Why you should be skeptical of the skeptics

[Dinger]

How would we getthe stuff abroad, what domestic use have we for it, how often in the last fifty years has the Un or anyone else really required that kind of hardware, would the quantities we could provide be in any way decisive, or even meaningful in such a situation.

The Uk has about 390 MBT's and 80 SP155mm SPGuns, Scotlands proportion of that would be about 35 and 7.

Even to focus on that, at the expense of Infantry would be 100 tanks and say 40 SP's, assuming we send a third, which is a huge proportion which we couldn't sustain over any long term deployment You are talking an armoured company and a gun battery.

Such a deployment would be rarely if ever needed, would never be independanly depolyed and never make a huge difference.

It makes far more sense for Big nations to do big heavy thinks (UK, France< Germany, Italy) and smaller nations to speciallise on the secondary but vital long term low tasks which are the mainstays of UN opperations and where the real work is done.

Aye, but you're thinking with a military mind, and not a political one. A politician will tell you that in UN/EU operations, you want to be the guy who on paper makes, or can make a major contribution, but in practice, it's the other guys who are "doing the real work". The "real work" is full of liability: people get shot, atrocities *might* be committed. So you have the heavy stuff around for photo ops, to make people feel good, and to participate in the "desert storm" style UN activities. You have the support stuff around to do something in the other cases, but leave the whole "getting shot at" bit to the other countries. If your country doesn't have to do MOUT/FIBUA/FISH, you don't do it. That's politics.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Peter Cairns:

I should point out that if there is a difference in emphasis it is that these would very much be "Infantry" in the British tradition equiped with a better armed and better armoured vehicle to support them, as opposed to mechanised infantry who primarily fought out of vehicles.

Mr. Picky would like to point out that, in the British tradition, Mechanized Infantry are not supposed to fight from their carriers, barring exceptional circumstances (mostly in the "Yeah, right" category of tactics, such as the suggestion I saw in one manual that it might be sensible to motor through the enemy position in FV 432s, then dismount behind the position and assault back through it).

The people who fight from IFVs are, in British Army English, called Armoured Infantry.

The fact that APP-6A doesn't have clearly-distinguishable symbols for each type means that Warrior (armoured infantry) elements used to be distinguished by a little "W" under the sausage in the box. Now that FV432 is no longer used as an infantry carrier, the "W" is gone, and Saxon (mechanized infantry) elements are distinguished by the wheeled mobility modifier.

What they'll do with FRES I have no idea.

All the best,

John.

[Battlefront.com]

Abbott

YES! The quarter ton. And it still is Mutha beautiful!

Did you still have M38s driving around in your time, or did you putt around in the M151 (or both)? Gotta say that as far as a multi-purpose, multi use vehicle the Jeep is certainly head of its class!

Buq-Buq,

No, that wasn't it though I suppose I distorted something that I didn't mean to There was a single line in there that said HEAT and MPAT were the "main gun rounds of choice", but the quote about MG fire being the "weapon of choice" is accurate. In other words, the MG was used over the main gun, though when the main gun was used it was effective when using HEAT or MPAT.

The distortion I did on purpose relates to this part:

"Abrams had significant problems acquiring targets in sandstorm conditions."

the part I left out implied that 2nd Generation FLIR, which is part of the SEP upgrade, would mitigate the targeting problems found in Iraq. By leaving this bit out of my rant I left the reader with the impression that all Abrams suffered the same problem and that there isn't a solution for the problem. That isn't an accurate impression to leave, but it is the sort of thing that axe grinding rants do all the time.

Steve

[Abbott]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Did you still have M38s driving around in your time, or did you putt around in the M151 (or both)?

Steve

To be honest Steve I don't know, we just called them quarter-tons and drove them. As you know they were used for everything and with good maintenance they rarely broke.

[MikeyD]

I had to double-check the original post to make sure that pseudo-rant actually came from BFC!

Yeh, you can make a laundry list of vehicles worthy of rants.

I think I heard every single aluminum armor M88 tank recovery vehicle in-theater was knocked out (or at a minimum holed) in the push to Baghdad. They've been patched-up and given a layer of brand-new applique armor to correct the problem.

Hummers tend to roll over. Strykers REALLY tend to roll-over! This was immediately noted during initial capabilities testing. Oddly, tthe slat cage outriggers actually help by keeping them from doing a full 180.

Since the Abrams first came into service it's spontaneously caught fire some 600 times! I canvased old tankers on the subject and they couldn't recollect any other tank type that simply bursts into flame under them (not counting fuelling accidents, etc.)

That armored bulldozer thingie - I can't recall the designation - used to have bad backfire problems. I assume that problem eventually got fixed.

Cataloging historical and contemporary armor flaws could become quite the hobby for someone so inclined. For some REAL fun we should start compiling old Soviet equiipment flaws! :mad: :eek: But any old CMBB player knows sometimes what you most need in a situation is a clunky old BT-7 fast tank, regardless of its flaws, with its huge stockpile of 45mm HE.

[ October 31, 2005, 09:15 AM: Message edited by: MikeyD ]

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by Dinger:

The indo-europeans kicked ass with the horse. It gave them unmatched mobility, armor, and lethality.

it didn't give them any extra armour or lethality - in fact the horse is a bloody great unarmoured target that is extraordinarily vulnerable to common missiles of the era.

Armouring it requires vast wealth.

In addition the horse requires feeding, has a relatively short operational life, cannot be upgraded, and you need to own several of them in order to be sure of having one good one for battle.

And they're expensive to own and maintain.

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by Dinger:

The indo-europeans kicked ass with the horse. It gave them unmatched mobility, armor, and lethality.

it didn't give them any extra armour or lethality - in fact the horse is a bloody great unarmoured target that is extraordinarily vulnerable to common missiles of the era.

Armouring it requires vast wealth.

Using it as a weapon in itself is expensive - the preferred tactic was to use existing weapons from horseback and use its mobility to reduce exposure to enemy action thus lessening the vulnerability of the rider - the battlecruiser syndrome in fact!!

In addition the horse requires feeding, has a relatively short operational life, cannot be upgraded, and you need to own several of them in order to be sure of having one good one for battle.

They're expensive to own and maintain, and are of very limited use in difficult terrain - indeed they are a handicap among rocks, woods, marshes and the like.

See - anything can be dissed!

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

They're expensive to own and maintain...

Indeed. I believe in A Distant Mirror, Barbar Tuchman made the point that it took around 15 peasant families working the land full time to maintain a single mounted knight in the 14th. century.

Michael

[Dinger]

Folks, you're misunderstanding the purpose and the value of the Multipurpose Equine Combat Systems (MECS).

It is a system, first of all. You can't rag on one element in the system without considering the rest. So:

In addition the horse requires feeding, has a relatively short operational life, cannot be upgraded, and you need to own several of them in order to be sure of having one good one for battle.

The MECS has been employed for over 3000 years. An individual horse may only be available for front-line service for a half-decade or so, but replacement is easy and automatic. In fact, if you don't contract out the maintenance, costs less to replace a front-line horse than it does to maintain and replace your standard HMMWV. Yes, you do "need to own several of them". It is a system. But most of the other units can be tasked for support roles.

The MECS has excellent tactical value, but its value doesn't stop there: it is a magnificent logistical tool.

Fuel consumption wise: yes, the MECS uses fuel. But its energy consumption is minimal, especially when compared to fossil-fuel-based systems. In fact, supply is only a major issue when it's not deployed. On campaigns, it can usually find enough fuel to keep going. And if not, well, then the army has serious supply issues, and the MECS can be converted to food itself. This multipurpose functionality has been tested across centuries of confict.

It isn't expensive. First, citing Barbara Tuchman on the Fourteenth Century is like citing Tom Clancy for modern warfare: they are both reading more knowledgeable sources, and they both can write pretty, but that doesn't give them any particular authority. That Pulitzer thing just shows how little the Pulitzer people care about history. Second, what part of the fourteenth century are we talking about? At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Europe had a land and capital-poor, labor-intensive economy. At the end, labor was short, and land and capital were not. So "15 peasants" isn't a stable number. Third, the MECS is only a part of those expenses. A mounted knight was first and foremost a dude who sat on his butt, and needed to be fed. Most of them had wives, kids and servants, and those guys need to be fed too. Armor and weapons for the knight are not all part of the MECS expenses. Fourth, even taking the "15:1" number, try comparing that to a modern weapon system. A Stryker comes with a $2M price tag, and an operational life of what? 20 years maximum? Add in the costs of major overhauls/upgrades, training, maintenance and fuel, and you're looking at a bare minimum of $1M/year per unit. The US spent 2.5 billion dollars last year, and has about 300 million persons. That's $8333/person, or 120:1.

15:1 for superiority that conquered a continent and a half is a pretty good expenditure.

Moreover, the arguments about the MECS' tactical use are rather confused. They also fail to understand the nature of combat upgrades.

The MECS had several upgrades. A few that are well known are the introduction in the 7th-8th Centuries of an improved operator harness that allowed greater maneuverability and shock absorption. A few centuries later, the energy-transfer interface greatly improved MECS efficiency as a prime mover.

You're also misrepresenting tactical employment of the MECS.

"missiles of the time" may have had a bigger target in the MECS, but for them to be effective, they needed to be massed. In such a cone of lethality, the added profile of the MECS did not matter much -- far more important was the mobility it offered, allowing the operator to escape an ambuscade. Moreover, "missiles of the time" were largely ineffective even against unarmored units.

Speaking of which, yes there have been attempts over the years to up-armor the combat MECS units, trading mobility for staying power. This has met with varying success. Still, one of the excellent features of the MECS in combat is its ability to preserve the SA of the operator, by refusing to proceed into "tumbleweed" situations.

Nonetheless, the MECS excels as a weapon platform.

In the Middle Ages, heavily armored MECS operators were effectively invincible, wading into combat and smacking down those below them with impunity -- sure there were failures, but lethalities were rare.

The up-armored slow heavy MECS was not an unequivocal success, of course -- massed frontal assaults into a planned defense was a recipe for disaster -- of course, the same could be said of any era.

Perhaps a more effective MECS-weapons platform is the "light" model. The operator uses low-lethality missile weapons to harry the enemy at the limit of range, and encourages them to pursue. As they pursue, they first lose formation discipline, then situational awareness. The MECS-borne force then rallies, and massacres the enemy piecemeal.

But the Indo-Europeans were using the MECS mark I, and they were using it more as a "Battlefield Taxi" than anything else. This allowed them -- even with inferior numbers -- to concentrate their forces at will, and avoid the strongholds. Yes, the MECS does not excell in Himalayan-like mountainous terrain or Sahara-like desert conditions. I would add that it's amphibous capability is limited only to modest fording. But it is a testimony to the supremacy of the MECS mark I that between those boundaries, the Himalayas, the Ocean and the Desert -- with the exception of a few pockets here and there -- to this day, those people still share the language of the Indo-Europeans, and in that language, a lot of terminology arising from the MECS.

So, that's about as perfect a system as you can imagine.

[Thomm]

Isn't it kind of odd that most of the discussions (including new info) right now are not about the game any more, but rather about individual systems/vehicles?

I cannot remember page-long posts by the developers defending the merits of the T34 prior to CM:BB, for example!

Just noticing ...

Best regards,

Thomm

[luderbamsen]

Interesting thread. However, I feel that the whole "Abrams vs. Stryker" debate (not particular to this thread) is based on a fundamentally flawed premise: That the two vechiles are directly comparable.

The Stryker was never intended as a replacement for the Abrams. Instead, it was (and is) intended as a way of improving strategic mobility (being transportable by air rather than by sea) of US mechanized forces, and be implemented quickly, while a more permanent solution (i.e. the Future Combat System) is being developed.

In doing so, it necessarily has to be smaller and lighter than the Abrams/Bradley combo (unless the USAF were to massively expand their fleet of C-5/C-17 aircraft to carry it). At the same time, it must of course be affordable in terms of aquisition costs as well as lifecycle expenses.

Therefore, the "proper" question when discussing the pros and cons of the Stryker should be: "Given the requirements, does the Stryker provide the best (affordable) solution?"

[Battlefront.com]

I cannot remember page-long posts by the developers defending the merits of the T34 prior to CM:BB, for example!

Actually I can I can remember having to defend the reality of the Sherman for CMBO as well. There has always been a bunch that think that since something looks strong/weak on paper that it will be so in a realistically simulated environment. They take that false asssumption and then try to demonstrate why the game we are making is going to be a cakewalk for one side (usually the Germans, but with CMBB not always so). It has fallen upon us to illustrate why this thinking is not always sound.

Luderbamsen's final question is correct, though there are a LOT of people that still argue the basic concept of Light vs. Medium vs. Heavy.

Steve

[M Hofbauer]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The Abrams is a vast waste of money and resources. When the suspension isn't breaking down the engine is acting as a marshmello toaster for the crew. The enemy doesn't need expensive and technologically superior weapons to kill the few that remain operational. All they need is a 25mm gun, which even an armored car can defend against. And before certain disaster befalls these vehicles, they can't hit the broad side of a barn when the dust kicks up, they have to run their vehicles to rotate their turrets even though the taxpayer's bought them extra power units, the crews spend their time cleaning air filters instead of looking for those 25mm gunners, and when they do find the enemy they are likely to use a M240 MG to cut them down. One has to ask if it is worth all these millions and millions of Dollars to field a portable weenie roaster with a popgun for the occasional firefight situation.

Steve,

I agree with you wholeheartedly - it's nice to see an american realizing that the Abrams is not the supertank that jingoists make it out to be

namely:

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

An example of "perspective" on misjudgements in initial vehicle design.

The Abrams was not originally designed with a powered means of moving the turret with the engine completely shut down. This surprised me because this has long been noted as an undesirable feature for a turreted vehicle. Having the engine running means fuel consumption, noise (at least for the crew), heat signature, and preculsion of turret motion if the engine stalls or is otherwise non-running. To me it is obvious that this is something a tanker, sooner or later, is going to object to.

From the little I have seen it appears the problem wasn't noted in Gulf War One,(...)

it had been pointed out in the 80ies, indeed as soon as the Abrams-design in contrast to the Leo2 became known, that this idling-issue would be acerbated by the Abrams' design using a turbine engine.

it would be nothing but insult to the intelligence of US Army tankers(i.e., the people using it in everyday military service) to presume that they had not realized this and pointed to this problem.

but - just the same way that I am sure that the officers and enlisted men manning these Abrams had the common sense to realize this, I am also sure that back then there had been plenty of people who had plenty of creativity of explaining this away and dismissing such critique,

just the way that the emperor's new Stryker clothes are being presented as the best thing since black berets, and any issues are actually features or, at worst, the much-stressed "teething problems" (when, such as in this case, it is nothing but a full design flaw).

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

BTW, the runflats can go for about 30miles before they give out. A tracked vehicle with a "flat" can't go more than a few feet.

I thought only two of the four axles, i.e., four out of the eight wheels of the Stryker are run-flat - or is my info wrong? has this been rectified by now ? :confused: (I've asked before but nobody answered my inquiry before)

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The overheating and speed issues with FBCB2 have nothing, repeat, nothing to do with Stryker.

IMO it *is* a Stryker issue because the whole Stryker concept relies so heavily on this FOW-removal-situational-awareness-superior-intelligence-electronics-thingamajig for its mission if not for the very survival of the SBCT.

btw, I also find the heavy dependency on UAV-borne surveillance and intelligence to be quite a burden/problem.

UAVs don't have the survivability of manned aircraft like the A-10, an F-16 or even an Apache or Kiowa.

They're actually pretty easy targets not only for sophisticated AirDefense systems but also for regular most primitive cannon-AA (ZPU-4, ZU-23, for example).

Drones are maintenance-intensive and had a high loss rate even in the low-to-no-intensity missions in KFOR.

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

I don't think a hull down tank formation at 1500m presents much of a problem for a Stryker force. At that range each Rifle Platoon can, in theory, kill 9 tanks all on its own (3 Javelin Command Launch Units, 3 missiles). That is roughly a company of enemy armor threatened for every one Rifle Platoon. That means a three Stryker Rifle Platoons, stripped of their powerful organic company assets (MGS/ATGM, Mortars, and FIST vehicles), can in theory take on an enemy Tank Battalion. Add in the rest of the Stryker Rifle Company's organic assets and what they are linked to and things just get a whole lot deadlier.

One of the interesting advantages of the Stryker's tank killing ability is the redundancy inherent with man portable ATGMs. In theory this is how it works...

Each Squad of 9 men has a Javelin CLU and 3 missiles at its disposal. The Platoon has 3x9man Rifle Sqd, 1x7man Wep Sqd, 1x3man HQ) for a total of 37 soldiers. These are internally divided into two Teams each (except the HQ), which means there are 3 maneuver elements for each Javelin, and almost 4 soldiers for every Javelin. In theory this means there are 38 manuever elments vs. the enemy Tank Company's 10 when it comes right down to it. Otherwise if you go with Teams then there are 9 maneuver elements, which is about the same as the Tank Company. This, of course, excludes the 8 men and 4 Strykers, which for the sake of this comparison I'm leaving out of the picture (you treadheads can assume they are dead if you like )

To degrade a tank's ability to fight all you need to do is score one hit. If you hit a tank and kill its driver, and wreck its controls, the tank is stuck where it is. Hit its engine and it is stuck where it is. Hit a track and it is stuck where it is. Hit its sensors and it can't shoot. Hit its turret and perhaps jam the elevation or the traverse. Etc., etc., etc. In other words, there are dozens of ways you can seriously degrade performance without actually killing it.

With a Stryker AT Element you don't have the same sort of vulnerability. Kill 8 out of 9 guys and if that last guy has Javelin then it is still as much of a threat as it was when the squad was at full strength. The weapon itself has not been degraded at all, though rate of fire will likely be lower.

To eliminate the Javelin threat completely the tank must destroy something that is a bit smaller than the size of a case of beer. The unit could be anywhere at any time and change locations within seconds to literally anywhere. Therefore, the tank can only kill a Javelin threat by sheer luck. It has no idea where it is and therefore can have no idea if it hit it or not. Tanks are exactly the opposite... they are large, loud, and can not move undetected for long in a tactical environment. In short, tanks draw a LOT of attention to themselves while a Javelin is for all intents and purposes invisible. The tank must therefore assume that there is always a threat to its survival within 2500m that it can't see, which is the opposite of the infantry (in relation to tanks that is).

On top of all of this, a Javelin can be positioned ANYWHERE and then reposition itself within seconds, probably without being seen. Tanks can only appear in very predictable places, and they almost always leave a clear sign of where they are headed next. Javelins are by their very nature supposed to be scattered around, while tanks by their doctrine are supposed to remain concentrated. This generally makes tanks easier to kill in rapid succession than tanks have a chance of killing AT Elements in rapid succession because the AT Elements have only to identify one target while the tanks need to identify many simultaneously.

In a 1500m engagement in broken terrain between a Stryker Rifle Platoon, all on its own, and a hull down enemy Tank Company, I'd put all my money on the Stryker Rifle Platoon being the one to win the battle.

come on, Steve, that's a pretty artificial and obvious example:

it is a no-brainer that an isolated company of (apparently mostly stationary, btw) tanks without any infantry screen at all would be easy prey to a bunch of infantrymen being able to make full use of the advantages that footsoldiers have.

however, in this example it makes no difference whether it is Strykers, Humvees or even bicycles which are parked outside the action at the far side of the woods when the infantry goes stalking the tanks.

sincerely,

M.Hofbauer

[edit: edited for emphasis, smilies 'n stuff]

[ November 02, 2005, 05:00 PM: Message edited by: M Hofbauer ]

[Battlefront.com]

Hof,

but - just the same way that I am sure that the officers and enlisted men manning these Abrams had the common sense to realize this, I am also sure that back then there had been plenty of people who had plenty of creativity of explaining this away and dismissing such critique,

just the way that the emperor's new Stryker clothes are being presented as the best thing since black berets, and any issues are actually features or, at worst, the much-stressed "teething problems" (when, such as in this case, it is nothing but a full design flaw).

Sure, but that fits in with this thread I started. You can say this about any design flaw. Every vehicle has its downsides and flaws. Either technical or design. The new Leo, for example, was criticized by the Dutch LTC I mentioned in some thread or another, as being a terrible liability for urban warfare. All the talk about how great that tank is with the extra penetration power won't matter if the vehicle is found useless in an urban environment that it finds itself fighting in.

The trick is to not get carried away with the criticism. Sure, the Abrams has some failings. But overall, it is an awesome fighting vehicle that is expected to serve the US, and many other countries, for decades. The Aussies just chose the Abrams over the Leo 2, for example, even knowing the issue about turret power. It is simply bad logic to say that because it has a shortcoming that it is useless or can't perform its mission acceptably. Yet that is exactly what some are saying about the Stryker. Many of those arguments were formulated prior to the vehicle even being built, not to mention deployed. Some of those arguments are now 100% factually false, yet the anti-Stryker crowd still keeps them around. For example, that Combatreform tripe still has on there a lengthy argument against the Stryker mortar carrier because it can't fire on the move. Well, it can now. No retraction or reconsideration... so one MUST be concerned that a source like that is not objective.

I thought only two of the four axles, i.e., four out of the eight wheels of the Stryker are run-flat - or is my info wrong? has this been rectified by now ? ? (I've asked before but nobody answered my inquiry before)

I'm pretty sure they are on all 8 now. The reason they were on only 4, I think, was because of C-130 weight requirements. Once on the ground there isn't a problem with that. Plus, as originally designed the vehicle could have (IIRC) 6 flat tires and still drive under its own power.

IMO it *is* a Stryker issue because the whole Stryker concept relies so heavily on this FOW-removal-situational-awareness-superior-intelligence-electronics-thingamajig for its mission if not for the very survival of the SBCT.

No, it is still a FBCB2 only issue. The two are, from a program standpoint, completely independent of each other. Fix FBCB2 and the problem is solved without any changes to the Stryker itself. There are other "digitized" units in the US military that are not Stryker based that now require FBCB2 to be effective, so again it is not a Stryker issue in and of itself.

I also think the overheating issue has largely been overcome by crew rigged solutions (I've heard of a few inventive ones). The speed, however, is still an issue and so is the learning curve of how to operate it. The Stryker training program has apparently already started to address the latter issue.

btw, I also find the heavy dependency on UAV-borne surveillance and intelligence to be quite a burden/problem.

From what I can tell, this is not a problem in Iraq.

come on, Steve, that's a pretty artificial and obvious example:

I wasn't the one that came up with it

it is a no-brainer that an isolated company of (apparently mostly stationary, btw) tanks without any infantry screen at all would be easy prey to a bunch of infantrymen being able to make full use of the advantages that footsoldiers have.

Uhm... yeah, but why do you think I was making this argument in the first place? Because some don't consider this is a "no-brainer".

Steve

[Lee]

Steve: As far as I know, no Apache choppers have been captured by anyone.

There was one shot down (or crashed) roughly 1 1/2 - 2 years ago in Iraq

and there were some terrorists in the area, so we called in an airstrike

and put a 2,000lb bomb on it and obliterated it to make sure no one got

to look at it.

[Battlefront.com]

Hi Lee,

As far as I know, no Apache choppers have been captured by anyone.

Now you know differently...

Steve

[SgtMuhammed]

They did bomb it but only after it had been carted away. Who knows what was taken off of it before we blew it up.

I think they found it sitting by a bridge when they hit it. I know it caused a bit of angst when they couldn't find it for a while.

[Lars]

Originally posted by Peter Cairns:

So you can see why I am quite keen on CM:SF, for me it's a sort of "Future Scottish Army" simulator.

This game must be stopped.

[Lee]

Steve: Yeah, that must be the one I was thinking of, they got it for a bit

after it went down, but then we blew it up right away with that 2,000lb bomb.

So that doesn't really qualify as captured. hehe

I doubt those dopes figured out anything useful in that time.

[SgtMuhammed]

Since everything is modular it would only take a matter of minutes to pull anything they wanted off of it. Then again there isn't really anything on the bird that the bad guys don't know about all ready. It's not like there are no other choppers like it in the world.

[Battlefront.com]

The Iraqis could care less about this stuff. Instead, it would be carted off to various "interested parties". As far as I know the one that was carted off was not knocked out in transit. Of course Iraqi resistance was nil shortly after, but you'd be surprised how quickly things of "interest" can sprout legs and walk away safely. I'm betting that some of the things in that Apache are somewhere where we don't want them to be.

Steve

[SgtMuhammed]

Radios, avionics, weapons, lots of things people are interested only take a minute or two to take off.

The bird was in Iraqi hands for at least a day before we found it again.

[M Hofbauer]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Some of those arguments are now 100% factually false, yet the anti-Stryker crowd still keeps them around. For example, that Combatreform tripe still has on there a lengthy argument against the Stryker mortar carrier because it can't fire on the move. Well, it can now. No retraction or reconsideration... so one MUST be concerned that a source like that is not objective.

I'm not up-to-date on this ever-changing Shmyker topic, but I thought the mortar carrier can *not* fire the intended prime 120mm weapon from inside the vehicle, it has to relegate to the 81mm for that.

but if they changed that, then that's okay.

that combatreform page sure is far out on many things. it is heavily biased and I see it just as such; in a way one could see it as a way of fighting fire with fire:

there is so much pro-Stryker propaganda spin being spouted by the politico-military-industrial complex that pages like combatreform are a counter-weight in this battle.

the only victim inbetween is the truth, which indeed is *somewhere* between the two.

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />I thought only two of the four axles, i.e., four out of the eight wheels of the Stryker are run-flat - or is my info wrong? has this been rectified by now ? ? (I've asked before but nobody answered my inquiry before)

I'm pretty sure they are on all 8 now. (...)Plus, as originally designed the vehicle could have (IIRC) 6 flat tires and still drive under its own power..</font>

[M Hofbauer]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Apparently the Army is reexamining their destruction policy. Does seem rather stupid to spend a half hour blowing up the thing

especially if other Abrams were captured rather intact without such destruction, as suggested here:

...or is that Abrams actually pretty blown up but the perspective misleading?

edit: to get picture right

[ November 03, 2005, 04:16 PM: Message edited by: M Hofbauer ]

[SgtMuhammed]

Some of the engine access panels seem to be up. Can't really tell how messed up it is. They could have taken a thermal grenade to the insides but it just doesn't show. Hard to tell.

[ November 03, 2005, 04:48 PM: Message edited by: sgtgoody (esq) ]