Market Garden

[joebloggs]

In my case it takes both

Yeah, who else is going to hold your beer?

Re MG: was it a bridge too far or too far from the bridge?

Market Garden was a disaster yet Montgomery still tried to claim it was a success. Any good commander should be able to stand up and take responsibility for their failures as well as their successes.

I suppose the true meaning of teamwork is that you can always blame some body else and as any military man (or woman in these PC times) knows, $h*t rolls downhill.

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, perhaps summed up Market Garden best. He said, 'My country cannot afford the luxury of another Montgomery success'.

Anyway, despite your views either way, it is still a fascinating subject.

[para]

This is fascinating reading. Not being as well read as some of you guys it always rankled me that Monty and the British always seemed to get the ****ty end of the stick from Hollywood and academics.

[LemuelG]

That is what drives me bonkers about the whole thing, "conventional wisdom" is to say Monty was rash and threw away lives because he was too pig headed.

For me it was the 82nd Airborne .....

"How did you go at the bridge mate? "

"Bridge? which one is that ?"

"The big one, the highway bridge, y'know.. in town ?"

"Oh that one ... yes ummmm goooood ... we're ahh ... we're working on it "

"WHAT ?!"

Instead we are sold some line of crap about British tanks finally crossing the bridge and then stopping to make tea.

There's a difference between thoughtful critique of command decisions, and armchair-generals disgracing themselves by needless slander of brave men who laboured under the most trying of conditions.

Why wasn't anyone dropped on the objective, if it's immediate capture was so vital? If it was a case of Gavin failing to recognize the objectives required, why didn't his superiors step in and over-rule his supposed oversight?

Gavin was not even the senior officer on the scene - what of Browning? The Corps commander, who's HQ's bungling led to him being out of contact with 1AB for two days.. newspapers in London knew more about what was happening in Arnhem than he did. Browning, who personally ordered Gavin to consider the capture and retention of the Groesbeek heights to be his primary objective (probably pre-occupied by the reports of German panzers refitting in the area) - and just as well when the Germans attacked through there in >regimental strength and nearly broke through. You should be praising the 82nd for not only eventually making good on their objectives (in spectacular fashion), but for holding the line against the odds while XXX was still running behind the clock.

Accept it, like Monty did, it was his foul-up

[Gen Von Television]

Well said LemuelG: still I have a gut feeling SBM is not entirely to blame; there were so many small facts that contributed to the SNAFU of the whole operation; planned hastily (adapt to the situation, and reach your objective: not?), started too late (a mere week, it seems), misplaced LZ (especially for the Red Devils), equipment failures (the radios for the British Paras), bringing your whole plans to the enemy (the whole plan of MG found in a crashed glider), having to move on a single high banked highway becoming a perfect target silhouetted on the sky, a too narrow corridor that was cut several time and in several different places by the flanking German Armies...

Instead of all this difficulties they were able to almost reach their single objective (cross the Rhine). I believe the movie is somewhat dramatizing the arrival of the XXX Corps to the Nijmegen bridge (so valiantly captured by the 82nd AB): if I remember correctly they were already behind schedules by a few days...

The movie is OK, but I believe you can get a better understanding of the situation there by watching those two episodes of the Band of Brothers series: even if the 101st AB was possibly the less pressed on Division in the whole MG Campaign, still they had an hell of a... beating.

[argie]

Why wasn't anyone dropped on the objective, if it's immediate capture was so vital?

Not affirming it was the case, but it could be doctrinal. There were two doctrinal approaches to airborne operations in WWII: to land over the objective and to land at safe distance from the objective, regroup and march over it.

The latter was the one used by the 1 AD, the former by the 101th, IIRC.

Now that this discussion arose, I'm not sure what doctrine the 82nd used, but my bet is on the same as the other US division, which makes your question a valid one on the importance the bridge had as objective in the plans.

[Gen Von Television]

The problem with the 1AB LZ wasn't just it was some 9 km from its target, it was also the same area used to supply the whole Division: in the end they had to stretch to far to hold their objective and their resupply base and consequently lost them both. An impossible task against two Armored Divisions +.

[Michael Emrys]

I too cannot find it in me to blame Gavin. His drop/landing zones were on the wrong side of Groesbeek Heights and were under almost constant attack, and it required offensive action on the part of the 82nd. to clear it. He couldn't do that and take Nijmegen (which BTW had been reinforced in the interval) too. For sure, troops should have landed on both ends of the bridge at both Nijmegen and more importantly at Arnhem. That they did not was entirely due to the Air Force senior officers who were afraid to go close to the bridges due to flak. In the event, the pre-landing flak suppression missions by Allied fighter bombers was entirely successful and the landings could have been done. So there is one more group who comes in for a share of the blame. Like I said in the other thread when this came up, a lot of people gave sub-optimum performances in an operation that had little room for such.

Michael

[Sardaukar]

By the way, to throw in something about Antwerp and Schelde, even after shipping lanes were cleared, IIRC, Antwerp harbour facilities was able to operate only at 25% of max. capacity. Was still better than hauling supply from France, but it was under almost constant barrage of V-1s and arguably didn't really live up to it's perceived importance.

If it could have been used more effectively is another thing, though.

[Fetchez la Vache]

I subscribe to the idea that if the Allies had aimed more to the right and made Wesel the final objective then they might have succeeded. Apparently Monty's subordinates were keen on Wesel but Monty took the unilateral decision (as oft he did) to go for Arnhem. Wesel meant that one less bridge needed to be crossed (Nijmegen wouldn't have happened) and was more lightly defended...

... and frankly it's looks more "right". It's Germany we were invading, not Friesland. :-)

Although to be honest, this is largely through the benefit of hindsight. And don't expect me to back this up with silly amounts of primary evidence, m'okay?

[Vark]

Perusing my local book shop I came across this, anyone else read it? Crap title but it seeks to judge the operation in the context of WWII airborne operations, not hypothetical and unrealistic benchmarks.

Sebastian Ritchie's "Arnhem: Myth and Reality"

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Arnhem-Reality-Airborne-Warfare-Operation/dp/0709089910

Crete and Arnhem are two battles I have always been fascinated by and have visited the battlegrounds of both. I have the classic Bridge too Far (or as an airborne wag suggested, too far from the bridge!). Middlebrooks "Arnhem 1944" and Kershaws "Nevers Snows in September", I even bought the Osprey title Arnhem (not bad for an overview). Any others suggested?

[Gen Von Television]

IAlthough to be honest, this is largely through the benefit of hindsight. And don't expect me to back this up with silly amounts of primary evidence, m'okay?

ehehe Well, it seems quite plausible, since in the end they went for that same place with Operation Varsity in March the following year...

To go back to the Air fouling up because of the Flak, still they got heavy casualties, especially above Arnhem LZ farther down Oosterbeck...

[Michael Emrys]

To go back to the Air fouling up because of the Flak, still they got heavy casualties, especially above Arnhem LZ farther down Oosterbeck...

Heavy? I honestly don't recall reading anything to that effect. Where did you come across that?

Michael

[Gen Von Television]

In many source books, documentaries, interviews, etc. I can find the sources if you ask politely, but not right now. After their dropping the C47s had to turn North toward the coast, and met heavy 88 Flak there, and many more 20 mm that were moved in position for the occasion, since the Germans had the plans, remember?

[Michael Emrys]

After their dropping the C47s had to turn North toward the coast, and met heavy 88 Flak there, and many more 20 mm that were moved in position for the occasion, since the Germans had the plans, remember?

Ah, perhaps that is the explanation. I was not so focussed on what happened after the drop.

Michael

[Gen Von Television]

Here you go:

Wings of Freedom Troop Carrier C-47 losses in Market Garden and the role of the underground movement By Hans den Brok

When the battle for the Arnhem bridges was lost, a legend was born. The brave battle fought by the British airborne troopers would over shadow all other parts of the Market Garden operation. And as where the Arnhem part became famous, the story of the two American Airborne Divisions stayed largely unknown. The Troop Carriers who brought all the paratroopers, except for a small detachment of the British, and all US gliders to the battle zone, remained in the shadow of all Airborne Forces. This book is the first to tell about the C-47 losses in the Market Garden operation. It will tell the stories of the men who flew with the C-47s, dropped paratroopers or towed gliders. Nearly 80 C-47s failed to get back to England and were lost over the Continent. Many men evaded capture with the brave help of Belgian and Dutch civilians. Some paid the highest price for their help. Over one-hundred crew members died.

This book is the result of the questions the author had. Where did a plane crash? What happened to the crew? Who were those men? Where did they stay? Ten years of intensive research resulted in this book. The book counts over 350 pages. There are about 380 photos, many of them never published before.

Besides, the Troop Carrier didn't have all the Aircraft or Gliders needed, so they had to be very careful about their losses.

[para]

How significant was the finding of the whole market garden plans on the American glider?

[Gen Von Television]

If at first they even thought it was a rouse, after a short time they were able to confirm all of the Allied moves, and consequently the Germans were able to exploit all the weak points of that plan.

[sburke]

If at first they even thought it was a rouse, after a short time they were able to confirm all of the Allied moves, and consequently the Germans were able to exploit all the weak points of that plan.

Seems to be a recurring problem. IIRC they also were able to find VII corps plans on D Day. Unfortunately for Germany they didn't have the resources to exploit that info.

[Gen Von Television]

But if for the Normandy landings there was also a huge disinformation work going on since a long time (Patton sent to NE Anglia commanding a fake Army made with rubber weapons and real fake radio transmission: Operation Fortitude) regarding MG there was mot enough time for anything but to press on, and the Allied had already lost too much time delaying for many reasons.

There was also another rouse for the landings in Sicily in 1943 (the dead body of an officer carrying secret plans for a landing in Greece IIRC found on the Spanish costs as if drowned after an aircraft crashing at sea): just to say the Germans' high echelons had many reasons to be suspicious about their findings, but not so for the field commanders who were close enough to verify the facts.

Unluckily for the Allied in this operation, chance wanted two armored divisions (II SS Panzer Corps) reforming and refitting their ranks right on the spot at Arnhem, the First Parachute Army's General Student reinforced with the 59th Division from the XV Army that was on the move right when the Allied Paras started their drops. All this placement of the Germans was dictated by other reasons, as they were expecting an assault on Holland proper, with a paratroopers drop East of the Rhine. But since they happened to be right there, they quickly understood what was going on, and had enough forces to react quickly, without even having to ask Berlin for support.

As I wrote, to me all these look like a full series of casual events that contributed to the ultimate failure of Monty's plan.

Odd (it was already noted): for a General always so cautious and meticulous, the only time he acts as bold and we may say as careless, but with good reasons to do it, he fails.

[Magpie_Oz]

Market Garden was a disaster yet Montgomery still tried to claim it was a success. Any good commander should be able to stand up and take responsibility for their failures as well as their successes.

At the end of the operation the 21 Army Group was in possession of the larger percentage of the Netherlands and in a good position to continue operations. Sure they did not achieve full success but the gains that they made were significant. Perhaps also consider one factor, what commander is going to carry out a major operation and sustain significant casulaties and then say to his me "Well we stuffed that one up, your mates died in vain"

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, perhaps summed up Market Garden best. He said, 'My country cannot afford the luxury of another Montgomery success'.

Sadly the Dutch people were going to suffer casualties whatever took place. The French civilians suffered just as much if not more in the liberation of their country, things like this help no one.

[Magpie_Oz]

There's a difference between thoughtful critique of command decisions, and armchair-generals disgracing themselves by needless slander of brave men who laboured under the most trying of conditions.

And yet we have no problem ensconcing into history the notion that US paratroopers paddled across the river in broad daylight into the muzzles of the guns, while the British made tea.

Why wasn't anyone dropped on the objective, if it's immediate capture was so vital?

As mentioned elsewhere it was the other of the 2 options, land by coup-de-main, as 6 Abn did in Normandy at Pegasus Bridge or land, concentrate and advance on the objective. As the brdges were essentially unoccupied and it was felt they were not in imminent danger of being blown the beter option is to concentrate and then capture.

If it was a case of Gavin failing to recognize the objectives required, why didn't his superiors step in and over-rule his supposed oversight?

True enough but by the time any one realised that the orders had not been carried out it was too late. We touched on this earlier, how far up does responsibility go? I would content to the immediate superior. The 508 PIR was tasked with taking the bridge, they did not move with sufficient urgency to do so. Gavin who undoubtedly was distracted by the need to defend the heights did not pick it up until to late.

You should be praising the 82nd for not only eventually making good on their objectives (in spectacular fashion), but for holding the line against the odds while XXX was still running behind the clock.

"Eventually" was too late and spent the lives of brave men needlessly.

XXX Corps got to Nijmegen early.

As I have said it is undoubtedly unfair to point the finger solely at Gavin, just as it is unfair to point it at Monty, you may as well point it at Ike at that level.

But the fact remains that by the time that XXX Corps go to Nijmegen the operation still had a huge chance of success, instead it took 3 days to resume the advance.

[Magpie_Oz]

I too cannot find it in me to blame Gavin. His drop/landing zones were on the wrong side of Groesbeek Heights and were under almost constant attack, and it required offensive action on the part of the 82nd. to clear it.

Actually he had drop zone around the south and south east of Nijmegen. The capture of the Grave bridge was via a drop nearby. They could have easily dropped further units in those zones to take Nijmegen Bridge. The heights were unoccupied when he got there but for sure heavy fighting ensued to hold them.

He couldn't do that and take Nijmegen (which BTW had been reinforced in the interval) too.

A Battalion was assigned to capture the bridge but they did not move quick enough to get there.

That they did not was entirely due to the Air Force senior officers who were afraid to go close to the bridges due to flak.

A decision made by Gen Brereton whom Ike appointed in command and who had little knowledge of airborne operations.

So there is one more group who comes in for a share of the blame. Like I said in the other thread when this came up, a lot of people gave sub-optimum performances in an operation that had little room for such.

And yet we much prefer to say "Monty stuffed it" and move on.

[LemuelG]

And yet we have no problem ensconcing into history the notion that US paratroopers paddled across the river in broad daylight into the muzzles of the guns, while the British made tea.

Don't put words in my mouth mate, I'm just speaking up against a clear-cut hatchet-job on a good general, I would never dream of slandering any of the fighting men.

You ignore the fact that there was every possibility that any bridgehead made by the lightly-armed paras would get forced back by the German forces in the area. You say that XXX 'made up' the delay, but that doesn't change the fact that they were delayed, and considering the fact that by D+1 the 1st and 82nd were effectively fighting for their survival XXX was needed much sooner than the scheduled time.

The failure to capture the bridge promptly was nullified completely by the tactical situation that actually developed, one which the planning did not seem to account for (landing your guys practically on top of enemy armoured formations.. for one).

Gavin was following the orders of his superior who was with him in the field, as commanding officer of the AB corps, Browning was responsible for the tactical decisions (not saying they were incorrect). You got the wrong guy.

[Magpie_Oz]

How significant was the finding of the whole market garden plans on the American glider?

It was actually only the Market plan in as far as it related to the 101st Abn.

There is doubt as to whether the story is true or not, it does seem highly unlikely that a full set of written orders and marked up battle plans would be taken into battle.

In any case by the time the plans go to where they could be useful they would have been out of date as the 101 would have held all its objectives by that time. They did have some value tho' names of units, areas being held and in what strengths etc.

[Michael Emrys]

Actually he had drop zone around the south and south east of Nijmegen. The capture of the Grave bridge was via a drop nearby. They could have easily dropped further units in those zones to take Nijmegen Bridge. The heights were unoccupied when he got there but for sure heavy fighting ensued to hold them.

More importantly the resupply zone for the Nijmegen part of the operation was to the EAST of the heights. Merely holding the Heights was not enough to ensure the security of that zone, which was also the designated landing zone for the reinforcing gliders. The 82nd. had to attack even farther to the east to accomplish that.

And yet we much prefer to say "Monty stuffed it" and move on.

Not me. I started my part of this discussion by opining that Montgomery was a better general than his harsher critics give him credit for being. I think it can be said though that by the time of OMG he was overly concerned with his public image (and by no means the only Allied general suffering from this) and it began to effect his military judgement a little and his relations with his allies and national superiors a lot.

Michael