Multymegaton ****storm :) Could the Germans win the war?

[IMHO]

Not really an option. See Tooze. The basic problem with the German economy was an unbelievably inefficient agricultural sector. What the

UK fixed in the 18th century with enclosures, the US with mechanization and the USSR by shooting the Kulaks, the Germans bumbled and (like the French) just caved in to rich peasants. So after say, 1931, they are doomed unless they follow the lead of the USSR and have ford motors build them some 5-year-plan wonders, collectivize, and purge the army (shoot all those Prussian Generals before they start plotting) and join the USSR and take over the world.

Why not an option? I'm reading Tooze right now. Just started so definitely don't have a complete picture... But what strikes me most so far is if the theoretical argument is that Germany was unable to ramp up military production due to near-wrecked economy then how did it happen in real life in 1942-1944? Availability of some critical imports was actually considerably lower than in 1939-1940 but still they managed to increase production 2-3 times.

So far I'm sticking to the obvious view that you need to differentiate between two issues. First is the civilian economy, "normalcy of every day life", political desire to keep raising the living standards for the wide swathes of population and resources required to attain that. The other issue is increasing military output in mobilization mode by switching massive parts of GDP into military gears and putting up to work as much reserves as politically attainable.

I'm looking forward on how Tooze plays out on the first issue but it seems to me it's hard to argue that the Germany WAS able to resolve the second issue as the history proves. And why exactly do we believe what was done in 1942 couldn't have been done in 1939-1940? There's at least one argument I know and that is the view that German population would have rebelled if the economy was mobilized in 1939-1940 when there was no sense of "Mother Germany In Danger".

So what do you think?

[IMHO]

I would just read Tooze. He is the most recent and he takes ideology and its contradictions into the account.

He's definitely exemplary. At least in breadth I've got another book of him - "Statistics and the German State", 333 pages devoted to perturbations of economical statistics in Germany in 1900-1945. My, my But I've always been scary of putting all my eggs in one basket.

The Wages of Destruction is quite an astounding book really. Once you get through with the influential German dude with "Horace Greeley" as his middle name -- you're ready for anything and Tooze doesn't pull any punches: Germany looks like a trainwreck from 1931 to 1945. Not only that but you will have a pretty good idea why. For example, Speer's miracle was due to retooling in 1942, a retooling that should have been done in 1934.

Sorry, didn't quite get the Horace Geeley line...

Seems like Tooze has some special agenda in tearing down "Speer myth" I mean it's obvious Speer wasn't Harry Potter. No magic wand And anyway he couldn't have done retooling in 1934 as he wasn't the "retooling tsar" in 1934. Not arguing with you - just funny how Tooze puts it.

[sburke]

I just picked up the book so don't give away the ending.

[MengJiao]

He's definitely exemplary. At least in breadth I've got another book of him - "Statistics and the German State", 333 pages devoted to perturbations of economical statistics in Germany in 1900-1945. My, my But I've always been scary of putting all my eggs in one basket.

Sorry, didn't quite get the Horace Geeley line...

Seems like Tooze has some special agenda in tearing down "Speer myth" I mean it's obvious Speer wasn't Harry Potter. No magic wand And anyway he couldn't have done retooling in 1934 as he wasn't the "retooling tsar" in 1934. Not arguing with you - just funny how Tooze puts it.

Well, I think Tooze has to tear into Speer because (in Tooze's view), the Speer myth holds up a lot of misconceptions. For example, that Germany had not mobilized fully before 1942. The fact was ( according to Tooze) that Germany never could mobilize as fully as the USA or the UK or the USSR essentially because economically, Germany was just an unusually large France -- burdened with an incredibly inefficient agricultural sector that it was politically impossible to do anything but make more complex and useless.

So if anything Germany started over-mobilizing far too soon. Other problems with the Speer mythos cover such odds and ends as the supposed non-impact of allied bombing. According to Tooze, as you might expect, blowing up factories actually had such a big impact immediately (in 1943) that the wonder of Speer is demonstrably just the wonder of a long parts pipeline coupled with measuring units that got priorities (eg the semi obsolete me-109) versus essential units (such as fuel and trucks) that either never were produced in sufficient quanities or that declined under the impact of the war (eg. bombing and loss of oil fields).

Anyway, read Tooze and the Horace Greeley event will become clear.

[MengJiao]

Why not an option? I'm reading Tooze right now. Just started so definitely don't have a complete picture... But what strikes me most so far is if the theoretical argument is that Germany was unable to ramp up military production due to near-wrecked economy then how did it happen in real life in 1942-1944? Availability of some critical imports was actually considerably lower than in 1939-1940 but still they managed to increase production 2-3 times.

So far I'm sticking to the obvious view that you need to differentiate between two issues. First is the civilian economy, "normalcy of every day life", political desire to keep raising the living standards for the wide swathes of population and resources required to attain that. The other issue is increasing military output in mobilization mode by switching massive parts of GDP into military gears and putting up to work as much reserves as politically attainable.

I'm looking forward on how Tooze plays out on the first issue but it seems to me it's hard to argue that the Germany WAS able to resolve the second issue as the history proves. And why exactly do we believe what was done in 1942 couldn't have been done in 1939-1940? There's at least one argument I know and that is the view that German population would have rebelled if the economy was mobilized in 1939-1940 when there was no sense of "Mother Germany In Danger".

So what do you think?

The pre-1942 non-mobilization is a myth and the post-1942 production miracle is as well. What we know is that German production never actually got going in the same way that production did in the USA (much, much more quickly), the UK and the USSR. It never got going and it began to collapse in 1943.

It seems to be difficult to realize just how much better Japan did in WWII than Germany. With a much smaller industrial base, the Japanese managed to seize all the essential resources they needed and hold on to almost all their gains until they got nuked. Even then they weren't invaded and they got to keep their Emperor. Germany never got its production going and was completely crushed and divided up. The comparison suggests the fantastic incompetence that it took to take a reasonably good industrial power and wreck it steadily from 1931 to 1945.

[IMHO]

The pre-1942 non-mobilization is a myth and the post-1942 production miracle is as well. What we know is that German production never actually got going in the same way that production did in the USA (much, much more quickly), the UK and the USSR. It never got going and it began to collapse in 1943.

It seems to be difficult to realize just how much better Japan did in WWII than Germany. With a much smaller industrial base, the Japanese managed to seize all the essential resources they needed and hold on to almost all their gains until they got nuked. Even then they weren't invaded and they got to keep their Emperor. Germany never got its production going and was completely crushed and divided up. The comparison suggests the fantastic incompetence that it took to take a reasonably good industrial power and wreck it steadily from 1931 to 1945.

First lets' agree we're talking about military industry NOT the civilian economy. And here are the numbers for the tank production:

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

370 2,799 3,623 5,530 13,657 18,956 4,406

There are similar numbers for aircraft, artillery pieces, submarines, small arms cartridges, gas (crude processing and synthetic) and many many more things. All will be about the same thing - military production between 1940 and 1944 increased 3-7 times depending on the item line with an ever increasing complexity of the items. For a besieged country starved of imported oil, foodstuff, non ferrous metals etc. with production facilities under constant strategic bombing and women almost totally out of the industrial production (means half of the population non contributing), I'd say this qualifies for a miracle So if the point is to say the military production (not the civilian economy) is wrecked then there should be the stats showing the rapid decline in production. Right?

[IMHO]

Well, I think Tooze has to tear into Speer because (in Tooze's view), the Speer myth holds up a lot of misconceptions. For example, that Germany had not mobilized fully before 1942. The fact was ( according to Tooze) that Germany never could mobilize as fully as the USA or the UK or the USSR essentially because economically, Germany was just an unusually large France -- burdened with an incredibly inefficient agricultural sector that it was politically impossible to do anything but make more complex and useless.

So if anything Germany started over-mobilizing far too soon. Other problems with the Speer mythos cover such odds and ends as the supposed non-impact of allied bombing. According to Tooze, as you might expect, blowing up factories actually had such a big impact immediately (in 1943) that the wonder of Speer is demonstrably just the wonder of a long parts pipeline coupled with measuring units that got priorities (eg the semi obsolete me-109) versus essential units (such as fuel and trucks) that either never were produced in sufficient quanities or that declined under the impact of the war (eg. bombing and loss of oil fields).

Anyway, read Tooze and the Horace Greeley event will become clear.

Sorry just read this post of yours. I agree I'd better put it to rest for now until I finish Tooze But it's gonna be interesting about the numbers. Just dig up the Germany military spending vs. GDP. 1944 share of military spending is higher than in UK, USSR, US... So I can't imagine a logic to prove that Germany could not mobilize as much as Allies because of backward agricultural sector if the numbers say it did mobilize "more" Anyway, back to Tooze..

[Narses]

The question is as given in the topic. Range of questions to consider:

1. Don't we need to throttle up before going to war? (Speer's reforms)

2. Who needs Roeder's big hulls, why don't we give all Kriegsmarine budget to Doenitz?

3. Why don't we have a strategic bomber yet, Mr. Goering?

4. Do we think our Luftwaffe pilots never die, don't we, Mr. Goering? (The issue of trained pilots pipeline for air superiority and CAS planes)

5. Let's imagine pesky Italians hadn't had their Balkan mess so we could have started USSR attack earlier, couldn't we?

6. Why do we need to waste resources on Tigers, Mouse etc. - let's keep it cheap (Stugs + PzKpfW III + PzKpfW IV + PzKpfW V).

7. Radars are force multipliers, aren't they?

8. If a wise guy suspects something we shall listen, shall we not? (Doenitz and Enigma bombes)

And so on and so on...

Whoever is interested - please keep emotions low and language gentlemanly

Why not just consider: Why declare war against the USA. That was the killer.

[Narses]

The pre-1942 non-mobilization is a myth and the post-1942 production miracle is as well. What we know is that German production never actually got going in the same way that production did in the USA (much, much more quickly), the UK and the USSR. It never got going and it began to collapse in 1943.

It seems to be difficult to realize just how much better Japan did in WWII than Germany. With a much smaller industrial base, the Japanese managed to seize all the essential resources they needed and hold on to almost all their gains until they got nuked. Even then they weren't invaded and they got to keep their Emperor. Germany never got its production going and was completely crushed and divided up. The comparison suggests the fantastic incompetence that it took to take a reasonably good industrial power and wreck it steadily from 1931 to 1945.

Uh, really ? "....Japan held on to almost all their gains until they got nuked. Even then they weren't invaded and they got to keep their Emperor."

Wow! Lets see the US had totally throttled Japanese shipping and resources and food could not get into Japan. The US was in Okinawa !!!! They had lost most of their islands except the ones the US decided to bypass. They were nuked so the US could force surrender and not have to invade and then the US occupied the country and hanged the war criminals.

[Michael Emrys]

I just picked up the book so don't give away the ending.

Germany loses the war.

Oops! Sorry, that one just slipped out before I could stop it.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Why not just consider: Why declare war against the USA. That was the killer.

It's not nearly so clear cut as that. For one thing, the USSR not collapsing in 1941 puts the war seriously in doubt for Germany. A long war in the East means looking nervously over their shoulder in the West. An unconquered Britain may not be able to field a powerful army, but they can still make a lot of trouble.

Secondly, the US is supplying arms and other goods to Germany's enemies at an increasing rate, and without a DoW against the US, Germany is hampered in its attempts to stem that flow. Hitler believes that it will be a year (and he was almost right) before the US can take to the field in any kind of serious way, and maybe his U-boats can do enough in that year to help his armies dispatch his worst enemy.

Bottom line: Hitler has little to lose and maybe something to gain by declaring in 1941. Especially if it encourages the Japanese to go all out and tie down the USN in the Pacific and keep it off his back.

One final note, even if Germany doesn't declare in 1941, chances are the US will sometime in 1942, so Germany still loses the war, but in a slightly different way, maybe even faster since the delivery of Lend-Lease would not have been interrupted in early '42 while the US accelerated the raising of its own forces.

Michael

[sburke]

Germany loses the war.

Oops! Sorry, that one just slipped out before I could stop it.

Michael

No Way!!! Man that was way out of left field, I hate when books don't reveal key facts until the last page just so you can't figure it out.

[JonS]

Yeah, deus ex machina is so overused as a plot device in these kinds of stories

[Magpie_Oz]

Uh, really ? "....Japan held on to almost all their gains until they got nuked. Even then they weren't invaded and they got to keep their Emperor."

Wow! Lets see the US had totally throttled Japanese shipping and resources and food could not get into Japan. The US was in Okinawa !!!! They had lost most of their islands except the ones the US decided to bypass. They were nuked so the US could force surrender and not have to invade and then the US occupied the country and hanged the war criminals.

Ok just a couple of things, in 1945 the Japanese still held vast areas that they had conquered in 41/42. This was largely due to the Japanese conquering them when they we more or less undefended and being especially difficult to root out. The ALLIES (you weren't alone here) bypassed most of the captured islands and only took the few required to cripple Japan in the Pacific Theatre and made steady gains in the South East Asian Theatre.

True enough though the ALLIES had choked off any form of logistical supply to or from the mainland. The dropping of the atomic bomb of course saved numerous lives, both ALLIED and Japanese and did lead to the ALLIED occupation and rebuilding.

Having said all that I cannot see how Japan could have been considered to have "done much better". They had strategic surprise and achieved some rapid gains for about 9 or 10 months and the lost just about every major engagement from that point on. They may have "kept" their gains but they were at a loss to use them in anyway. Bit like have a really great car but someone keeps blowing up your driveway.

[Michael Emrys]

Having said all that I cannot see how Japan could have been considered to have "done much better". They had strategic surprise and achieved some rapid gains for about 9 or 10 months and the lost just about every major engagement from that point on.

Make that four or five months and you'll strike closer to the truth. After May '42 their only gains were in China, the Aleutians, and Burma. Everywhere else, if there was movement, it was retrograde.

They gained ground in China because they were facing a poorly organized enemy there and it was also where the vast preponderance of their army was committed. The only value of the Aleutians was that it forced the US to commit significant forces there. Burma was essentially static from early '42 for a couple of years. Then the IJA launched a major effort to enter India, were turned back and then ultimately driven out of Burma.

About the only things of any value that the Japanese still held at the end of the war, were Vast tracts of China, Korea, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia, and as previously noted they received little use of those due to the loss of so much of their merchant marine.

Michael

[Magpie_Oz]

Make that four or five months and you'll strike closer to the truth. After May '42 their only gains were in China, the Aleutians, and Burma. Everywhere else, if there was movement, it was retrograde.

Yes I was being generous it really wasn't until August/September of 42 that the first real defeats were affected on land, Milne bay and Guadalcanal but yeh the offensive had pretty much petered out by May/June

[MengJiao]

Uh, really ? "....Japan held on to almost all their gains until they got nuked. Even then they weren't invaded and they got to keep their Emperor."

Wow! Lets see the US had totally throttled Japanese shipping and resources and food could not get into Japan. The US was in Okinawa !!!! They had lost most of their islands except the ones the US decided to bypass. They were nuked so the US could force surrender and not have to invade and then the US occupied the country and hanged the war criminals.

They still had all of their gains in China and the DEI and Singapore and all of Indochina and all their home islands. It took nukes to knock them out. All-in-all they did much better than the Germans with much less of an industrial base. They didn't do very well, but they still did 10 times better than the Germans.

[MengJiao]

Yes I was being generous it really wasn't until August/September of 42 that the first real defeats were affected on land, Milne bay and Guadalcanal but yeh the offensive had pretty much petered out by May/June

though in China they were still taking lots of territory clear into 1944.

[MengJiao]

About the only things of any value that the Japanese still held at the end of the war, were Vast tracts of China, Korea, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia, and as previously noted they received little use of those due to the loss of so much of their merchant marine.

Michael

And Singapore. I don't think the Germans held "vast tracts" of anything when they surrendered. And it didn't take nukes to knock out the Germans.

[Narses]

They still had all of their gains in China and the DEI and Singapore and all of Indochina and all their home islands. It took nukes to knock them out. All-in-all they did much better than the Germans with much less of an industrial base. They didn't do very well, but they still did 10 times better than the Germans.

Great a little bit of contested China. Kicked out of Burma, about to be totally beaten by the Soviets, no longer in the Philippines. In addition no navy and the entire country open to B29 strikes. Only islands controlled those we didn't care about.

Japan was starving, no oil was getting in, no coal from Manchuris. They were handing out bamboo sticks to the population to kill the invaders.

US subs, surface ships and aircraft sunk 2,534 ships of 8,897,393 tons. They had no merchant marine. Subs got 1178 ships of slightly over 5 million tons and another 214 naval craft of 578,000 tons.

Nukes were used to avoid US casualties and Japanese casualties and wind up the war. The point here is we could've done nothing but blockaded Japan in 1945 and waited for them to beg for peace after millions died of starvation. In addition we wanted our few still alive POW's back that hadn't been murdered already.

[MengJiao]

Great a little bit of contested China. Kicked out of Burma, about to be totally beaten by the Soviets, no longer in the Philippines. In addition no navy and the entire country open to B29 strikes. Only islands controlled those we didn't care about.

Japan was starving, no oil was getting in, no coal from Manchuris. They were handing out bamboo sticks to the population to kill the invaders.

US subs, surface ships and aircraft sunk 2,534 ships of 8,897,393 tons. They had no merchant marine. Subs got 1178 ships of slightly over 5 million tons and another 214 naval craft of 578,000 tons.

Nukes were used to avoid US casualties and Japanese casualties and wind up the war. The point here is we could've done nothing but blockaded Japan in 1945 and waited for them to beg for peace after millions died of starvation. In addition we wanted our few still alive POW's back that hadn't been murdered already.

The Japanese were still fighting in the Phillipines and controled most of China, all of Indochina, most of the DEI. US casualties were going up steadily as the battles got closer to Japan. Given how little they had, they did a lot better than the Germans. And in the end they faced all of the allied forces alone.

[IMHO]

Nukes were used to avoid US casualties and Japanese casualties and wind up the war. The point here is we could've done nothing but blockaded Japan in 1945 and waited for them to beg for peace after millions died of starvation. In addition we wanted our few still alive POW's back that hadn't been murdered already.

Killing a quarter of a million civilians looks hardly a "life-saving" act. The only reason, I believe, why Truman needed nukes was to prevent a repetition of the Europe front - where Soviets got half of Europe. Plus threaten Stalin with an uber-bomb because for some reason the Western powers believed Stalin could go right through their lines and reach Atlantic.

By the time the atomic bombing took place Japan was bombed into the stone age. No oil, no metals, almost no food. Fighting with bamboo sticks Japanese would have hardly be major threat for allied armies.

So it's not a war it's a war crime.

[Narses]

Killing a quarter of a million civilians looks hardly a "life-saving" act. The only reason, I believe, why Truman needed nukes was to prevent a repetition of the Europe front - where Soviets got half of Europe. Plus threaten Stalin with an uber-bomb because for some reason the Western powers believed Stalin could go right through their lines and reach Atlantic.

By the time the atomic bombing took place Japan was bombed into the stone age. No oil, no metals, almost no food. Fighting with bamboo sticks Japanese would have hardly be major threat for allied armies.

So it's not a war it's a war crime.

That was not how the Allies saw it. I used "bamboo spears" to make a point but there were great numbers of Japanese Army with weapons and after the blood letting at Iwo and Okinawa the nukes were called in. The nukes caused fewer casualties than a protracted land campaign would have caused based on our experience in Okinawa where there were Japanese women and children in large numbers. They were advised, and did commit suicide in horrific numbers rather than be captured or occupied. In Okinawa the Jap troops also used their own civilians as shields as they drove them forward into American lines.

It was Okinawa that turned the page on to use or not use the nukes. There was also legitimate concern anout our own casualties and about the Russians who were rushing to get in against Japan and as you are certainly well aware still occupy parts of Japan's northern islands.

[Narses]

The Japanese were still fighting in the Phillipines and controled most of China, all of Indochina, most of the DEI. US casualties were going up steadily as the battles got closer to Japan. Given how little they had, they did a lot better than the Germans. And in the end they faced all of the allied forces alone.

Certainly not. The Japanese had lost the war by June 1942 certainly by early 1943.

The Japanese strategy in engaging the US was never to conquer but to defeat us in a series on naval and air battles so that we would come to terms and leave them alone in Asia.

They hadn't meant Pearl Harbor to be a "sneak" attack but it was perceived as such by the US and there would be no thought of settlement.

[MengJiao]

They hadn't meant Pearl Harbor to be a "sneak" attack but it was perceived as such by the US and there would be no thought of settlement.

Yet the Japanese got a much better deal than the Germans. As you point out even the nukes were just as much to keep the Russians out as to take over an relatively well-populated Japan. so there was a de facto settlement or a series of de facto settlements with the Japanese.

Even after the series of surrenders in September (and each regional Japanese command seems to have surrendered under a separate local protocol), Japanese forces were still in control of large parts of China, Indochina, and the DEI.

And of course, the Japanese got to keep their Emperor.

So not a big win for the Little Empire, but not a complete and utter unmitigated crushing such as the Germans got.