M1A2..how tough?

[Battlefront.com]

Drusus,

There are two separate issues. If I have understood correctly there is first the stage of more or less conventional fighting where the US Army fights against the Syrian Army. And US are going to win this one. The question is how much casualties they are going to take. It seems that there would be some CMSF scale battles that the Syrian Army could win. But winning even something like one CM operation style battle is going to be hard. That is, the Syrians will propably be able to hold some location for the first encounter, but if the US Army wants to take that location, then it is going to happen. It might take more than one try, but it is going to happen anyways. (I am not talking about taking Damascus, but a small village or something like that).

Then there is the 2nd stage of fighting. The insurgency. Now, this could be really hard or even impossible for the US to win. Or then not. It depends of why the forces are there.

Correct. CM:SF focuses on the (largely) conventional fight. The battle to occupy Syria is outside of CM:SF's scope.

Just one interesting question: How likely is it that the fighting goes in clear stages? As I have understood in Iraq there was clearly the Army vs Army stage, which was over fast. And then, _after_ that, the insurgency started. Now, if in Syria 1) the insurgency would be a lot stronger 2) the insurgency would start immediately and 3) the Army and the insurgents would work together, then the mission of taking Damascus could turn out to be really, really hard. Ofcourse then there is the question what it means to take Damascus.

As in the war in Iraq the line between conventional and irregular is extremely fuzzy by design (not the US' design, that's for sure ). The way to think about it is in terms of degree and applicability. What I mean by this is that during the conventional phase armored vehicles, artillery (not just mortars), and other things are available and therefore will be used when possible. These things will not be available for the second part of the war (the occupation) so they can't be a part of it. Likewise, tactics that rely upon manipulation of the masses, using civilians as shields, covert ops that take weeks to carry out, etc. will see a ton of action in the occupation, probably not much during the conventional phase. Suicide bombers, IEDs, hit and run tactics, use of civilian disguises, etc. would be present as the norm in the occupation phase, but only somewhat (overall, not necessarily tactically) during the conventional phase. Uniformed opposition during the occupation phase would be nearly nonexistent, though very common for the conventional phase. So on and so forth.

Now, do not think of conventional/occupation as some sort of linear thing. Any place where the conventional fighting is over switches to occupation mode, even if there is still weeks of conventional fighting elsewhere. This means there is some overlap at the places of first contact, but there can be pure conventional warfare in one place and pure occupational combat in another place at the same time.

For you guys wanting to really see how this line is blurred, check out any good account of Nassiriyah. It was a mix of forces, but heavily weighted towards unconventional.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

JC_Hare

The Syrian army's performance was a mixed bag, some units fought bravely, some turned tail and returned to Damascus. There was wholesale desertion, especially by officers.

This is the exact same thing that was experienced with the various forms of Iraqi opposition to OIF, as well the early stages of the insurgency. Since then Darwin's laws have taken over and most of the ones that were brave, but stupid, have been killed off. Fortunately, it would appear marksmanship still is a skill the insurgents have not acquired.

Gibsonm,

With regard to the "TUSK" (Tank Urban Survival Kit - if I recall correctly) upgrades, are you looking at the reintroduced APERS rounds for the main armament as well or just the up armouring for added protection?

We'll just have to see what becomes the norm. From what I can tell the loadouts have already changed so that should be expected for CM:SF. How far US commanders will go in changing their loadouts... we'll just have to wait and see. Fortunately this is something we can decide upon late in development and, in any case, can be changed for individual scenarios in the Editor.

And every time I see someone say this, especially a US Army officer, I get pretty cheezed off:

"Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army had one vision for the future: ... This notion that a lighter, more mobile force" would make armor obsolete.

This was never, ever the plan. At least not for the next 20 years. The only group I have ever seen throwing this idea out was the tankers themselves. That was for shock and fear effect, not because there was reasonable basis to make such a claim. M1A2s continue to be made, M1A1s recondition to as new, M1A2s upgraded to SEP, etc. There has never been a backing off of heavy armor. It's a lie.

What is true, however, is the US military's surprise at how well tanks perform in MOUT ops. And I'm not talking just about the light vs. heavy crowd but the heavy supporters as well. They've always dreaded MOUT warfare because they thought it would expose a weakness in their favored system. But with careful management, tanks and heavy armor in MOUT warfare can be the decisive element in an engagement. So much so that the US Army has decided to extend the life of the Abrams from the 2020ish time frame out to about 2050ish timeframe.

As for reactive armor...

We are simulating all sorts of different types. We are also simulating direct damage to the reactive protected areas. Like in Chechniya... hit the same place twice, and that second shot hits base armor. Some types of reactive armor, like the latest Kontakt-5, have a dual ability to not frag friendly troops as well as to offer some resistance to a subsequent hit.

Steve

[Rick]

So are the TUSK modifications going to be in the game? They seem like they will be quite useful, even if they do make the Abrams uglier.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Dogface:

RE: silencer on tank MGs.

Forgive me if I'm wrong but wouldn't the noise of the tank (engine, tracks, ect)kind of cancel out any perceived benefit of a silenced MG?

No, if you placed the tank on a big sled and pushed it around the streets. It maybe tough, but trust me, the surprise factor is worth it!

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

There is always a gap between doctrine and the ability to cary out doctrine. All indications are that in Syria the gap is really a chasm. They don't have the money, the political will, nor historically proven institutions to back it up.

all naturally true, but the transformation is largely a question of how to use the already available resources. it all boils down to wether the Syrians are able to transform mentally or not (not that simple of course, but it boils down to it). i am well aware of the rigid nature of Syrian military force, and the internal powergames related to military affairs, but i wouldn't underestimate the evolutionary pressure they must be feeling on their shoulders.

i am not expecting them to turn into super warriors of planet Zydzy, i am just expecting them to at least try to use those desired low-signature light force tactics & strategies.

but of course you are the one writing the scenario, so if you say that the reforms have failed then they have failed.

Cite your sources that they have well trained infantry units and I'll cite mine that state they are extremely poorly trained and poorly lead.

i don't think we have different or contradictory sources, i just think that we are reading them in different ways. the great majority of Syrian units are poorly trained and poorly lead, but they have a considerable number of units that are considered to be at least moderately, if not well, trained. in a defensive war that just might be enough to halt the enemy invasion for long enough.

I really, REALLY wish you would actually read something about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan before you post utter crap like this again. Tactically speaking the US forces can match, and generally beat to a pulp, any armed action against them.

i am certain that you have read a lot more than i have, especially regarding Afghanistan, but i don't think it's the cause for our differing opinions. i think we just interpret things differently, or perhaps our background & basic viewpoint is just so different (mine, as a Finn, being one constructed on the question of how to defend succesfully against 1st world superpower with a light 3rd world force).

it might also be that where as i have the priviledge of just speculating and dreaming up perhaps a bit unlikely events, you have the responsibility to create a scenario that is the most likely & generally expected one. it might also be good to remember where my take originates from; the discussion in which others said that Syrians should use their artillery in direct fire against tanks etc because they have no chances to use conventional tactics succesfully.

i totally agree with what you say about US forces above, though there's a questionmark on how the US forces would do against a well-equipped light infantry force. the odd thing about wars is that every now and then the better side loses.

The kill ratios between US forces and insurgents is very high in favor of the US. It's just that the US considers every soldier in high regards while the other side does exactly the opposite for the overwhelming vast majority. Leaders and trainers are protected, the rest are cannon fodder.

exactly. the question is would the kill ratios be high enough for the invasion not to halt against a determined defender.

Again, see above comments about reading SOMETHING (anything credible will do) about what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US forces there have been in occupation for 3+ years in two much larger geographical areas. Logistics? Strategically, Operationally, and usually Tactically there have been no significant problems. To think that the US would suddenly forget and/or become incapable of supplying forces in the field is a stupid position to take. In fact, Syria would be MUCH easier to deal with than Afghanistan for so many reasons, and Iraq for lesser but similar reasons.

with Afghanistan you have such a small number of forces that it is not comparable. with Iraq you had good safe logistical routes. you don't have either with Syria.

i am not saying that the war would turn either side because of logistics, i am just opposing the idea that US forces could just stop before Damascus (and other similar key areas) and wait for them to collapse because of logistics.

As for Damascus, there was a thread dedicated to that. The evidence suggests Damascus would be tough but would fall sooner rather than later. Weeks, not months.

if Syrians would lack morale & cohesion like the Iraqis did, then no doubt Damascus would fall just like Baghdad did. if they have morale & command and if the invading forces are overly careful on taking casulties, then it might take longer than weeks. and that is enough in my scenario, where domestic US & world pressure mounts too high at that point.

[nijis]

One thing to keep in mind re tanks and MOUT is that Baghdad is uniquely suited to an armored thrust into the heart of the city. The airport road has a wide stretch (maybe 50-100m) of open ground on either side, as I understand deliberately designed to prevent Saddam Hussein's motorcade from assassination attempts. It runs right from the edge of town almost directly to the palace district. The Larry/Curly/Moe motorcade as I recall has a similar if less dramatic buffer in many parts.

Iraqi residences, particularly in the smaller Sunni Triangle towns where much of the fighting has occurred, also strike me as being less useful for infantry than buildings in, say, Damascus. There's a lot of one- or two-story walled compounds, and though I haven't read anything on this I'd suspect it would be relatively difficult for infantry to find places where you could fire onto the street from concealment then slip out the back, unless they were carefully prepared beforehand like (as I understand) some houses in Falluja.

This is not to say that armor has not proved its worth in MOUT in more built-up places like Sadr City or Mosul. However, I would not expect the results of battles in other Middle Eastern cities to necessarily duplicate Thunder Run.

[ December 22, 2005, 01:41 AM: Message edited by: nijis ]

[Bigduke6]

I'll take exception to the claim a capture of Damascus would necessarily take weeks, not months.

Damascus is a big place, and you can stuff a lot of soldiers into it. There are hundreds of thousands of buildings to clear. What if 50-100 buildings have some kind of Syrian resistance inside of it? When the most efficient urban clearing tactics - leveling building blocks the moment you hit resistance - is not a realistic U.S. option?

What if the Syrians just take every .50 caliber MG they have, and scatter them throughout the city, one per 10-man suicide team. On average that would be one dead U.S. soldier for each MG uncovered and smashed. Maybe more. Now add in mines, booby traps. How many dead U.S. soldiers does that equal? Can the U.S. military sustain that casualty rate? Is it willing to?

Here's another painful scenario: What if the population of Damascus just refuses to leave? Sure it's easy enough to say "the civilians get out of the way of wars if they can". Well, what if most Damascenes don't?

What if the Syrian general public decides the best way to resist the Americans, is to just stay put in their houses? How many Syrian women, children, and grandfathers can the Americans kill off clearing buildings, before the international reaction makes clearing the city not worth the U.S. effort? There is a limit to the arguement "Well, they stayed in their homes, so they deserved to die." That line won't fly internationally period, and frankly it is unlikely to fly with the U.S. general public for any length of time.

And unless you have enough troops to control what you've cleared, then you face the prospect of the enemy sneaking back to where you supposedly mopped up, and making you fight for it again, a la Grozny or Stalingrad.

It all comes down to Syrian military organization - not technology or training particularly, but the ability to organize a coherent defense of a city - and the will to fight on the part of the populace.

Both of those factors were clearly on the U.S. side when it came to Iraqis and Baghdad.

To me it is absolutely unclear whether the same would be the case with Syrians and Damascus. I am not at all convinced a U.S. force of any realistic size could gain control of Damascus in a matter of weeks. If Syrian resistance collapsed, sure. But if the Syrians turned out ready and able to fight for their capital...

[Battlefront.com]

URC,

i think we just interpret things differently,

The problem I have with your arguments is that you aren't interpreting things armed with the same knowledge. You've drawn conclusions that run contrary to current fact. There might be a reason to support your interpretation, but in order to do that you have to explain it. Like your logistics position. You just now tried to explain it better, but it still doesn't conform to reality. A conflict in Syria would be far easier to support than one in Afghanistan and Iraq, not less. And even if it was less... how much less would it have to be to make a real difference?

or perhaps our background & basic viewpoint is just so different (mine, as a Finn, being one constructed on the question of how to defend succesfully against 1st world superpower with a light 3rd world force).

Don't forget that I am a historian first, game desginer second. Specifically, I have an extensive knowledge of 20th century warfare and a fairly decent knowledge base of warfare going back to guys hitting each other over the head with rocks. That is the info I draw from.

As for your Finnish background... Finland lost two wars against a 3rd rate and then 1st rate large military force. No matter how good the Finns were, and they absolutely were, they lost. If the Soviets had not been majorly distracted by the other 1000 miles of front, and had more reason to be interested in Finnish lands than (for example) German territory, you'd likely have been brought up Soviet.

My point here is that the big country will win the conventional war if it wants to. There are very few examples in history where that hasn't been the case. After the conventional occupation... that's where the big country can run into problems.

BigDuke,

I am not at all convinced a U.S. force of any realistic size could gain control of Damascus in a matter of weeks. If Syrian resistance collapsed, sure. But if the Syrians turned out ready and able to fight for their capital...

I agree completely. Same was true for Baghdad. If the Iraqi regular and irregular forces had decided to make a significant stand there... things would have turned out very differently. So obviously collapse of will is a very big factor.

I'm speculating that the will to fight would be quite a bit stronger than Iraq in general and Baghdad specifically. This is why I've put down weeks as my guess for how long Damascus would hold out vs. the days that Baghdad did. But months, IMHO, would require significant will and ability to resist. I'm guessing it wouldn't be that strong.

I picture the attacking force striking mostly out of Iraq and through the bulk of Syria before getting to Damascus. This does a few things, but militarily it means the capital is isolated. The populace, and the forces mixed in with them, will know that no matter what they do they are going to do it on their own. That has its advantages for the attacker because it usually is a demoralizing factor, sooner rather than later. Especially if the will to fight a losing cause wasn't all that great to begin with.

An attacker that is able to focus its complete, or near complete, attention on taking the city. It doesn't have to worry about anything else, just that one task. Obviously the defender has only on thing to worry about too, but they have little ability to do anything other than react to the attacker's whim.

[Drusus]

If USA would try to Thunder Run Damascus and fail, then it might take really long to take all of Syria. When succesful, Thunder Run can make the morale of the enemy collapse, but if it ends up in a disaster (big losses + nothing gained) it can make the morale of the enemy much better.

[Battlefront.com]

I would hope that US commanders won't try another Thunder Run unless they have extremely good intel that there will be no significant opposition. The thought of a Thunder Run going into Damascus and living through it are extremely low IMHO. At least that is what I would predict. Then again, I would have predicted the same fate for the same thing in Baghdad in 2003, and yet it worked very well.

Steve

[John Kettler]

Steve,

You're in excellent company. Look how disastrously wrong the renowned Trevor Dupuy and his people were about expected Desert Storm casualties. See their HOW TO DEFEAT SADDAM HUSSEIN.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Battlefront.com]

Dupuy is an excellent example of flawed scientific methods incorrect applied to real world events. His "science" consists of extremely complex equations that use unquantifiable values mixed in with quantifiable ones. When the end data doesn't come out to their liking, they tweak the unquantifiable ones until they get a result that they do like. Then they say they've got what it takes to predict the future. Not surprisingly, it doesn't.

I am a huge fan of Azimov's Foundation series. In it there is something quite similar to Dupuy's, only on a much larger scale and with a huge scope. In theory it is possible to predict the future based on math. However, the more complicated the subject matter, the less likely it will work. The interesting thing about Azimov's fiction is that they looked for trends and adjusted their calculations as they went. Azimov's theory was that predicting small events within those larger ones was not possible. An interesting story, that's for sure.

Steve

[M1A1TC]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

I am a huge fan of Azimov's Foundation series.

Steve

Me too. Ive read the series both in English and in Russian. Takes awhile

[Battlefront.com]

Cripes, it took me a while in English! Especially because Azimov managed to crank out a few more before he passed on.

Steve

[oren_m]

Hey everyone!

I've been away from this thread for a while, and i have a reason, my reserve unit went out for training.

So, why i'm telling you this?

During training we had some briefings about the Syrian army and the whole US-Syrian situation,

the buttom line is that the Syrian army is building "regular iregular" fighting units to fight the US forces in cities, moreover, the syrian goverment has increased funds for villeges and towns which wish to build new buildings.

Their strategy is to increase the urban areas between Damescus and the iraqi border and israel.

Oren_m

[Battlefront.com]

Hi Oren,

Thanks for the information! It is extremely valuable to us. I'm also glad to see that it confirms the trend we have predicted. And that is to transition regular conventional capacity into regular unconventional forces. As we have said, we do not think the Syrians are stupid. Because of this they should know that a conventional conflict with the US/NATO, fought in Cold War ways, would mean quick destruction. Their best chance is to transition to defensive, unconventional forces. At least in principle.

In reality I don't see them making huge progress over the next year. At least not to the extent they need. The kind of planning they are (apparently) doing will need many years to have a significant strategic impact on a conventional war fought against them. Especially the buildings. But it will be enough time to make tactical level operations much more "interesting" than they would have been in the recent past.

Steve

[Rick]

Loved the Foundation series. Games, Movies, etc. on the universe would be greatly appreciated.

[M1A1TC]

A Foundation trilogy movie would be awesome, especially if directed by Peter Jackson. Can you imagine?!

[John Kettler]

Oren and Steve,

Back in the 1980s, I read a crude machine translation of a Soviet military book with a title something like OVERCOMING ANTITANK DEFENSE, by V.A. Tonkikh?, in which was a diagram illustrating precisely what Oren describes and its impact on modern armored warfare in Europe. Essentially, what it showed was that the ever growing urban and suburban sprawl in West Germany was effectively creating a series of defensive islands squarely in the once wide open path of any armored thrust, with the villages and towns close enough together to permit ATGM equipped forces in those places to cover the open spaces between them. This was a worrisome development for the Soviets and led, I believe, to a much greater emphasis on air mobile operations. So the Syrians are doing the same thing, creating a ready made in depth hedgehog defense for their reconfigured forces? Interesting!

Regards,

John Kettler

[oren_m]

John, you have just reminded me someting.

I think it was 5 years ago, during combat manuvering training, my batllion moved near the Syrian border and we positioned our selfs in war position in order to look at what we would see from there in a real war, suddenly, a large number of Syrian soldiers came out of the alleged houses near the border, we maneged to see that they are all AT units, i think they had AT-4 SAGER missiles.

Anyhow, their whole "we have secret units near the border" thing exposed, i guess their commaders did'nt really liked that.

So, according to this i would presume that they are thinking about this whole idea of urban fighting for a while...

[Battlefront.com]

The pitiful thing about US military planning is that they correctly identified the same trends in Germany. I have a 1980s, or early 1990s?, US Army Field Manual on MOUT warfare. It clearly states that MOUT will be a significant part of any conflict in the near future and illustrated why it would become even more so with each passing year. Yet it would appear that these conclusions were largely ignored for a while, then only semi influential thereafter. It is only since Iraq that the military has kicked its MOUT training, tactics, and weaponry into high gear. Still much room for improvement, for example non-lethal capabilities. The latter would be exceptionally useful in Iraq, that's for sure.

Steve

[Rick]

M1, exactly what I had in mind.

I thought I had heard about increased US MOUT training several years ago, so was expecting us to be a little better prepared. Although, in general I expected Iraq to go similarly to the way it has.

[Battlefront.com]

Oh, for sure MOUT training was on the increase. But it seemed it was still done with the collective higher ups holding their nose. At least that is my impression.

What seems to be further behind than tactics are innovative tools. For example, kits to break down doors (Urban Breach Kits) weren't produced and made available for soldiers. Instead, units went out to local hardware stores or fire/rescue supply sources and bought whatever they thought might work best. Radios for Squads were also totally inadequate. COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) radios were bought in large quantities to give Squads the ability to talk with each other. IIRC at one time there were over 50 different brands in use in Iraq, with most of them not performing very well. I already mentioned the lack of non-lethal weapons... when the enemy forces a crowd on you, then starts shooting from within the crowd, it sure would be nice to defend oneself without killing innocent civilians. Makes for bad TV on the Arab networks too since they rather show bloody kids and women. The military also has no system to deal with the battery needs of all these devices, resulting in going through something like 9,000 batteries a day! So on and so forth.

Anyway, like in WWII the US military is showing that it can enter a fight moderately (or even ill) prepared and quickly adapt. The problem with Iraq is that so much damage was done to the overall mission during this time of adjustment (much of it caused by politicians, mind you) that many are unclear if it can be salvaged or if civil war is the more likely outcome. Time will tell, but hopefully the US military doesn't forget how important MOUT warfare is.

Steve

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The problem I have with your arguments is that you aren't interpreting things armed with the same knowledge. You've drawn conclusions that run contrary to current fact. There might be a reason to support your interpretation, but in order to do that you have to explain it.

awful amount of explaining to do.

i guess it is enough if i make a couple of points what my scenario would look like. this is just the prelude to the actual war, so that we can find a setting you find likely enough.

- Syrians have been at least partly succesful in their reform. no Soviet style massing of heavy divisions, but focus on low-signature light forces as per their new doctrine. their forces are still largely poorly trained & lead and their attempts to adopt Israeli tactics have for most parts failed. but no more Soviet doctrine.

- Syrians are determined to defend their nation. power games & rivalry are pushed aside for the duration of this conflict - or else Syria and Islam fall. for our Nation and Mohammed we fight, Christian Crusaders must be slain! no Iraq 2003 style bribery & self-disarming divisions & welcoming by the masses. no decades of sanctions and low morale.

- even if Russian talk about being on the side of Syria is largely rhetorics for domestic Russian politics, the write-off of 70-80% of Syrian debts and the numerous new weapons deals & some military cooperation are enough to give Syrians, at least on theory, something to fight against the US equipment on tactical level.

- the pre-invasion air-war is largely ineffective because Syrians are fielding mainly low-signature light forces. there are no heavy troop concentrations to bomb, mostly just infrastructure and decoys.

- like in previous cases (even against opponents who massed heavy forces in Soviet style) the US forces are unaware of this and believe they have destroyed 70-90% of Syrian forces.

- the thinness of the flow of hi-tech intelligence data further emphasis their wrong picture of the situation. light low-signature forces cause far less blips on the map.

- the US forces believe they have temporaily paralyzed and neutralized their opponent and thus believe they must act boldly and daringly to make use of this window of opportunity & launch a "Thunder Run" to capture Damascus and other key locations before the Syrian side is able to regroup. besides general doctrine, this decision is further encouraged by politics and the success of operations in 1991 & 2003.

so that's the prelude to the actual ground war. do you have many objections to the scenario so far?

Like your logistics position. You just now tried to explain it better, but it still doesn't conform to reality. A conflict in Syria would be far easier to support than one in Afghanistan and Iraq, not less. And even if it was less... how much less would it have to be to make a real difference?

but Steve, it was you who brought logistics into the discussion. i was just arguing against your position that the invading forces could just halt outside key locations like Damascus and wait for them to fall due to Syrian logistical problems.

Syrians don't have logistical problems in key locations like Damascus because they are the logistical roots of their military.

if Iraq is the main source of US logistics and Iraq has not been pacified by 2007, then the US logistical situation is IMHO worse than it was in the 2003 invasion (in which US forces used friendly Kuwait).

my take on logistics on the 2007 conflict is that it is mostly meaningless. if the conflict lasts long enough for logistical factors to kick in then the invading side has lost.

As for your Finnish background...

you misunderstood what i meant. i was talking about post-WW2 Finland, not WW2. post-WW2 Finland has had to find ways to fight 1st world superpower with 3rd world light forces. i propably have been brainwashed to think too highly of what a determined light infantry can accomplish. at least i have been brainswashed to look at things from the viewpoint of light infantry instead of heavy mech forces.

My point here is that the big country will win the conventional war if it wants to.

that's where our different background is showing. i believe the small country can defend herself succesfully by making the war painful enough. there's always the political & diplomatical & economical side to wars. sure, the big country can still fight the war to its conclusion, but few leaders have what it takes, especially Western ones.

[ December 28, 2005, 03:34 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[oren_m]

Say, what are the reasones for the US army to not use Israel as it's logistical base, i mean, it's a whole lots safer than Iraq and much more closer to Damescus, moreover, the US army could use the already existing logistical sources of the IDF.

I know it's highly unlikely to happen, but would'nt it be much easier for them?

Oren_m