Panther availability late 43, early 44?

[ASL Veteran]

Panzertruppen volume 2 has a nice chart on page 205 listing the tank strengths of all units on the Eastern front for 31 May.

There are 9 units listed in Heeregruppe Suedukraine with a total of 107 available, of which 56 were operational and which includes 59 replacement tanks that came to the front by June 31 (If I'm reading that right). Of the nine units, the Panthers are all concentrated in only two divisions (23 Pz Division and Gross Deutchland)

There are 13 units listed in Heeresgruppe Nordukraine with a total of 194 available of which 177 operational and which includes a further 206 replacement tanks that arrived between 31 May and 30 June. The operational tanks are concentrated in 4 divisions - really only two divisions (Wiking and 8th Panzer) with the other two having around 30 between the two of them. The replacement tanks mostly went into two divisions (79 each for 4th and 5th Panzer) with the two others that only had 30 between them getting the rest.

There are 4 units listed for Heeresgruppe Mitte of which none have any Panthers.

There are 3 units listed for Heeresgruppe Nord, of which one (11th SS Pz Grenadier) has 12 Panthers - only 5 operational.

While this is only a quick snapshot at the end of the period Steve is asking about, I find it notable that nearly all the Panthers were to be found in Army Group South (yeah, so it was broken into two parts). So, if we were having regional distinctions, a QB set in the south would have a much better chance of getting a Panther than someone in the north or center.

Anyway, the totals given for 31 May are:

Pz IV: 603 Available, 484 Operational, and 123 replacements arriving between 31 May to 30 June.

Pz V: 313 Available, 238 Operational, 265 replacements arriving between 31 May and 30 June.

Pz VI: 298 Available, 233 Operational, 32 replacements arriving between 31 May and 30 June.

Examining the production figures for the month of June 44 we find that 370 were produced during the month and that 338 were ready to issue during the month. From our chart we show that 265 replacements arrived during June so that is 71% of the production run heading east and a whopping 78% of the ready to issue heading east. We see the total inventory is listed as 2038 for the month of June. If we take our available and add that to our replacements we get 578 Panthers accounted for on the east. This leaves a further 1460 in the inventory unaccounted for.

I can check the tank totals on the eve of D-Day in the west on page 177. It shows that in the west there were 655 Panthers on 10 June 1944 in the West. That of course leaves 805 unaccounted for (1460 - 655). Probably in depots or in various stages of refitting or somefink.

Okay, IF we assume that the 78% figure (of the ready for issue numbers) holds true for the entire time period, you would see the following number of Panthers sent east as replacements during the appropriate months (from page 284):

Sep 43: 121

Oct 43: 182

Nov 43: 173

Dec 43: 241

Jan 44: 221

Feb 44: 191

Mar 44: 227

Apr 44: 215

May 44: 288

The raw total of ready for issue between that time period is 2,163. 2163 x .12 = 260 tanks theoretically sent to the west, but if you have 655 deployed in the west, then I guess that would make the 78% figure incorrect as a blanket assumption. Taking 655 divided by 2163 we get a 70% figure for Panthers sent East so the numbers above would have to be adjusted down to:

Sep 43: 109

Oct 43: 164

Nov 43: 155

Dec 43: 216

Jan 44: 198

Feb 44: 172

Mar 44: 204

Apr 44: 193

May 44: 259

There were also around 200 Panthers already in the east at the beginning of this time period (August). You will note, of course, that the number theoretically sent east in May is an all time high and is almost equivalent to the total of operational Panthers on May 31 (which may indicate a high attrition rate). From this, I would hazard a guess that your operational Panther strength for the period would probably be somewhere between 100 and 300 Panthers a month (or less) during this time frame and that they would almost all be located in Army Group South.

My goodness, that post was almost Jason like! :eek: Perhaps I should go and seek help.

edited because equalivent is not a word (Doh)

[ February 26, 2002, 07:30 PM: Message edited by: ASL Veteran ]

[MajorBooBoo]

I think you miss some points already brought up:

[ March 01, 2002, 04:04 PM: Message edited by: MajorBooBoo ]

[LGMB]

Soldiers,

Wow..... If I haven't all ready, I'd like to nominate the Major for a Grog award!

[ASL Veteran]

I’m not sure if I like punishment or what, but I was a little curious to see how accurately I could account for the Panthers during the period Steve asked about. All this comes from Panzertruppen Vol 2. BTW I neglected to include the rebuilt Panthers in the previous post for Ready for Issue figures. Okay, so on 1 July 1943, There are a total of 192 Panthers split between Pz Abt 52 and Pz Abt 51 along with 8 HQ Panthers for Pz Rgt 39 for a total of 200. Now, let’s check this against the inventory and production figures through July. Ready for issue figure for May 43 is 235, plus another 176 for the month of June. This gives us a total of 411 Panthers ready for issue (new) prior to Zitadelle – of which 200 are deployed. There were also a further 26 rebuilt making our total of 437 prior to Zitadelle. Inventory given for July 43 is 447 on the 1st of the month which is close to 437 but not exact. Okay, so losses for July are 84 with ready for issue being 180. This nets to +96 which would theoretically leave us with an August 1st figure of either 533 if we go by the ready for issue number or 543 if we use the inventory figure for July 1st and add 96. The figure given as inventory on Aug 1st is 553 (there seems to be an ‘off by ten’ theme here). IF 70% of the ready for issue was sent to the East Front this would give us 180 x .70 = 126 replacements for 84 losses netting out to 42 additional tanks added to the 200 previously deployed and a total tank strength of 242 for the month of August (not all of which would be operational). This does give us a theoretical max figure for the east of 242 and if we use the May 31 1944 figures for an operational ballpark percentage we would have a 76% operational readiness figure making 242 x 76% = 184 operational Panthers on August 1st all on the East Front.

Okay, now we can calculate runners for September 1st. We can check the replacements sent to the East Front on Page 109 which shows 71 Panthers heading east in SS Pz Rgt 2 in August. The ready for issue figures for August are 153. Using our 70% assumption we would guess that 107 of these Panthers were sent east – of which 71 were all in SS Pz Rgt 2. The others would have either been sent east individually or would be added to the 247 that we already haven’t accounted for in the inventory. If we assume that the 107 were all sent east then we have 242 + 107 = 349. We then have to subtract losses of 43 giving us 306 x 76% readiness = 233 operational Panthers on September 1st. If we assume that the only Panthers sent east were the 71 of SS Rgt 2 we would have 242 + 71 = 313 subtracting losses of 43 we would then have 270 x 76% readiness = 205 runners. This should establish a min and a max for September 1st. Similarly let’s look at our total inventory figure as a check. The total inventory on September 1st is listed as 650. Our last given inventory figure was 553 so if we add 153 (RFI) – 43 (losses) = 110 (Net Gain) to 553 we get 663 total Panthers. Once again, not exact but pretty close. If we use the previously calculated 543 figure and add 110 we get 653 which is a lot closer, but still not exact. Anyway, the 233 operational figure seems fairly reasonable as a max.

Looking at October 1st we can see that 96 Panthers arrived on the East Front in Pz Rgt 23. Ready for issue figures for September were 159 so if we use our 70% assumption we would have 111 sent east. Losses were 80 during that month so we would have 111 – 80 = +31. Add that to our previous total of 306 and we have 337 x 76% = 256 runners maximum. IF we assume that the only Panthers sent east were the 96 of Pz Rgt 23 then we would have 270 + 96 = 366 – 80 (losses) = 286. If we take the 286 and multiply it by the readiness factor of 76% we get 217 runners for October 1st. This gives us our min max as between 256 and 217. Checking against the given inventory we see that it is listed as 728 on Oct 1st with a note saying that the original document was adjusted. Our previous given inventory was 650 + 159 RFI = 809 for Oct 1st. Subtract losses of 80 and we get an inventory of 729. Okay using our calculated inventory figure from before we would have 653 inventory + 159 RFI = 812 – 80 (losses) and we have 732 total inventory. Taking our adjusted figure of a 663 base figure (calculated from the previous given inventory figure) we would have 663 + 159 RFI – 80 = 742 (which probably accounts for the note that it was adjusted). We have three different total inventories, two of which we calculated and one that’s given.

Anyway, I guess that’s enough for now. I can continue for the rest of the months if this is of interest to Steve. Otherwise I think I’ll just go watch some NBA basketball!!

[ASL Veteran]

Originally posted by MajorBooBoo:

I think you miss some points already brought up:

1. Panthers were not shipped as replacements (primarily) during this period. Units were being shipped WITH panthers after the units had been trained. Panzertruppen 2 documents this and I posted it previously.

My other post accounts for both conditions

2. The 200 (or whatever the correct number)Panthers at Kursk were very quickly reduced in number and cant be taken as a starting point.

Yes, I believe they can be used as a starting point because we have all the data to use it as such.

3. These raw math posts are usually going to show

a. Overly high attrition

b. Missing tanks

Not really - I think I have narrowed most of it down, other than the 247 from the beginning.

The panther tank losses were posted also. The units that recieved Panthers in the East has been posted. We know an end point (May 31 1944) that also was posted (just curious, did you read my posts?).

I attempted to get through the scattered information in your posts, but I never saw the May 31st figures posted there - just a lot of different unit strengths. However, even if you posted them already, I needed that information to make my post otherwise it wouldn't have made sense. Your posts also don't tie in the replacements with the inventory and the ready for issue figures and give a running total. If you did then I guess I missed it. By the way, I am not going to get into an argument about this, I am simply running some numbers from the same book you have and I am attempting to tie the numbers together into a sensible presentation. It is truly irrelevant to post the replacement units inventories without tying it into the whole or giving a running account. If you feel that I am just repeating in an inferior way what you have already spoken of, then I guess I'll just let you do your own thing.

Incidentally, since I am not even addressing you or your posts I don't think it even matters if I read your posts. Perhaps if I was making a direct response to something you posted - then maybe you would want to ask if I read something you posted. Otherwise SOD OFF (to borrow a Cesspoolian term)

[ASL Veteran]

OMG, I am going to commit the cardinal sin of posting three times in a row!! I only add this because I wanted to make a quick adjustment to my numbers. Unfortunately my Minimum estimate is off because no additional Panzer units were deployed to the East Front in July so only the initial 200 can be counted and I can't add the individual replacements. This means that my raw minimum number will be off by 126 in each subsequent month because that's how many I added in July that didn't belong to units. So, the adjusted minimum for August would be 116 Available with 88 runners.

For September it would be 144 available with 109 runners.

For October it would be 160 available with 122 runners.

[MajorBooBoo]

Wow, someone woke up with a sore ASL.

[ March 01, 2002, 04:05 PM: Message edited by: MajorBooBoo ]

[ASL Veteran]

Originally posted by MajorBooBoo:

[QB]Wow, someone woke up with a sore ASL. I will just post info and someone else can repost it or whatever. I can't follow his posts so just as well.

perhaps you can't follow my posts because you don't understand finance or accounting. That's okay, it isn't for everyone. Knowing that though, I'll try very hard to resist the temptation to rip your posts apart.

[MajorBooBoo]

[ March 01, 2002, 04:05 PM: Message edited by: MajorBooBoo ]

[M Hofbauer]

MajorBooBoo:The panther tank losses were posted also. The units that recieved Panthers in the East has been posted. We know an end point (May 31 1944) that also was posted (just curious, did you read my posts?). I agree with your estimate by the way. I posted that post-kursk till the end of the year 1943, the panthers were about a battalion (40-50)to maybe a few hundred (caveat-very maybe). Mostly concentrated in special units.

MajorBB, from your posts I get the impression there is a tendency of you to say that Panthers are a rather rare tank? Please correct me if my impression is wrong.

If however that is your bearing then I feel compelled to point out that the numbers of Panthers are not low at all. A "few hundred Panthers" is a lot. Other tanks and StuGs did not reach such different dimensions either. One has to look away from production numbers or russian tank numbers, because compared to these the operational numbers of german tanks are always pretty low.

What I am trying to say is that the Panther, in contrast to, say, the Sturmtiger or the Ostwind, was by no means a rare vehicle (it's ubiquity went on to be right up there with the Pz IV). If I misunderstood the underlying tone of your post then please disregard.

[MajorBooBoo]

[ March 01, 2002, 04:06 PM: Message edited by: MajorBooBoo ]

[M Hofbauer]

I see, and I agree with your opinion that killed tanks should be taken into account when calculating rarity.

I disagree about the Pz IV vx Pz V thing in so far as that I think that towards the end of 44 the Pz V took over from the Pz IV as the backbone main tank.

[Mattias]

Originally posted by MajorBooBoo:

Major,

Your proposition would have left the Germans with a tank slightly superior to the Pz IV and in no appreciable way superior to the next generation of enemy tanks and TD's. And this lack of technical superiority is supposed to have been offset by what? Numbers?

There was a crying, nay, screaming lack of manpower in every part of German society and trained tank crews was at a premium. The enemy could, by way incredible human sacrifice, match the German losses 1:1 and more and still win, this the Germans could not.

Hence they did not need a tank that could match the opposition, they needed one that was able to outrage the opposition and increase the own "safe" zone.

All production centers where already going full steam and even if there had been a streamlining of the manufacturing process and a fewer number of vehicles produced there is still only so many hours in the day and hands to carry out the work.

For these reasons I believe it could not have worked.

M.

[MajorBooBoo]

[ March 01, 2002, 04:06 PM: Message edited by: MajorBooBoo ]

[Speedy]

Brrrrrrr, this thread is spooky.

[MajorBooBoo]

[ March 01, 2002, 04:07 PM: Message edited by: MajorBooBoo ]

[Mattias]

Your theory alternate tank seems to hinge on the Germans somehow being able to design another, inferior, tank faster than they actually designed the Panther. Why would your alternative tank have been available any sooner, if indeed it was to represent a real step forward tactically? Since you could not have pushed the Pz IV or it's chassis much further (several approaches where tried, all dismissed eventually) you would still have had to start from scratch.

And why would your tank and it's production be less prone to start up problems, technical as well as tactical?

The Germans knew that the Soviets were not resting on any laurels as far as tank design went. The only reason they had to "stick" with the T34/76 for the period when the Pz IV was the best all round tank was that they had not yet fielded the tanks that were better.

--

You say that:

"They were also misused because of Tiger syndrome (the panthers only had thick fur on the front). The germans quickly learned that the sides were too thin and the insides of the Panthers were just powder kegs of gunpowder and gasoline. They werent supertanks."

I take that to mean that Germans quickly learned to deploy the new tank. Is that a problem? After all, no one ever expected them to be a super tanks. The crews themselves where supremely content with what posterity has branded as one of the best three tanks of the war, and as you put it, they certainly knew the score. There were a lot of trouble with them to begin with but that was, as in all new designs, unavoidable.

What exactly do you mean by calling the 75L70 overkill in 1943? That is like calling the T34 overkill in 1941. Of course you always strive to produce a tank that is able to dominate the opposition, not merely break even. this becomes especially vital when you were short on men and facing opponents that outsized you many times in population.

And the Panther was not a tank that took this idea to the perverse extremes that the Germans displayed in later designs.

And I do disregard the alternative JagdPanther (Jagdpanzer?) you propose, as it is my opinion that the turret less approach was already pursued to the fullest through the StuG, PzJg's and evolving JgPz's. You couldn't have cut any more corners with this than you could with your demi-tank.

--

On the one hand you say they needed a tank that took advantage of the Soviet forces sticking to the T34/76 and on the other hand you say the Pz IV L/48 was a much better tank than the aforementioned T34. Wouldn't that mean that it would have been wiser to put all bets on the Pz IV?

Well, if the German strategic thinkers had begun planning for Zitadelle in early 1942 and could reliably expect to win the war in that one battle it would have seem to be the wiser course of action. But, obviously, they could not.

If there was anything overly ambitious with the Panther project then it was the speed with which it was completed and the resulting vehicle fielded. After the, inevitable, kinks were ironed out the Panther was anything but over ambitious.

To return to the 1941 T34 analogy, that tank too used bigger ammunition and drank more fuel than the BT-7 but then it was a superior tank, a battlefield winner. Just as the Panther it had what it took to be the best, and demanded the supplies for it. After all, the Germans where still thinking in terms of winning the war, not just draw it out long enough to achieve a peace settlement.

--

But really Major, I think I see what you mean. The problem was, as you touch upon in your 20/20 reference, that Germans did not know what lay ahead of them and worked for a victory that was promised soon, as you know the full blown war effort was not started until much too late. The kind of, in a way, minimalist and hyper streamlined thinking you propose was not a reality in 1942 and 43. There was a movement towards it when circumstances pressed towards it with the full power of multi front onslaughts and horrendous shortages of resources and manpower. And some of that "logical" didn't even exist at the time, being the product of another 50 years of human thinking.

M

[ February 27, 2002, 05:36 PM: Message edited by: Mattias ]

[mrcitizenkane]

Did the Germans need to produce the numbers of tanks the Soviets did? Probably not, Seeing interviews with German WWII vets all saying one German Tiger could take out 12-13 T34s even being immobile before getting taken out. Soviets expected high loses and made up on it in producing mass numbers. People where expendable war material. I think Stalin's men took out more Soviet officers then the Germans. Sorry to get off the subject a bit.

Just remember the Soviets Lost 22million people in WWII just fighting Germany. The Germans lost a third of that and the US rounds outs under 400k. If the Soviet war machine was better then the Germans, What happened?

[MajorBooBoo]

[ March 01, 2002, 04:07 PM: Message edited by: MajorBooBoo ]

[Fernando]

Panther production and delivery to the ordnance depots:

Nov42 1 0 0 0 0

Dec42 4 0 0 0 0

Jan43 21 0 4* 0 0

Feb43 50 18* 17* 0 0

Mar43 75 59* 40* 0 0

Apr43 105 78* 0* 0 0

May43 130 324 225 10 16

Jun43 153 160 167 9 10

Jul43 195 202 165 11 4

Aug43 232 120 128 22 3

Sep43 223 197 152 3 4

Oct43 247 257 215 19 1

Nov43 300 209 212 10 0

Dec43 290 299 291 18 0

Jan44 329 279 258 25 0

Feb44 270 256 238 7 12

Mar44 295 270 284 7 6

Apr44 290 311 266 10 8

May44 305 345 351 19 16

Jun44 320 370 329 9 11

Jul44 365 380 315 26 5

Aug44 370 350 356 37 15

Sep44 350 335 366 11 4

Oct44 350 278 245 11 5

Nov44 295 318 329 28 13

Dec44 310 285 240 13 7

Jan45 300 211 217 13 4

Feb45 175 126 161 11 5

Mar45 175 102 94 0 5

Apr45 200 ¿? 64 0 0

1st number: Monthly Goal

2nd number: Accepted by inspector

3rd number: Normal Panthers delivered for Issue

4th number: Bef.Wg. Panthers delivered for issue

5th number: Rebuilt Panthers delivered for issue

* With the exception of the three Panthers that had been provided to Wa Pruef 6 for testing, all the Panthers completed from january through April were returned, rebuilt, and included in the 324 panthers reported as accepted in may 1943

Source: Jentz, Thomas L., "Germany's Panther Tank. The Quest for Combat Supremacy", Schiffer Military History, 1995

[Soddball]

Major BooBoo, I think you are being needlessly offensive. If (and only if) English isn't someone's first language and they have a problem communicating (Mattias doesn't), perhaps you should switch to their native language to aid them? I'm sure a clever chap like you speaks at least three languages, possibly more.

[MajorBooBoo]

I thought I was being nice.

[ March 01, 2002, 04:08 PM: Message edited by: MajorBooBoo ]

[MajorBooBoo]

[ March 01, 2002, 04:08 PM: Message edited by: MajorBooBoo ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by MajorBooBoo:

On page 230 of Panzertruppen 2 it shows the Status of Panzers on Eastern Front from May31 44 to Mar 15 45. Theres a big discontinuity jump from the time on May 31 44 (already posted here) to sept 15 44. The numbers are then biweekly or so till mar15 45. It clearly shows that Panzer IV numbers are on par with the panther during this period. The operational numbers are superior. So I respectfully disagree with you as far as the eastern front is concerned.

In the Bulge, the germans may have had a slight advantage of Panthers over Panzer IV but I would hardly call either the backbone. They were both players and the Panzer IV shouldnt have been by this time. The Panzer IV did not get any major improvement from when the H model was introduced. Even a better turret design and frontal armor layout would have been a handsome payoff.[/QB]

That table (Pg230) includes the PIV/70(V), PIV/70(A), FlaKPz and Sturmpanzer in the PIV number. The Pz.V number includes only the Panther, Jentz explains this on Pg 202.

The table on Pg247 dealing with Panzer Strength 15 March 1945 on the eastern front details

Panther 776 (Operational 387)

PIV 603 (Operational 345)

PIV/70 357 (Operational 189)

FlaKPz 97 (Operational 50)

The table on 230 states 15 March 1945

Panther 762

PIV 1239 (This figure includes PIVlang, PIV/70, Sturmpanzer and Flakpanzer distorting the number of PIV)

The Germans initiated tests on conversion to sloped armour December 3, 1942 it proved impossible. The PIV chassis was already stretched and the test came back negative. January 5, 1943 Hitler decided despite negative test results the PIV was to receive a sloped bow plate of 100mm. (1977 Spielberg Pg 60). Nobody actually carried out the order and PIV production was continually interfered with in order to get more PIV/70 built.

November ’44 Freid.Krupp attempted to mount Panther turrets on the PIV chassis, unachievable much like the earlier attempt to mount a KwK 42/70 in a PIV turret ‘43 both overburdening the chassis. The PIV was a dead end by 1942. (1977 Spielberg Pg 78).

Cost for the PIV was 103,462 RM the Panther cost 117,100 RM 1,June 1944. Savings versus capability aka cost effectiveness are overwhelmingly on the side of the Panther.

[ February 27, 2002, 11:49 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[JonS]

Good lord Bas - who knew you had it in you! :eek: You must be Doroshs' long-lost sister. Or sumfink.