Multymegaton ****storm :) Could the Germans win the war?

[Blackcat]

IMHO,

You said, "What really makes Japan case emotional - there were no danger to Allies any more".

I am curious, in what sense do you mean that there was no longer a danger to allies from Japan in early August 1945? Assuming Truman decided againt the use of bombs what do you think he should have done?

[IMHO]

I think you consistently fail to consider how things looked at the time. Dresden happened because it was felt—whether correctly or not may be another matter—that there were compelling military reasons to bomb. The Soviets requested the bombing because Dresden was thought to be an important link in the transportation system being used by the German army as it confronted the Soviets.

Another thing is that you aren't considering momentum as a determinant in human affairs. There was still a war on. Germany not only had not surrendered yet, there were rumors, which were taken quite seriously at Allied headquarters, that the Nazis were organizing a terrorist army to carry on guerilla warfare even after a defeat. Germany came back after WW I and started a new, destructive and deadly war that almost took Europe down completely. The Allied powers were determined that no such thing could be allowed to happen again, and yes they were willing to kill every German on the planet if that was the only way to prevent such an end. Fortunately, no such extent of violence was necessary.

Very similar arguments were applied to Japan. In general, it was thought that that fascist militarism in the Axis countries was a weed that had to be utterly obliterated. The Axis had done more damage and had come closer to winning the war than anyone in the victorious powers felt could be tolerated. This was not your usual gentleman's war to adjust borders or trading prerogatives, this had been a war for survival.

Michael

Again you're right. I actually have no problem with that. But then we're obliged to accept the argument that, for example, Hamas is also fighting the war for survival. And Cole was also an act of war for the survival or resurrection of someone's dream state (Yes, I know I do not stick 100% to the definitions given in the conventions). I mean "winning at all costs" is also a logical position but then let us not be fooled by the PR brainwashing about the "heinous" one.

[Michael Emrys]

But then we're obliged to accept the argument that, for example, Hamas is also fighting the war for survival.

I'm afraid this opens up several cans of worms. There is a ban in this forum on topics of recent politics. My own feeling is not that it is a subject that should not ever be discussed or debated, but experience has shown that it is unlikely to be debated with any real intelligence. Such discussions generate far more heat than light. I wish it were not so as I have my own observations and opinions that I wouldn't mind airing, not that I am convinced that the world will be very much the poorer if I don't.

Michael

[IMHO]

IMHO,

You said, "What really makes Japan case emotional - there were no danger to Allies any more".

I am curious, in what sense do you mean that there was no longer a danger to allies from Japan in early August 1945? Assuming Truman decided againt the use of bombs what do you think he should have done?

Simplistic answer - blockade the Japanese islands. Destroy Japanese military in China and the Pacific islands. Start the negotiations in parallel.

A better answer should take into account the political dynamics in Japan. Were they ready to accept "conditional armistice" and when? What were the costs in terms of life lost in China and other occupied lands? But I can't argue this case now. I don't have enough detailed information on faction politics in Japan.

And just like Michael Emrys said - it all depends on how you view that war. Total destruction of Axis nation states at all costs or not.

[IMHO]

I'm afraid this opens up several cans of worms. There is a ban in this forum on topics of recent politics. My own feeling is not that it is a subject that should not ever be discussed or debated, but experience has shown that it is unlikely to be debated with any real intelligence. Such discussions generate far more heat than light. I wish it were not so as I have my own observations and opinions that I wouldn't mind airing, not that I am convinced that the world will be very much the poorer if I don't.

Michael

Sorry I didn't know about the ban. Actually I'd rather stop the (im)moral line here. It's clear it will not go anywhere.

[Blackcat]

IMHO,

Thanks for answering my question. Would you mind if I suggest that you are judging the situation and the decision makers from a 21st century perspective? The values held, by both sides, sixty-odd years ago were very different and people like Truman should be judged on what they knew and believed and not what on the knowledge we have and our values.

[IMHO]

IMHO,

Thanks for answering my question. Would you mind if I suggest that you are judging the situation and the decision makers from a 21st century perspective?

Right.

The values held, by both sides, sixty-odd years ago were very different and people like Truman should be judged on what they knew and believed and not what on the knowledge we have and our values.

Well... I'd differentiate between knowledge and values. And on the advice of the councellor I refuse to go into details. Lest it opens another can of worms

[MengJiao]

If you haven't already read it, I strongly recommend Downfall by Richard B. Frank. He goes over all of this in some detail. To tell the truth, I was surprised by some of the information he was able to glean by looking at primary Japanese documents. They were more prepared to fight, and fight effectively, than I had previously believed.

Michael

Mr Emrys is entirely correct. Downfall does show that dropping nukes probably saved at least 50 times more people than it killed as well as saving Japan from being partly occupied by the Russians.

The crucial element for Japan was timing. They were busy surrendering, but is was way too slow especially with the Russians getting ready to hit the relatively undefended northern Islands.

[IMHO]

Mr Emrys is entirely correct. Downfall does show that dropping nukes probably saved at least 50 times more people than it killed as well as saving Japan from being partly occupied by the Russians.

The crucial element for Japan was timing. They were busy surrendering, but is was way too slow especially with the Russians getting ready to hit the relatively undefended northern Islands.

Russians must be eating people alive heh... To justify the killing of 250'000 civilians.

[Magpie_Oz]

I think the focus on the that sentence should be "...saved at least 50 times more people..." rather than "occupied by the Russians"

[IMHO]

I think the focus on the that sentence should be "...saved at least 50 times more people..." rather than "occupied by the Russians"

1. Frankly speaking 50 times is hard to believe (it would have made the toll 12.5 million or 37.5 million if count in fire bombing) but I read Downfall first before seriously arguing for or against.

2. I think "occupied by Russians" is very important in the context of how Truman and Churchill might think at that point of time. Seems like even if they didn't believe in Russians eating people alive their thinking did not exactly go that far from the idea. Like Vietnam - nobody thought of Vietnamese peasants - imaginary Domino Effect was more important than their lives. Total war at all costs.

[MengJiao]

1. Frankly speaking 50 times is hard to believe (it would have made the toll 12.5 million or 37.5 million if count in fire bombing) but I read Downfall first before seriously arguing for or against.

2. I think "occupied by Russians" is very important in the context of how Truman and Churchill might think at that point of time. Seems like even if they didn't believe in Russians eating people alive their thinking did not exactly go that far from the idea. Like Vietnam - nobody thought of Vietnamese peasants - imaginary Domino Effect was more important than their lives. Total war at all costs.

Counting starvation for another year, attack from all sides and maybe some more fighting in China plus the US estimate (based on Okinawa) of 1 million US casualties, 12.5 million is probably a good ball-park guess.

But at the time, blocking the Russians and avoiding 1 million US casualties seemed like a good enough idea.

[MengJiao]

The "missed opportunity" that truly breaks my heart is that France did not take action when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936. At that time Germany's military strength was relatively negligible and could have easily been brushed aside. I have read that that is in fact what the German generals expected and they were prepared to arrest Hitler, put him on trial, and shoot him. But he won his gamble and the army and the rest of the country was willing to go along with him as long as he was on a winning streak.

There are several lessons to be drawn from that, but I fear the most important one, namely that a seeming winner may in fact be a disaster waiting to happen, has not been attended as well as it deserves.

Michael

The French in 1936 are indeed hard to understand. Reading Paxton's French Peasant Fascism didn't help me much.

Shirer's The Collapse of the Third Republic at least gives a feel for how messed up France was in the 1930s.

[Alchenar]

Given that the one absolute red-line for the Military was preserving the Imperial Dynasty it seems very arguable that a lot of lives could have been saved if the Allies had indicated that they were not planning to abolish the Monarchy. Certainly when dealing with a culture that placed so much emphasis on honour and 'saving face' that it conditioned soldiers to commit suicide rather than accept surrender it should have been recognised that getting a voluntary peace required offering an 'out' that would be acceptable.

Also too many people in this thread are committing the fallacy of viewing nuclear weapons from a post-cold war paradigm. Remember that at the time 'the bomb' was seen by all but a very few scientists working on the project as little more than an exceptionally large and efficient explosive. Too much is also being placed on the political dynamic of what Truman might have wanted. Truman's involvement in the dropping of the bombs amounted to little more than responding in the affirmative when asked 'hey, we have this really powerful weapon that we'd like to deploy, is that okay?' All the operational aspects of bombings were handled at a far lower level.

It seems odd living in a world where the US president has a briefcase giving him direct control of his nuclear arsenal near him at all times but the closest Truman was to the decision to drop the bombs was a polite note telling him that they'd probably be happening in a few days.

[sburke]

If you haven't already read it, I strongly recommend Downfall by Richard B. Frank. He goes over all of this in some detail. To tell the truth, I was surprised by some of the information he was able to glean by looking at primary Japanese documents. They were more prepared to fight, and fight effectively, than I had previously believed. Preserving the Monarchy while still making an unconditional surrender was apparently already known to be a non started in negotiations.

Michael

For those interested Richard Frank wrote an article for the Weekly Standard summarizing some of the debate and new intelligence uncovered on the 60th Anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. Pretty interesting reading.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/894mnyyl.asp?page=3

[IMHO]

For those interested Richard Frank wrote an article for the Weekly Standard summarizing some of the debate and new intelligence uncovered on the 60th Anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. Pretty interesting reading.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/894mnyyl.asp?page=3

So may I summarize the article:

Japan

1. Most of the Japanese leadership wanted to start negotiations with Allies. But the idea of negotiations didn't have a universal support among the military. Unconditional surrender and removal of Emreror were not acceptable as a starter. What was acceptable is not specified. In any case Japanese leadership did not feel immediate urgency to start the negotiations ASAP. Japanese leaders were not concerned with military or civilian losses when formulating their strategy.

2. Japanese military was quite able to put a fight in case of invasion of the homeland. And they were prepared to fight until the utter destruction. They counted on the political pressure that high losses would put on the American leadership. Japanese commanders hoped for eventual negotiations from a relatively stronger political position for Japan.

US

1. US leadership fought not for the defeat of the Japanese military but for the total dismantling of the state of Japan the way it existed at that moment. Thus the only possible negotiation option for the US was unconditional surrender and total submission to the american occupying force.

2. Since the only US goal in the war was destruction of the state of Japan American leadership felt invasion of the Japanese homeland is required. Invasion would have been accompanied by very high casualties among american military at the time of high war weariness at home. Because of these considerations the idea of invasion was not universally accepted - Navy would have argued for blockade and bombing campaign.

3. Nuclear bombing were not expected to bring about the collapse of Japanese empire. Conventional bombing (500'000 civilians killed) was expected to continue after the nuclear one (250'000 civilians killed) then possibly followed by the invasion.

4. And as a conclusion, US was more or less ready to bear high price in terms of military losses during the invasion campaign to reach the goal of unconditional surrender and dismantling of the the state of Japan. And US was ready to inflict ANY kind of civilian losses on the Japanese nation to reach the stated goal.

Personally, so far US leaders do not look that much different from Japanese. Both parties were willing to exterminate as many civilians as needed to reach the goal of utter destruction of their political enemies.

[DLaurier]

The thing I wonder about is whether France could have won the war in 1939. If France had launched a major offensive into Germany in September of 1939 maybe a lot of subsequent misery could have been avoided.

Agreed.

A november or december '39, joint Franco/Anglo assult into the Rhine and Rhur basins area, would have seen Hitler scrambling for clean underwear pretty fast.

[LemuelG]

Personally, so far US leaders do not look that much different from Japanese.

Then I suggest you look again.

Let me summarize that article for you:

This brings us to another aspect of history that now very belatedly has entered the controversy. Several American historians led by Robert Newman have insisted vigorously that any assessment of the end of the Pacific war must include the horrifying consequences of each continued day of the war for the Asian populations trapped within Japan's conquests. Newman calculates that between a quarter million and 400,000 Asians, overwhelmingly noncombatants, were dying each month the war continued.

Newman et al. challenge whether an assessment of Truman's decision can highlight only the deaths of noncombatant civilians in the aggressor nation while ignoring much larger death tolls among noncombatant civilians in the victim nations.

[sburke]

bad IMHO, bad. Go sit down. :-P

Trying to summarize the argument of an article that is only a couple pages long and present a conclusion different than the authors is not really a summary. I would suggest folks read the article for themselves. Whatever your position on the subject, the more interesting aspect of the article is how we can assume we can extrapolate information and turn out to be totally wrong when not in full possession of the facts. Folks had assumed Truman was hiding information that would undermine his argument for bombing. Turns out he was hiding info, but for entirely different reasons and the info would actually have bolstered his argument.

I for one am now even more interested to read Downfall than I was previously, good find Michael.

[IMHO]

bad IMHO, bad. Go sit down. :-P

Trying to summarize the argument of an article that is only a couple pages long and present a conclusion different than the authors is not really a summary. I would suggest folks read the article for themselves. Whatever your position on the subject, the more interesting aspect of the article is how we can assume we can extrapolate information and turn out to be totally wrong when not in full possession of the facts. Folks had assumed Truman was hiding information that would undermine his argument for bombing. Turns out he was hiding info, but for entirely different reasons and the info would actually have bolstered his argument.

I for one am now even more interested to read Downfall than I was previously, good find Michael.

Yes better read for themselves. And you're right - I was incorrect in calling it a summary of the article. It's a summary of the facts given in the article.

Since the author initially shares the belief that Japan state should have been crushed at all costs (total war) he does believe that atomic bombings were lucky break. And possible continuation of the conventional bombings are not a problem either. It's seriously do it at all costs.

[Michael Emrys]

I for one am now even more interested to read Downfall than I was previously, good find Michael.

I sort of came into it sideways. I had previously read his excellent book on Guadalcanal, and although I was not especially interested in the events leading up to the surrender of Japan, I thought I would give it a look. So I borrowed a copy through inter-library loan. I was only able to get through the first few chapters before I had to return the book, but it was clear that he had done a vast amount of research and there was a lot of information that I had not seen before anywhere. There the matter rested for several months, all the time there was a nagging voice in the back of my head reminding me that I had a job to complete. So finally I ordered my own copy so that I could read and absorb it at leisure. I'm glad that I did.

Michael

[sburke]

I sort of came into it sideways. I had previously read his excellent book on Guadalcanal, and although I was not especially interested in the events leading up to the surrender of Japan, I thought I would give it a look.

Michael

Yeah I have a copy of Guadalcanal and that was a very good read.

I actually find events and the decision making process within the Japanese government and military fascinating. Watching the two (US and Japan) cultures interacting and completely mis reading one another so badly borders on Sci Fi. I am an afficionado of the work of C J Cherryh and this stuff almost seems like something she would dream up.

[IMHO]

Then I suggest you look again.

Let me summarize that article for you:

1. To calculate casualties properly you should include 750'000 civilians killed in the US bombings. Plus the whole population of Tokyo where the third nuke was destined.

2. I do not say Japanese were angels - they were fully responsible for annihilation of huge masses of people. I say in its quest to crush Japan state the US started to exterminate Japanese population and were fully prepared to finish the job if necessary.

Let's stop it here. I don't think even reading Downfall or any other book will change anything. You don't believe there could have been another way out of the mess. And I do believe there was. So this is it

[sburke]

Let's stop it here. I don't think even reading Downfall or any other book will change anything. You don't believe there could have been another way out of the mess. And I do believe there was. So this is it

Sorry, would let it go, but I have to ask as I am not actually sure of your answer to this question, actually questions.

Is it your feeling the US could just have left the exisiting power structure in Japan in authority?

Would you have also considered that an acceptable option in the war in Europe?

No need to explain, just looking to see if my understanding of what you think the alternative would be is correct. Though if your answer to #1 is yes and #2 to no I guess I would like to understand why the difference.

[LemuelG]

1. To calculate casualties properly you should include 750'000 civilians killed in the US bombings. Plus the whole population of Tokyo where the third nuke was destined.

2. I do not say Japanese were angels - they were fully responsible for annihilation of huge masses of people. I say in its quest to crush Japan state the US started to exterminate Japanese population and were fully prepared to finish the job if necessary.

Let's stop it here. I don't think even reading Downfall or any other book will change anything. You don't believe there could have been another way out of the mess. And I do believe there was. So this is it

What bugs me is that you have moralized the situation to the point where it has completely flipped on it's head.

Suddenly, in IMHO-land, the Imperial Japanese are victims, and the US becomes the genocidal aggressor. Give me a break, the amount of Japanese civilians killed pales in comparison to the 17 million killed at the hands of Imperial Japan, genocidal beasts that they were.

The US applied precisely as much violence as was necessary to achieve the goals of it and it's allies - if there was any similarity between IJ and the US, then the Japanese surrender would have just been the beginning of the massacre.

If the dim-wits who ran the Japanese war-of-conquest had admitted their shame, and that they had lost the war sometime in '43 - then committed ritual-suicide or surrendered themselves to justice, a lot of Japanese, and other Asian, civilians would have lived.