Dinger

That sounds like the M224 61mm mortar when fired in "handheld mode" with the baby baseplate. the problem with the example given for the argument for organic guided mortars (OP spots 4 recon vehicles on reverse slope), is that it's not a situation where a squad needs to act quickly without relying on external resources. The OP is calling this in -- we're already assuming a reasonable-sized engagement. The ideal infantry weapon would way 2 kilos, be able to penetrate 10m of Homogenous rolled steel, have a warhead of 50kg of compound B and be able to fire off 20 shots in a minute without reloading.It would have a MultiOption fuze with the settings: Airburst (VT), Graze, Impact, Delay, Sensor-Armor, Sensor-Soft, Sensor-AP, Sensor-POL/Ammo, GPS and Electronic Time. It could fire high and low angle and would require only one day of proficiency training. AARs from Iraq have the infantry-carried 81mm M252 as already being too heavy to use effectively in mobile operations. That being said, Anti-Armor rounds are going to be very interesting for spec fire on those pesky "sound contacts"

CAS is expensive. It requires a huge supply train. This is especially true for aircraft. I remember seeing figures for the early days of the Korean war, during the drive the Yalu. They stationed one F-51 squadron in Pyongyang, and it used by weight something like 40-50% of the weekly supplies shipped to an army division -- and those were prop aircraft. Rotary CAS has its role, but fixed wing stuff -- it's a question of what's most the most useful allocation of resources, and having guys loitering around on call in a stack, or send them off to knock down stuff beyond the point of ground contact.

Outside of the hotkey/axis sensitivity issue (Which practically every game outside of CMx1 has), the features you describe are what you get from designing to the hardware's strengths. It's not simply a development team that listens. Quake and CS were and are built to spec on the hardware. And, while you might "consider the lifespan" of the shooters, the hardware used by the athletes of the computer world is always top-notch. Moreover, if you look at these players, many of their key abilities are athletic: the ability to issue thousands of separate instructions a minute; precision in movement; fast reflexes. They also cultivate an intuitive knowledge of every inch of their tiny online arenas. yeah, they can play in teams, but what they play -- Counterstrike, RTS, Quake, is about as close to simulated combat as an NBA game. Indulge me for a minute here -- I tried not to talk about OFP, but sooner or later I fail. OFP is an ugly game, and sure, de gustibus, it's not for everybody. Online, most games are either some variation on the MP competitive styles made popular by Quake/CS/BF and the others -- some with vehicles, some without. The rest are these interminable FPS RTS games. But at times, I'd get the posse together, someone would write a mission and post a briefing. We'd then go in and try it -- often unfamiliar terrain (not quite as unfamiliar as a quick battle). For example: 6 of us form a LRRP squad on a vietnam map -- we are to investigate some activity in a wooded area 7 km NE of our camp. For support, we had a FB with some 155s roughly 6km NE of the target area; I get to be the FO. We board the Huey and ride to a LZ 3 km East of the target area. Staggered column through woods, pausing every couple hundred meters to listen and look for activity (as well as to figure out where the heck we are). We come to a small hill, and I carefully look around and fix our position on the map: Hill 31. Proceeding West, we're on our guard, until someone screws up. Bullets crack over our heads as a couple VC squads are coming right at us. Behind them, the woods are alive with activity. We duck back behind a small rise in the terrain -- it can't be more than a couple feet high, but it gives us some cover. The squad pops up, and returns fire -- the air is really thick with lead now, while I get my back to a tree stump and get the FB on the horn. I need the rounds to hit 200 meters away, and I hope to hell I got my location right -- well, not like anyone will yell at me if I got it wrong. Meanwhile, the enemy has sent a squad to flank us south, and the others are shifting their fire that way. Finally, about 2 minutes later, the first shells start ripping overhead and exploding in the trees, right on target. As we see bodies flying over the rise, we break contact with the enemy and regroup at the reverse slope of Hill 31. Back at the hill, I call up the FB and have them prep a 500mx500m box to the North and West of where we made contact. When the shells finish landing, we advance -- more cautiously this time -- and investigate. We find the ruins of what was a company-strength camp, but all the enemy is either dead, injured or run off. We head back south to the exfil LZ, and secure it, and call in the Huey to take us home. Elapsed time: ~4 hours. In that time, yes, we had a firefight, and yes we got videogame-class kills; but the pacing and the experience was completely unlike CS or Quake. You could probably write similar accounts of outstanding SH3 games, GR matches, WW2OL sorties, Target:Whatever battles or IL2 Missions. But this combination of open-ended play, narrative richness and coping with the unexpected -- that keyholed AT gun on the approach to Paislinis -- is I believe, what engages people in this sort of simulation. And, to be honest, the game that in my experience most consistently delivers this sort of engaging play is CMx1. Almost every battle is epic. (EDIT - I use paragraph breaks, but UBB doesn't indent. Anyway, it's not like you're supposed to read this) [ November 18, 2005, 02:29 PM: Message edited by: Dinger ]

Oh yeah, we are talking about CM, aren't we? You can always find that little square that's "close enough" for area fire. Now try to find that square that's "dead on". Now get that shot lined up. Call it in. Now wait one turn and get the "Angle T Exceeds 500 Mils -- Observer shift your position" message. Repeat.

Mortars -- now we're talking. Found this excerpted from Oct. 2005 of Army: It's still experimental, and it still requires someone to laze the target. 120mm cartridge weighs about 30 pounds, so maybe half that is HE. (Compare to a 155mm warhead which is something like 98 lbs). The "penetrate targets beneath cover" suggests they're going for a "copperhead light", so expect a smaller charge (155mm CLGP has something like 15 lbs of Comp. that's shaped for penetration. Again, they're going on the philosophy that if it's not in some way hardened, you don't need guidance. Spotting for Laser-guided artillery is in itself tricky. High-angle is even more so: the seeker has to acquire the lazed target relatively high up -- that means you need to be lazing something where the reflected light is visible from the incoming trajectory, and preferably without haze or cloud cover. So I'm thinking in their "Dumb" mode, the 120s will be just fine.

Which does raise the question: what about artillery called in from airborne observers? Will we have AH-64s calling in ATACMs from MLRS units 100 km back? Or is that considered "deep penetration" and outside the scope of the stryker module concept?

Again, it sounds like what you're asking for is an SU-152. I'm pretty sure the US is fielding Excalibur rounds or something analogous relatively soon. But what you describe is sort of like the copperhead issue: for some things, using artillery is more complicated and less effective than other means. A guided howitzer shell is much more maneuverable and precise when fired low angle than it is high angle. But urban environments often render low-angle fire undesirable. Indirect fire -- even precision indirect fire -- by its nature creates greater risk of collateral damage of all sorts. Better to have something with a gun on it take it out directly. I too am interested to hear if the US has any new doctrine regarding the use of precision HE artillery shells in urban areas, but it really doesn't sound like a good idea to me.

I don't want to hear anyone's personal opinions. Yes, there's a lot of nostalgia and a lot of subjective judgments swimming around this thread, but that doesn't reduce it all to the level of "just personal opinion". I'd rather read reasoned arguments about what constitutes a "dumbed down" game, and how the "graphics arms race" expresses itself in terms of video game design. These can and often are interpretations based on evidence, not mere curmudgeonly whining about a lost golden age.

Heh. I thought copperhead (155mm cannon-launched (laser-)guided projectile) was still in inventories. After firing, it is fin-stabilized, and the last 13 seconds or so are guided (assuming it sees an appropriately lazed target). I understand its employment is a little tricky, since it requires the observer to be lasing with the gun to his back and the target to the front, and it has a "footprint" within which it can be guided that varies according to range (they have a bunch of little oblique shaped overlays they put on the map to see what they can and cannot hit). Excalibur is simply GPS-guided. Guided means it has fins that give it directional control. Strix is a terminal-homing shell. Terminal Homing I suppose means that it has a propulsion system that assists at the end of the trajectory. For the strix, this means that it has some sort of IR/acoustic sensor in the front (correct me if I'm wrong) and, on the way down, if it spots a "live" target, it has little rocket ports in the sides that push it towards it. AFAIK, the US does not use Strix. BONUS and SADARM are sensor-fuzed. SADARM (which the US has used in Iraq, to great effect) bursts at something like 1000m over the target, and deploys two submunitions. Parachutes slow the subs, and they scan below using a combination of mm-radar, acoustics and optics (again, I think) for appropriate targets. When they find one, they fire an explosively-formed projectile at the target. But many, many useful targets for artillery do not require 10-figure-grid accuracy. Precision munitions have their uses, and can be quite impressive, but it's still an area effect weapon. When possible, direct fire on a destruction target requiring HE is preferable.

Bah, I'd probably still play X-Com or SimCity today. I could play a season of Earl Weaver Baseball with my crew. And crap, I'm probably in the top 5 in all time The Perfect General/TPG2 hours wasted (A big shout out to the other 4, BTW). But could I do Karateka again? Arctic Fox? This were great games for me at the time -- but I don't see myself tolerating them now. It's not that every "old game" is intolerable; but most of them are things you do once in your life. Likewise for innovation. Let me take an example that's a little uncharacteristic (because it was so damn good), but might get the point across: Maxis' Robosport. At the time I was an Amiga owner. But if there ever were a game that would make me buy a Mac, this was it. Y'all from the CM crowd know many of the features: a single or MP turn-based strategy game, that could be played on one computer or networked. Each player (up to 4) controlled 1-8 robots with specific abilities (MG, burst, rifle and Missile -- and all had grenades). You'd give the robots orders for each minute of gameplay -- things like "Move Here", "Cover this Arc", "Shoot at this target", and it would compile a film. You'd watch the film and get your contacts, plus ? on suspected contacts. The graphics were cool and the special effects rocked. In general it was an innovative game; unlike most innovative games it had a future. But the game itself was a failure. Why? Well, it wasn't really fun. See, the robots would follow your moves as you ordered them, regardless of threat. So you couldn't suppress and maneuver. Suppress didn't work and maneuver got you killed. So the guy who did the least inevitably won. Or that's how I remember it. Plus, there were very few maps, and they were all of the "symmetrical deathmatch" variety (until some guy at Maxis took pity on us and slipped us a copy of their map editor). Basically, innovation means trying something new, and breaking the rules of the canon. At times, this brings out really fresh gameplay, and a classic for all times. Often, the wrong rules are broken, and the thing ends up boring or masturbatory, or, in the best case, appealling to a very limited group. By a limited group, I mean like the ones who would appreciate the supply and artillery/air coordination sims I joked about in another thread -- great ideas for military training simulations; boring as heck for most gamers. Can you imagine "SEAD Fire Mission Simulator" ever hitting the Gamespot top ten? (If that happens, I'm buying everyone in this thread a beer, by the way)

Alright, time for me to disagree about everything. Nostalgia is a myth. There have always been bad games. And many of the games you remember as good you would not be able to tolerate today. The fact is that as gamers y'all have grown. Much of the current generation buying stuff does not have the experience you have, and therefore what looks derivative to use is in fact new to them. Or new enough. So yeah, I remember playing all those great games. I also remember playing a bunch of crappy ones. Still, it is true that the market has expanded -- and that expansion means that games have moved from the exclusive domain of enthusiasts with time and technical skill necessary to play them to the larger realm of the casual gamer. Or rather, consoles have gotten a lot better (and the last five years has not unsurprisingly seen an explosion in shelf space for console games). But there are other factors at work, and they're not all exclusive to computer games. Consider Brave New World. Written in an age where the mass-entertainment wonder was the "Talkies", Huxley has this exchange (Better to read it in context, I suppose): The implication is the general disinterest for history, religion, and culture, in favor of technically superior simulations of reality. Or something like that. It's more or less the same whine we get today: games are picking fancy effects over substance; Tom Clancy novels substitute high-tech gadgetry for character development or exploration of the narrative; action movies spend millions trying to one-up one another for special effects. I'll disagree with AH on this: sooner or later most of us tire of such things; but every year sees more 17-year-old males on the planet. The "technical race" has always been there, in whatever form of mass entertainment. Pretty art work, louder special effects, big bangs and stuff -- that's what sells a lot of video games. as for the specific manifestation of such games, well that's a feedback loop created the games and the hardware. Here's another example for you: the Roland D-50. Here's a digital synthesizer that came out in 1987 and can make all sorts of sounds, and allowed the use of sampling. But the easiest sounds to create (many of them presets) were "oohs" and "aahs" -- the result is that the popular music and soundtracks of the late 80s and early 90s are permeated with these soft tones, the laziest application of the D-50. You can spot it immediateley. The lesson: hardware and APIs determine much the artistic production. For PCs and consoles, that hardware and API is predominantly the video card and its associated code (directX, openGL). And these cards are built around a few very specific game types, and we can all guess what those are. Okay, for those of you who can't guess, think of FPSs in very confined spaces. So, combining these, if you want to appeal to your core demographic, you make games that look and feel the best. If you play to the strengths of the video cards, you achieve this much easier and with much better results. Two other details: hellfish likes "Dynamic Campaigns." I don't always think they're a good idea. Take SHIII: the dynamic campaign is a snore, nor is it very dynamic (just a list of months and patrol areas): go to sector, patrol for 24 hours, come home. "Dynamic campaigns" fail because they operate within "expected" limits. Learn the rules of the campaign, and nothing will surprise you that much. Your sub's engine never breaks on its own, leaving you adrift, until your genius mechanic rigs up a solution involving disassembling a torpedo and the observation periscope. Scripting can be done badly too, but some combination in between works best for me. Consider the fate of the companies/teams that made your favorite games. Way too many of them were just breaking even (the developers would call it "Earning an honest living") until adverse business forces pushed them to a point where they had to sell to one of the big boys. Sometimes those "adverse business forces" can be summarized by the expression "Version 2.0". X-com was fun, and the sequel (or two) based on the original engine was neat. But X-Com:Apocalypse was an abortion of a 2.0 game that failed because the developers overestimated what they could achieve, and got half of it done. Most innovative games are really quite dull to play.

Coordination of aviation and artillery. Here's on of my favorites . Chapter 4 is on aviation. Anyway, starting on page 4.7 you'll find a simplified overview of how you put Artillery fire, Fixed- and Rotary-Wing aviation in the same battlespace. The various kinds of support do impose limitations on each other, but they don't exclude mutual operation. In fact, this manual is for Artillery and NGF specialists, and only secondarily for Aviation needs (hence my labored description above of the different levels of training) -- so even at the "more basic" levels of training, coordination of artillery and air is emphasized. And, as the manual notes, the chances an aircraft is going to be hit by a friendly artillery shell are very low compared to the thread of enemy AA. (well, assuming they're not flying below DPICM dispensing alt) As far as radios and the rest; the notorious problems of converting grids to lat/long, and all that nonsense: well, that's "lessons learned" already. So, maybe it isn't. In that case, well, either somebody does have a radio that can reach the aircraft, or nobody does. If nobody does, then there's no need to include those aviation assets in the scenario. If somebody does have a radio (say back at the off-map Battalion HQ), then you've just got the problem of a lack of specialization expressing itself in yet another way: the additional time and inaccuracy acquired by relaying through another controller. That requires no additional representation: the loss in speed, precision, efficiency and versatility is covered by the fact you're using an underexperienced controller.

These kinda threads are fun because you get folks talking about how things actually happen and often losing sight of how things should be implemented. Airspace segregation of fixed- and rotary-wing Aircraft, and artillery shells? Just what kinda a game are talking about here? Sure it'd be cool and all that, but those are the technical details, like the supply system, that I'd rather not have to deal with. Segregation can be by altitude, by setting up "Do not cross lines" or by time; this sort of coordination occurs all the time. So let's say that if you have aircraft and artillery in the same battlespace, some segregation plan has been implemented somewhere. I mean, I'm a big fan of artillery, NGF and CAS simulations, but these elements, as cool as they are, aren't, or at least shouldn't, be the focus of CMx2. Anyone with a radio can call in airstrikes/artillery? Well, sure, probably. But let's move behind the BS about "My CAS can do this" or "USMC rocks because" to exploring some of the roots of these anecdotal comments and what they translate to in simulation terms. I generally don't know what I'm talking about, so feel free to correct me. Given that FO and FAC are roles that "anyone with a radio can play", what does that mean? Haul out your favorite infantry field manuals, and you'll see a short section on FO and FAC duties. So, at some basic level, every one with a radio should have had some training in "You, this is me. FFE Grid 08675309." In practice, I'd give the ability to request artillery/airstrikes to each Platoon HQ unit. Above that, you'll have something like a company forward observer that actually has experience calling in fire; and training in its effects. I'd assume this would be represented by the company HQ unit. Then you get the specialists: the FISTS, the ANGLICOs, the FACs, and so on. These are the folks who have extensive training not only calling in fire, but in the capabilities of the platforms they are coordinating. They also can have their own fancy equipment. Many of them (such as ANGLICOs) have cross-training in coordinating other kinds of fire; the specific training and the degree of "versatility" depends a lot on the purpose of the unit and the quality of the troops. So, if you like, we can consider three categories: Field Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Aviation, and give numeric scores to each group, reflecting their ability... something like: ___UNIT______FA___NG___AV USA_Pltn HQ___0____0____0 USA_Cpny HQ___1____0____0 USMC_CpnyHQ___1____1____0 FA_FIST_______2____1____1 ANGLICO_______2____2____1 anyway, you get the idea... What does unit quality translate to in raw game terms? Better trained units will be: Faster, More Precise, More Effective, and More Versatile. Faster: Imagine a green PL with questionable radio discipline, trying to describe a target using landmarks (the tall house) and cardinal directions. Now imagine a pro giving the same directions. More Precise: Target Location, Target Description and Error will all be better. More Effective: The better the training, the better the Observer/Terminal Controller will be able to tailor the effects to the specific tactical situation. For example, the volume of fire will more closely reflect the volume needed to achieve desired results: he won't be calling in 20 rounds of 155mm HE to suppress a single MG. If you request a smoke screen 800 meters long along a NE axis, that's what you'll get; not simply a mass of smoke in the general area. Also note that effectiveness in aviation extends to survivability of the aircraft. A trained FAC will be more effective at describing ingress/egress routes, and identifying and avoiding anti-air threats. Likewise for setting up rotary-wing firing positions. More Versatile: I'd have the "special toys" only available to the FO/FACs with higher-level capabilities. I can't imagine a CM:SF scenario where a SFW could be used, but if there were one, the PL wouldn't be the dude calling in it; You could also make stuff like Time on Target attacks only available to Company HQ and better units. Now, how to run this through the interface? For each mission, I'd specify A) Preplanned strikes (set up on turn 0, or locked by scenario designer) Available assets (with optional reinforcement schedule to specify when they come on/go off station) For the units with an observed fire capabiility, "calling fire" would bring up a menu of all available air, NGF and artillery assets; The observer would be "Tasked" to an asset, and then selects a target -- area or unit, and the precise results (ammunition expended, type of munitions, error, loss of aircraft) depend on the quality of the controlling unit. Well, that's how I'd do it anyway

Just a point of information. WP in Fallujah was never something the US was hiding, not merely in the house-cleaning ops mentioned here, nor in the reporters accounts of glowing bits of WP in the streets as they advanccd. The commonly available video and still photographs clearly show 155mm WP/Time barrages going in. WP is not an illuminant. In many configurations (e.g., M825 155mm Improved Smoke round) it is used as a smoke generator. Its really good for screening, particularly if you don't want stuff coming through your screen (Breaking contact), suppressing, and setting stuff on fire. Oh yeah, we need WP grenades in CM:SF. And a new version of the Mk77 napalm bomb I hear is being used again. Incendiaries have their role.

Folks, you're misunderstanding the purpose and the value of the Multipurpose Equine Combat Systems (MECS). It is a system, first of all. You can't rag on one element in the system without considering the rest. So: The MECS has been employed for over 3000 years. An individual horse may only be available for front-line service for a half-decade or so, but replacement is easy and automatic. In fact, if you don't contract out the maintenance, costs less to replace a front-line horse than it does to maintain and replace your standard HMMWV. Yes, you do "need to own several of them". It is a system. But most of the other units can be tasked for support roles. The MECS has excellent tactical value, but its value doesn't stop there: it is a magnificent logistical tool. Fuel consumption wise: yes, the MECS uses fuel. But its energy consumption is minimal, especially when compared to fossil-fuel-based systems. In fact, supply is only a major issue when it's not deployed. On campaigns, it can usually find enough fuel to keep going. And if not, well, then the army has serious supply issues, and the MECS can be converted to food itself. This multipurpose functionality has been tested across centuries of confict. It isn't expensive. First, citing Barbara Tuchman on the Fourteenth Century is like citing Tom Clancy for modern warfare: they are both reading more knowledgeable sources, and they both can write pretty, but that doesn't give them any particular authority. That Pulitzer thing just shows how little the Pulitzer people care about history. Second, what part of the fourteenth century are we talking about? At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Europe had a land and capital-poor, labor-intensive economy. At the end, labor was short, and land and capital were not. So "15 peasants" isn't a stable number. Third, the MECS is only a part of those expenses. A mounted knight was first and foremost a dude who sat on his butt, and needed to be fed. Most of them had wives, kids and servants, and those guys need to be fed too. Armor and weapons for the knight are not all part of the MECS expenses. Fourth, even taking the "15:1" number, try comparing that to a modern weapon system. A Stryker comes with a $2M price tag, and an operational life of what? 20 years maximum? Add in the costs of major overhauls/upgrades, training, maintenance and fuel, and you're looking at a bare minimum of $1M/year per unit. The US spent 2.5 billion dollars last year, and has about 300 million persons. That's $8333/person, or 120:1. 15:1 for superiority that conquered a continent and a half is a pretty good expenditure. Moreover, the arguments about the MECS' tactical use are rather confused. They also fail to understand the nature of combat upgrades. The MECS had several upgrades. A few that are well known are the introduction in the 7th-8th Centuries of an improved operator harness that allowed greater maneuverability and shock absorption. A few centuries later, the energy-transfer interface greatly improved MECS efficiency as a prime mover. You're also misrepresenting tactical employment of the MECS. "missiles of the time" may have had a bigger target in the MECS, but for them to be effective, they needed to be massed. In such a cone of lethality, the added profile of the MECS did not matter much -- far more important was the mobility it offered, allowing the operator to escape an ambuscade. Moreover, "missiles of the time" were largely ineffective even against unarmored units. Speaking of which, yes there have been attempts over the years to up-armor the combat MECS units, trading mobility for staying power. This has met with varying success. Still, one of the excellent features of the MECS in combat is its ability to preserve the SA of the operator, by refusing to proceed into "tumbleweed" situations. Nonetheless, the MECS excels as a weapon platform. In the Middle Ages, heavily armored MECS operators were effectively invincible, wading into combat and smacking down those below them with impunity -- sure there were failures, but lethalities were rare. The up-armored slow heavy MECS was not an unequivocal success, of course -- massed frontal assaults into a planned defense was a recipe for disaster -- of course, the same could be said of any era. Perhaps a more effective MECS-weapons platform is the "light" model. The operator uses low-lethality missile weapons to harry the enemy at the limit of range, and encourages them to pursue. As they pursue, they first lose formation discipline, then situational awareness. The MECS-borne force then rallies, and massacres the enemy piecemeal. But the Indo-Europeans were using the MECS mark I, and they were using it more as a "Battlefield Taxi" than anything else. This allowed them -- even with inferior numbers -- to concentrate their forces at will, and avoid the strongholds. Yes, the MECS does not excell in Himalayan-like mountainous terrain or Sahara-like desert conditions. I would add that it's amphibous capability is limited only to modest fording. But it is a testimony to the supremacy of the MECS mark I that between those boundaries, the Himalayas, the Ocean and the Desert -- with the exception of a few pockets here and there -- to this day, those people still share the language of the Indo-Europeans, and in that language, a lot of terminology arising from the MECS. So, that's about as perfect a system as you can imagine.