Battle of Kursk- was it really a draw?

[Colonel Klink]

As you all well know, the standard interpretation in most history books of the Battle of Kursk is that is was an unqualified Soviet success. However, I've been looking into the battle recently, and I've found a lot of folks who argue the battle was more of a draw, and that the Soviets lost catastrophic amounts of tanks. They all agree that even if the Germans had won, the Soviets still would've won the war, but say that calling the battle a Russian victory is a mistake.

The most interesting article I saw was this one, a short, yet to the point little article, which was written after some old Soviet and German war records were declassified:

http://www.rose.cc.ok.us/faculty/mmorgan/Johnson33/

I was just wondering if you all had any takes on the subject. Was the Battle of Kursk a clear cut Soviet victory, or a bloody draw? :confused:

[Redwolf]

I know of no decent and recent military analysis that claims that the battle of Krusk was a victory for the Soviets when considering this battle alone.

For the Germans it was a battle where they had to score a big win, otherwise they were doomed. And they were, whether you interpret the actual result as a draw, light loss or light victory.

[Colonel Klink]

You're probably right. The Germans would have lost the war even if they won. But they're just saying the battle wasn't a knockout Soviet Victory. In my opinion, the retaking of Khrakov later that year for the final time was just as important.

[Chupacabra]

Col. Klink:

Citadel was intended to be the blow the knocked out the Soviet Army. It didn't. The Soviets could more easily make good their losses than the Germans, regardless of the fact that Soviet losses were numerically greater. Pyrrhic victory, certainly, but the Soviets won.

[Colonel Klink]

Hmm. Should've stated I don't agree with the author of the article that the Germans could've won the battle. I agree Germany didn't win the battle at all. It's just that I don't agree with some historians who say Germany got "routed" at Kursk. I concede that the Soviets won. But they paid an extremely high price for the victory. Truly a hard fought battle.

[ May 06, 2002, 05:21 PM: Message edited by: Colonel Klink ]

[Zitadelle]

Colonel Klink-

...the standard interpretation in most history books of the Battle of Kursk is that is was an unqualified Soviet success. However, I've been looking into the battle recently, and I've found a lot of folks who argue the battle was more of a draw, and that the Soviets lost catastrophic amounts of tanks. They all agree that even if the Germans had won, the Soviets still would've won the war, but say that calling the battle a Russian victory is a mistake.

Yes, the Russians had lost quite a bit of material for those units that were directly involved in the fighting of Operation Zitadelle. However, and more importantly, they still had a strong strategic reserve. This strategic reserve allowed them to begin their offensives and finally rest the strategic initiative from the Germans.

On a strategic/operational level, Operation Zitadelle was Germany's last moment of holding the initiative on the Eastern Front. Thereafter, they could only establish the initiative on the tactical level- not at the level of an Army Group or Front.

I would probably state (and agree with S. Zaloga) that the Battle of Kursk became a large battle of attrition. The diffences between the two sides equipment, intelligence, deployment, urgency, etc... still make it an interesting battle. Kursk battles will have all sorts of fun tactically, but on the strategic level it was two armies mauling each other over only a few miles.

Redwolf-

I know of no decent and recent military analysis that claims that the battle of Kursk was a victory for the Soviets when considering this battle alone.

For the Germans it was a battle where they had to score a big win, otherwise they were doomed. And they were, whether you interpret the actual result as a draw, light loss or light victory.

I agree with Redwolf that the Battle of Kursk was not considered a true victory for the Russians. Where the victory came into play was after the battle. The Germans had use their reserves for what became a battle of attrition. Thereafter, their troops were exhausted and supplies had be used up for a mere 25 odd miles (sorry I'm an American- still using obsolete measurements...) of gain which probably increased their frontage.

Starting in late July and proceeding through the end of 1943, the Russians were able to use their reserves- which were still available- to begin the great summer/fall offensives of 1943. These quickly re-took Kharkov (for the last time) and pushed to the Dnieper. In Glantz's _Battle of Kursk_ he begins to outline the beginning Russian offensives and the Germans pulling back from their gains (all in several days).

I think we can argue whether a big win would have made any difference in the long run (and I will leave that one for later....

Chupacabra-

Citadel was intended to be the blow the knocked out the Soviet Army.... The Soviets could more easily make good their losses than the Germans, regardless of the fact that Soviet losses were numerically greater. Pyrrhic victory, certainly, but the Soviets won.

The plan for Citadel was to stabilize the front and remove the salient (Kursk salient) that had formed in the German line after the Russian winter offensive of fall/winter 42-43 and the German re-taking of Kharkov (for the third time...). The goal was not an eventual defeat of the USSR as the previous Summer Offensive had been (Operation Blue- leading to the Battle of Stalingrad). Rather, it was to take a large salient out of the front- minimizing the length- and to allow the Germans to maintain the initiative but hold on defensively.

[Skipper]

It was a draw that totally satisfied the soviet side, and spelled the certain doom for germans.

On the grand strategy level, arguably, germans lost the war in August 1941 (when AG Nord, unexpectedly for germans, was stopped at Smolensk).

Actually, it is not entirely unreasonable to say that they lost before the shooting even started - simply by underestimating soviet mobilization potential over the first 4 weeks by about 50%.

[Colonel Klink]

The Soivets won because they had a near inexhaustible supply of men and armor. And because they won, they sorta got to dictate the history of the Eastern Front(At least to their own people). For instance, the Statlingrad counteroffensive, Uranus, was one of two major attacks laucnched against the German Army during the last mounths of 1942. The other offensive, Operation Mars, was an unreedemable failure. The Russians used rigid censorship to virtually wipe out knowledge of the defeat of Operation Mars from the Soviet public, and make it seem like Operation Uranus was the only offensive that took place. They could this because they were the victors.

[ May 06, 2002, 07:01 PM: Message edited by: Colonel Klink ]

[Roksovkiy]

The Russians used rigid censorship to virtually wipe out knowledge of the defeat from the Soviet public. They could this because they were the victors.

The Russian had bulit up a tank park prior to Kursk. The Germans could have destroyed every soviet tank around Kursk and within a month 2000 new tanks would be back at the front.

[Colonel Klink]

I wan't talking about Kursk there. I was talking about Operation Mars. A bit off topic, it was, but I was pointing out a fact that the Soviet government was quick to cover up its failures in the post WWII years. I'll edit that post so it's more clear about that.

[ May 06, 2002, 07:02 PM: Message edited by: Colonel Klink ]

[Mikael]

On the grand strategy level, arguably, germans lost the war in August 1941 (when AG Nord, unexpectedly for germans, was stopped at Smolensk).

Did I miss out something? After reading Guderian's Panzer Leader and several other accounts of Barbarossa it is my understanding that in August there was no real resistance in front of Army Group Centre. After the taking of Smolensk the Army Group had to rest and regroup and its 2.PzGroup was then sent South to assist Kleist in encircling Kiev.

Much to Guderian and several other commanders' anger, who thought Moscow was well within Army Group Centre's reach in the late summer.

So I don't see what was so unexpected about regrouping at Smolensk and waiting for Guderian to complete his task in the Ukraine?

[zukkov]

kursk. the final frontier. lol.. it's well known in history for 2 reasons. 1)it was the largest tank battle in history and 2)it was the last major attack by the germans on the eastern front. it was their gettysburg you might say. i'd just like to add that despite the battle being delayed for what, 3 months from it's initial start time(?), and the fact the russians knew it was coming and had so much time to prepare defenses, i'm still amazed how well the germans did as far as destroying russian tanks was concerned. it's just a good thing the germans suffered terribly from lack of tanks and fuel for their war machine for much of the war...

[Stormhouse]

Even after reading the article I still think the battle of Kursk was a complete defeat for the Germans. I'm saying this because the Germans achieved nothing significant with it. They didn't slow down the Russian army at all. Sure the author mentions one Russian tank army being put out of commission because of heavy loses, so what the Russians still counter attacked and won.

I think the author is to interested in pure numbers and statistics. The final outcome was complete failure on the German side to achieve anything they set out to do in operation Citadel.

I have watched some newer shows about the battle of Kursk and they seem to be giving a somewhat more accurate account. For one most tanks even in this battle where panzer IV. Not that many Tigers and Panthers took part and the Elephant was a complete disaster. Allot of the heavy tanks got stuck in mind fields right at the beginning of the battle. Also The north attack by the Germans was stalled very early on and didn't make any significant progress for the rest of the battle. He also seems to concentrate on three elite SS divisions. I still say the Germans where routed they lost all initiative on the eastern front, if that’s not a defeat then I don’t know what is. Germans also poured all of there reserves for this battle and lost.

The battle would have been a victory for the Germans only if they would have been able to encircle the salient in 3 days and with light loses. Anything else would have been a defeat and it was. For the Russians a victory was to get the Germans to commit all of there forces to this battle and then attack them on there flanks which they did so they won.

Now if his goal is just to correct some of the numbers, loses of tanks and so on then it’s a good article. To say that the Germans didn’t really lose is borderline revisionist.

[Mikael]

You seem to be confusing the Zitadelle Operation and the Prokharovka battle. While the Operation was most certainly a German defeat, what the author argues is that the battle for Prokharovka ended as a draw/minor victory for the Germans and not as a total Soviet victory.

[SpazManOught]

1) it was the largest tank battle in history

Is it still the largest tank battle? I thought it had been superseded by the October War 1973 with 6000+ Israeli, Syrian and Egyptian tanks (actual tanks not StuG's/assualt guns and involved in the fight not reserves)

[ May 06, 2002, 08:52 PM: Message edited by: SpazManOught ]

[Skipper]

> it is my understanding that in August there was

> no real resistance in front of Army Group

> Centre.

Well... Smolensk defensive operation, 10 July - 10 September. 13th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 28th armies.

Barbarossa plan called for decisive defeat of RKKA in border battles. In the sector of AG Center, this meant encirclement and decisive defeat of 3, 4, 10 and 13 armies. By early July this task was complete. After that, there wasn't supposed to be any serious consolidated resistance in that sector, and OKW deemed AG Center capable of continuing advance on Moscow with infantry divisions.

Hence the OKW directive 33, which redirected both tank groups to north and south, respectively, and instructed AG Center to:

"After improving situation in the area of Smolensk, and on the south flank, AG Center by sufficiently powerful infantry formations of both its armies must defeat the enemy that is still present in the area between Smolensk and Moscow, advance by its left flank as far as possible to the east, and capture Moscow.

The fact that RKKA already managed to consolidate another strategic echelon was for germans an unforeseen emergency. Oops.

Soviet counteroffensive attempts during Smolensk operation were a costly failure, with notable exception of Yelnya. Yet, AG Center was forced into defensive mode for precious 6 weeks.

[ May 06, 2002, 09:05 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

[zukkov]

Originally posted by SpazManOught:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> 1) it was the largest tank battle in history

Is it still the largest tank battle? I thought it had been superseded by the October War 1973 with 6000+ Israeli, Syrian and Egyptian tanks (actual tanks not StuG's/assualt guns and involved in the fight not reserves)</font>

[Doug Beman]

Yom Kippur may have involved some 6000 tanks, but the Israelis were fighting separate, though interrelated, actions against the Egyptians, Syrians, and Jordanians, in several distinct places. For Kursk, Caidin's "The Tigers are Burning" lists "official Soviet figures" crediting the Soviets with fielding 3306 tanks, while Zhukov states that he had to have enough supply for 3600 tanks. Rokossovsky lists "at least 3600 tanks and SP guns, 2535 of them heavy or medium."

German figures given list out to 2700 tanks and SPguns.

All these forces were set against each other on a frontage of just 150 miles, something like half the length of Israel (as long as the map I found online is accurate). That worked out to something like 3000 men, 40 tanks, and 50 artillery pieces per kilometer of front.

The result of the battle, because it was NOT a German victory, was a German defeat. In fact, the Germans largely played into the Soviet strategy; after Zitadelle was ended, the Germans were so weakened that the Russian summer offensive made huge gains.

DjB

[ May 06, 2002, 09:47 PM: Message edited by: Doug Beman ]

[Colonel Klink]

I guess I agree. I just take issue with some people calling the battle a complete German rout. The German army fought very hard, and inflicted what would be to any other army besides the Red Army catastrophic losses (The Red Army could thow its men around like money). Could you imagine what the reaction of the American or British public would've been to causualties like that, even in victory?

[Stormhouse]

Originally posted by Colonel Klink:

I guess I agree. I just take issue with some people calling the battle a complete German rout. The German army fought very hard, and inflicted what would be to any other army besides the Red Army catastrophic losses (The Red Army could thow its men around like money). Could you imagine what the reaction of the American or British public would've been to causualties like that, even in victory?

Funny that you say that because after the battle the number of russian dead was kept a secret from the public. Only recent files and number from the russian army put the russian death toll at about 250,000 men.

I'm just looking at the book "Russia at War" and I'm reading the section about this battle, for a 1000 page book they sure spend very little time on this gigantic battle.

Here are some number being claimed by the russians:

German loses

1st day 586 tanks 203 planes

2nd 433 tanks 111 planes

3rd 520 tanks 111 planes

4th 304 tanks 161 planes

The writer of the book is a british reporter in russia during the war, i think his numbers are from the russian news papers at the time. So I'm sure the numbers are off. He did have a chance to see a part of battle field after it was all over. He said 100's tanks littered the land scape the smell was horrible from all dead bodies all over the place.

[killmore]

Was Battle of the Bulge a draw?

What I would consider a draw:

Offensive gained small territory but was quickly stopped. Attacker was able to hold that small territory without large cost.

Axis was not able to hold the gained territory therefore they lost. I would put it a loss (not a minor loss) because they lost large amount of newest toughest tanks they had that were better than soviet ones.

If you look at just first couple of days I would make it a draw. After that it became a loss.

Now if you want to discuss the battle in terms of number of killed as reported by Axis - you might call it a minor victory.

If you look at Soviet number the story is different.

[Grisha]

Klink,

When you consider that the Soviets had never stopped the Germans in a summer offensive this victory was huge, even when considering the tremendous losses in men and equipment absorbed by the Red Army. One has to remember this was the German Army, now reinforced with an entire SS Panzer Corps, and the Germans were still very much in their prime. The plan for operation Zitadelle was to eliminate the Kursk salient and deprive the Soviets of the initiative and any offensive capability in summer of 1943. The Soviet plan was to allocate sufficient forces to stop the German offensive while planning for a general counteroffensive that would start from just south of Velikie Luki all the way down to the Black Sea coast with the objective set at the Dnepr line. In the final analysis, the Germans did not penetrate the tactical depths in the northern pincer and barely penetrated the tactical depths in the south pincer before calling off the operation. The Soviets successfully defended the salient then launched their counteroffensive, eventually establishing two very large bridgeheads along the Dnepr.

In the two most exhaustive studies done on Kursk, Glantz and Zetterling both state that even if the Germans had penetrated through the operational depths in the southern pincer, its effects would have been negligible.

[ May 07, 2002, 01:15 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Mikael:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />On the grand strategy level, arguably, germans lost the war in August 1941 (when AG Nord, unexpectedly for germans, was stopped at Smolensk).

Did I miss out something? After reading Guderian's Panzer Leader and several other accounts of Barbarossa it is my understanding that in August there was no real resistance in front of Army Group Centre. After the taking of Smolensk the Army Group had to rest and regroup and its 2.PzGroup was then sent South to assist Kleist in encircling Kiev.

Much to Guderian and several other commanders' anger, who thought Moscow was well within Army Group Centre's reach in the late summer.

So I don't see what was so unexpected about regrouping at Smolensk and waiting for Guderian to complete his task in the Ukraine?</font>

[Thantis]

The Germans should have either launched the Kursk Offensive when it was originally planned (May '43) or abandoned the idea, husbanded their tank reserves and used their superior manuevering skills to fight a flexible defensive action on the Eastern Front for the remainder of the war.

Its interesting to note that the Germans were able to launch a strategic offensive in 1941, operational offensive in 1942, but only a tactical offensive in 1943. These reduced expectations for the offensive should have been a huge red flag to the Germans that they could not accomplish any meaningful victory at Kursk. Even a German tactical victory is still a strategic defeat due to the overwhelming equipment advantage held by the Red Army.

[Zitadelle]

Originally posted by Thantis:

The Germans should have either launched the Kursk Offensive when it was originally planned (May '43) or abandoned the idea, husbanded their tank reserves and used their superior manuevering skills to fight a flexible defensive action on the Eastern Front for the remainder of the war.

Its interesting to note that the Germans were able to launch a strategic offensive in 1941, operational offensive in 1942, but only a tactical offensive in 1943. These reduced expectations for the offensive should have been a huge red flag to the Germans that they could not accomplish any meaningful victory at Kursk. Even a German tactical victory is still a strategic defeat due to the overwhelming equipment advantage held by the Red Army.

I would argue that Operation Zitadelle should not have been launched at all- not in April, May, or June. Whenever the attack would have been launched, the Russian reserves still would have eventually made an appearance. Yes, the Germans may not have lost as much equipment (i.e., armor) trying to roll through defense-prepared ground, but loses still would have occurred since the Russians had improved on their defensive fighting capabilities by then. Furthermore, the Kursk salient could have been stablized through other means than trying to remove it. With the Germans trying to hold Kharkov in the south and Orel in the north, the salient was a natural curve in the line.

I would support your contention that the Germans should have, "husbanded their tank reserves and used their superior manuevering skills to fight a flexible defensive action on the Eastern Front for the remainder of the war."

Finally, even though Operation Zitadelle was not on the scale of Operation Blue (summer, 1942), I would still call it an operational offensive. Remember the scale of forces involved.