Army brass hint at more Stryker brigades

[Clavicula_Nox]

By Matthew Cox - Staff writer

Posted : Thursday May 14, 2009 22:31:19 EDT

As the Army redesigns its future ground combat vehicles program, senior leaders told Congress on Thursday that the service will likely add more Stryker brigades to the force.

The Army’s fiscal 2010 budget request of $142.1 billion plus an additional $83 billion for ongoing operations overseas doesn’t include money for more Stryker vehicles.

But that may change once the Quadrennial Defense Review is complete next year, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey told lawmakers at a budget hearing before the House Armed Services Committee.

“We are looking at the future of the force mix, examining what it is going to look like in the years ahead, and it’s possible at the end of this process the decision will be made that some of the heavy brigades will become Stryker brigades.” Geren said, adding that the Stryker concept “has been an extraordinarily successful program.”

Since 2003, the Army has fielded seven Stryker brigade combat teams, each equipped with about 300 Stryker wheeled vehicles built on common chassis. Stryker units have spent most of their time in Iraq, but the Pentagon announced in February that the 5th Stryker BCT would deploy to Afghanistan for the first time.

The prediction of more Strykers came as the Army is revamping its plans for future ground combat vehicles after Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered the service to start over on its manned ground vehicle portion of Future Combat Systems.

“I was not able to convince the secretary of defense that we had incorporated enough of the lessons learned in the current operations” into the FCS vehicles, Casey told lawmakers.

The new vehicle concept design, slated to be complete by Labor Day, “will be full spectrum. It won’t necessarily be optimized for major combat operations like the tank and Bradley, but it will be able to do that,” Casey said.

He also said “as we look to the future, one thing we know is we never get it quite right, and so we want to have available for every rotational cycle a mix of capabilities, Strykers, heavies, lights … and I agree with [Geren] that it is highly possible that the Strykers will have an increased role” in the future force.

Source: http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/05/army_budget_hearing_051409w/

Has Stryker now become the answer to everything?

[Battlefront.com]

No, because HBCTs and IBCTs are still the majority of forces. What is clearly out is the FCS, in its current form, as a replacement of all three Brigade types. And I think most people outside of the Beltway's influence think that is a good thing.

Steve

[Apocal]

Has Stryker now become the answer to everything?

Probably not for everything, but if they do relatively well in Afghanistan, then a lot more then they currently are slotted for.

The new vehicle concept design, slated to be complete by Labor Day, “will be full spectrum. It won’t necessarily be optimized for major combat operations like the tank and Bradley, but it will be able to do that,” Casey said.

Then what is the point of this vehicle? If Strykers are sufficient for SASO and other low-intensity assignments and the current heavy-mech force is considered top of the line for high intensity combat, why the hell should we buy FCS? Yeah sure, winning when you only field 9 players (in this case whatever fraction of current heavy-mech capability FCS offers) makes you seem brilliant, but when you lose you just look ****ing stupid.

[Elmar Bijlsma]

I am having difficulty believing that much will come of the above. Certainly there will be no major project. Not in this financial climate. The above plans seem more a last gasp and twitch of the FCS program.

The Obama administration has shown itself as being willing to stand up to DoD and say no to their pet projects. Good thing too, IMHO. This whole technological ninja force things doesn't seem sustainable for a large fighting force.

[Battlefront.com]

Actually, it's not as much the DoD as Congress which is responsible for bad decision making, cost overruns, and keeping outdated programs going. I bet if you asked all 900 or so US Army Generals if they would rather have FCS or the money that was blown on it for use in other places, I bet the overwhelming majority would rather have had the money to use elsewhere. Remember, Congress is ultimately in control of the DoD because Congress controls spending. And spending creates jobs which in turn help Congressmen/women get elected. And the opposite helps them get unelected, which is why these sorts of programs keep going long after they should have been killed/modified.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Remember that the Stryker vehicles, as fielded today, were not originally supposed to be the end product. They were originally conceived of as stepping stones towards something else. However, the massive amounts of money poured into reconfiguring the LAV III into Strykers has probably, defacto, killed the idea of ground up wheeled vehicle designs in the foreseeable future.

Let's face it... until there is some major breakthrough in armor technology, how much better could a ground up vehicle design be than the current Strykers? Probably not enough to justify the R&D costs. Since the Strykers are doing a very good job at their intended roles, and money is tight, it seems like the replacement for the Stryker can wait another decade or so. The Abrams and Bradleys have been around for almost 30 years now, so why not another 25 for the Strykers?

IMHO not everything in the FCS program is crapola. There are some pretty solid pieces of technology in there which could be adapted for use in more practical vehicles. For example, the auto-loader for the SPA variant. That looks pretty solid and offers the possibility of a more deployable heavy artillery capacity vs. the current Paladins. I'm sure some of the new fire control and remote control stuff could be useful too.

However, the main point is that FCS is designed to fight a war that is currently not on the radar. And if such a war came upon the US, chances are it would go nuclear anyway. So if the system isn't good for the wars we know we'll be fighting, for sure, over the next 20-50 years AND the wars it is designed to fight in are lost causes anyway, there appears to be little point in having FCS in its originally conceived form.

Steve

[Apocal]

IMHO not everything in the FCS program is crapola. There are some pretty solid pieces of technology in there which could be adapted for use in more practical vehicles. For example, the auto-loader for the SPA variant. That looks pretty solid and offers the possibility of a more deployable heavy artillery capacity vs. the current Paladins. I'm sure some of the new fire control and remote control stuff could be useful too.

Wasn't most of the actual gun technology of the NLOS-C taken from the Crusader?

And you can have relatively rapid (10-15 days) deployability for a complete heavy division if you prepositioned equipment on ships. And they'd offload with either two weeks or thirty days worth of supplies and more enroute, for something like 15-20 additional MPS ships.

[Battlefront.com]

It wouldn't surprise me to find out that an expensive component of one program was really a swiped technology from another expensive program. That way us taxpayers can be billed twice for the same thing

The FCS SPA is supposed to be light enough to be transportable by C-130 (IIRC, otherwise C-17 and C-5), which obviously the Paladin can't be since it exceeds the weight limit. It can also do upwards of 50mph on roads vs. the Paladin's 35mph. I presume the fuel usage would be much lower due to the reduced weight and rubber tracks compared to the Paladin. All of which makes the vehicle the FCS vehicle better in terms of logistics, which of course is critical for most of the places it's likely to be used. Look at the troubles we have getting stuff into Afghanistan to see what I mean.

In other words, if the program were managed efficiently and was focused on making the vehicles more deployable and, once deployed, more supportable... well, that would be fantastic. Wouldn't it? But as we know the program has instead become a black hole budget item which is now in danger of being killed off because it's over budget and not nearly ready for prime-time.

Steve

[Sgt Joch]

I never really understood the big push behind FCS. The eight manned FCS vehicles have more or less the same function as their Stryker vehicle counterparts, but the Strykers are still brand new, most of models only became operational in 2003-05.

The FCS vehicles would require brand new technology, which either only exists on the drawing board or is brand new and untested.

The only real advantage of the FCS over the Strykers that I could see was the FCS (BCT) network which certainly makes for great videos:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-Gh6-_9J4M

but again, the software and most of the hardware and systems to run the network do not exist yet and no one really knows how long and how much it will cost until they can actually make it work.

even though the Stryker was only meant as an interim vehicle, it makes more sense at this point to stick with what is now proven technology, even with its current faults, than keep pouring money into a brand new program.

It does look though as if the unmanned vehicles and other technologies which can actully be used by soldiers will eventually make it into the field.

http://news.cnet.com/2300-1008_3-6246291-1.html?tag=mncol

[MikeyD]

FCS has all the hallmarks of a classic DoD boondoggle. They fall into the same pattern over and over and over, whether its ships, or missiles, vehicles, aircraft... The project is over-optimistically low-ball priced by the contractor. The project then grows and expands beyond all recognition. More features get mandated, R&D runs into obstacles, weight grows, test are unsuccessful, even the original mission gets changed! Eventually you've got another Commanche helicopter or Marine EFV on your hands. I once heard Rumsfeld make the statement "First we'll field it, then we'll fix it" in connection with Pentagon acquisition policy.

[Battlefront.com]

Or Bradley or Osprey for that matter. In both cases there were serious calls from the officers who were to use these things to kill the programs. Why? Because they looked around at the plethora of other things that are necessary to wage war and found them lacking. They know that money doesn't go on trees, so if barrels and barrels of cash are being spent on a single project they can do the math and see that x, y, and z won't be replaced any time soon.

The fact that the vehicles EVENTUALLY finally appear to do what they were intended to do, usually a decade later than expected and WAY over budget, doesn't mean that the system works. Especially because many systems never, ever go into production and all that R&D money is lost (OK, a little of it carries forward). Just as the Coast Guard about how badly that hurts

Steve

[Clavicula_Nox]

FCS has all the hallmarks of a classic DoD boondoggle. They fall into the same pattern over and over and over, whether its ships, or missiles, vehicles, aircraft... The project is over-optimistically low-ball priced by the contractor. The project then grows and expands beyond all recognition. More features get mandated, R&D runs into obstacles, weight grows, test are unsuccessful, even the original mission gets changed! Eventually you've got another Commanche helicopter or Marine EFV on your hands. I once heard Rumsfeld make the statement "First we'll field it, then we'll fix it" in connection with Pentagon acquisition policy.

You know, even though Rumsfeld was a douchebag of the highest degree; his high standard of douchbaggery actually saved my life once in Iskandariyah.

FCS is more "taking the warrior from the war" garbage.

[dan/california]

You can't tell that much of the story and then stop, I mean its just cruel. If you really don't want to talk about it I understand, But......

[Tuomio]

Instead of 100 million gadgets, there should be more effort to build more disposable assets. Unmanned is the way to go.

99% of the current threats are in shape of high explosives buried in dirt roads. Tough nut to crack for smart people? I think not..6 years ago they landed 2 super high-tech, solar powered robots into mars which are STILL functioning.

Get the guys from Mythbusters series and 10 nasa sensor scientists working for 5 days and i'm sure you have your first disposable IED buster prototype. You cant out-armor yourself out from the shaped charges but you can definetly out-smart few sand monkeys living in the desert.

[Apocal]

The FCS SPA is supposed to be light enough to be transportable by C-130 (IIRC, otherwise C-17 and C-5), which obviously the Paladin can't be since it exceeds the weight limit. It can also do upwards of 50mph on roads vs. the Paladin's 35mph. I presume the fuel usage would be much lower due to the reduced weight and rubber tracks compared to the Paladin. All of which makes the vehicle the FCS vehicle better in terms of logistics, which of course is critical for most of the places it's likely to be used. Look at the troubles we have getting stuff into Afghanistan to see what I mean.

In other words, if the program were managed efficiently and was focused on making the vehicles more deployable and, once deployed, more supportable... well, that would be fantastic. Wouldn't it? But as we know the program has instead become a black hole budget item which is now in danger of being killed off because it's over budget and not nearly ready for prime-time.

I'm trying to look at things holistically.

The real logistic weight of artillery is in the ammunition. Going by Jim Dunnigan's "How to Make War" a U.S. heavy brigade uses 1,000 tons of ammunition per day on the offense. Elsewhere in the book he states that 70% of a division's ammunition goes to artillery, which I'm assuming (anyone correct me if I'm grossly wrong) holds true for brigades in our current force since DIVARTY is no more. Deploying a Paladin by air sucks, no arguing about it. But it's a one time suck and since a brigade only has 16 of them, it's a 500 ton one time suck. Keeping the pieces in powder and projos is going to be a 700 ton daily suck. Which still leaves out the 120mm (gun and mortar), 25mm, TOWs, small arms and other odds and ends of the ammo business. Then you get down to fuel which, again according to norms, is going to 200+ tons daily on the defense. And so on and so forth through other, sundry items that a fighting force needs to continue, well, fighting. So what are we really saving by going with lighter vehicles "not necessarily optimized for high-end combat"?

Obviously my bias against the whole "air deployability" metric is creeping out and the numbers I'm using could be wrong, but still I'm left wondering, "Did I miss something or did someone else?"

The mismanagement aspect of things... I don't believe I've seen a single major program without flaws so it's just kind of icing on the cake.

[Battlefront.com]

Good point about the ammo. Once of the things the Army is moving towards, regardless of platform, is the capability to use fewer rounds with more effect. One of the primary motivators is logistics. The old days of needing to pound a battalion sized force with hundreds of rounds of 155 are not likely to return any time soon, so having an artillery system basically centered around volume of fire doesn't make sense. Especially when the reality of current and near future ops is about avoiding collateral damage.

The upshot here is that if you can deploy a much smaller, lighter, and less logistically intensive vehicle which ALSO can hit things with pinpoint accuracy... you're now talking about a dramatic reduction in logistics requirements and a huge increase in deployability. Now you airlift 6 or 12 FCS vehicles and a couple of planeloads of "smart" 155 rounds and charges. Now you have an effective heavy artillery component for a brigade with enough ammo for a few days.

The FCS vehicles consume less fuel and (theoretically) parts due to their lower weight, smaller size, and rubber tracks. If you can both reduce the number of vehicles deployed, decrease the number of supply vehicles, decrease the number of re-supply missions (from CONUS to the actual gun)... you're talking about a significant impact on logistics. Granted, there is huge room for improvement in the other arms as well, which is what the overarching FCS program was supposed to address by offering similar benefits and efficiency of scale (e.g. all vehicles share common components).

The problem with FCS is not the concept. The concept is great and if implemented correctly would offer the US far more flexibility and sustainability for its military operations. The problem is that the degree of mismanagement has pushed the entire program into the danger zone. So instead of getting a "pretty good" implementation in a reasonable time for a reasonable cost, the nation gets nothing except a huge bill.

And that's the big difference between mismanagement of a program which eventually sees the light of day AND works (like Bradley) compared to one which doesn't (Sgt York).

BTW, I agree that the air deployability issue is another "boondoggle". In theory this is what the military needs if it is going to engage in smallish conflicts anywhere in the world on short notice. But the reality is the US' strategic lift capability is not up to the challenge in terms of being able to move the amount of stuff these plans call for.

Steve

[Clavicula_Nox]

You can't tell that much of the story and then stop, I mean its just cruel. If you really don't want to talk about it I understand, But......

Alright, some guys might remember when Rumsfeld was questioned by some Specialist at Camp Buering/Udari, Kuwait about the use of salvaged pieces of scrap metal being used to armor humvees. The doors were this really odd shaped hunk of metal with an open window; they were supposed to have little door handles from the canvas doors inserted into little holes, but they usually didn't line up with the frame and they were often tied shut with 550cord.

It was with such a door and such a humvee that I found myself driving in march of 2005. My little group was supporting a company from 155th BCT, Delta company, if I remember right. Anyways, we were driving through Iskandariyah looking for weapons caches and other stuff, IED went off, and the blast wave pushed me out against Rumsfeld's scrap metal door, broke the 550 cord, and deposited me on the street in a most rough manner. Now, my TC and gunner, obviously, did not benefit from Rumsfeld's cheapness, but uh..that's how it is.

Armor kits are neat, and everything, but they still turn into swiss-cheese.

[Apocal]

Good point about the ammo. Once of the things the Army is moving towards, regardless of platform, is the capability to use fewer rounds with more effect. One of the primary motivators is logistics. The old days of needing to pound a battalion sized force with hundreds of rounds of 155 are not likely to return any time soon, so having an artillery system basically centered around volume of fire doesn't make sense. Especially when the reality of current and near future ops is about avoiding collateral damage.

I have a video of 96 guns laying 1536 DPICM shells onto a target, dated April 2003.

The upshot here is that if you can deploy a much smaller, lighter, and less logistically intensive vehicle which ALSO can hit things with pinpoint accuracy... you're now talking about a dramatic reduction in logistics requirements and a huge increase in deployability. Now you airlift 6 or 12 FCS vehicles and a couple of planeloads of "smart" 155 rounds and charges. Now you have an effective heavy artillery component for a brigade with enough ammo for a few days.

I don't think we have planeloads of smart 155 rounds. Even if we did, in many cases, historically most cases, artillery targets have either been moving or ill-defined or both so the area effect was a necessary component. Maybe we've fixed things since, but the commander of the 3rd ID himself remarked that in spite of all of our satellites, UAVs, signal monitoring and special reconnaissance capability, his division didn't know where Iraqi troops and tracks were until the Iraqis began firing at them. I imagine for that reason he was (according to Takedown: The 3ID 21-day Assault on Baghdad) a big fan artillery, especially DPICM.

They had precision munitions, SADARM and possibly Cooperhead, available but mention of it being used is only made once, in reference to destroying a single T-55 tank spotted by a group of scouts early in the campaign.

I certainly think it would be awesome if something like fifty precision guided munitions could take the place of five hundred. But I also remember the air force had been hitting armies precisely for the better part of fifteen years before they got it right. And the conditions under which they got it right were a largely incompetent military, on a pool table flat desert, with lots of tanks and armored vehicles. When they weren't under those conditions, at close of business the effects were underwhelming.

The FCS vehicles consume less fuel and (theoretically) parts due to their lower weight, smaller size, and rubber tracks. If you can both reduce the number of vehicles deployed, decrease the number of supply vehicles, decrease the number of re-supply missions (from CONUS to the actual gun)... you're talking about a significant impact on logistics. Granted, there is huge room for improvement in the other arms as well, which is what the overarching FCS program was supposed to address by offering similar benefits and efficiency of scale (e.g. all vehicles share common components).

The problem with FCS is not the concept. The concept is great and if implemented correctly would offer the US far more flexibility and sustainability for its military operations.

Oh I certainly think the concept of a medium force is great; networking technology so we get sensor-to-shooter with no middlemen, hell yeah I'll vote for that; simplified logistics, fo' sho'. It's when it's turned into a kind of half-breed, "meaner than a Stryker but tame compared to Abrams/Bradley at twice the price" that it loses me.

The problem is that the degree of mismanagement has pushed the entire program into the danger zone. So instead of getting a "pretty good" implementation in a reasonable time for a reasonable cost, the nation gets nothing except a huge bill.

And that's the big difference between mismanagement of a program which eventually sees the light of day AND works (like Bradley) compared to one which doesn't (Sgt York).

Most definately. But it's looking like at least some of the FCS program will see the light of day. Actually, I'm pretty sure parts of it already have. Which is at least one benefit of that whole system of systems marketing slogan.

[Battlefront.com]

Clavicula_Nox,

I wouldn't crow too loudly about that 550 cord or the next thing you know some defense contractor will make a proposal that entire vehicles be made out of it and $123 Million will be spent on a feasibility study that takes 5 years to conclude that it would never. Grr.

Thanks for the story and glad you're still with us, even if it was due to negligence.

Apocal,

Oh... absolutely there is still the need for massed gunfire at times, but those are the same times when you have the luxury of prepositioning. So I'll amend my previous comments by saying that the chances of needing 96 gun fire support are quite narrow. Plus, the case still is true that if you reduce the logistics tail you don't reduce the chances of providing such fire... you increase it. If we could manage a 1536 round barrage with the existing system, then a more efficient system could do that and more.

Clearly for massed targets there's no economical way to employ smart munitions as the primary shell of choice. Plus, why would you want to since a target rich environment is just about the only time a massed bombardment works effectively

Yes, the whole Netcentric approach is not a substitute for tried and true military stuff. It's a "force multiplier". If you have no basics then 100 times 0 = 0

I am also completely in agreement with the FUBAR that FCS has turned into. The Pentagon could teach even someone with a low IQ how to take a good idea and completely screw it up. Sure, sure... we get some residuals out of the disaster that get worked into some other program or another... but if you look at the total cost of the failed project and then the good stuff that is viable outside of it... I bet the % of good to bad is extremely unfavorable.

Back in 2003 and 2004 I read a lot of criticism of FCS by those in uniform. I thought it was too early to declare it a boondoggle. But now I'm wholeheartedly of the opinion that it is. Stryker, on the other hand, has done far more and with far fewer Dollars spent than FCS likely ever will.

Steve

[Clavicula_Nox]

Steve, 550 cord is great. We had guys running around with M249s that were literally held together by the stuff.

I don't know if lack of armor is negligence or not. Certainly, much of the operation was poorly planned and supported, but I'm not one who thinks every humvee needs the maximum amount of armor. Certainly the gunners need something, and maybe the doors should have some light kevlar or something, but what is the point in heavy duty armor that overloads the vehicle while providing minimal protection from IEDs?

I'm not overly familiar with FCS, but what components are going to survive the purge?

[ChrisND]

I don't know if lack of armor is negligence or not. Certainly, much of the operation was poorly planned and supported, but I'm not one who thinks every humvee needs the maximum amount of armor. Certainly the gunners need something, and maybe the doors should have some light kevlar or something, but what is the point in heavy duty armor that overloads the vehicle while providing minimal protection from IEDs?

Reminds me when we deployed (this was before those armor kits), and we had to fortify the humvees with sandbags. They were so loaded down that they could barely do more than crawl...

[Clavicula_Nox]

Reminds me when we deployed (this was before those armor kits), and we had to fortify the humvees with sandbags. They were so loaded down that they could barely do more than crawl...

We had something similar for our guntrucks. The gunner stood in the back (no sissy troop strap required!) and we stacked sandbags up to his calf, then installed regular benches, and put sandbags on the seats.

We also had little scrap metal plates on our floorboards, which I thought was completely ridiculous. I mean, seriously, 5mm of scrap metal at my feet is supposed to do something besides create more shrapnel?

On occasion, we got away with canvas doors when no one was looking, or we would pull our scrap doors off and put them in the back of one of our vehicles. I always preferred no doors. Nowadays, humvees are like little coffins rolling down the road.

[Battlefront.com]

Clavicula_Nox,

I don't know if lack of armor is negligence or not. Certainly, much of the operation was poorly planned and supported, but I'm not one who thinks every humvee needs the maximum amount of armor. Certainly the gunners need something, and maybe the doors should have some light kevlar or something, but what is the point in heavy duty armor that overloads the vehicle while providing minimal protection from IEDs?

Yup. My point is basically this... you are but a grunt, I am but a civilian. We aren't supposed to be thinking about the next war's equipment, tactics, and strategies. You're supposed to concentrate on the "here and the now" and I'm supposed to be too ill informed to have an opinion worth a damned. But somewhere there are people, generally with shiny bits of metal on them, who are supposed to figure out what the future will hold for military ops. Afterall, what moron thinks the next war is going to be exactly like the previous one? I mean, c'mon... even a civilian chump like me knows that (OK, I have a degree in history and spend most of my waking hours on military stuff, but supposedly that doesn't count for much ).

So my thinking is that SOMEONE should have thought "hey, based on a very long established track record, it's probable that not everybody in Iraq is going to love us being there. And if they don't, they aren't likely to hold back. And if they don't hold back, it's highly probable that they'll try hitting us where we're most vulnerable". But nope... as far as I can tell, this was NOT what happened for a variety of reasons (many of them ideological from the top).

What happened because of this? What always happens in the US military... the grunts realize that the "here and now" is quite different than they were told it would be. Sandbags get stuck onto roofs, Vietnam Gun Truck designs are dusted off, totaled vehicles are cannibalized for armor, etc. Better than nothing, but it's the same old thing of fighting the present war using a mix-mash of equipment, tactics, and strategies which aren't cohesive nor with full effort behind a well thought out combination of things.

What we should expect of those in charge is figuring out ahead of time that there is no longer a frontline and likely never will be ever again. If you don't completely crush your enemy's will to fight then you're supply trains are going to get hit and hit hard. Therefore, figure out some way to fix the problem and optimize the solution for it.

One stop-gap method the US used in 2004 was to fly most stuff around Iraq instead of going overland. This was an extremely limited and expensive way to move things around, but very few aircraft were lost compared to what would have been lost going overland. Perhaps that is the best way to reduce vulnerability, but if so then shouldn't the forces in the field be optimized for the practical limitations of air lift capabilities? For example, not having to use 9000 batteries a day or protect foreign KBR contractors from unemployed locals?

That sort of thing And it's that sort of thing that FCS, in its current form, can't possibly solve.

Steve

[MikeyD]

You game me another idea of what an upcoming conflict might be... "War as photo op!" Some charismatic despot leader - lets say in Khazikstan to pick a spot at random - imagines himself a great historical figure in the making, except all past great historical figures had a 'great war' to distinguish them. So this despot concocts a jolly little invasion of a neighbor just to put on his resume. Unfortunately the convenient invaded neighbor has friends and allies and things don't go so well for our little despot. Think Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1914, except this happens in 2014.

[Clavicula_Nox]

Yeah Steve, I agree, but alot of people did question The Big Dumb Plan. Gen. Shinseki, chief of staff, went public with his objections and soon found himself out of a job. No more questioning after that.

I've been reading about how Obama and Gates want to re-work the acquisitions process, and if it turns out to be better, then that's fine by me. I just haven't read any details on what they're trying to do.

One stop-gap method the US used in 2004 was to fly most stuff around Iraq instead of going overland.

I remember that in '05. Guys would fly in from Baghdad (rather than drive 30mi) and act like they just went through the worst hell ever. It was weird.