Breaking (multiple levels) Red on Red!

[Cpl Steiner]

John Kettler,

The trouble with these scare stories is that we've heard them all before and it's difficult to be sure they amount to anything. I managed to find a "Telegraph" article which indeed suggested that the Operation Brimstone ships were steaming towards the Iranian coast. However, I also found articles that said there were already large numbers of ships off the Iranian coast as long ago as 2007. Indeed, it isn't that long ago that a load of British naval personnel were captured and held by the Iranians. Couldn't the new deployments just be part of the ongoing naval operations in that area, either to raise the temperature on Iran a little or just to allow other ship crews some R&R?

There was also that story not so long ago about an Israeli 100+ aircraft exercise off the Greek coastline, which was allegedly a practice for a deep strike into Iran. I'm sure Israel is scared stiff of a nuclear-armed Iran, and we know how close Israel and America are, so anything is possible!

If the stories are true then it does indeed look like Iran is being lined up for a massive air campaign to knock out it's NBC capabilities once and for all but I think I'll wait for some more solid confirmation from the mass media before I start building my bunker!

[purpheart23]

Don't think i'd rely on the mass media there Steiner. They've been good for nothing but reporting the extremely obvious.

[Splinty]

I don't think the U.S. and it's allies are going to do anything to Iran right now unless Iran does something to actively provoke it. I beleive this because there has been no repositioning of any ground forces in the region.

[Cpl Steiner]

I don't think the U.S. and it's allies are going to do anything to Iran right now unless Iran does something to actively provoke it. I beleive this because there has been no repositioning of any ground forces in the region.

If there was a war with Iran though, wouldn't it just be an air war? I can't see the US wanting to go toe-to-toe with the Iranians on the ground considering how committed they already are to Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if the Iranians decided to invade Iraq, I guess the US could beat them off from the air whilst the Iraqi army provided the ground troops to defend the country.

[John Kettler]

People,

The fat's officially in the fire. Again! Not only is Germany strongly backing Georgia's membership in NATO, but German Chancellor Angela Merkel appeared side by side with Saakashvili in Tbilisi to say so.

http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5irjdfQdHqnS5LyXe2laHu-TxW8zQ

Cpl Steiner,

There's long been a rule of thumb regarding carrier deployments. It's called the 1/3 rule. In order to forward deploy one carrier, you need three. Why? Because one's in drydock, and the other's at sea off the coast of the U.S. working up its air group. Given what we already have there in the Gulf area, if we are in fact sending what's indicated, assuming it's not a routine relief (don't have the figures presently for how long the CVBGs already there have been there), then this is a major military move, one that leaves lots of other places exposed in consequence.

purpheart23,

Disgusting topic to be sure, but the tech's as real as your nose. Your point about the U.S. response to such an attack is well taken, seeing as how I've heard that word was passed before OIF via cell phone calls to various Iraqi generals. OTOH, it could fairly be argued the U.S. has no moral leg to stand on, having doused Iraq and Afghanistan in hundreds of tons of 400,000 year half life DU, causing enormous ongoing losses to them (and ourselves, since we're in the same environment and aren't masked) and waging, in the view of many, illegal radiological warfare.

Regards,

John Kettler

[The_Red_Rage]

Markel was always very anti-Russian. It's some sort of ex-Soviet complex (she is East German) certain world leaders seem to be having.

Serving in a NATO country, I can only hope that countries like Georgia and Ukraine never get accepted. Ukraine is a political time bomb, with anti-Russian West Ukraine currently in power, and very pro-Russian East Ukraine (Donbass, Crimea for example are 100% ethnically Russian). Crimea is the "next big thing" - it is a Russian city that was transferred from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. Following the new Ukrainian logic that all Soviet was bad, they should really give it back. There is a strong Tatar influence there too, with newly discovered Islamic Vakhabbitism. So the Russian population is stuck between Ukranian nationalism and Islamic radicalism in their own house.

As for Georgia, they are not up to NATO standard and will never be. I will never feel comfortable serving alongside "soldiers" who found it OK to level a civilian city, shoot at fellow peacekeepers, finish off wounded, and when **** hit the proverbial fan, they simply ran (didn't even pack up and run - just ran, leaving hangars full of equipment) - i am disgusted by such behaviour as it is un-soldierly and not how a NATO-affiliated soldier should conduct himself.

On subject of German involvement:

http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3571263,00.html

[The_Red_Rage]

More humour. This one ought to get quite a few laughs.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wrRN1_2pM08&feature=related

[John Kettler]

People (BigDukeSixField in particular),

As if things weren't weird enough and unnerving already, I just got this article which supposedly appeared August 15th on www.NewsWithViews.com Only, I can't find it there, and Byron J. Richards normally writes about health matters. Even so, the linked article tells quite a tale, with many aspects covered I certainly had not heard of before. If the article's right, BFC may need that modern module sooner rather than later. Why? It says one U.S. infantry brigade equivalent is landing in Georgia, joining 4000 Blackwater and Israeli soldiers already there!

http://www.rense.com/general83/dreep.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Here's an analysis I just learned about concerning Moscow's proxy offensive in South Ossetia. This was written before everything went tilt! From what I can see, the analysis is cogent and insightful, providing a lot of previously unknown to me background.

http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373298

Regards,

John Kettler

[Guest BigDukeSixField]

I've talked to people who've been to Tskhinvali including co-workers I've known for years, and "completely leveled" is overstating it.

What the Georgians did was line up something between 20 - 40 howitzers, a similar number of 130 - 210mm rocket launchers, and about 30 or so tanks on the hills around Tskhinvali and then fired until they ran out of ammunition. That is enough to smash buildings and block a few streets, break pretty much every window in the vicninty and start fires and knock down trees, and of course kill civilians that don't get into a basement. It is not nearly enough to level a town built primarily of brick and reinforced concrete maybe 25-30 kilometers square.

I think the Russian peacekeeper casualties are indicative. Here we have a battalion-sized unit of infantry recruited and trained to Russian paratrooper standards. So these are guys that know their weapons and their small unit tactics, they have more than a few combat veterans in their ranks, and they have defensive positions and holes that they can run to. On the other hand, the Georgian barrage was pretty unexpected, no one thought the Georgians would be so foolish as to just unload on Tskhinvali, and even a good infantry unit will take extra casualties the first time it is under intense artillery fire.

I don't know the exact firing times, but the Georgian bombardment of Tskhinvali was ongoing for about 24 - 36 hours, not constant but fires from time to time, and supposedly most intense over the first night of the actual shooting war.

The Russians took about 20 - 30 per cent casualites. (Although I am willing to be a good portion of those remained in the ranks.) That is I think a very believable result, considering what the Georgians had and did, and the type of unit they were firing on.

And that sort of bombardment simply is not enough to level a town the size of Tskhinvali. It is also worth remembering that by the second morning, the Russians were firing counter-battery, according to them with good effect.

A comment on the Russian peacekeepers, they weren't exactly the same as the UN. For the record, they for years never lifted a finger when the Ossetians fired bullets or even mortars into Georgia, and in the two weeks leading up to the war the Ossetians were shooting MGs daily and mortar stonks frequently, and something like 6 Georgians had been killed and 20 injured just since the beginning of August from Ossetian fire. The Russians peacekeepers did nothing, indeed, the Georgians have evidence the supposedly neutral Russians were supplying the Ossetians ammunition. So it is hard to say the Georgians attacked without provocation.

The thing is, just because your are provoked it does not logically follow you must embark on a suicidal war. That is the essential Georgian position today. Me, I think they are lying, and that in fact they had capture of Ossetia on their agenda but they underestimated the staying power of Russian infantry under artillery fire, and the willingness and readiness of the Kremlin to retaliate.

As to civilian deaths Elmar, you know, I might just believe 2000+, what with the small scale ethnic cleansing, old people out on the streets trying to find water, Tskhinvali citizens trying to walk their way out and the Georgians shelling the exit road to keep more Russians from coming in, and the CEP of a Grad rocket. Civilians if they can't run and hit the dirt (i.e., if they are not young, or ARE carrying bagged) will get cut up in conditions like that, and combat lifesaving among civilians sucks, so you have to figure alot of the wounds turned into preventable but very real deaths.

Point is, and I agrew with you here, this is not the same as people being blasted into oblivion by the Marne-level Georgian artillery barrage as the Ossetians huddled in their basements. Rather, it is the outcome of tens of thousands of people walking around, upright, in an area hit periodically by random artillery shells over the course of 36 - 48 hours. That said, the actual count could be in the hundreds not thousands.

One caveat regarding Abkhazia: Before the wars of 1992 the region was predominantly Georgian. There are some 200 - 250 thousand ethnic Georgian (mostly, their are minor ethnicities like Mingrels) refugees from that war, they are still alive and they are still in Georgia, and just like the Palestinians as far as they are concerned Abkhazia is still their home. Were all these ethnic Georgians repatriated to the place where they and their forefathers were born, they would outnumber the Abkhaz. This makes a plebiscite in Abkhazia a tricky proposition: whom do you allow to vote?

Ossetia is I think a simpler proposition. The ethnic Georgian presence there is minimal, and given the war no way the Ossetians would ever accept Georgian rule.

[John Kettler]

BigDukeSixField,

Wasn't buying the Stalingrad level of destruction argument before, and definitely wasn't after seeing the picture links The_Red_Rage posted. Hugely appreciate the info on how and with what it was done.

Am particularly interested in evidence you may have seen or heard for or against claims in the articles I cited regarding prior presence of Israeli mercenaries/troops and Blackwater in Georgia, their participation in the attack on South Ossetia, alleged presence of U.S. "advisers" in the field with Georgian troops during the Russo-Georgian War, and the reported arriving/arrival of a U.S. infantry brigade equivalent in Georgia. Also, can you confirm or deny the reported clash between a 120 foot Georgian missile boat, which lost, and a Russian Krivak, which won, sinking the Georgian vessel?

Seems to me almost any of those would make for a very hot internationally reported story if proven.

Regards,

John Kettler

[akd]

HRW is still only able to confirm 44 civilian deaths in Tshkinvali, and it is very unusual for HRW to try to hold down estimates of civilians deaths. They are really making a point on this one, because they believe S. Ossetian/Russian genocide propaganda is inciting ongoing violence against civilians.

[John Kettler]

akd,

Apparently that's not all. The reports I've seen indicate the Russians are essentially demolishing Georgia's infrastructure. Last week it was an air defense facility, yesterday a bridge was destroyed, denied by the Russians, but CNN had footage of the ruin, and today THE WASHINGTON TIMES is saying the runway at Senaki has reportedly been blown up by the Russians, but so far, this is unconfirmed. What is confirmed is that 4 x 15 men per Russian APCs smashed right through a Georgian roadblock consisting of Georgian police cars while the hapless cops stood by moving from Gori to Igoeti. So, not only is no one seeing any signs of a withdrawal as required by the cease fire terms,

there is still reinforcement of the most forward Russian position in the country. Worse,

the UNHCR can't get through to South Ossetia, and there are reports that people who try to leave are being shot at. Gori is heavily occupied and pretty much locked down.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/19/georgia-russia-exchange-war-prisoners-8344322/

Confusion reigns! This article says one thing, but the photo series paints two different pictures, which seem to be happening simultaneously. On the one hand, the Russians are reinforcing, as in the SS-21s, BMPs and ZSU 23/4s (see photo series) being brought in. On the other, a small column of tanks (I make them T-62 and T-62E), BTRs and trucks has actually left Gori and is bound for Tshkinvali. ATGMs have definitely been spotted. See pic 109 for example.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080818/ts_afp/georgiarussiaconflict;_ylt=AsJ2bhzthCJWf78BhVzx7InlWMcF

Turning now to the forking discussion I made earlier, NATO has recognized that its credibility is at stake, so is presenting a unified front on bringing Georgia into the fold.

This is also evidently intended to thwart the perceived Russian goal of stopping just such a move and "encouraging" others so inclined to reconsider. Had a great article on this earlier, but failed to bookmark it and now can't find it. Oh, and Condi's now spouting New Iron Curtain rhetoric. Gah! That's former military analystese for "I think they're all crazy and acting out a death wish!"

Meanwhile, we have this analysis of the cyberwar activities conducted.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/19/georgia-hackers-strike-apart-from-russian-military/

Regards,

John Kettler

[Guest BigDukeSixField]

On the mercenaries, very little.

As noted, there was a report early on of the Russians killing a large African-looking fellow in desert boots and wearing a Iraq-style desert t-shirt under his fatigues, and I talked to Russians who saw the body. Maybe some US super-secret dude, maybe some child of a Soviet-era African-Georgian mixed marriage. I'd rate the statistical chances of either about the same - too small to believe w/o more evidence, but there is eyewitness evidence. So who knows.

The Russians today say they captured or killed 2 x Ukrainians and 3 x Arabs fighting on the Georgian side. The Ukrainians I would be willing to bet would be Georgians that became Ukrainian nationals, that happens. As to the Arabs, I dunno, mixed marriages or Russian misidentification probably. But in any case, evidence of major foreign contingents on the Georgian side is pretty much nil.

HRW is pretty reliable, so maybe the Tskhinvali dead count is several dozen dead after all. But me, all those rockets and artillery Saakashvili fired, and what with refugees trying to walk out, that just seems too much flying metal for such low civilian casualties. The peacekeepers holding out sure, I can buy that, totally those guys know digging in. But it just seems improbable to me that with all that fire going in, you didn't get more dead civilians than about four dozen.

But the bottom line here is HRW is pretty durn reliable on stuff like this, so maybe I better re-evaluate my guesswork.

On the Igoeti roadblock as it happens I can speak with some authority as I have been up there so often some of the troops already recognize me, and the captain in charge can't decide why I keep pestering him.

As I understand it, what we had when the Russians busted through was a failure to communicate - it was part of the recon company in the area, they had been up on some hills above the village and they were pulling back to the main roadblock. However, to do that they had to get through the Georgian police roadblock. By rights the Russians should have gone cross-country around the Georgian roadblock, but the Russian platoon commander apparently said "Screw that, I'm going by road." So he did, too.

I was about 5 km. away walking around Russian positions and chatting with Ivan when all this happened (and durn hot it was too, it's about 100 in the afternoon these days) but I talked to some eyewitnesses later on and they gave pretty much the same story: The Georgians had a chance to move their pretty white cars out of the way, the Russians warned them, but the Georgians did nothing and put their money on Russian respect for foreign property and Georgian traffic regulations. Bright move, boys.

Gori is not locked down, civilian traffic may pass through and so may nasty journos. There are a bunch of Russian checkpoints but it can be done. Georgian official traffic is not allowed, nor is international aid traffic w/o clearing it with the Russians first.

Interesting that the Russians are cratering Senaki airfield, I heard they were trashing things up that way but didn't know what exactly.

I kind of wonder why the Russians are bothering, when Halliburton gets in here they'll fix the damage in about a week, and at a fair price too I hear.

[Guest BigDukeSixField]

Regarding the naval clash, all I know is that the Russians are saying they sank one Georgian vessel in a open water exchange, and the rest of the Georgian navy at its moorings in the harbor.

[The_Red_Rage]

Mercenaries are not entirely out of the question. 2nd Chechen war, and 2 years of lawlesness prior to it, attracted alot of garbage to the region from all over the world. Plus sketchy links Saaskashvili has with Pentagon, which i am sure include access to a massive network of private security contractors. Over 100000 private contract presonnel operate in Iraq alone, with 20000 of them American and the rest of very international mix.

Ukrainian radicals (Banderovtsi/modern Nazi fanboys) have a history of sending volounteers to wars, just to spite Russia - their "big" idea is that what is bad for Russia is good for them so they will fight on any side as long as it is against Russia (1st Chechen war is the best example). Pre-Baltic states provided alot of mercenaries as well during the last 15 years of coflicts in Caucasus.

[Guest BigDukeSixField]

Well, the Russians don't exactly have a history of moderation when it comes to pointing fingers, and right now they're accusing Ukraine of supplying Georgia lots of military equipment including the ADA that shot down all the Russian jets - but there are no accusations of Ukrainian mercenaries. I think if there was even a grain of even the most questionable evidence, the Russian media/propaganda would have long gone to town on it.

I think security contractors in Iraq is a poor comparison as Georgia can't pay like the Americans.

Also, Georgian military performace was so cruddy it doesn't seem credible that any soldiers worth the name actually were helping therm.

Late note: The Russians just sunk two more Georgian naval ships, a Soviet-era landing shop and a US-donated coast guard cutter. Them Russian engineers, they're busy, busy, busy.

[Nidan1]

Stefan,

Thank you for the eyewitness accounts....cutting through all the BS and propaganda.

Giving us the straight skinny on this conflict is a real service to this community.

Please take care of yourself...I have a few warmed up StugIVs for you when you get back home.

[Guest BigDukeSixField]

Fred,

You and your goddam StuGs. It almost makes it worth going to a RL war, just so I'm not getting the crap shot out of me by your £$%^&* assault guns. I hates them I do.

Don't know if I'm giving you guys the straight skinny, but you're right the forum deserves the best. Just doing what I can.

When we get back to doing turns ask me about doing my job underneath total Russian air superiority. I have a new appreciation for overcast, I can tell you.

[John Kettler]

BigDukeSixField,

Would that be aluminum overcast, steel and aluminum overcast, or aluminum, steel and titanium overcast? Hugely appreciate the reports! Stay safe!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Nidan1]

Fred,

You and your goddam StuGs. It almost makes it worth going to a RL war, just so I'm not getting the crap shot out of me by your £$%^&* assault guns. I hates them I do.

Don't know if I'm giving you guys the straight skinny, but you're right the forum deserves the best. Just doing what I can.

When we get back to doing turns ask me about doing my job underneath total Russian air superiority. I have a new appreciation for overcast, I can tell you.

Stefan,

Are you saying that Sukhoi ground attack aircraft do not fly in bad weather? Even my StuGs can drive in the rain....as you well know

[The_Red_Rage]

Turkish Cobra vs. high caliber sniper rifle:

http://krig42.livejournal.com/118266.html

Outcome was 3 dead passangers, wounded driver and the round still richocheted inside. Vihicle proceeded to roll into a ditch, which in turn took out its entire front suspension(!!!). Russians inspecting foreign trophees gave Cobra a nickname - Coffin.

[John Kettler]

The_Red_Rage,

Didn't realize you meant the Cobra wheeled vehicle, was thinking AH-1 Cobra helicopter.

Was thus confused when I read about 3 KIA, 1 WIA in two-place chopper! Am guessing the high caliber is 12.7mm, as in one of these. Looks like one shot hit smack in the right rear "bulletproof" glass.

http://www.warfare.ru/?lang=&catid=275&linkid=2284

Now for the international news....

Russia's sending a small CVBG based around its only true carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, and the ASW cruiser Moskva, to Tartus, Syria. Assad's said he's open to a Russian base in the region. He's backed Russia's play in South Ossettia and Abkhazia and wants Russian antimissile defenses on his soil.

http://www.barentsobserver.com/russia-sends-aircraft-carrier-to-syria.4502333-16149.html

Meanwhile, Assad went shopping in Russia, looking for long range SAMs and offering to let the Russians put the SS-26 Iskander into Syria, and the Russian president talked to Olmert, offering reassurances that the Russo-Israeli relationship is just fine. Merely the tip of the information at the link!

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1219218602024&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

Stratfor.com's George Friedman has provided us with another incisive analysis of the global and regional correlation of forces as it applies to the Georgia situation and regional aftermath. (Used with permission.)

The Real World Order

August 18, 2008 | 1835 GMT

Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report

By George Friedman

On Sept. 11, 1990, U.S. President George H. W. Bush addressed Congress. He spoke in the wake of the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the weakening of the Soviet Union, and the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. He argued that a New World Order was emerging: “A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor, and today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.”

After every major, systemic war, there is the hope that this will be the war to end all wars. The idea driving it is simple. Wars are usually won by grand coalitions. The idea is that the coalition that won the war by working together will continue to work together to make the peace. Indeed, the idea is that the defeated will join the coalition and work with them to ensure the peace. This was the dream behind the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, the United Nations and, after the Cold War, NATO. The idea was that there would be no major issues that couldn’t be handled by the victors, now joined with the defeated. That was the idea that drove George H. W. Bush as the Cold War was coming to its end.

Those with the dream are always disappointed. The victorious coalition breaks apart. The defeated refuse to play the role assigned to them. New powers emerge that were not part of the coalition. Anyone may have ideals and visions. The reality of the world order is that there are profound divergences of interest in a world where distrust is a natural and reasonable response to reality. In the end, ideals and visions vanish in a new round of geopolitical conflict.

The post-Cold War world, the New World Order, ended with authority on Aug. 8, 2008, when Russia and Georgia went to war. Certainly, this war was not in itself of major significance, and a very good case can be made that the New World Order actually started coming apart on Sept. 11, 2001. But it was on Aug. 8 that a nation-state, Russia, attacked another nation-state, Georgia, out of fear of the intentions of a third nation-state, the United States. This causes us to begin thinking about the Real World Order.

The global system is suffering from two imbalances. First, one nation-state, the United States, remains overwhelmingly powerful, and no combination of powers are in a position to control its behavior. We are aware of all the economic problems besetting the United States, but the reality is that the American economy is larger than the next three economies combined (Japan, Germany and China). The U.S. military controls all the world’s oceans and effectively dominates space. Because of these factors, the United States remains politically powerful — not liked and perhaps not admired, but enormously powerful.

The second imbalance is within the United States itself. Its ground forces and the bulk of its logistical capability are committed to the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States also is threatening on occasion to go to war with Iran, which would tie down most of its air power, and it is facing a destabilizing Pakistan. Therefore, there is this paradox: The United States is so powerful that, in the long run, it has created an imbalance in the global system. In the short run, however, it is so off balance that it has few, if any, military resources to deal with challenges elsewhere. That means that the United States remains the dominant power in the long run but it cannot exercise that power in the short run. This creates a window of opportunity for other countries to act.

The outcome of the Iraq war can be seen emerging. The United States has succeeded in creating the foundations for a political settlement among the main Iraqi factions that will create a relatively stable government. In that sense, U.S. policy has succeeded. But the problem the United States has is the length of time it took to achieve this success. Had it occurred in 2003, the United States would not suffer its current imbalance. But this is 2008, more than five years after the invasion. The United States never expected a war of this duration, nor did it plan for it. In order to fight the war, it had to inject a major portion of its ground fighting capability into it. The length of the war was the problem. U.S. ground forces are either in Iraq, recovering from a tour or preparing for a deployment. What strategic reserves are available are tasked into Afghanistan. Little is left over.

As Iraq pulled in the bulk of available forces, the United States did not shift its foreign policy elsewhere. For example, it remained committed to the expansion of democracy in the former Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, to include Ukraine and Georgia. From the fall of the former Soviet Union, the United States saw itself as having a dominant role in reshaping post-Soviet social and political orders, including influencing the emergence of democratic institutions and free markets. The United States saw this almost in the same light as it saw the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II. Having defeated the Soviet Union, it now fell to the United States to reshape the societies of the successor states.

Through the 1990s, the successor states, particularly Russia, were inert. Undergoing painful internal upheaval — which foreigners saw as reform but which many Russians viewed as a foreign-inspired national catastrophe — Russia could not resist American and European involvement in regional and internal affairs. From the American point of view, the reshaping of the region — from the Kosovo war to the expansion of NATO to the deployment of U.S. Air Force bases to Central Asia — was simply a logical expansion of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a benign attempt to stabilize the region, enhance its prosperity and security and integrate it into the global system.

As Russia regained its balance from the chaos of the 1990s, it began to see the American and European presence in a less benign light. It was not clear to the Russians that the United States was trying to stabilize the region. Rather, it appeared to the Russians that the United States was trying to take advantage of Russian weakness to impose a new politico-military reality in which Russia was to be surrounded with nations controlled by the United States and its military system, NATO. In spite of the promise made by Bill Clinton that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union, the three Baltic states were admitted. The promise was not addressed. NATO was expanded because it could and Russia could do nothing about it.

From the Russian point of view, the strategic break point was Ukraine. When the Orange Revolution came to Ukraine, the American and European impression was that this was a spontaneous democratic rising. The Russian perception was that it was a well-financed CIA operation to foment an anti-Russian and pro-American uprising in Ukraine. When the United States quickly began discussing the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians came to the conclusion that the United States intended to surround and crush the Russian Federation. In their view, if NATO expanded into Ukraine, the Western military alliance would place Russia in a strategically untenable position. Russia would be indefensible. The American response was that it had no intention of threatening Russia. The Russian question was returned: Then why are you trying to take control of Ukraine? What other purpose would you have? The United States dismissed these Russian concerns as absurd. The Russians, not regarding them as absurd at all, began planning on the assumption of a hostile United States.

If the United States had intended to break the Russian Federation once and for all, the time for that was in the 1990s, before Yeltsin was replaced by Putin and before 9/11. There was, however, no clear policy on this, because the United States felt it had all the time in the world. Superficially this was true, but only superficially. First, the United States did not understand that the Yeltsin years were a temporary aberration and that a new government intending to stabilize Russia was inevitable. If not Putin, it would have been someone else. Second, the United States did not appreciate that it did not control the international agenda. Sept. 11, 2001, took away American options in the former Soviet Union. No only did it need Russian help in Afghanistan, but it was going to spend the next decade tied up in the Middle East. The United States had lost its room for maneuver and therefore had run out of time.

And now we come to the key point. In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia’s southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.

Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.

The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible.

The Russians were partly influenced in their timing by the success of the American surge in Iraq. If the United States continued its policy and had force to back it up, the Russians would lose their window of opportunity. Moreover, the Russians had an additional lever for use on the Americans: Iran.

The United States had been playing a complex game with Iran for years, threatening to attack while trying to negotiate. The Americans needed the Russians. Sanctions against Iran would have no meaning if the Russians did not participate, and the United States did not want Russia selling advance air defense systems to Iran. (Such systems, which American analysts had warned were quite capable, were not present in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007, when the Israelis struck a nuclear facility there.) As the United States re-evaluates the Russian military, it does not want to be surprised by Russian technology. Therefore, the more aggressive the United States becomes toward Russia, the greater the difficulties it will have in Iran. This further encouraged the Russians to act sooner rather than later.

The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground.

We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don’t, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn’t absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another.

The other country that is watching and thinking is Iran. Iran had accepted the idea that it had lost the chance to dominate Iraq. It had also accepted the idea that it would have to bargain away its nuclear capability or lose it. The Iranians are now wondering if this is still true and are undoubtedly pinging the Russians about the situation. Meanwhile, the Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it can’t do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the United States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see).

One of the interesting concepts of the New World Order was that all serious countries would want to participate in it and that the only threat would come from rogue states and nonstate actors such as North Korea and al Qaeda. Serious analysts argued that conflict between nation-states would not be important in the 21st century. There will certainly be rogue states and nonstate actors, but the 21st century will be no different than any other century. On Aug. 8, the Russians invited us all to the Real World Order.

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Stephen Kinzer of the GUARDIAN is concerned that losing in Georgia may be the last straw for the Bush administration, with the public perception corrective feared to be an attack on Iran!

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/20/usforeignpolicy.iran

Will close with video of some of the American and Israeli supplied weapons seized. Color them unimpressed with the M4's durability!

http://en.rian.ru/video/20080819/116138262.html

Regards,

John Kettler

[Guest BigDukeSixField]

Well they can fly OVER it, but they have trouble finding targets, and of course every once in a while that armored vehicle they see for a moment is a civilian car. Not so easy to talk to a local when half of your attention is on the sky, it's like you're a fat little rabbit and the sky is full of very hungry hawks, or maybe none at all, you don't know.

Stefan,

Are you saying that Sukhoi ground attack aircraft do not fly in bad weather? Even my StuGs can drive in the rain....as you well know

[John Kettler]

Nidan1,

The A-10, as originally built, was a VFR aircraft, with primitive avionics to match. The addition of PAVE PENNY (laser spot tracker), IIR Maverick (impromptu night capability by watching IIR display relayed to cockpit while missile was still on pylon) and, more recently, LANTIRN has changed that considerably, but the Su-25 is of the same period and was even more primitive than the A-10 when it first appeared. These days, it has considerable capability, at least on paper.

http://www.warfare.ru/?lang=&catid=256&linkid=1611

But paper capability simply isn't the same as pilots used to routinely operating in weather, and even routine flying requires expensive flight hours, before the more demanding matters can be addressed. BigDukeSixField rightly notes, too, that a pilot's eye is attracted to motion and that at even a Su-25's relatively low speed, target ID can be very tough, resulting in attacks on AFVs that aren't. Master tank buster Rudel found the target location and ID difficult from a plane flying at well under 200 mph, and he had tons of flight hours and combat experience. Pity, then, the FROGFOOT pilot who, by U.S. standards at least is woefully undertrained, doesn't get enough flying time to begin with, and is now supposed to work in weather and earlier may've been under fire and watched a buddy get blasted by a Georgian SAM. I'd be nervous, too, with heavily armed folk like that zooming around above me, just itching to blow something up!

Regards,

John Kettler