CM:Normandy - Bocage?

[Sergei]

Yes, this is all too true, and one of those facts that wargamers overlook, along with the fact that in the real world ammunition and fuel do not magically appear at the front in unlimited quantities as long as a line free of enemy zones of control back to the mother country exists.

Michael

Let's also not forget that many times in war, intelligence was fully aware of problems ahead but the high leadership decided to ignore them. Case in point: Montgomery before Market Garden. But intelligence officers and spies often come up with false information, possibly intentionally fed by the enemy or another government. Still, it makes me wonder, how did people like Richard Sorge feel it when their warnings on impending doom went to deaf ears?

[Michael Emrys]

The LVTs, which are tracked and can go up on the beach, would certainly have reduced casualties on Omaha...

Maybe, maybe not. Why wouldn't they with their passengers have been quickly picked off by the AT weaponry that did for most of the early arriving tanks? They would have also been easy meat for any artillery that was lucky enough to score a direct hit, or even a near miss.

Being able to move infantry quickly from the waterline to the base of the bluffs would have been a very great boon indeed, but I don't know how many would have made it. And could enough LVTs have been made available to transport more than just the first wave?

Without answers to these questions and more, it's hard to form an estimate of how much of a factor they might have potentially have been.

Michael

[Sgt Joch]

They would certainly have reduced casualties from MG fire and would have carried infantry over the barbed wire that blocked much of the beach road. LVTs were already in common usage in the Pacific from Tarawa in November 43.

How much of impact they would have had is, of course, open to debate...

[dieseltaylor]

Popular Science Sep 1945

Google books has some stuff on LVT's - but nothing on seaworthiness. And most of them were not armoured being embarrassed by HMG fire.

http://www.marineswwii.com/pdfs/LVT%27s.pdf

[Michael Emrys]

LVTs were already in common usage in the Pacific from Tarawa in November 43.

I know, and they were certainly useful there. Try to understand though that there were critical differences between the defenses of the beaches in the Pacific and Omaha Beach.

Michael

[JonS]

One nice thing about Doubler is that the success is attributed to better combined arms though I am sure that also the German Army basically bled to death in Normandy and then could hold the line no longer.

Well, they didn't bleed to death out of the goodness of their hearts ...

[dieseltaylor]

No, but posibly the Allies could have relied on serious material advantage to wear them down without bloody armour and infantry attacks ... I know that sounds trite and based on hindsight [ and lack of politics] but if indeed artillery is the big killer in the war then that with airpower must have been a less bloody approach.

I cannot recall it but I suspect V1's and atomic bomb research may have demanded speedly ending Germnay

[dan/california]

Not letting the Russians roll all the way to the Rhine figured in there somewhere.

[Secondbrooks]

Let's also not forget that many times in war, intelligence was fully aware of problems ahead but the high leadership decided to ignore them. Case in point: Montgomery before Market Garden. But intelligence officers and spies often come up with false information, possibly intentionally fed by the enemy or another government. Still, it makes me wonder, how did people like Richard Sorge feel it when their warnings on impending doom went to deaf ears?

Not related to Normandy, or western front in general but as i'm whipping myself with book concerning lost "battle" of Vyborg in -44. Few things springs to my mind.

German warning and descriptions of large scale Soviet offenses and what tricks worked in defense almost totally ignored. Placement of Antitank guns. Which were found out already in 1939 but by many already forgotten. Again some very basic things already known had to be re-learned by blood, lost land and loosing vital equipment.

Those top secret military-secrets concerning Panzerfaust and Panzerscherck which lead to fact that when Soviets launched full scale assault almost no-one knew how to operate them, there's stories of men using fausts like pile-up-charges... Yeah, throwing them at tanks. Soviet tankers probably knew that weapon better than troops who were supposed to use them. First shipment of weapons i believe was around -43, so there was time to at least organize some kind training-organization (well there was something, usually insufficient). At least they could have printed enough user-manuals in Finnish.

When units started to re-train for combat (which had time and opportunity for it) they did ofcourse refresh their skills, but at same time depleted most their ammo and hand grenades... And didn't get resupply, couple tens of rounds per rifle at max. Ammo depot responsible to supply unit fighting in Vyborg hadn't adjusted to hot war's reality but worked on stiff static trench warfare bureaucracy, and static trench warfare's mind set.

Tankers not telling to their commanders what kind tanks they were using. Those BT-42 tanks ment for indirect fire, but named as assault guns. Yeah they were sent to fight against KVs and T-34s, commanders naively thinking that they as capable at that task as they were, after all, assault guns.

To name few things. So there's lots of potential for unexpected or overlooked aspects in military fairs. I'd guess figuring out something of which one doesn't have much first hand experience is even harder.

[Sergei]

2ndBrooks,

Yes, those were the good times... argh. The way that Mannerheim ignored signs of Soviet summer offensive is at par with the best WW2 leaders. Out of the strange fates of WW2, I feel most sorry for the poor sods fighting on the islands of Viipuri Bay under orders expecting them to keep the little rocks, with minimal troops, shelter and artillery support, against a swarm of invaders supported by gun boats. Elsewhere, you could at least run away. There you had to swim.

P.S. Name the book or it didn't happen!

[Mikko H.]

First shipment of weapons i believe was around -43, so there was time to at least organize some kind training-organization (well there was something, usually insufficient). At least they could have printed enough user-manuals in Finnish.

The first shipment of Panzerfausts and -schrecks arrived in April 1944. IIRC the weapons were branded top secret and warehoused (without training any infantrymen in their use) on German request.

Tankers not telling to their commanders what kind tanks they were using. Those BT-42 tanks ment for indirect fire, but named as assault guns. Yeah they were sent to fight against KVs and T-34s, commanders naively thinking that they as capable at that task as they were, after all, assault guns.

IIRC the tankers were very well aware of the shortcomings of their tanks, and tried to reason with the infantry commander they were subordinated to. But for the commander in question a tank was a tank was a tank, and BT-42s were ordered to take on T-34-85s. Fortunately for the Finnish tankers, the BT-42 was so mechanically unreliable that most of them broke down without seeing an enemy tank; only one or two was destroyed by enemy action on or around 20 June 1944.

[JonS]

No, but posibly the Allies could have relied on serious material advantage to wear them down without bloody armour and infantry attacks ...

Er ... they did. And ever since people have been whining that the only reason the Allies won was because they didn't fight like the Germans. Or sumfink.

But you still need to mount ground attacks. Simply firing artillery across the FEBA, and having the Brylcreem Boys stooge about and drop bombs on stuff isn't a strategy. It's a waste of time and money.

That whole 'combined arms' thing is about combining the effects of various arms and services to present the enemy with a massive Paper AND Scissors AND Rock problem, rather than a series of Paper, Scissors, Rock problems in sequence.

So the Allies - or at least the Brits and CW (I assume the US too, although I don't know) - developed an approach in which they would seize ground using a CA approach, but the critical part was a robust plan to hold the ground once seized, in the safe expectation that the Germans would woodenly counterattack. And the Germans did indeed keep coming on in the same old way, so they kept getting shot down in the same old way. It was in defeating those counterattacks that the Allies were really able to write down significant German forces, and it started on D-Day with the heavy losses to 21st Pz and 6th FJ Regt, countined in the days after with the losses to 12th SS against the Canadians, then the losses to 9th and 10th SS against the flanks of EPSOM, etc, plus an uncountable number of local or minor counterattacks to smaller Allied attacks, right through till August, and eventually the end of the war.

[Blackcat]

From what I have picked up fro various posters the Bocage was more of a problem that it could/should have been because everyone's attention was on the invasion with insufficent thought given to what would happen if it succeeded. It would certainly seem that no detailed planning and training was carried out for the post invasion period, but there was a lot of optimism about the other side packing up early.

Why does that sound familiar? At least in those days the British government did not refuse to purchase the equipment their troops needed and didn't lie about the reasons for invading.

[JonS]

There is a quote relating to that period, by one of the participants, that runs something along the lines of "Prior to D-Day, it was simply impossible to imagine D+1"

A bit of reflection explains why that should be so. Granted /someone/ should have been imagining it (and there was) but they weren't the people who'd have to live it.

*shrug* It's a risk that went wrong. It happens sometimes, that's why they're called risks.

[Sergei]

Remind me again, what might have happened if Rommel hadn't been back in Germany / if Hitler had been awaken / if the latter hadn't been so hung up with Calais and FUSAG? And if Montgomery hadn't been an incompetent douchebag? Or if Channel storms didn't happen or lasted longer? There certainly were risks, and both sides had some good and some bad luck, so I guess in the end it all evens out. But I wonder which side got the better deal out of the wheel of fortune.

[MikeyD]

Seems to me the Allies counted strongly on the eventuality of coming out ahead, regardless of unforeseen roadblocks. They knew they had more 'stuff' piled up in England, while Germany had a rapidly crumbling Eastern Front. What was that old Patton quote? Hold 'em by the nose and kick 'em in the arse. Even when the Germans won they lost because they were being too rapidly attrited to make up the losses.

[Sgt Joch]

Remind me again, what might have happened if Rommel hadn't been back in Germany / if Hitler had been awaken / if the latter hadn't been so hung up with Calais and FUSAG? And if Montgomery hadn't been an incompetent douchebag? Or if Channel storms didn't happen or lasted longer? There certainly were risks, and both sides had some good and some bad luck, so I guess in the end it all evens out. But I wonder which side got the better deal out of the wheel of fortune.

Good point. In june 44, the US/UK/Canadian/Polish/French forces were about equal in terms of tactical competence with the German forces. There were mistakes on both sides, but since it was easier for the Allies to replenish any casualties/equipment caused by the "mistakes" of their officers (since invariably it is always the non-coms/privates that pay for their officers "experiments"), it was inevitable that the Allies would win.

It is not pretty or an "elegant" way to win, but that is the nature of attrition warfare. For example, "Goodwood" is seen as a major blunder by Monty, but the more I look at that battle, the more I think that he saw it as a gamble: 1) if it works, fine, we breakout; 2) if it does not work and I lose armor at a 3:1 ratio to the germans (more or less what happened), fine, my tank losses will be made up tomorrow, the German's won't...

[Sergei]

Monty seems to have also counted on that either 1) he succeeds in breakthrough and comes out as a hero or z) he ties down German Panzer divisions, allowing Bradley to maneuver out of bocage and therefore later claim to be the mastermind behind the success. After all, even Market Garden was 90% successful.

[Blackcat]

From where we sit now I don't think many would disagree that Montgomery was not as good a general as he thought he was and as he was made out to be at the time. He had one piece of luck, to be appointed to North Africa at a time where Auchinleck's planning was going to pay off (remember Auchinleck was sacked because he refused to attack until he was ready and Montgomery kept to The Auk's timetable).

However, he was popular with his troops, who, after El Alamein, trusted him to lead them to victory and they believed he was, as far as possible, careful with their lives. Public relations spin it might have been but one should not underestimate the value to morale of trusting one's leader.

[JonS]

He had one piece of luck, to be appointed to North Africa at a time where Auchinleck's planning was going to pay off (remember Auchinleck was sacked because he refused to attack until he was ready and Montgomery kept to The Auk's timetable).

Two pieces of luck. Montgomery got 8th Army after Straffer Gott was killed while on his way to taking over 8th Army. Montgomery got the nod as a second stringer, if you like. Still, it should be obvious (even if only with hindsight) to all that

a) Montgomery was a vastly more qualified and suited for the role than Gott

Even though the second choice, Montgomery wouldn't have got the nod to command Britian's preeminent army in the major active theatre if he'd been a chump (or even an "incompetent douchebag")

c) Montgomery's plan for Alam Halfa owed something to The Auk, but not a whole lot (unless you lap up Barnett like a puppy dog)

d) Although based on the prior work of others, Montgomery's successful integration of Army and Air Force was revolutionary

e) Montgomery's plan for the breakout in October '42 owed practically nothing to The Auk (unless you lap up Barnett like a puppy dog)

f) Montgomery's plan for the Sicilian invasion was better than the initial proposal. Like everyone on the Allied side, his execution of the land campaign wasn't that great

g) Montgomery's contribution to the NEPTUNE plan was crucial

h) Montgomery's plan prior to and throughout Normandy *was* that the UK/CW would tie down the Germans in the east while the US broke out in the west. Granted that plan wasn't exactly realised in terms of time and/or place, but that 'failure' is incidental to the overall success of the Army Group plan

i) Montgomery was a throughly unpleasant and unlikeable person, but he was also a highly successful commander

[tooz]

So, any update on this module? I haven't played a WW2 game now for over a year!

[Battlefront.com]

Montgomery also gets a bad rap for being overly cautious. The fact is that by 1944 the British were facing a serious manpower shortage (which was never great to start with). The British knew, from top to bottom, that they would be out of the war if they got hit really hard in any one spot at any one time. Normandy and then Arnhem proved that concern for caution was well founded. Just imagine if the British had two divisions in the path of the Germans' Ardennes offensive! They would have been rendered nearly impotent as a national fighting force. Instead of commanding an Army Group with some Americans they would have been in an Army Group commanded by Americans.

Therefore, much of Montgomery's caution was quite prudent. The fact that he didn't get along with his peers, and the Americans were perhaps too gung-ho, certainly didn't help keep things in perspective.

Now, if you want to talk about an "incompetent douchebag", I've got two words for you:

Mark Clark.

Not much more needs to be said, eh?

Steve

[Paper Tiger]

<Sigh> Again with the attacks on Montgomery. And some folks don't like CMSF because of the controversial politics. There's no controversial politics in WW2?

[dieseltaylor]

Paper Tiger - I think you may be confusing current with historic. One might get excited about the current events rather more than something that is over 60 years ago and which you can do nothing about. : )

Following JonS's point about forcing the CA I was thinking of the alternative fighting methods that may have been considered for the bocage given the US did not want to use British Funnies. The ampulomet idea for slinging napalm equivalent to the next hedgeline may have been a possibility. The Calliope fired directly from beind hedgerow to the next one. .....

Fire seems the chief weapon as fear of fire works darn well even against the bravest.

As for the Brylcreem Boys reading the German accounts of trying to reach the battlefield and the lack of sleep and stress of being "hunted" they were not a waste. It seems a shame that cooperation with the ground could not be raised to the level that the FB's could be vectored more closely.

However my big belief is that if the US had the equivalent of the 79th's range of specials the bocage may have been less traumatic.

[Cuirassier]

IMO, Montgomery could be regarded as mediocre at best. In Normandy he was constantly searching for a decisive breakthrough when the conditions clearly didn't allow for it. Sure battles such as Epsom and Goodwood wore out the Germans. But those battles were more expensive for the British than they needed to be.

If anything, Montogomery could have benefited from exercising more caution in Normandy. Instead of loading infantry or tanks into massive spearheads chasing after the illusion that he could beat the Germans to their own rear, he should have been more willing to probe with smaller forces over a longer period of time, and aim to stand on the tactical defensive whenever faced with serious German armor.

As for Mark Clarke being an incompetent douchebag..well I can't really disagree with that one lol. It is hard to argue that he had any idea what he was doing in the Italian campaign.

Edit: Though I can't help but vote Voroshilov as the biggest douchebag of the all...