Please, please, please let us set attack direction for air support.

[akd]

Situation: Bunker next to road covering objective. Compound on one side of bunker, map edge on another and open fields on the other two sides. Apache with limited ammo called in to neutralize the threat. Apache proceeds to repeatedly attack from direction of compound, landing all ordnance against buildings and walls of compound. All Hellfires wasted. All rockets wasted (with those not striking the compound soaring off into the city. Most 30mm HE wasted, and no effect from the little that connects. Bunker is fine.

Final outcome: total player frustration.

p.s. - rockets should not even be included in load out of modern CAS aircraft if we cannot set the attack direction.

[Lanzfeld]

+1

Modern setting, modern comms and all. Makes sense to me.

[c3k]

+2

,,,,,,

[Chops]

And a triple shaka for the boys.

[MeatEtr]

Is this done in RL? I vaguely recall seeing a show with SpecOps doing it in the 91 Gulf war. So my guess is yes. If it's not SOP for the average unit, then at the least make it possible for the designated FO teams. The UI change could be pretty simple to implement. Same way as you draw a line with arty except with an arrow at the end or start point to show attack direction. I'm guessing the difficult part will be with actually changing the attack run used by the AI.

In short, +4 to this.

[Flanker15]

Make it an support specialist only ability and you've got yourself a new strategy depth as a bonus.

[YankeeDog]

Is this done in RL?

In my understanding, yes and no. IRL, a blue ground unit calling for air support almost always KNOWS the attack vector air support is coming in on. They may or may not be able to DICTATE it.

For example, in a situation where there is a significant AA threat from a certain vector, air assets may not be able to approach from that direction (especially low-level stuff like AH-64s etc.) Other things can come into play, too -- deconflicting with other support assets like artillery, topographical features, etc.

Whatever the case, CMSF's current modeling, where the ground commander has no (*&^$! idea of the vector of an airstrike, is definitely at odds with reality.

In short, +5, with a caveat.

[akd]

Even if we presume that because in some situations (due to factors that aren't actually in the game and thus arbitrary) a unit would not be able to specify direction (yet are inexplicably able to request other mission parameters like ordnance and time), then no unit should be able to specify attack direction in any situation, this still does not deal with the fact that the AI is not able to logically select an attack direction. Telling the player that they can't do this because of XYZ higher level factors is bad when the only thing that is really happening at a higher level is random selection.

Also, letting the player know the attack direction but not control it would be bad for the same reasons. In the original scenario, I would have found myself instead repeatedly canceling the mission and requesting again until I got a good run-in direction, when in reality a simple description of the target would have prevented the pilot from even considering approach from one quarter (from which the target would not even be visible anyways). That would have been equally frustrating in outcome.

All units capable of calling for support should be able to request an airstrike vector. Whether this direction is actually used could be a factor of the unit-type/skill, however it should be assumed that an attack direction might also be the simple outcome of describing target characteristics that the game does not take into account ("east-west treeline," "long north-south building") rather than minute control of the aircraft's approach by a lower-level unit.

And I don't think map UI is necessary or even realistic. A simple cardinal direction selection under mission parameters (either "N,S,E,W" or "N, S, E, W, NE, NW, SE, SW") would be more realistic. It could replace the "general/personnel" selection page for air support, as this is totally obscure in function to the player anyways.

[c3k]

How about using a graphic, similar to artillery's Linear attack? Select "Air Support/Point Target" and click the target. That fixes one end of a blue line, representing the end of the attack run. The second click "sticks" the back end of the line down, delineating the orientation of the attack run. The second point should not need a valid LOS from the observer, since this is just simulating a spoken direction. This would keep the UI within familiar parameters, and, hopefully, keep the programming from getting too wonky.

Ken

[AkumaSD]

I'd like to have this feature.

[Lethaface]

+1 one the linear attack grid for AIR. Could be a fixed length bar, so gamey hacks aren't possible.

Want to add though that in mission 1 of the Dutch campaign the Apaches made the first useful hydra strafing run in the game ever for me Seems they have been tweaked a little bit more, or I just didn't notice it.

[pazuzusmiles]

Ive used the point targeting to somewhat controll the direction air support will swoop in to some effect.

[Lanzfeld]

Ive used the point targeting to somewhat controll the direction air support will swoop in to some effect.

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[noxnoctum]

Yep, this is needed.

[bodkin]

While we're here I'm finding getting the mission type right even more frustrating now that there is a 'Personel/General' option. I just called in CAS with an aircraft that had the first two bars showing some level of ordanance on board. I selected 'medium/general' only to wait a few minutes for the pilot to get in the 'POP' to tell me 'all ordanance expended, I'm RTB'. It would be a really nice feature if you could only select missions that are available for the given aircraft.

[Jonny(FGM)]

No matter what mission you select the aircraft should be able to fire, for example the cobra with just 30mm u can select any mission (heavy, med, light etc) and it will just fire the 30mm. Perhaps the pilot just couldn't find the target

[Peter Panzer]

This, along with trees that don't shrug off tank rounds, would be primo adjustments if they found their way into v1.31.

It seems both would be potentially applicable to the Normandy game as well.

So, how many of you would be willing to wait longer for v1.31 were BFC to pop on by and say, "gee guys, we think it's feasible, we'll get the CAS request protocol fleshed out a bit more. Oh, trees shouldn't stop multiple T-72 or Stug III main gun rounds either, let's see what we can do about that too."

I know I would gladly wait. Maybe. For a little while.

[YankeeDog]

It seems both would be potentially applicable to the Normandy game as well.

Errr... no. The shell vs. tree thing perhaps. But in Normandy, neither side had the capability to make CAS requests over a time frame relevant to a CM-level engagement. And they certainly didn't have air to ground communications that would to allow a ground commander to even be aware of an aircraft attack vector, let alone dictate one to the pilot.

Later in the ETO, the Allies did begin to implement a system of keeping fighters armed for ground attack loitering over attacking columns, and creating a direct radio link between these fighters and forward observers on the ground. But even in 1945, this was rare. And it didn't exist at all in June, 1944.

We had a long thread on this recently; I'm sure a bit of digging would turn it up.

Cheers,

YD

[Peter Panzer]

I'm not so sure you're entirely correct Yankee Dog.

I thought Allied forces were operating with FAC's in the field during the summer of '44 coordinating smaller, "tactical aircraft" from "Cab Ranks." I had also thought the modest effectiveness of this early CAS system was partially due to the relative lack of bomb carrying capacity of the fighter-bombers of the era not strictly communications hardware or techniques.

Here is some information about RAF FAC's in Normandy you might find interesting (highlights are mine)...

FORWARD AIR CONTROL.

Visual Control Posts.

Initially, in Normandy, fighters were controlled from ships. Each of the five beaches had its own Air Staff aboard a Headquarters Ship, under whose orders there was a Fighter Direction Tender. Dusk on D-Day found 83 Group Control ashore and starting to take over from its FDT. It seems that in the first days of the Normandy landings there were problems caused by the understandable confusion, the difficulty of accurately identifying forward positions and the problems of communication and co ordination when the aircraft were still based in the UK.

When the first rush was over, additions were made to the control apparatus. Armoured divisions were given their own RAF controllers, who travelled with a wireless operator in tanks whose armament had been replaced by wireless sets. Half-track contact cars were used as forward visual control posts.

It is difficult to work out the precise organisation, and even more difficult to identify the equipment and vehicles used. However it is clear that the Visual Control Post consisted of an RAF controller and equipped with a variety of wireless sets. There was an RAF VHF transmitter/receiver for communication with aircraft, a high frequency RAF set for communication with Group Control Centre and a set for communication with the army unit being supported.

The Visual Control Post had fighter bombers assigned to it. These might be already in the air nearby, waiting to be given a precise target, or waiting on the ground if the base was to far away. The army unit would identify targets it would like attacking and the RAF controller with the VCP would decide if it was practical. If necessary the Group Control Centre would be asked to notify the aircraft and then the controller would contact the aircraft direct, giving a grid reference and any landmarks etc.

The vehicles varied over time and with the unit to which they were attached. There are reports of the following

- A light reconnaissance car. If this is correct it would not be able to carry all the wireless equipment and crew needed so it would report back to a halftrack. Light reconnaissance cars were available, being used by the armoured car flights of the RAF Regiment. In any case it seems to have been a one off.

- A wireless van. This seems to have been a forward controller from Forward Direction Post, a radar unit. On occasion they did take a wireless van forward to try and direct fighters against enemy aircraft flying below the radar.

- White Scout Car. These are mentioned but they were probably halftracks since it was common to call halftracks Whites.

- Ram Observation Post Tanks. These would be an excellent choice since they had been converted for artillery forward observation and had room for various wireless sets and personnel.

It seems that by July the following were standard

- A Sherman tank with a telescopic aerial mast fitted in the turret. This carried an aerial for an RAF VHF set. These were used by armoured brigades and were deployed as required.

- A halftrack, again carrying a telescopic aerial mast. The mast could be dismounted. These were used more widely. In both cases there seems to have been a second halftrack, presumably carrying some of the equipment and personnel. It is possible that these were the vehicles of an army Air Support Signals Unit tentacle.

The Visual Control Post was short lived. It had several drawbacks

- If it selected a viewpoint from which to observe a target it was not in a position to see what was happening elsewhere on a brigade front. One VCP was not sufficient to cover the ground, but more than one controller would be confusing for the air support.

- In a forward position it was not in a position to consult or liaise with headquarters staff.

- It could not be aware of the positions and movements of units flanking that being supported. This could be dangerous in a mobile battle.

The Visual Control Post was replaced by Forward Control Posts. These operated from divisional headquarters. It was found that the location of the Forward Control Post was not important as long as it had good communications and access to accurate and up to date information. When required, armoured units could have forward controllers mounted in Sherman tanks. These were held at brigade headquarters for the use of artillery observers and air controllers. Normally this was only required in the case of a breakthrough and rapid advance.

In Normandy the following methods are recorded.

1. 29 Armoured Brigade Headquarters. The brigade had rocket firing Typhoons on call and an RAF halftrack arrived to control them. Positioning itself at tactical headquarters near the command tanks the Flight Lieutenant Liaison Officer was given the target, a wood which was hiding Tiger tanks. The halftrack erected its telescopic aerial with its guy ropes and star shaped aerial. The crew of the halftrack laid out a fluorescent red arrow pointing towards the target. The Flight Lieutenant called in the Typhoons by first talking to the airstrip and then to the cab rank leader. Planes dived and each fired two rockets destroying the targets. Medium artillery finished the job. The halftrack was hurriedly packed up and moved off with the brigade headquarters. (Eye witness account)

2. Operation Goodwood, 18 July 1944. During the battle the RAF would give continuing support to the Army as requests for help were received. They would be kept in touch with the Army’s needs through tentacles of the Air Support Signals Unit attached to each armoured brigade, division and corps. In addition, a Visual Control Post housed in a tank was attached to the armoured brigade of the 11th Armoured Division. It carried an experienced Air Force Controller with a very-high-frequency wireless set which enabled him to communicate directly with fighters operating above. To some extent they were handicapped when the air force officer in the Sherman tank of the 29th Armoured Brigade’s Visual Control Post was wounded, but the young tank commander took over and, when he was unable to control a strike, the aircraft were directed to an alternative target by the Group Control Centre. (Eye witness account). This account is supported by the Divisions War Diary. 18th July 1944.1215. VCP with Tac HQ asked to get Typhoon RP attack down on tanksat 085608. Unfortunately Officer IC VCP wounded and this attack delayed. A 2/Lt Asst ALO soon picked up what was required of him and coped very well indeed through the rest of the day.

3. 19th July 1944. 2015. 13 RHA give PW statement that the enemy main defensive positions are at 043615 – 053613 – 050600. VCP arranges for these positions to be attacked by Typhoon RP aircraft and get 13 RHA to put down red smoke on the targets. The aircraft have difficulty in seeing the red through the general smoke and dust of battle, but eventually made several successful attacks.

4. ‘My father served as a Forward Air Controller in Normandy. In the days after D Day he was mostly attached to the 51st Division. One section had a Sherman and a halftrack. The other section had two halftracks. The standard method was to align the two vehicles towards the target. Part of the crew went forward with a 2” mortar. They spotted the target and fired a smoke bomb onto it. The radio operator then called in the Typhoons. As up to eight planes targeted a single tank they always got a kill.’

I'm certainly not a CAS expert, WWII or otherwise, and I don't want to sidetrack akd's thread. More to the original point, this would definitely be a good feature for our modern game!

[pazuzusmiles]

Oh wow I meant the liniear targeting as a way to try to dictate what direction the attacking plane/chopper comes in. DYSLEXIA: Its not just for kids anymore...

[YankeeDog]

PP -- Like I said, this has all been debated ad nauseam before; do a search for previous posts by JonS on the subject; he's posted a lot of detailed stuff about the CABRANK system in the past.

In brief; you are correct that the CABRANK began to be implemented at the VERY end of Normandy; it was in use by late July.

So maybe you get it for the last week or two of Normandy fighting. It's also worth noting that the first few weeks of the system weren't an unqualified success -- it took a while to work the kinks out of the system.

It's important to look at the primary sources when evaluating how effective the CABRANK system was, and how often it was used. It was definitely an improvement over what preceded, but it was nothing like the responsiveness of modern CAS, and it also was extremely expensive to maintain, so it was only ever used for high-priority "tip of the spear" armored attacks.

Edit to add: To be clear, though, for CMSF I've been a strong advocate of improving player knowledge and control over air support ordnance and attack vector for a long time. Some airframe/ordnance combos, such as AH-64s with Hydras, are very difficult to use properly as the modeling is done in the game now. Might as well not have Hydras in the game. It's very frustrating when your Strkyer sitting over 500m from the aim point gets brewed up by an errant Hydra, when what you really wanted was a Hellfire precision strike, and/or a Hydra salvo normal to your line of advance, to avoid exactly this problem... IRL, ground commanders these days have very good communication with the pilot over this sort of thing. That's not to say mistakes aren't made, but that's just it: they're mistakes, not SOP.

[akd]

While we're here I'm finding getting the mission type right even more frustrating now that there is a 'Personel/General' option.

I've tried to narrow this down with a bit of testing, but I really can't figure it out. I don't think it does anything. The only applicability I could see is if it were a armor/personnel option, controlling whether AT missiles or rockets were used on the target, or possibly 30mm HE versus 30mm AP when available. If so, it would be a partial fix for the random rocket attack problem, but an attack direction fix would be the only thing that would cover the wider problem.