The armoured fist vs. the combined arms breakthrough

[Grisha]

I more or less agree with you, Fionn. As I stated towards the end of my above post, logistics was crucial to it all. By consciously raising the idea of successive operations, it almost followed in tow that the development and practice of operations, or operational art, would arise. Also, by bringing the study of continuous operations to the fore, the Soviets realized the need to reassess and redefine strategy and tactics. Strategy went from the maneuvering of forces to achieve victory in war to the process of mobilizing and conducting a nation to a war footing. Thus, strategy took on a much larger scope than in previous eras. It merged the planning and conduct of the civilian rear with that of the military front. Thus, decisions on the development of operational art and tactics rippled up and over into civilian sector production, impacting not only types and number of equipment, but analyses to determine a balance between mobilization percentages with personnel needed for optimal wartime production capacity. Lastly, as you state, it also had a huge effect on how all this was to be supplied, and the development and practice of logistics was crucial to the concept of operational art. As you know, Triandafillov makes that perfectly clear.

Now, as to what comes first, the chicken or the egg, I tend to disagree with you, if I understand you correctly. In WWII, it became quickly apparent to all combatant nations just how important logistics was to success in warfare. However, by recognizing operational art, the Soviets were able to refine their wartime production to better match the progression of military operations. Through operational art the Soviets brought logistics to the fore. Because of this, I believe it was their development of operational art that was most important toward Soviet victory in WWII. Its recognition forced the Soviets to address, reassess, and redefine many other corollary issues, not the least of which was logistics.

[Grisha]

Fionn,

Another thing I forgot to add was on the type of offensive operations conducted by the Germans, and how that differed from the Soviets. I find the tendency of the Germans to focus armor into a minimum of attack axes as a weakness of their military art. Sure, it allowed for very massed armor attacks, but I don't think it outweighed the disadvantages:</font>

• the creation of huge pockets that seriously tied down already limited infantry formations with reducing these pockets.</font>
• the limited attack axes made the Red Army's response simpler to plan and conduct.</font>

The Soviets made sure after Stalingrad never to conduct huge encirclements, and to attack on quite a few axes to hinder a German response. The use of forward detachments by not only the mobile groups, but also the main forces did much to maintain a continuous link between the two groups. Granted, this concept didn't really evolve until the summer offensives of 1944, but it did much in reducing the German response - a capability of the Panzers the Soviets probably knew better than anyone else in WWII.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Frunze:

Wasn't this produced by Germany's goals and situation in the world? That is, trying to achieve world, or at least European domination against competitors with larger areas, populations, and industrial bases. Given these facts, Germany would lose regardless in any war that did not end quickly, but turned into a contest of attrition.

Sorry, I missed your post, Frunze As to your post, exactly. I think the fear of a recurrence of the Great War (Germany suffered horribly in WWI, particularly as the war wound down) is what compelled the Germans to look for another way of fighting - a quick and relatively painless method of winning wars. To their credit, they made a very good run of it, but in the end the odds finally caught up with them in the form of the USSR.

[SgtMuhammed]

The main cause of German failure can be traced directly back to Hitler. Hitler felt that Germany lost WWI because of collapse back home (the famous "Stab in the back."). This caused him to seek a better way of fighting than those of the Great War. The "Blitzkrieg" seemed to offer that better way. Unfortunatly for Hitler (and fortunatly for the rest of us) the concept of lighting war became not only military but political doctrine as well.

The German economy was not mobilized till about the middle of '42. Nearly all research into strategic programs was discontinued (heavy bombers being the most obvious) as unnecessary. Conquered nations were to by looted for usable supplies and then governed as Germany saw fit. This all translated into a Wehrmacht that was high powered but short ranged. It was the only one of the major powers to rely as heavily as it did on horses for transport. For all its percieved technological prowes it was in actuallity the most backwards of all the armies from an overall point of view. While it had some standout weapons, most of its systems were inferior to their allied counterparts. German troops prefered the superiour Russian submachineguns and came nowhere near matching the Russian cold weather equipment. German radar was so inferior to British and American sets that the Germans underestimated the capabilities of the Allied units for the entire war. The American M1 Garand was the best rifle of the war and the Germans were amazed by our field radios. Most important of all the Germans never designed an easily manufactured gp truck to compare with the American duce and a half. It was these trucks that carried the Allied armies and all their supplies to victory. Conversly it was the lack of them that not only hampered but destroyed any hope that the Germans had of supplying their invading armies. This lack of motor transport effected the German war effort at all levels by depriving troops of mobility (during the Battle of the Bulge, 2 Panzer was forced to mount one of its PzGren Bns on bikes because of lack of transport) and depriving its armies of supplies. This lack came directly from Hitler's unwillingness to mobilized the country behind the war effort.

As to the Germans learning from the Russians you have to look at the track record. Up until Kursk the Russians had never stopped the Germans from achieving a breakthrough into the operational zone. In other words, while they had stopped them from siezing the strategic objectives (Leningrad, Moscow, etc...) the Germans had always broken through the initial Soviet lines. This gave the Germans little incentive to change their methodes. After Kursk they lacked the power to launch anymore massive offensives and so again there was no opportunity to change their methodes.

In the end it was only the size of the Soviet Union that saved it from defeat. If the Soviet capital were Minsk or Kiev the Soviets would have been defeated. As it was they had kind of a natural defense in depth as it took so long for the Germans to get to their objectives that the Soviets could afford to make dissasterous mistakes without capitulating. The limits of the Soviet command structure and training prevented any true mirroring of German tactics but their ability to turn their entire manufacturing base to the production of weaponry (because we were making all their other supplies) insured that they could quickly build up massive numbers needed to be successful at what they did learn from the Germans. No one ever called Soviet tactics subtle but they were very effective.

One last thing. In the discussions of the developement of armored tactics one should look up the contributions of General Percy Hobart. His work, while largely ignored by his own government in Britan, was very influencial in Germany. Gudarian claimed to be greatly influenced by Hobart's theories. You may know Hobart best as the commander of the British 79th Armored Division better known as "Hobart's Funnies." Also about the tactical use of Airborne troops, I think Salerno was about as close as you can get to a tactical drop.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Sgtgoody:

The main cause of German failure can be traced directly back to Hitler. Hitler felt that Germany lost WWI because of collapse back home (the famous "Stab in the back."). This caused him to seek a better way of fighting than those of the Great War. The "Blitzkrieg" seemed to offer that better way. Unfortunatly for Hitler (and fortunatly for the rest of us) the concept of lighting war became not only military but political doctrine as well.

The German combined arms concept popularly referred to by the vague term blitzkrieg began development in the 1920s, led by Hans von Seeckt of the Reichswehr. When Hitler assumed the chancellory in 1933 he inherited what eventually became the Wehrmacht. There was little Hitler had to do by this time to develop or train the most advanced army in the world.

The German economy was not mobilized till about the middle of '42. Nearly all research into strategic programs was discontinued (heavy bombers being the most obvious) as unnecessary. Conquered nations were to by looted for usable supplies and then governed as Germany saw fit. This all translated into a Wehrmacht that was high powered but short ranged. It was the only one of the major powers to rely as heavily as it did on horses for transport. For all its percieved technological prowes it was in actuallity the most backwards of all the armies from an overall point of view. While it had some standout weapons, most of its systems were inferior to their allied counterparts. German troops prefered the superiour Russian submachineguns and came nowhere near matching the Russian cold weather equipment. German radar was so inferior to British and American sets that the Germans underestimated the capabilities of the Allied units for the entire war. The American M1 Garand was the best rifle of the war and the Germans were amazed by our field radios. Most important of all the Germans never designed an easily manufactured gp truck to compare with the American duce and a half. It was these trucks that carried the Allied armies and all their supplies to victory. Conversly it was the lack of them that not only hampered but destroyed any hope that the Germans had of supplying their invading armies. This lack of motor transport effected the German war effort at all levels by depriving troops of mobility (during the Battle of the Bulge, 2 Panzer was forced to mount one of its PzGren Bns on bikes because of lack of transport) and depriving its armies of supplies. This lack came directly from Hitler's unwillingness to mobilized the country behind the war effort.

Again, this was an outgrowth of the development of German military art, first begun in the 1920s. While it was underdeveloped as I stated in my previous posts, there was a reason for that: the Germans believed they could conduct successful wars of brief periods, thereby skirting the problem of modern war’s massive scope and scale. The question of attrition was intentionally circumvented, and left unanswered.

As to the Germans learning from the Russians you have to look at the track record. Up until Kursk the Russians had never stopped the Germans from achieving a breakthrough into the operational zone. In other words, while they had stopped them from siezing the strategic objectives (Leningrad, Moscow, etc...) the Germans had always broken through the initial Soviet lines. This gave the Germans little incentive to change their methodes. After Kursk they lacked the power to launch anymore massive offensives and so again there was no opportunity to change their methodes.

In the end it was only the size of the Soviet Union that saved it from defeat. If the Soviet capital were Minsk or Kiev the Soviets would have been defeated. As it was they had kind of a natural defense in depth as it took so long for the Germans to get to their objectives that the Soviets could afford to make dissasterous mistakes without capitulating. The limits of the Soviet command structure and training prevented any true mirroring of German tactics but their ability to turn their entire manufacturing base to the production of weaponry (because we were making all their other supplies) insured that they could quickly build up massive numbers needed to be successful at what they did learn from the Germans. No one ever called Soviet tactics subtle but they were very effective.

The size of the Soviet Union did, indeed, contribute to their salvation. But why this did had much to do with the limitations of German military art. I’ve pointed this out in my previous posts, but will attempt to do so again here.

If the Germans had developed a form of military art that consciously addressed the use of successive operations, they would have:</font>

1. realized the need to create another middle level in military art, called the operational level, placing it between strategy and tactics.</font>
2. understood that a theory based on the use of continuous, successive operations, one placed after the other like a set of waves striking the shore, would require a serious study into the support of such a huge and ongoing military action. Questions of logistics would easily arise, as would national production capacities. This, in turn, would probably draw interest into a reassessment of strategy and tactics within this larger, more consuming form of war.</font>

What the Germans had as a military art could’ve easily fit within this larger subset that was first developed by Soviet military theorists in the 1920s and 1930s.

I think what people tend to get most confused with operational art is that after WWI, most countries’ understanding of it was only the tip of the iceberg, so to speak. Britain, France, the USA, and Germany all had an understanding of operations per se, but for some reason none of them ever considered studying and developing the use of operations in the sense similar to the tactical method of bounding overwatch. Only the Soviets saw the use of operations in this leapfrog manner - a series of continuous, successive operations, each building on the advancement of the former until victory was achieved. No one saw operations in such concrete detail as the building blocks of strategy. No one studied this manner of using operations, the logistics involved to support ongoing operations, the production capacity needed to provide the logistical support, and the balance between the military front and the civilian rear. No one, but the Soviets. In WWII, most combatant nations were concerned with how to support and conduct an operation. The Soviet were concerning themselves with how to support and conduct a series of linked operations.

One last thing. In the discussions of the developement of armored tactics one should look up the contributions of General Percy Hobart. His work, while largely ignored by his own government in Britan, was very influencial in Germany. Gudarian claimed to be greatly influenced by Hobart's theories. You may know Hobart best as the commander of the British 79th Armored Division better known as "Hobart's Funnies." Also about the tactical use of Airborne troops, I think Salerno was about as close as you can get to a tactical drop.

In the book, The Roots of Blitzkrieg (published 1992), Corum states that while Guderian was important to German military theory, he was not indispensable (Guderian was a bit of an egotist). Far more important was von Seeckt or even von Eimannsberger. Corum also states that the British military theorist who probably had most influence on German military theory was Fuller. It was Fuller’s practical advice on the use of tank forces that drew German attention (since he was the architect of Cambrai in 1917), something the Germans were eager to collect given their post-WWI restrictions. They were not particularly influenced by Fuller’s theories, however.

[KNac]

All the operational and strategical german doctrine was limited by their resources and manpower. They had to conduct fast wars because if they felt in a war of attrition (like it did in Eastern front eventually) they would lose.

Here comes again the "Germany against the world" topic. You can't ignore the fact that the allies had infinite resources and manpower compared to egrmans, that their prodcution was much higher, and in general, they could aid each other. While the production and movilization for war was a bad error of Hitler, you cannot blame germans for their inferiority of manpower and resources, which in definitive forced them for "fast wars". Germans had to hold several fronts, but soviets only had to hold one of them. Maybe if Germany had only attacked the soviets thing could have changed.

For example how can you explain the brutal logistical effort in the final part of the war? You can't ignore the 150.000 trucks that USA send them by lend lease.

In definitive we can see that germans lost because their grand strategy (management of industry and resources, movilization, etc.) more than by their operational thinking. Germans had, even with each time worse trained men, the tactical advantage almost to the end of the war. Even if you see lots of soviets victories, you can also see how germans managed to close the gaps and breakthougth several mre times (it sound like victor writing History again), if not ask Glance, as much as you like it.

It was the logistics, as Fionn has already said, and production/resources (in definitive Hitler, who controlled them) which made them lose war, not their operational thinking.

[coe]

hmmm, perhaps the allies could at some points afford to use the infantry to eat at the MLR because they new that the Axis could not concentrate enough reserves near the breakthrough point (due to lack of time/lack of equipment, etc.). It seems that the

combined arms breakthrough might be the best IF

you really need to get the breakthrough quickly and in time before the enemy has time to gather their reserves...

[CombinedArms]

(snip)

Most important of all the Germans never designed an easily manufactured gp truck to compare with the American duce and a half. It was these trucks that carried the Allied armies and all their supplies to victory. Conversly it was the lack of them that not only hampered but destroyed any hope that the Germans had of supplying their invading armies. This lack of motor transport effected the German war effort at all levels by depriving troops of mobility ... and depriving its armies of supplies. This lack came directly from Hitler's unwillingness to mobilized the country behind the war effort.

(snip)

In the end it was only the size of the Soviet Union that saved it from defeat. If the Soviet capital were Minsk or Kiev the Soviets would have been defeated. As it was they had kind of a natural defense in depth as it took so long for the Germans to get to their objectives that the Soviets could afford to make dissasterous mistakes without capitulating.

These points illustrate the fundamental illogic of the whole German war effort (not surprising when one considers the man was leading that effort.) Germany needed to win wars fast, but how do you win a fast war against the USSR, and particularly without trucks? How do you win a fast war against the US? How do you invade and defeat Britain without a surface navy? How do you paralyze any of these enemys' war-making capabilities w/o a strategic air arm? How do you develop an effective strategy for world conquest when your strongest ally (Japan), is a whole hemisphere away and is as self-centered as you are in its war aims.

Germany basically overlooked or refused to face some fundamental strategic and logistical realities and, so, despite some high quality tactical-level weapons (highlighted in CMBB), they embarked on a war that they couldn't realistically hope to win, despite the high level of operational skill on the part of its generals. It turned out that the major Allied combatants (US, UK, USSR) all, in my opinion, thought much more effectively on the logistical and strategic levels.

One of the bitterest battles the Allies fought was vs. the u-boat, and that was fundamentally a battle for logistic communications. W/o winning THAT battle, the Russians wouldn't have had their trucks and the Overlord force would not have been positioned and supplied to attack in the west. The ability to win that battle despite grave technical and tactical challenges showed the high level of strategic realism that guided the Allied war effort. Compare the total failure of the Japanese to respond effectively to the submarine threat in the Pacific. There was a similar level of wishful thinking underlying the entire German war enterprise. All in all, millions of people were killed on all sides in pursuit of an impossible dream.

[ December 27, 2002, 03:32 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[KNac]

So true COmbinedArms...

[SgtMuhammed]

Well stated C.A. I have always been of the opinion that the Allies' greatest weapon was Hitler. Thank god Churchill wasn't German.

[Determinant]

Originally posted by Sgtgoody:

Thank god Churchill wasn't German.

Thank God Brooke wasn't German I think...

[Grisha]

Originally posted by KNac:

All the operational and strategical german doctrine was limited by their resources and manpower. They had to conduct fast wars because if they felt in a war of attrition (like it did in Eastern front eventually) they would lose.

I think the key word in this paragragh is "felt." For the Germans, it was a conscious decision to limit their military art. As events turned out, the Germans showed quite a capacity for putting their country on a war footing, so it wasn't that the Germans couldn't, it's just that they wouldn't. One can't have ones cake, and eat it too - especially in such a serious endeavor as world-wide war. You seem to be unaware that the Soviets actually had fewer key resources then the Germans in WWII, yet they out-produced their enemies quite handily. Yes, it was a case of the Germans not 'wishing' to go the extra distance.

Here comes again the "Germany against the world" topic. You can't ignore the fact that the allies had infinite resources and manpower compared to egrmans, that their prodcution was much higher, and in general, they could aid each other. While the production and movilization for war was a bad error of Hitler, you cannot blame germans for their inferiority of manpower and resources, which in definitive forced them for "fast wars". Germans had to hold several fronts, but soviets only had to hold one of them. Maybe if Germany had only attacked the soviets thing could have changed.

This is a weak argument for the simple fact that Nazi Germany initiated hostilities with just about every nation it fought. By the time the Nazi Party had taken over Germany the Army was fully developed and trained with its new combined arms tactical doctrine. No one questioned the wisdom of this military 'short-cut' for a nation about to embark on a campaign of European domination, yet that was the very thing that needed questioning: can we maintain a war that might take the form of several fronts? Like so much of German planning in general, the General Staff and Hitler both never bothered to address this issue in depth, preferring to make the assumption that they would just have to make sure everything went like clockwork. Run anything like that and you will lose out 90% of the time - unless you have the genius of Alexander the Great

In definitive we can see that germans lost because their grand strategy (management of industry and resources, movilization, etc.) more than by their operational thinking. Germans had, even with each time worse trained men, the tactical advantage almost to the end of the war. Even if you see lots of soviets victories, you can also see how germans managed to close the gaps and breakthougth several mre times (it sound like victor writing History again), if not ask Glance, as much as you like it.

It was the logistics, as Fionn has already said, and production/resources (in definitive Hitler, who controlled them) which made them lose war, not their operational thinking.

I can see there is a lack of understanding here regarding the operational level and operational art. It was not something as vague as "operational thinking." It was a distinct level of military art: tactics, operational art, strategy. The importance of recognizing operational art made the process of logistics and overall strategy more refined, streamlining the planning and conduct of a nation going to a war footing.

In order to understand this one needs to understand operational art, since this was the missing piece of the puzzle that revealed the scale of production needed and the logistical structure that had to be in place to support the military sector in war. And the way it did this was by taking a good, hard look at operations, and seeing exactly how they could be best used to furthering strategic objectives. The Soviets' solution was to use them as a continuous set of 'stepping stones,' each operation individually planned and supported to accomplish precise operational objectives. Start thinking of using operations in such precise and defined terms, and it won't be too long before somebody says, "Gee, this is going to take a lot of logistical planning. Yikes, and that means we better have a major industrial base from which to feed our military logistical structure, too!"

I'm not saying that other combatant nations couldn't figure out the need for heavy production and a comprehensive logistical structure. I am saying that recognizing operational art made that job a lot easier to develop, because it put much of it in proper perspective. Because the Germans limited their military theory to the tactical level, they couldn't know beforehand the critical need to be on a total war footing as a nation involved in modern war among fellow industrialized nations. Most other nations still held onto the WWI experience, seeing war as a long haul where production and manpower would be great demand. While it took them awhile before this was refined, this experience held them in good stead.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Grisha:

[big snip]

Because the Germans limited their military theory to the tactical level, they couldn't know beforehand the critical need to be on a total war footing as a nation involved in modern war among fellow industrialized nations. Most other nations still held onto the WWI experience, seeing war as a long haul where production and manpower would be great demand. While it took them awhile before this was refined, this experience held them in good stead.

I completely agree, and I think its also hard to avoid the conclusion that the US took this form of thinking to its highest level. Not only did they build lots and lots of guns, tanks, planes, and warships for themselves and their allies, but they also mass-produced the shipping to get it across the Atlantic and Pacific and the escort craft to make sure it got there, and they worked out the logistical procedures and high-tech equipment to get all this stuff to the right place at the right time. Both the Germans and the Japanese got themselves overextended well beyond their realistic logistical capabilites--e.g. Guadalcanal or Stalingrad--whereas the western Allies and the USSR built the logistical element into their offensive plans from the get go. They only got caught short logistically when, as with the Russians a few times in '43-44 and the Allies post-Cobra, their offensive successes far exceeded their own expectations.

One could add that this reflected a fundamental problem with Germany's planning process. War plans and national government were concentrated in Hitler and became virtually indistinguishable, and the only people Hitler talked to were the military high command. Compare the Allies, with their Joints Cheifs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff, as well as the meetings between FDR, Churchill, and Stalin to map grand strategy, and you see a whole different level of strategic thinking going on. The Allied method provided at the same time:

1. Far more individual initiative to individual theatre commanders.

2. A more balanced and realistic level of strategic thinking. Bad ideas tended to get ruthlessly winnowed out by this process. If one country or faction within a country wanted to charge ahead with a plan that was really pretty stupid (and this happened quite frequently), the others would check that plan and a better one would eventually be formulated.

Compare Hitler bullying Jodl & Co. into doing whatever he said and you see the difference. Churchill had as many screwy ideas as Hitler (one associate said he had 100 ideas a day, all but three of which were bad), but his staff and his Allies held him in check to a significant degree, so the UK could benefit from his strengths and not suffer too much from his weaknesses.

[ December 27, 2002, 09:29 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[SgtMuhammed]

Old Winnie had his faults but would you have wanted to fight him? He had exactly what Hitler lacked, common sense.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Sgtgoody:

Old Winnie had his faults but would you have wanted to fight him? He had exactly what Hitler lacked, common sense.

Well, I wouldn't have wanted to fight Hitler, either. He didn't win, but he put up a hell of a dangerous fight. I think Winston had plenty of guts and imagination, but he didn't really ABOUND in common sense (as FDR did, for example.) OTOH, he could fairly often be talked out of a bad idea, he was--for all his imagination--a hardheaded realist, and he believed passionately in constitutional government. In those respects, he differed fundamentally from Hitler.

[Determinant]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

Well, I wouldn't have wanted to fight Hitler, either. He didn't win, but he put up a hell of a dangerous fight. I think Winston had plenty of guts and imagination, but he didn't really ABOUND in common sense (as FDR did, for example.) OTOH, he could fairly often be talked out of a bad idea, he was--for all his imagination--a hardheaded realist, and he believed passionately in constitutional government. In those respects, he differed fundamentally from Hitler.

Just so. Both Hitler and Churchill were remarkable leaders. You don't get to where they got by being a run of the mill joe.

Hitler's fundamental flaw was all a piece with his 'man of destiny' belief: he was a one man band. He believed that he knew best. But as Speer said of him he had an artist's temprement. He would solve problems 'intuitively' without going through all that clag of staff meetings and conferences. This suited him fine when he was undertaking small campaigns. But as is said above once he found himself running a real world war it became impossible.

Churchill also did a lot of creative thinking: he nearly broke Brooke, his CGS, an extremely tough and realistic soldier, with his continual demands to launch some wildly impractical offensive scheme. But Churchill had a very good sense of history, and knew enough to listen to advice (or more often point blank refusals!). Something Hitler seldom troubled himself to do.

The sad truth is that winning a modern war is like running a big business (and about as interesting - lots of dull meetings and planning groups). One man cannot do it. Churchill was man enough to understand this, but Hitler never did.