American Small Unit Leadership

[Michael Dorosh]

My Reserve regiment in Canada has an association with the 1st Battalion, 161st Infantry Regiment, Washington Army National Guard

Their sergeants and officers come up here every second Labour Day to exchange pleasantries; this year they had some interesting things to say, as they recently completed a tour of the Iraqi war zone.

One thing that one of the majors (IIRC) said was that Iraq was a junior leader's war, and he talked about "strategic corporals." Anybody, at any time, could have played a decisive part in the fighting there due to the nature of operations.

I'm splitting this off from another thread where the conversation went like this:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by fytinghellfish:

IMHO, part of the interest in the game is making sure I suffer the fewest number of casualties possible. American troops don't win wars just because they've got the best stuff and because their troops know the battledrills. Leadership is key.

You're playing the leader - are you going to do as good a job as the 21-22 year old lieutenants out there in Iraq under similar circumstances?

Or firepower. That might make a great subject for another thread.

I'm rereading AN ARMY AT DAWN right now. Leadership in North Africa was piss poor, from Eisenhower to Fredendall....but they had a few months to shake out, and the Axis were luckily outnumbered...and outgunned. Not that the US was any different from anyone else - all the armies in WW II expanded dozens of times over from a standing start.

I'm not so sure I believe that American "leadership" has always been universally good; in fact, at the platoon level it seems to be a mixed bag from WW II right through to Vietnam.

Has the US Army actively addressed this (if true)? A large standing army in the 1990s had to help this some.

I know the 90 Day Wonder of the comic books and "Vietnam movies" is an exaggeration but there seems to be plenty of historical examples of a Norman Dike for every Dick Winters. </font>

[SgtMuhammed]

What saves the U.S. Army is it's NCO Corps. Young officers are a lot like privates, some are good, some are bad, some just are. Privates are the product of a technologically advanced society with a good educational system. As a result they are not scared to use all the toys the army gives them and are able to quickly adapt to new situations. It is from them that the NCO's come. Usually they are men who have been in for more than one enlistment and have been on real deployments of various types. They are used to rapid changes and have a natural distrust of officers until they prove themselves.

In many armies NCOs are assigned rather than created and so have little experience that their soldiers do not have. They never learn to be soldiers before they have to learn to be leaders.

In answer to your specific questions;

I don't believe the U.S. Army has had any better or worse small unit leadership but I believe the U.S. system gives its NCOs a lot more responsibility than many armies do. An American squad leader doesn't need to consult an officer every time he wants to do something.

The major effort to get more competent leadership was the creation of the various leadership schools for both officers and Non-coms and the creation of the major trainin centers. The main purpose of the MTCs (CMTC, JRTC, and NTC) is to stress units to the breaking point to see how they react. Hopefully you will be able to weed out bad performers although I have never seen anyone booted because of bad performance at one of the training centers. The U.S., just like most other nations, continues to commission kids straight off the street to lead men into combat. I would love them to commission entirely from the enlisted ranks but I don't believe that will ever happen.

The one major advantage U.S. troops have is that you can take soldiers from nearly any unit and throw them together and they will still perform with some level of aptitude. Of course a squad that has been together a while will be better but U.S. soldiers are flexable enough to perform a wide range of missions.

[ October 08, 2005, 08:52 PM: Message edited by: sgtgoody (esq) ]

[Thermopylae]

Playing out at the NTC this summer (as an insurgent/OPFOR light infantryman actually) I saw a platoon leader (2LT) relieved for serious sub par performance during the virtual battle. Not to say it happens frequently, but it does happen.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Thermopylae:

Playing out at the NTC this summer (as an insurgent/OPFOR light infantryman actually) I saw a platoon leader (2LT) relieved for serious sub par performance during the virtual battle. Not to say it happens frequently, but it does happen.

The fact that it happened at a training centre rather than Iraq may say something, too(!)

[SgtMuhammed]

It's a good sign to me.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by sgtgoody (esq):

I don't believe the U.S. Army has had any better or worse small unit leadership but I believe the U.S. system gives its NCOs a lot more responsibility than many armies do.

I've heard, however, that the roles individual NCOs and private soldiers play are very specialized. A vehicle driver, for example, is not expected to do minor maintenance on his vehicle - is this true? Canadian troops crosstrain in all weapons systems in a platoon, generally are trained to operate the communications systems, etc. The large criticism I've heard of the pre-Iraq US Army is that they didn't do that in line units. There is an old story up here about the US Army private whose Hummer he was driving is sitting by the side of the road. He doesn't change the flat tire because that's the job of the mechanics - not his.

Is there truth to that?

[Captain Wacky]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

So my questions are

a) has US small unit leadership historically been above average, from WW II to the Gulf War? My belief is that it's been a mixed bag, with many poor junior leaders in the mix during this period

I would imagine that the leadership is pretty good in units like the 82nd or 101st, a mixed bag in regular infantry units, and pretty horrendous in some rear echelon place and reserves--the Jessica Lynch fiasco comes to mind.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Captain Wacky:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

So my questions are

a) has US small unit leadership historically been above average, from WW II to the Gulf War? My belief is that it's been a mixed bag, with many poor junior leaders in the mix during this period

I would imagine that the leadership is pretty good in units like the 82nd or 101st, a mixed bag in regular infantry units, and pretty horrendous in some rear echelon place and reserves--the Jessica Lynch fiasco comes to mind. </font>

[Captain Wacky]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[junk2drive]

I'm wondering what the state of the US Army is today; is recruiting keeping pace?

Listening on the net this morning to KFI, Los Angeles number one talk radio station.

There was an advertisement for an Army recuiting office in suburban Pomona and the $20k signup bonus.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by junk2drive:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />I'm wondering what the state of the US Army is today; is recruiting keeping pace?

Listening on the net this morning to KFI, Los Angeles number one talk radio station.

There was an advertisement for an Army recuiting office in suburban Pomona and the $20k signup bonus. </font>

[junk2drive]

You asked about recruiting. Meaning the Army is spending big bucks to advertise on a top market radio station.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by junk2drive:

You asked about recruiting. Meaning the Army is spending big bucks to advertise on a top market radio station.

Yeah, but so what?

[yuvuphys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by junk2drive:

You asked about recruiting. Meaning the Army is spending big bucks to advertise on a top market radio station.

Yeah, but so what? </font>

[ng cavscout]

As to the question about specialized roles in the U.S. Army, I have to say, as a SGT. in Iraq right now, (actually, just south of Iraq, in a CSC (convoy support center) in Kuwait, but our missions take us over the border daily escorting convoys), I can say definitively that the modern U.S. Army has a heavy investment in cross training. Our drivers pull not just minor maintenance on our vehicles, but they do mechanic level repairs with supervision from the mechanics themselves. Our riflemen know how to use the machine guns, our machine gunners know how to use grenade launchers, etc.

As a member of the Wisconsin National Guard, I am probably biased, but I would say that after pre-mobilization training, and a month or so in country, that our NG and reserve units operate at a level comparable with that of active duty units. I feel that reserve formations such as my national guard unit have an advantage in unit cohesion over the active duty units, because, we spend literally years together as a unit, whereas an active duty Bradley crew for example, can reastically expect to have maybe 18 months together before one or more members are transfered or get out of the Army altogether.

Also, to the best of my knowledge, there are no Strykers in reserve formations, just active duty units.

[hellfish]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by junk2drive:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />I'm wondering what the state of the US Army is today; is recruiting keeping pace?

Listening on the net this morning to KFI, Los Angeles number one talk radio station.

There was an advertisement for an Army recuiting office in suburban Pomona and the $20k signup bonus. </font>

[hellfish]

The 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division (Pennsylvania Army National Guard) is slated to become a Stryker brigade, but they're last on the list.

Next up for conversion is the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (who will also transfer to Germany) and then 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. IIRC the 56th Bde will convert around 2008 or so.

[Michael Dorosh]

Interesting stuff, thanks guys. Junk, sometimes the Army spends money on stuff just because if they don't use up their budget this year, they don't get the money again next year - so I'm leery of taking high paid advertising as "evidence" that recruiting goals are not being met.

NG and fytinghellfish - interesting stuff and good to know; the Washington boys seemed to have a similar experience from what little I've heard. We do things a bit differently up here; reservists go to augment regular units for deployments, though in recent years we've had entire subunits go - for example, we recently sent a CRIC (Composite Reserve Infantry Company) as part of a regular battalion to the Balkans. My own regiment fielded a platoon as a platoon in that company. For Afghanistan, there is even talk of forming company sized task forces from reserve units. Shall be interesting to see what plays in the next couple of years.

[Andrew H.]

According to this, the Army missed it's recruiting goal by 6,700 this year - not a huge number given that: (1) retention of currently serving units is apparently higher than expected (108% is the number I found, although it's not clear of what the 108% is); and (2) the 6,700 is based on a number the army needed to increase its force by, I think 40,000 over a few year period.

Of somewhat more concern to me is the fact that they have somewhat lowered standards.

The National Guard has had more problems - apparently they had a 17,000 shortfall, recruiting 51,000 instead of the planned 68,000.

I think that the national guard shortfall will be harder to overcome. For twenty years they've had a consistent advertising message of "One weekend a month; two weeks a year" - I don't think that's going to be as successful as it once was. And, more to the point, the NG is designed to be a part-time force, and appeal to people who want to be part timers. To the extent it is changing from that role - which it appears to be doing - recruitment is going to be harder, inherently.

[SgtMuhammed]

As to cross training, the Army is constantly moving people around so while officially you are supposed to be qualified for various fields it is often a case of who knows how to do the job.

With vehicles, for example, there are various levels of maintenance, operator (10), mechanic (20), depot etc. Technically operators are only supposed to perform 10 level but by the time I left Hohenfels I could do everything to my 113 except actually pull the engine apart. If you want it done now you often have to do it yourself. Plus it got you in good with the mechanics if you were willing to get dirty to keep your track running. Same thing with the arms room. I could fix anything that the armorer could on any weapon in the arms room.

Official policy and actual practice rarely resemble one another unless there is an expection.

[gunnersman]

What is the point of the National Guard and the Reserves? I thought the NG was more "home guard" and the Reserves were kind of a stop gap. It seems they are both being used as stop gaps, and then some. Is the regular Army trying to get bigger? It seems dangerous to me to have to rely on anything but professional soldiers (no disrespect to the National Guard or Reserves).

[Barrold]

Except for the fact that in times of need both organizations have been used to supplement the regular army. Why have such organizations if they aren't used when appropriate?

BDH

[imported_Captain_Wacky]

Originally posted by gunnersman:

What is the point of the National Guard and the Reserves? I thought the NG was more "home guard" and the Reserves were kind of a stop gap. It seems they are both being used as stop gaps, and then some. Is the regular Army trying to get bigger? It seems dangerous to me to have to rely on anything but professional soldiers (no disrespect to the National Guard or Reserves).

From what I understand, in recent years the Army has moved most of its logistical support to reserve units. I assume they wanted to keep the number of combat arms up during post Cold-War era downsizing, and so something had to go, and that's why reserve units are being called on so much nowadays. Now whenever the regular units deploy, the reserves have to go with them. So they aren't really "reserves" at all anymore.

[SgtMuhammed]

Originally posted by gunnersman:

What is the point of the National Guard and the Reserves? I thought the NG was more "home guard" and the Reserves were kind of a stop gap. It seems they are both being used as stop gaps, and then some. Is the regular Army trying to get bigger? It seems dangerous to me to have to rely on anything but professional soldiers (no disrespect to the National Guard or Reserves).

The traditional view of the Guard and Reserves as being separate forces has been inaccurate since after Vietnam. Vietnam was fought largly with Regular formations as part of Johnson's effort to limit the war. The response by congress was to force the Regular military to make more use of the Guard and Reserve so that any major action would involve much more of the general population. Many of the Regular military's functions are carried out entirely by the Guard and Reserves. USAF tanker aircraft are all Guard and Reserve and I believe the Army Water purification units are all Guardsmen and Reservists.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Heil3451:

So they aren't really "reserves" at all anymore.

But they are in that they spend most of their time in civilian careers, right?

Michael