on the flanks remains more stable, enabling Ukrainian forces to defend Avdiivka. Sattelite imagery shows a continued shift of artillery fire north of Avdiivka, targeting areas near Stepove, Berdychi, Novobakhmutivka, and Novokalynivka.
5/ In summary, Avdiivka's situation has worsened due to limited artillery ammo, a decrease in counter-battery fire, and a lack of reinforcements. Russia exploits these gaps, leveraging its personnel and ammo numbers advantage.
6/ Resurgence of Helicopter Operations
Our team previously identified a FARP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point) helicopter base in Strilkove. Following Ukraine's ATACMS strikes on airfields in Luhansk and Berdyansk, the base was abandoned and remained unused until recently.
7/ Recent imagery from January 2024 reveals the presence of Russian helicopters at the base. Analysis over multiple days indicates that Russians keep no more than 3-4 helicopters at a time. Additionally, the helicopters appear to be more dispersed.

I would LOL if President Zelenskiy ended every speech with "Russia delenda est!"

I would LOL if President Zelenskiy ended every speech with "Russia delenda est!"

UKR attack of Russian position between Ivanivka and Yahidne villages, 20 km east from Kupiansk
 

Bad day for situation on Kupiansk and Avdiivka directions
Russians could capture Krokhmal'ne village. Despaite this is tiny vilage, which had 45 settlers before a war, this is not good, because Russians came on R-07 Kupiansk - Svatove road and now threten to right flank and rear of UKR tropos in Kyslivka northern

In Avdiivka Russians multiplied airstrikes and infantry assaults. After losing of many armor in previous asault several days ago, they shifted own efforts to the south and could capture UKR fortified positions near "Tsar hunting" recreation complex. Two days ago Russian recon groups already came to southern streets of Avdiivka, but were expeleld by drone strikes. Now came bad news, Russians managed gain foothold in several buildings on these streets again. 
Defense of our troops holds on FPV drones, bwcause we have limited ammo for atrillery, very big lack and exhausting of personnel - 110th mech. brigade fights here almost 1,5 years so far. But previuos days reportedly had bad weather for FPV, so Russians using multiple infantry small groups could adbance from the south. Details maybe will come further. Now our forces try to conduct stabilization measures. 
Video of 4 FAB-500 (of its gliding variant) hit UKR positions (video filmed by Russians). Long-range AD is absent here, so Russian aviation can feel almost free here. 
One more video of gliding bomb strike - FAB-1500 on Pivdenno-Donbaska coal mine No.3 - main stronghold of UKR troops on Vuhledar - Mariinka sector. It's great we will receive per 50 AASM gliding bombs from France, but Russians drop the same number each 1-2 days... For example, Avdiivka area was hit with 250+ bombs since the year has began, when for whole 2023 the city was hit only with 148 bombs.
 

Mark Galeotti...who I quite respect...with a nuanced on Russian prospects even in the case of a 'win': https://www.intellinews.com/stolypin-no-world-war-iii-is-not-on-the-horizon-308608/

I look forward to using bucket trucks in future CM games
 

How shifted east the spotting zone of A-50 radar, since these planes now forces to fly over Krasnodar region, not over Azov sea. Red arc is current spotting range. Within spotting range A-50 can see all aircraft in the air, all missile launches, large troops formations on march or on deployment

So, after I learned more about how Soviet tactics are actually supposed to work from watching @domfluff's collaboration with Free Whisky, and giving FM 100-2-1 a full reread*, I found that Soviet doctrine actually works really well. I was even able to use it to good effect in CMBS, even against American forces.
One of the most important things to remember is that it's not about just lining up and charging forward (in fact I rather got the impression that the founding principle of Cold War Soviet doctrine was "let's not do things the way we did them in WW2" (more emphasis on maneuver and avoiding frontal attacks, and more emphasis on artillery)). The most important part of the Soviet army isn't the tanks, it's the artillery. The tanks come in 2nd place in importance after the artillery, and the infantry come in 3rd place (though the infantry are still important, they understood completely that tanks need infantry support**). It's true that the Soviet army is less flexible than NATO armies at lower levels. It's true that lower ranked leaders (platoon and company commanders) were not supposed to exercise the kind of initiative that lower level NATO leaders were expected to exercise. So from the battalion level down it was a very battle-drill focused army. But from the regimental commanders up there is considerably more flexibility to come up with detailed plans, which should account for multiple contingencies. The lack of emphasis on lower level initiative (in fact outright discouragement of lower level initiative) isn't about stifling flexibility, it's about ensuring the will of the commander is carried out. So how well a given Soviet force performs will depend very heavily on the quality of their regimental and division commanders.
Again, the battalions and companies fight according to battle drills. But the regimental commander had a lot of flexibility in how and where to employ his battalions. Assuming the regimental commander is competent (granted, a big assumption, based on what we've seen from Russian commanders), he would try not to just use his battalions as blunt instruments. He would come up with a detailed plan, using deception, maneuver, and overwhelming firepower. In Combat Mission terms, since you rarely have full regiments, you'll be wanting to do this detailed planning with whatever sized force you have available, even if it's only a battalion or company.
When it comes time for the main attack you should go all in with everything you've got. But you shouldn't send the main attack in until you're ready. You'll want to spend a large chunk of the scenario just preparing things for your main attack. Think hard about the avenue of approach you want to use for your main attack. The Soviets would try to attack from an unexpected direction (for example: they absolutely will attack through forests if they think their vehicles can get through and it might allow them to emerge on the flank or rear of enemy defenses). So if you think you see an approach that the scenario designer wouldn't have thought to defend, and which you can get your forces through, then that approach is in line with Soviet thinking. A key element of the main attack, when it is finally time to send it in, is overwhelming firepower. The artillery fire plan is one of the most important elements of the overall plan. The Soviets were an artillery army first and foremost. Every attack would be supported by mass concentrations of artillery. You'll want to time your main attack to coincide with a full barrage consisting of all of your guns (the main attack is not the time to save ammunition), hitting both known and suspected enemy positions that might interfere with your advance. And don't just leave it up to the artillery either. Don't wait for your tanks to spot targets, but give them a large number of target briefly commands to hit every potential enemy position you can think of, even if you don't know for certain that it's really an enemy position (my rule of thumb as the Soviets/Russians is that my infantry never storm a town until every floor of every building has been hit by at least two HE rounds, regardless of whether enemy troops have actually been spotted in that building). Again, the main attack is not the time to try to save ammunition. I'll generally chain up multiple target briefly commands for each tank to execute each turn by targeting them from waypoints, sometimes with a 15 second pause order at each waypoint for better control (though firing on the move is probably more in line with how the Soviets wanted to fight). Whether I intend to bypass a position or storm it with infantry, I want to make sure no point in the position remains unhit with HE. And I always endeavor to have my infantry, coming up in their vehicles just behind the tanks, enter the enemy positions mere seconds after the last HE round has hit them (the timing on this can be tricky, but it is possible). Mass is an important component of Soviet doctrine. But it's really about massing firepower, not massing platforms. Massing platforms is merely a means to massing firepower.
In a meeting engagement (or any attack that does not start with Soviet forces already in contact with the enemy), they would have an advance guard ahead of the main body, itself broken up into three parts. The first part is the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP), consisting of one platoon. Their job is to find the enemy. Ideally by spotting them, but if necessary by dying to them. The second part is the Forward Security Element (FSE), consisting of a company minus the platoon that was split off to form the CRP. Their job is to brush aside a weak enemy, or fix a strong enemy in place for the third part. The third part is the advance guard main body, consisting of the regiment's lead battalion, minus the company that was split off to form the FSE. Depending on the conditions set by the CRP and FSE they may try to flank the force that was fixed in place by the FSE, or pursue some other objective that the fixed force can't stop them from taking. In this sort of battalion-sized advance to contact the battalion commander has more of the flexibility and initiative normally reserved for the regimental commander. Technically the Advance Guard main body is still setting conditions for the regiment's main body to do whatever it intends to do (larger flank attack, breakthrough, exploitation). But in Combat Mission terms I think it's good enough to just think in terms of your CRP, FSE, and your main body (the regimental main body behind the advance guard main body is probably out of scope for a single Combat Mission scenario anyway). You may want to have an FO with your CRP or FSE to start calling in the barrage that will support your main attack. Or you will want to preplan your artillery (you can certainly have a more complex fire plan if it's preplanned), with your main attack timed to go in at the 15-minute mark, and the CRP and FSE expected to have done their jobs before the 15-minute mark.
When an attack starts in contact with the enemy (they aren't moving to contact, and they already know what's in front of them), the Soviets wouldn't have an advance guard. The attack would go in more according to the 'deliberate attack' training scenarios. Whether you choose to employ a CRP and/or FSE in advance of your main attack, the important thing is that you have a good idea of what you are facing so that you can decide how, where, and when you want your main body to spring the main attack. Again, you are trying to avoid a frontal attack (hit their positions from the flank or rear if such an approach is available), and go in firepower-heavy with everything you've got, when (not before) you are ready to spring the main attack. Do everything you can to prepare the way for the main attack before springing it (recon, fix any forces that need to be fixed, start calling in fire-missions timed to support the main attack).
*I had read parts of FM 100-2-1 before. But I had skipped to the parts about platoon, company, and battalion formations and battle drills. But those are just the building blocks of Soviet doctrine, not the actual substance of Soviet doctrine.
**In fact they apparently decided that they were a bit too tank-heavy at some point in the 80s. One of their late 80s organizational reforms (which I don't think they ever actually completed before the Cold War ended (the 1991 edition of FM 100-2-3 suggested they were still early in the process of implementing this reform)) was to replace one of the tank regiments in each division with another motor rifle regiment. So tank divisions were to go from three tank regiments and a motor rifle regiment to two tank regiments and two motor rifle regiments. And motor rifle divisions were to go from three motor rifle regiments and a tank regiment to four motor rifle regiments, with the only tank support being the tank battalions organic to each motor rifle regiment. One can imagine how this would have resulted in a much more sensible ratio of tanks to infantry.

I think this is a major factor in a lot of the complaints about spotting being broken.