Ok Battlefront it is about time for a CM: Normandy Forum

[Jaws]

As the title says. Check your latest bone post its runing over 200 replies and going into the WW2 tech details as we (CM WW2 lovers) like it. Some post are even unaswered because of the mass replies to other posts. Could you give me an answer to the Hedgerow cutters please ;p

Bocage a problem for US?? I may hope they have Hedgerow Cutters in CM Normandy ;p

[MeatEtr]

I'm a bit surprised it isn't up yet either. Considering since the game is supposedly only 3-4 months away from release. Hell, when did the CMSF forum go up, one, two years before launch?

[Mr Ed]

^^^ Agree^^^

[Sergei]

I suspect there will be a CM Afghanistan forum (and announcement) first.

[Battlefront.com]

We don't mind having discussions about future CM games (Normandy, Afghanistan or otherwise) in the Shock Force Forum for now because we're not quite ready to talk about NATO or any of the other games in extreme detail *yet*. The time is coming when we will be, but we're not quite there yet. Once we do open those Forums things will kick into high gear.

Yes, Hedgerow Cutters will be explicitly simulated in CM: Normandy. That's actually old news

steve

[undercovergeek]

ooo if youre in the mood for quick replies - any infantry pics in the pipeline - im spanish and dont celebrate Christmas til 6th Jan so need my own set of bones and pics! and mrs undercover didnt get her pics for Divali!!! and any other fake reasons for more pics i can think of

[Boris Balaban]

I am waiting and just keep looking for the CM:NORMADY forum.

Your humble servant.

[Jaws]

We don't mind having discussions about future CM games (Normandy, Afghanistan or otherwise) in the Shock Force Forum for now because we're not quite ready to talk about NATO or any of the other games in extreme detail *yet*. The time is coming when we will be, but we're not quite there yet. Once we do open those Forums things will kick into high gear.

Yes, Hedgerow Cutters will be explicitly simulated in CM: Normandy. That's actually old news

steve

Ok thx,

Great news about the Hedgerow cutters:)

[John Kettler]

Steve,

And they should be quite rare. ISTR the number was 56 sets installed in all of the U.S. 1st Army (?) when the first attack using them went off. I'm hoping you'll give us some alternate breaching means which were employed historically, as in Doubler's book and that account of the St. Lo drive I posted linked from the 29 ID historical site. What would be outstanding is if we could actually do the explosive breach, followed by a pair of canister spewing Stuarts sanitizing the enemy side of the breached hedgerow and infantry on the back decks keeping down other threats.

Also, since I doubt you're on the GDF much, might I request you and/or others there peruse this and please respond? http://www.battlefront.com/community/showthread.php?t=90292

Regards,

John Kettler

[Jaws]

Sgt Culin invented the Hedgerow cutter.

http://www.knox.army.mil/school/194arbde/181/gmd/culin.htm

This page says around 500 where made. Specially in the St Lo area they used these. In the race to Carentan most problems where solved due the fact airborne units took key area's by surprise. After the front had settled by the Germans the real Hedgerow problems started and the Germans where able to conduct their infamous Hedgerow Tactics. At the start Operation Cobra (although there is still a lot Hedgerow terrain up to Mortain) the German organized front was smashed by a 6 km areal bombardment and the almost total destruction of the Panzer Lehr Division. Pattons independent fast Combat Command teams took advantage of the German gap. Therefore the Germans were not able to contact Hedgerow tactics anymore because they were to busy to get the cork back in their defence and stop Patton. They never succeed in that even not with the mass concentration of armour around Mortain.

The strange thing is that the British had almost no Hedgerow terrain and where very unhappy with the open terrain because of the German superiority in armour and AT guns like the Pak 40 and Flak 88. The slaughter at hill 112 and the failure Goodwood, Totalize, Tractable, Epsom etc etc is a bitter proof that open terrain was also not preferable in Normandy.

[Sergei]

The slaughter at hill 112 and the failure Goodwood, Totalize, Tractable, Epsom etc etc is a bitter proof that being under Monty's command was also not preferable in Normandy.

There, I fixed that for you.

(...ducks in his foxhole...)

But seriously, though, bocage certainly was preferable - for Germans. They were only able to hold the Brits in bay for a long time by concentrating all available Panzer reserves to that area. If the situation had been the same in the US sectors, they simply wouldn't have had enough armour to form any meaningful concentrations to plug Allied breakout attempts for such a long period.

[Piecekeeper]

And the fact that he claimed them being successful is even worse..

[John Kettler]

Jaws,

Actually, he didn't. Another sergeant came up with the idea, and he took the idea and ran with it, winding up being credited as the inventor. Here's a very good account, but it's still wrong on Culin's inventor credit.

http://www.missing-lynx.com/articles/usa/zaloga_culin_cutter.htm

This shows that Culin was the implementer.

http://cghs.dadeschools.net/normandy/bocage/overcame.htm

Doubler's study, Busting the Bocage, confirms what I'm saying.

http://carl.army.mil/resources/csi/doubler/doubler.asp

"Soldiers of the 2d Armored Division's 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron invented the hedgerow device that gained the widest publicity. During a discussion between some of the 102d's officers and enlisted men, someone suggested that they get "saw teeth," put them on their tanks, and cut through the hedgerows. Many of the troops laughed at the suggestion, but Sergeant Curtis G. Culin took the idea to heart. Culin designed and supervised the construction of a hedgerow cutting device made from scrap iron pulled from a German roadblock. Testing showed that the device allowed a Sherman to cut easily through the hedgerows. Because the hedgerow cutter's blades made a tank resemble a large pachyderm with tusks, troops called the device a "rhinoceros," and Shermans equipped with Culin's invention became known as "rhino" tanks. Though the most famous of the hedgerow-reducing devices, Culin's "rhinoceros" was only one of many such contrivances invented and employed throughout First Army.32

Culin's device soon got the attention of the chain of command within 2d Armored Division and V Corps. On 14 July, General Bradley attended a demonstration of Culin's hedgerow cutter. Bradley watched as Shermans mounting the hedgerow device plowed through the hedgerows "as though they were pasteboard, throwing the bushes and brush into the air." Very impressed by the demonstration, Bradley ordered the chief of First Army's Ordnance Section to supervise the construction and installation of as many of the hedgerow cutters as possible.33

First Army Ordnance assembled welders and welding equipment within the beachhead and from the rear areas in England to assist with the project. Welding teams used scrap metal from German beach obstacles to construct most of the hedgerow cutters. In a prodigious effort between 14-25 July, the First Army Ordnance Section produced over 500 hedgerow cutters and distributed them to subordinate commands for installation. By late July, 60 percent of First Army's Shermans mounted the hedgerow-cutting devices.34"

I think the 56 I mentioned earlier was probably the number for 3rd AD's installed cutter count. (Goes off to research) Just checked. It was 57, and the story's in Cooper's book Death Traps, pp.44-47.

As for the British plight, they had the bulk of the German formations in their zone, especially the heavy units with all the nasty toys. The bocage in the American sector allowed the Germans to conduct an economy of force operation there, with the terrribly restrictive terrain making infantry, well supported by mortars and artillery, king in a deeply echeloned dug-in defense.

Regards,

John Kettler

[YankeeDog]

Actually, he [Culin] didn't. Another sergeant came up with the idea, and he took the idea and ran with it, winding up being credited as the inventor.

Well, that all depends on your point of view. Coming up with an idea for something is one thing. Coming up with a engineered, practical application of that idea is another. It's worth noting that, as far as the USPTO is concerned, the latter is a patentable invention, but the former is not. If you give credit just for coming up with an idea for a new device or process, then you can argue that Murray Leinster "invented" the personal computer in 1946 in his Sci-Fi story "A Logic Named Joe." Writers like Leinster do deserve some credit for inspiring the concept, but I still give most of the inventor credit to guys like Jobs and Wozniak.

As your links correctly note, Culin was not the only one to come up with an idea of placing something on the front of a tank to help breach the hedgerow. At the least, others came up with similar ideas about the same time, and he may have actually gotten the inspiration for his device from someone else. However, his implementation of the idea had advantages over others in that it (a) could be made quickly and cheaply out of available materials in the field, ( did not require use relatively scarce consumables like explosives every time it breached a hedgerow, © was durable and could be used repeatedly in rapid succession, and (d) just happened to be the one that Gen. Bradley liked when he saw demonstration of it, and ordered into emergency mass production.

So I have no problem with calling it the "Culin Hedgerow Cutter." I do think you make good point though that there were multiple other attempted solutions to the hedgerow problem, some of which did see considerable use, and that history tends to forget about these others and tell the tale of only the Culin device. So I certainly hope that the Culin device is not the ONLY hedgerow-defeating device we see in CM:N. At the least, I hope we get the dig-a-hole + demo charge breaching technique as well. Hopefully, we'll also get the related "Salad Fork" prong device that was sometimes mounted on tanks, to help punch holes for the explosives. IIRC, Bulldozer tanks were also used sometimes (though there were definitely very few of these to go around). Not sure of the details of representing all of this in the game, but it will be a really cool thing if BFC finds a way of getting this stuff in.

I think the 56 I mentioned earlier was probably the number for 3rd AD's installed cutter count. (Goes off to research) Just checked. It was 57, and the story's in Cooper's book Death Traps, pp.44-47.

When you think about it, 56 is probably enough to equip an entire division adequately for an offensive. I don't remember exactly, but IIRC the US Army Heavy Armored Division at the time had a little less than 400 tanks, light (Stuart) and Medium (Sherman) inclusive. So, straight by the numbers 56 cutters only gives you about 1 cutter/7 tanks. But you don't need a hedgerow cutter on every tank. Some formations will be held in reserve for breakout, used to screen flanks, etc. and so will not be involved with hedgerow breaching. And you don't need the cutters on the company and battalion command tanks, either. 56 cutters across the entire division probably gives the "up" platoons actually involved in the attempt to break through the hedgerow defenses at least one, and possibly closer to two cutters/5-tank platoon. Sounds like enough that there would usually be a Culin-equipped tank nearby, where and when one was needed...

Cheers,

YD

[Jaws]

There, I fixed that for you.

(...ducks in his foxhole...)

But seriously, though, bocage certainly was preferable - for Germans. They were only able to hold the Brits in bay for a long time by concentrating all available Panzer reserves to that area. If the situation had been the same in the US sectors, they simply wouldn't have had enough armour to form any meaningful concentrations to plug Allied breakout attempts for such a long period.

Hehe I do not totally agree on Monty. His division commanders failed even harder sometimes. I agree on the Panzer reserves (also used as an excuse of lack of success by Monty). But don’t underestimate the role of the 12 SS Hitler Jugend they where the real pain in the Ass in the Cean area.

[Jaws]

Nice info JK didnt know that about the Hedgerow Cutters

[Battlefront.com]

YankeeDog,

If you give credit just for coming up with an idea for a new device or process, then you can argue that Murray Leinster "invented" the personal computer in 1946 in his Sci-Fi story "A Logic Named Joe." Writers like Leinster do deserve some credit for inspiring the concept, but I still give most of the inventor credit to guys like Jobs and Wozniak.

On top of that, it's the established name for the device and it's not technically wrong. Compare this to calling a MP-40 a "Schmeiser", which is not only technically incorrect but it is completely unnecessary to use the incorrect name.

As your links correctly note, Culin was not the only one to come up with an idea of placing something on the front of a tank to help breach the hedgerow. At the least, others came up with similar ideas about the same time, and he may have actually gotten the inspiration for his device from someone else. However, his implementation of the idea had advantages over others in that it (a) could be made quickly and cheaply out of available materials in the field, ( did not require use relatively scarce consumables like explosives every time it breached a hedgerow, © was durable and could be used repeatedly in rapid succession, and (d) just happened to be the one that Gen. Bradley liked when he saw demonstration of it, and ordered into emergency mass production.

Many of the technological devices we use today are based on things which failed to make it out of the workshop or flopped in the market place for one or more reasons. A good example of this is the MP3 player concept, which was actually first designed in 1979. There was a working prototype, but the inventor just couldn't pull the money together to get it made. It served as the direct conceptual basis for the iPod and, in fact, iTunes Store. So who do we give credit to for the proliferation of digital music? The guy who had a great idea but couldn't pull it together, or the company 20 years later who turned a great idea into a practical, prolific technology? Do we give Xerox PARC credit for GUI computing, or do we give Apple or Microsoft (cough... cough) credit?

So I certainly hope that the Culin device is not the ONLY hedgerow-defeating device we see in CM:N. At the least, I hope we get the dig-a-hole + demo charge breaching technique as well. Hopefully, we'll also get the related "Salad Fork" prong device that was sometimes mounted on tanks, to help punch holes for the explosives. IIRC, Bulldozer tanks were also used sometimes (though there were definitely very few of these to go around). Not sure of the details of representing all of this in the game, but it will be a really cool thing if BFC finds a way of getting this stuff in.

We had a very good discussion about this some time ago. There were basically 4 ways to breach a hedgerow:

1. Dozer Tank. Effective but only a couple of these were available per armored division. Attempts to replicate them in the field failed. Attempts to get more factory produced ones into theater failed as well.

2. Massive quantities of explosives, hand dug/placed. Took a ton of time and was found to be woefully impractical because the amount of explosives required was greater than could ever be put into use (logistics and production considerations). Initial openings were often inadequate and additional blasts had to be done to affect a meaningful breach.

3. Tanks with pipes that would ram into the hedgerow so the charges could be placed faster and use less explosives than the above method. Still found to be very inadequate on anything but a small scale because of setup time and the need for very large quantities of explosives.

4. Hedgerow cutters. This is the obvious solution that worked on all levels. Required no explosives and could be done on the fly.

We are not simulating #1, but are simulating #2, #3, and #4. The idea is for #2 and #3, which are effectively the same from a tactical standpoint, to basically be like IEDs in CM:SF. Preplaced during Setup (or by the scenario author) and triggerable by the player when the timing is right. This gives the US player, pre-Culin, a method for getting through hedgerows. But it is quite limited and not very flexible, which is the primary reason it was only seen as a stop-gap measure and not a full solution.

When you think about it, 56 is probably enough to equip an entire division adequately for an offensive. I don't remember exactly, but IIRC the US Army Heavy Armored Division at the time had a little less than 400 tanks, light (Stuart) and Medium (Sherman) inclusive. So, straight by the numbers 56 cutters only gives you about 1 cutter/7 tanks. But you don't need a hedgerow cutter on every tank. Some formations will be held in reserve for breakout, used to screen flanks, etc. and so will not be involved with hedgerow breaching. And you don't need the cutters on the company and battalion command tanks, either. 56 cutters across the entire division probably gives the "up" platoons actually involved in the attempt to break through the hedgerow defenses at least one, and possibly closer to two cutters/5-tank platoon. Sounds like enough that there would usually be a Culin-equipped tank nearby, where and when one was needed...

Yes, and I think it's pretty obvious that history bears that out. The reason they stopped at 57 was because they broke through and didn't need to make any more. Or put another way, they likely wouldn't have made it through the hedgerows any quicker if they had 157 vs. 57.

Steve

[Michael Emrys]

Anybody have any numbers on how many hedgerows a tank-infantry team could breach and clear in a day on average?

Michael

[MeatEtr]

Anybody have any numbers on how many hedgerows a tank-infantry team could breach and clear in a day on average?

Michael

I breach my wifes hedgerow everyday, does that count?

[Battlefront.com]

They could breach as many hedgerows as was possible from a combat standpoint. In other words, once the Culin device was in place the normal combat variables for rough terrain applied rather than the rather unique bottleneck of hedgerows themselves.

Steve

[Michael Emrys]

They could breach as many hedgerows as was possible from a combat standpoint. In other words, once the Culin device was in place the normal combat variables for rough terrain applied rather than the rather unique bottleneck of hedgerows themselves.

In other words, you don't know either.

Michael

[JonS]

Michael,

Doubler's "Busting the Bocage" - the pre-cursor to "Closing with the Enemy" - is available in full, online, at the US CGSC or CARL site. That is where you're most likely to find anything meaningful, I should think.

[gibsonm]

In other words, you don't know either.

Michael

I think what he's saying is that "it all depends".

Do you have "Culin" devices attached or not (i.e. how early in the campaign is it)?

Do you have Engr support and are they logistically supported enough to offer the possibility of explosive breaching?

What is the quality of your troops?

How many Hedgrows are across your axis of advance?

What is the weather like?

How strong is the enemy opposing you?

etc. ...

I doubt very much that there's a staff table you can look up that says a Coy will breach X hedgerows per day "regardless of season weather or terrain".

I've seen figures (with thanks to another Beta Tester) for example in Doubler; "Closing with the Enemy", or the pre-cursor report entitled "Busting the Bocage", which is available online.

The urgency of the situation resulted in the development of improvised methods that allowed tanks to maneuver in the Bocage. The first field-expedient solution to the mobility problem came from the 747th Tank Battalion assigned to Major General Charles H. Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division. The 747th was not equipped with dozer tanks, so instead of trying to drive directly over the hedgerows, someone suggested that demolitions be used to blow gaps in the hedgerows. After experimentation, the tankers discovered that demolitions could indeed breach the hedgerows. Two 24-pound explosive charges placed eight feet apart and eighteen inches above ground level blew a sizable hole in a hedgerow. On 24 June, engineer squads from the 29th Division's 121st Engineer Combat Battalion emplaced demolition charges on hedgerows during a limited attack by elements of the 747th Tank Battalion and the 115th Infantry. The attackers discovered that the 24-pound charges did not always create a hole large enough for the Shermans. After the attack, the engineers decided to increase the size of the explosive charges from twenty-four to fifty pounds. They hoped the increased charges would consistently blow breaches large enough to accommodate the attacking tanks.

However, several problems resulted from increasing the size and weight of the explosive charges. The commander of the 121st Engineer Combat Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Ploger, conducted an informal study of the logistics involved in supporting a tank attack with fifty-pound explosive charges. Ploger assumed that in a typical attack, a tank company moving a distance of one and one-half miles through the Bocage would encounter thirty-four separate hedgerows. As a result, each tank company needed seventeen tons of explosives. Demolitions were not readily available in such quantities, and the problems involved in the transport and emplacement of enough explosives seemed insurmountable. Apparently, other techniques were needed to breach the hedgerows.

The urgency of the situation resulted in the development of improvised methods that allowed tanks to maneuver in the Bocage. The first field-expedient solution to the mobility problem came from the 747th Tank Battalion assigned to Major General Charles H. Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division. The 747th was not equipped with dozer tanks, so instead of trying to drive directly over the hedgerows, someone suggested that demolitions be used to blow gaps in the hedgerows. After experimentation, the tankers discovered that demolitions could indeed breach the hedgerows. Two 24-pound explosive charges placed eight feet apart and eighteen inches above ground level blew a sizable hole in a hedgerow. On 24 June, engineer squads from the 29th Division's 121st Engineer Combat Battalion emplaced demolition charges on hedgerows during a limited attack by elements of the 747th Tank Battalion and the 115th Infantry. The attackers discovered that the 24-pound charges did not always create a hole large enough for the Shermans. After the attack, the engineers decided to increase the size of the explosive charges from twenty-four to fifty pounds. They hoped the increased charges would consistently blow breaches large enough to accommodate the attacking tanks.

However, several problems resulted from increasing the size and weight of the explosive charges. The commander of the 121st Engineer Combat Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Ploger, conducted an informal study of the logistics involved in supporting a tank attack with fifty-pound explosive charges. Ploger assumed that in a typical attack, a tank company moving a distance of one and one-half miles through the Bocage would encounter thirty-four separate hedgerows. As a result, each tank company needed seventeen tons of explosives. Demolitions were not readily available in such quantities, and the problems involved in the transport and emplacement of enough explosives seemed insurmountable. Apparently, other techniques were needed to breach the hedgerows.

That's about 5 tons per tank platoon, over an area at the upper-end of a typical CM:N map.

Incidentally: note the density - 34 hedgerows in 1.5 miles. That's on average one every 71 metres, or one every nine (9) CM:N tiles!

[edit] Jon, Sorry just included your source in the above - wasn't sure if you were going to come in on this or not.

[Battlefront.com]

Michael,

Gibsonm has it right:

I think what he's saying is that "it all depends".

If a single Company, with no backup, had to cross a 100m long field that was actively opposed on the other side, it might only breach that one hedgerow for the entire day. A neighboring Company with 2 Platoons of Engineers up against a moderately defended sector might clear through a 25m long field, a 75m long field, and then to top it off a 100m long field. All depends

The point is that the Culin got rid of the bottleneck. That's the key point of the whole thing. So the only possible single answer to your question is "they could breach as many hedgerows as they had time, energy, and/or orders to breach in a given day". Before Culin the answer was probably "they could breach only one".

Steve

[Sergei]

I breach my wifes hedgerow everyday, does that count?

I suppose this means your rhino device is too small to alert the defender, otherwise your advances would be repulsed.