The armoured fist vs. the combined arms breakthrough

[dalem]

Originally posted by Renaud:

The 'Red Army way of doing things', before they learned the new methodology for employment of mechanized forces, was identical to the French or US or Commonwealth way of 'doing things'. That is, to missapply and waste the new technologies as if you are still fighting a WWI battle. The western allies had the technology, but had to learn a new methodology the hard way through the example of its successful early war application by the germans.

Ren

Off topic, but...

I can't speak to the intent of the other Allied armies, but if you think that the U.S. Army of WWII was created simply for the purpose of "...fighting a WWI battle." then you are mistaken.

-dale

[kipanderson]

Lars, hi,

You wrote,

“You contradict yourself here. They obviously learned the lesson but either did not have the manpower to solve the problem or a high command that would let them withdraw to a defendable MLR.”

I am not contacting myself by saying that in “some cases” they did do the correct thing. Nor is it a manpower problem. Of course, they were short of men, but this was not a specific manpower problem. It is a tactical /operational problem. They setup their defensive positions in too much depth. It was bad tactics, nothing more. One of the best accounts is in the Soviet General Staff Study on the L’vov Operation of July 44. You can buy it from http://www.frankcass.com .

The fact that they were still making the same mistake in July 44, is a bit of a shocker. In the case of the L’vov operation it cost the Germans very highly. A number of pockets in the range 5,000-15,000 men formed as a result.

All the best,

Kip.

[Hensworth]

Don't forget that the German high command, notably Hitler, refused to accept that there were any lessons to be learnt in the first place.

Right up until 1943, Hitler refused to believe that Russia could keep recovering from 'one more great blow'. Anybody who dared to suggest otherwise, or failed to execute his part in dealing the blow, was removed from command. A policy not exactly conducive to learning lessons.

After that, Germany was forced onto the back foot to a degree which, in my view, made their offensive tactics relatively irrelevant. They probably no longer had the opportunity to make ANY large scale offensive action succesfully.

[ October 10, 2002, 02:45 PM: Message edited by: Sgt_Kelly ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Gary T:

[snip]where it failed against better organised and manned lines (Mius, Kiev, Jassy, battles against AGC in the winter of 1943/44, the Courland battles, attacks along the Vistula in late summer/autumn 1944).[snip]

Gary, hi. Good to see you weigh in. Can you maybe elaborate on your Jassy and Vistula examples? Particularly the former. I assume you do not mean the August 1944 Iassy-Kishinjew operation?

I agree it did not always work - I think though that when it really was critically important, it delivered every time. The late summer 44 attacks along the Vistula failed against ad-hoc defenses. But at that time, the doctrine was not properly acted upon (and could not) because the Red Army was at the extreme end of its supply lines. When they tried again against an entrenched Wehrmacht (in prepared positions, who knew that the Red Army was coming for it) a few months later, they went through it like a warm knife through butter.

Kurland puzzles me - I am still wondering whether it was a case of the Soviet forces there being commanded by less capable commanders, or whether it was just seen as a secondary theatre, once the Germans were bottled up with their back to the Baltic sea, and the local front did not receive the means to really finish them off.

If you have any reading suggestions on the winter battles in AGC 43/44, I'd be very interested.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by kipanderson:

One point where I differ from Andreas is, Panzer Divisions, with two Panzer battalions and four infantry battalions, were nicely balanced combined arms teams. In my view.

Kip, I agree that the Panzerdivision was a very well balanced force. Especially when it was up to strength, with additional pioneer and recce forces and one armoured infantry battalion. The SP artillery of the divisions and the presence of dedicated, and armoured artillery FOOs also supported them well. All in all much better than the British model.

It would have been the ideal exploitation force - what I think it was not balanced for though was the slog through the defense. And the motorised (PzGr) divisions that were supposed to move on with them only had two regiments of infantry and lacked the SP artillery, on the whole making the force too weak to get anywhere in the face of determined resistance.

Michael's point about motorisation in general is also critically important. The Wehrmacht in 1941 was a force with a great, winning strategy (at that time!), but lacking the means to achieve victory. It was only downhill from there.

[Redwolf]

The motorization issue is also something I think the Germans are to easily bashed for.

They didn't have much fuel and they needed it for Panzers and planes. That's it for artillery tractors for the infantry divisions.

I also don't see that the horse-speed movement of the non-motorized divisions was a decisive disadvantage at any time. Certainly they were where needed in Barbarossa.

[Andreas]

Redwolf, I think I have to disagree again. For the end of the war you are certainly right about the fuel issue. At the start of Barbarossa though, having a fully mechanised army and to me that does not just include having wheels instead of horseshoes, but also full all-terrain capacity in the Panzer and motorised divisions, this could have made the critical difference in getting to Moscow quicker, by being able to reduce the large Kessel much faster and more reliable. The Germans themselves saw this absence of all-terrain capability as a serious drawback.

[Keith]

Some comments about the German breakthrough tactics in Bulge. Dietrich's Sixth SS Panzer Army in the North attacked with Volksgrenadier and Fallschirmjäger divisons for the initial breakthrough. The majority of the infantry units were composed of inexperienced men conscripted from the surplus Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personel, or they were over age reservist or teenagers. The infantry failed miserably, incuring high losses (a formula that was repeated in Nordwind). Subsequently Dietrich commited the SS Panzer Divisions to break through (Pieper).

In contrast, the more successful Fifth Panzer Army attacked with the armor divisions in the first waves (once they bridged the river). The German infantry prooved inadequate for the task of taking Bastogne, thus drawing away German armor from the spearheads. Of course the supply situation eventualy become catostrophic resulting in the wholesale abandonment of German armor due the lack of gas.

I would have to agree with the assertion that the German army was very unbalanced, with only a handful of elite Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions having mobility and high quality personel. The majority of the German army was infantry divisions who relied on horse drawn artillery, marched on their feet, and often lacked tank support. This is in contrast to the American and Russian infantry divisions, which customarily had a tank battalion and/or a SP gun or TD battalion attached for combined arms purposes, not to mention copious amounts of artillery.

The bottom line is the German offensives failed in the later part of the war in no small measure due to their inadequate infantry, which resulted in the constant wearing down of the elite Panzer units.

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by redwolf:

On a more general note, I am very sceptical about the view that the Soviets had this great doctrine on an operational level and the Germans were suffering heavily from not doing it as well.

There is to much of Soviet concepts that would not apply to the Germans, and there is too much that some German commanders did on their own and too much much other blunders the Germans committed.

Considering that 'Blitzkrieg' is essentialy "Deep Operations lite" I don't see why it would not work for the germans. For example properly expoiting and encircling was very much a part of soviet doctrine, whereas the germans generally just let their spearheads run off until they ran out of steam/panzers/conquerable country.

The german army was still fighting the last war (invasion of France) when they invaded russia and seemed to have clung to that in the abscense of an actual doctrine.

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by LightningWar:

You seem to hold a bias view. What other major offensive was there besides the Bulge that late in the war? After Kusrk the german army was more or less spent. Not enough equipment and manpower to stop an overwhelming soviet army. I remember reading about the fall of the belorussia. German man power figures were staggering. Divisions at half strength. Sometimes at a 1/3rd.

The reason that that the understrength german divions were having to face an overwhelming amount of forces in Belarus is not because the german army was "spent" at Kursk*. It was because the russian were smarter. All that manpower and equipment was in the Ukraine where the soviet main offensive was expected.

* In may 1944 the germans had in the east a total strength of almost 3.5 million men the same as the year before at that time.

[Grisha]

I'm curious to hear what some people think an operation is at the operational and strategic level, because some of the comments are more than a little confusing. Maybe there should a separate discussion on this so that we're all in agreement here. Otherwise, what one may call an 'operation,' I may call extended tactical actions.

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by redwolf:

On a more general note, I am very sceptical about the view that the Soviets had this great doctrine on an operational level and the Germans were suffering heavily from not doing it as well.

There is to much of Soviet concepts that would not apply to the Germans, and there is too much that some German commanders did on their own and too much much other blunders the Germans committed.

Considering that 'Blitzkrieg' is essentialy "Deep Operations lite" I don't see why it would not work for the germans. For example properly expoiting and encircling was very much a part of soviet doctrine, whereas the germans generally just let their spearheads run off until they ran out of steam/panzers/conquerable country.

The german army was still fighting the last war (invasion of France) when they invaded russia and seemed to have clung to that in the abscense of an actual doctrine.</font>

[Renaud]

Dalem, without qouting you at length, my diatribe only applies to the early war situation. In other words, prior to Operation Torch for the US. The US had the luxury of learning the new methods from a safe distance for the first few years. However, experience proved to be the necessary crucible to test the new organization. Witness the debacle at Kasserine. We did learn rather fast starting there and then.

Grisha, (once again not quoting) I think the Soviets in 1941 were strong on theory, weak on it's application. The Sino-soviet war gave them little opportunity to test their certainly advanced theories. The japanese were in no better shape than the western allies as far as employment of mechanized forces. I don't doubt the japanese learned more from the encounter. The Soviets were different from the western allies in that, prior to Barbarossa, they had embraced the idea of mechanized concentrations, tanks armies, etc. This allowed them to rebound rather quickly after the stalinist cronies were swept away in the initial encirclements. I still stand by my central point, that they learned the correct theory and practice of mechanized warfare from witnessing (and painfully experiencing) the first great practitioners in action. Later they adopted these first lessons to the exigencies of the moment and forged an irresistable weapon.

Ren

[dalem]

Originally posted by Renaud:

Dalem, without qouting you at length, my diatribe only applies to the early war situation. In other words, prior to Operation Torch for the US. The US had the luxury of learning the new methods from a safe distance for the first few years. However, experience proved to be the necessary crucible to test the new organization. Witness the debacle at Kasserine. We did learn rather fast starting there and then.

I agree we had the time (and luxury) to build something that would work in the new, mechanized environment- that was my point. With a little practice, it worked fine.

-dale

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Renaud:

Grisha, (once again not quoting) I think the Soviets in 1941 were strong on theory, weak on it's application. The Sino-soviet war gave them little opportunity to test their certainly advanced theories. The japanese were in no better shape than the western allies as far as employment of mechanized forces. I don't doubt the japanese learned more from the encounter. The Soviets were different from the western allies in that, prior to Barbarossa, they had embraced the idea of mechanized concentrations, tanks armies, etc. This allowed them to rebound rather quickly after the stalinist cronies were swept away in the initial encirclements. I still stand by my central point, that they learned the correct theory and practice of mechanized warfare from witnessing (and painfully experiencing) the first great practitioners in action. Later they adopted these first lessons to the exigencies of the moment and forged an irresistable weapon.

Ren

Okay, this I can generally agree with. I thought you were making the point of the Germans superceding all nations in the correct theory to defeat positional warfare. But, as far as practical applications go, yes, the France campaign shocked the Soviets who had just finished up eliminating the very people who were developing this very thing for the Red Army. And, so without naming names or familiar old theoretical terms they got cracking on renewing this primarily theoretical work. Though the tactical aspect (deep battle) was more or less understood in theory, the operational aspect (deep operations) was still in need of theoretical refinement before it could even be tested.

I should also point out that the Germans showed the Soviets not only what to do, but what not to do as well. In latter offensive operations, the Soviets made sure to not overstretch their logistical tether, and to never conduct large encirclement operations which were much harder to reduce than numerous smaller ones.

[Renaud]

In general I reserve the right to make sweeping generalizations and unsubstantiated claims, liberally seasoned with flamboyant rhetoric.

I want to take a moment to carp on a pet peeve of mine. Kursk. This operation is given quite often as the example of the 'end of blitzkrieg' or the 'swansong' of german armor. It could be called the 'swansong' of german armor, but hardly a rebuff of theoretical principle. In fact the new 'panzerkiel' concept was quite effective. Even the traditional infantry attack covering the south flank of the panzer spearhead made remarkably progress (they used AA regiments in the direct fire and artillery role as they were light on normal artillery).

Kursk was an utter failure as an operation, but not of german arms or martial theory (at least not at that point). This is because the element of surprise was completely missing. The Lucy spy ring, comprised of 10 high OKH staff officers (most general officers), was relaying a constant stream of detailed information to Stavka during all phases of the operation including planning. The Soviets were forwarned and forarmed in every possible way. I doubt any army has ever been more prepared to meet an assault. That the soviet reserves actually had to be committed to stem the penetrations from the south (ala prokhorovka) is actually quite amazing to me.

So in essence I don't think Kursk is a good example of a clash of martial theories. It's more an example of a desperate attack that everyone secretly knows is doomed. If Gettysburg is Kursk, Prokhorovka is Pickett's (sp?) charge. Just as Lee's cavalry failed, so did german intelligence against the Lucy spy ring.

Something like Manstein's counterstroke at Jeremejewska provides a better case study to contrast Soviet and German operational art.

Ren

[Redwolf]

I agree, Krusk is a bad base to compare. It has largely been designed by Hitler, most noticably in the timing. There are very few conclusions to draw about officers involved either way, for bashing the officers or to argue they would apply more sophisticated methods.

Which is, BTW, a reason why Kursk (as an operation) is surprisingly rarely played in wargames. If it starts at historical time with historical unit placement there are few things to explore.

[Grisha]

Renaud, as for sweeping rhetoric and wide generalizations I've made more than my share (and dread the ones to comes as well ).

Regarding Kursk, actually not all the reserves had been used before Kursk was called off. 27th, 53rd and 47th Armies along with 4th Gds Tank Corps and 1st Mech Corps were never committed in the defensive phase, and they were all second echelon armies/corps there. In fact, German intelligence failed to spot them altogether.

[jrcar]

I disagree with the concept that the German doctrine was a mailed fist to punch through the Defences. My understanding of the doctrine was for the infantry (without significant armoured support) to conduct the break in battle, and the the armour conducted the break through and pursuit (with the infantry left to mop up the bypassed enemy formations. That is my understaning of their doctrine, and they were certainly able to do this in France, the low countries, in the desert and in the early stages of Russia.

Unfortunately for the Germans the practice slowly strayed from the doctrine for two main reasons, the German infantry became progressively worn out and their quality diminished lessoning their ability to succesfully attack, and the defensive zone became too deep to effectively conduct a proper break in with infantry only. This lead to the introduction of the armour into the break in battle, which in turn took the edge off it for the break through and pursuit battle.

By late war the German infantry is really only capable on the defence, and all the break in is having to be done with armoured forces.

That the main axis of attacks were Panzer Coprs or Armies hides the fact that the initial assault is by the infantry divs attached to the Pazer Corps.

Late war Soviet doctrine is similar with infantry Divs doing the break in to unleash the armour. But like the Germans they found that this was not always possible and for various reasons (C2, infantry quality) the tanks were frequently released early.

Note that the Doctrine was one thing, the practise was different.

Cheers

Rob

[PJungnitsch]

Some points maybe not mentioned (I guess they have more to do with defense):

Hitler becoming ever more controlling of how the war was conducted as the war turned against him, whereas Stalin giving his commanders more and more freedom to move as long as they were winning. The opposite of the early war, with just as disastrous a results for the Germans as it was for the Soviets at that time.

Concentration on 'Hedgehog' defense and 'Fester Platz', dependent on holding strongpoints in critical areas. Another brainchild of Hitler, born of his experience in WWII, and very effective in some cases, eg 'Operation Mars'.

Progressive 'demechanization' of the German army, due to loss of transport and loss of fuel, combined with increasing mechanization of the Red Army, largely due to Lend-Lease providing 500,000 of the best trucks in the world.

Considerable Soviet superiority in numbers of aircraft, artillery, tanks, and men.

Together these factors add up to disaster. In my understanding, at least, the plan of holding the Soviets at the time of Bagration by controlling the few good roads had a chance of working, until the Soviets simply drove around the strong points in their new 6 wheel drive trucks.

I submit that without a combination of all these factors the Soviet 'Operational Art' would not perhaps look quite as golden.

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by redwolf:

We are talking different things here, I don't think we actually disagree. What I say does not apply to the concept of trying to get to vital parts fast. Both methods did this.

I think we actually agree quite a bit in that 'deliberateness' is the key difference (at least in practise), although I would like to differ a bit in saying that this actually aplies to the offense more so than the defense.

I do disagree on somethings and to properly discuss that I will respond to your post in an upside down way, conclusion first and examples secondary (and hopefullyit will still make sense that way )

overall I think the Germans were much better off with their "dynamic" approch of not planning everything through but to have small units do what they can (which often was much).

In general terms I agree with that, as you say the germans used the abilty to relay desicions to the commanders in the field to squeeze the maximum performance out of their limited resources. But there are a number of reservations I have about this that I will discuss in reference to the points you bring up.

What distinguises the Soviet operational art from the (mostly) lack thereof in the German army is deliberate planning. In very detailed ways, down to every single unit and its place at any point in time, and buffering varying results by reserves. The Germans did not do that, they threw units at the enemy which would advance as they see fit, where the small unit commanders would have a good idea of what the overall purpose of the attack is and what the capabilities of their (small) unit is.

This is my first, and probably biggest reservation. If you say that they planned down to the unit then that conjures up the images of STAVKA organising a set-piece battle with detailed plans for every squad being issued by the STAVKA, reality was of course less bureaucratic (and a good thing to, or they's still be busy organising it ).

The STAVKA set the general targets for the offensive and assigned Front commanders, who were relatively free in how they were going to conduct the offensive. STAVKA would mainly be involved with logistics, overseeing planning and coordination between the Fronts.

The front commanders in turn would assign sectors and targets to their army and Corps commanders, who were given relative freedom to conduct their operation, and so on down to company commanders. So there would be a plan that went right down to the lowest units, but that didn't mean there was no flexibility or room for initiative.

It is also important to note that these plans generally comprised only a short time, and new plans were drawn up as the first phase of an operation was completed (or had come to a halt, as the case may be) so there was also a lot of inherent flexibility.

The germans lacked such an integration, and while that made possible great flexibility for the commanders in the field to fight the best they could it implies a lack of focus on the overall objective, a greater risk of command losing control of its units and a situation wherein winning at the tactical level might not be helpfull to the overall effort.

So, what I say is that the deliberate planning would not work for the Germans, for a number of reasons:

1) it requires good knowledge of enemy strength, positions and reserves. Over all of WW2 the Germans were always bad in getting this information and worse they were easy to trick into wrong assumptions. The Soviets in comparision were master in both getting this information and hiding their own situation.

This is indeed a serious weakpoint, but I would think that would be a problem regardless of how the army is organised. Flexibility at a lower command level may occasionaly help in getting out of a fix, or exploiting a weak spot. It can just as well help get you in that fix or cause indecisiveness.

2) the deliberate planning works much better if you assume low performance of individual units. The resulting plan will be much more robust. If you assume high performance from small units, then you are screwed if they don't meet it. if you assume low performance from hih-quality units you do not use the potential these units have and of course you run into understrength problems.

I disagree at least partly, I think that deliberate planning can make good use of high-quality units. In fact the best quality units are generally the ones assigned key missions in any kind of plan and deliberate planning allows you to use these more purposefully and can thus be less wastefull.

3) the deliberate planning requires to have reserves and multiple echolons. The overstretched lines of the Germans over most of WW2 do not allow this. They would have to leave parts of the front so seriously undermanned that it would collapse on the slightest push. This is especially bad in combination with point number one - the Germans could never tell where the enemy would strike.

I agree, but that was aproblem with fighting the war in general, if you don't have what it takes to mount a proper offensive then your best hope is for local units to conduct miracles

In addition I think the effect of the deliberate Soviet planning is overrated in its direct effect.

If the soviets hadn't done things the way they did then I doubt they would have gotten very far

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by Paul Jungnitsch:

In my understanding, at least, the plan of holding the Soviets at the time of Bagration by controlling the few good roads had a chance of working, until the Soviets simply drove around the strong points in their new 6 wheel drive trucks.

I assume you were told this by a representetive of the Studebaker company

The soviets moved their attacking forces on track, on horse and on foot. The trucks were mainly used for logistics and certainly wouldn't have been capable of simply going off-road through the marshlands.

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />In addition I think the effect of the deliberate Soviet planning is overrated in its direct effect.

If the soviets hadn't done things the way they did then I doubt they would have gotten very far [/QB]</font>

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by redwolf:

I see a number of "secondary" effects from the way the Soviets organized things.

So I think the actual precise planning was not as useful as it is often seen.

But it has a lot of other effects which affect compbat performance. The most important one is probably that the Soviet officers were practially under constant input of ideas and concepts from these plans. This will enable them to make much better decisions when the plan falls apart. Remember that the education of Soviet soldiers including officiers was far worse than thei opponents. Keeping them under a constant flow of information would make them flexbile enough to actually win the war.

I would say that that is a primary rather than a seconday effect. The Plan is ultimatly a frame of reference, a way of bringing organisation and structure more than a pre-written scenario (exceptions good and bad excepted of course).

[Simon Fox]

This is an interesting discussion and certainly a peg or two above the usual dross but it seems to me that many posters are talking at cross purposes and the distinction between whether comments refer to the tactical and operational is rather blurry. I think that in order to understand the issues of comparative adaptibilty between the Germans and Soviets in WWII it is necessary to examine the issue of doctrine and organization and their interplay. Essentially in 1941 the Soviets possessed an excellent offensive doctrine but lacked the means both organisationally and physically to implement until 1943. In contrast in 1941 the Germans possessed a rather haphazard doctrine but possessed an excellent instrument to employ in whatever way they decided.

The most significant insight that one gets when one reads on the subject is that there is actually no such thing as "Blitzkreig" doctrine (Doughty, 1998). As a coherent military doctrine it does not exist. German military doctrine at the begining of WWII was merely an extension of earlier German military theory (Cooper, 1978). Certainly the organisation of tanks into powerful combined arms units was a revolutionary idea brought to fruition by Guderian but mobility and combined arms is hardly unique in German military thought. In WWII they merely utilised these formations as superior instruments to apply the doctrines of annhilation (Vernichtungsgedanke) and cauldron battles (Kesselschlacht) which originated in the late 19th century. In this respect what is clear and telling is that the Germans made no organisational effort to promote and maintain develop deep penetrations by armoured formations, it seems that such events occurred more by default than design (at the doctrinal level at least) (Corum, 1993). That is not to say that it did not happen, but that it was not doctrinally and consequently organisationally provided for. This contrasts markedly with the Soviets who continuously refined their organisation and planning to this end.

Returning specifically to the original point of this thread, I have seen elsewhere on this forum an analysis of the relative success of the northern and southern German efforts at Kursk based on the fact the Model planned conduct his break in battle with infantry divisions whereas in the south the panzer divisions led the way. It is certainly an interesting viewpoint to comparatively analyse an offensive operation based solely upon the compostion and organisation of the attacking force and without regard to that of the defender nor the terrain, but it is not one to which I would ascribe. Even taking the southern front as a microcosm, just witness the difficulty that III Pz Corps suffered south-east of Belgorod jumping off with the 6th, 19th, 7th Pz and 168th Inf divisions in the van, especially against the 81st GRD. Furthermore it is seems from recent analysis (Glantz and House, 1999) that a proportionally heavier toll on the Germans was taken by the Soviet rifle divisions and their supporting units operating in the 1st and 2nd defensive belts in comparison to the subsequent more open battles between the 2nd and 3rd belts. Therefore one might consider that the employment of these units for the break-in battle actually took the "sting" out of them somewhat when they subsequently bumped into Soviet reserves. Even so considering the relative strengths of the units involved at the point of contact it should hardly be suprising that II SS Corps eventually was able to bull it's way through the tactical defense of 25th GR Corps.

Cooper, M (1990) The German Army 1933-1945.

Corum, J (1992) The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform.

Doughty, R (1998). "Myth of the Blitzkrieg"

Glantz, D. and House, J, (1999) The Battle of Kursk.