The T-34, Russia's Ace in the Hole

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Originally posted by patolino:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Wild Bill Wilder:

That, coupled with the appearance of the KV-1, were quite a bitter suprise for the smaller, less adequately armed Panzers.

This seems to be one of those cases where the 3rd Reich skipped its intelligence homework (not that it surprises anyone). After all, KV saw test use in the Winter War. One would suppose them to have at least some sort of spying network inside their main ideological enemy's borders, too, but apparently not...

Anyway, should provide loads of fun for early days of CMBB timeline... </font>

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

Why did the Abwer or who ever was in charge of that fail to come up with anything on the T-34 or KV-1? For CMBB i plan on making alot of use of Stukas in the 1941 campains.

In general, it was plain old arrogance in their 'superior' capabilities. The Germans had just pulled off a lightning campaign in France, and they had seen how badly the Soviets fared in the Winter War, and even the annexation of eastern Poland. A few other examples of the surprising lack of interest, or consideration, for all things Soviet was:</font>

• That the Luftwaffe was rudely surprised by the numbers of Soviet fighters they encountered in June of 1941. Sure, VVS pilots were poorly matched against the experienced veterans of the German air force, but that still doesn't discount the fact that German intelligence made either the wrong assessment, or more likely, no mention of the amazing numbers of Soviet fighters that were operational - and fighting.</font>
• German intelligence had all the information they needed to correctly assess Soviet wartime production capabilities, but for whatever reasons discounted it, deciding instead that the Soviet Union was one step from collapse, and ripe for attack.</font>

[ February 18, 2002, 12:33 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Makes sense, i beleive it was Hitler who thought the Soviet Union would collapse after and attack. I can't remember who exactly but did'nt mostof his high command try to dscourage him from attacking the Soviet Union in 1941? It was inevitable that they went to war with one another, but i am pretty sure alot of the High Command wanted to wait till 1942?

[Grisha]

While the German General Staff objected to Operation Barbarossa, it had more to do with the fact that a ex-WWI soldier who had been gassed was giving the orders, rather than an accomplished General. Once the operation was in planning, the vast majority of German officers were very optimistic about the campaign in the Soviet Union. As Glantz had pointed out in a lecture, the general German impression was that they were on a 'crusade' against the Bolshevik threat to Western civilization. Hence, it was a culture-krieg. Combine this with Germany's astounding combat performance to date, and it's easy to see how infectious such an impression could be. I remember reading where one German commander even gave the amazing quote of something like one month would be all it would take to implode the Soviet Union.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Grisha:

I remember reading where one German commander even gave the amazing quote of something like one month would be all it would take to implode the Soviet Union.

I could be wrong, but I thought that was Hitler, who said "smash in the front door and the whole rotten structure will come crumbling down."

[Capitalistdoginchina]

Hitler's original plan for Barberoosa anticipated a complete victory within 6 weeks :eek:

CDIC

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Andreas, was your grandad in the German equivalent of a "Bantam Battalion", or was the KV really as freakin' big as it looks in that picture?

I think it was a monster - my grandfather certainly was not in a Bantam BN. He is about 1.75m (5'9") tall, which would probably qualify as average in his time. Just check the proportion compared to the motorbike leaning against the tree.

Good thing for the Germans that these tanks had weak transmissions.

[Panzer_Meyer]

Heinz Guderian was one of the Generals who opposed operation Barbarosa. He did a study on the soviet Union military and when he finnaly got all the figures together, number of tanks, men, planes and so on. He was reluctanct to attack the Soviets. He also states the industrial capacity and the natural resources the Soviet Union has available.

He did submit this to Hitler, but that was overlooked. I can't remember where I read this, but if I remember I'll post the source.

[Foreigner]

It seems that a common shortcoming of nearly every user of intelligence information is to tend to believe (and reward) the kind of (favorable) information they want to believe.

The "armor intelligence" game betweeen the Soviet Union and Germany prior to June 1941 besides being a good example of that common bias, is also quite ironic, in a way.

It might have been Guderian who claimed that he got his first inkling of the trouble to come when Soviet Russia and Germany were still cooperating, and a Russian delegation visited Germany. The Germans were accomodating enough to show them their newest prototype (PzKw - IV, I believe), but the Russians kept insisting they be shown the "really good" tanks, unconvinced to the end that was Germany's top-of-the-line AFV at the time. Those who wanted to could draw the conclusion the Russians had something pretty advanced to benchmark against, but few could resist the always-popular and "politically correct" approach of discounting unfavorable intelligence as "propaganda" and deliberate disinformation.

Both sides stuck to their prejudices. In particular, Hitler never fully believed data he had gotten about Soviet armor strength and production capabilities prior to "Barbarossa". In a unique recording (a taperecorder was "inadvertently" left on after an officially sanctioned interview) of a meeting with Finland's Fieldmarshal Mannerheim some time into the war (late 1941 - early 1942, IIRC), a very unusual Hitler - pensive, almost melancholic, nothing like the fiery speaker familiar from newsreels - can be heard acknowledging he hadn't believed intelligence about the Soviets, and he had been unpleasantly surprised by the sheer mass of Soviet resistance. Still no comment about relative quality, though - but then, he wasn't the one facing enemy armor on the battlefield.

On the other hand, the Soviets (or at least some influential people - mosts sources finger Artillery Marshal Kulik) - were convinced (some say - because of German disinformation) the Germans possessed 35 - 55 ton tanks (with corresponding firepower), so designers and manufacturers were directed to develop appropriate countermeasures. In effect, that determined the design requirements for T-34, KV-1, and the 57 mm M1937 ATG, among others. However, when the Germans attacked, the Soviets faced concentrated forces of relatively light-armored tanks, while their major AT assets, tailored for the wrong purpose, were too few and dispersed to make much of a difference.

What's the moral of the story? IMO, any gross bias in sizing-up their opponents ultimately hurts military commanders. So if bias is unavoidable, maybe fortune favors the one who errs the less?

[ParaBellum]

One of my all-time favourites is a quote by General Halder, the army chief of staff from mid-July 1941.

Translated from german:

"One can now already say that the task of the Heer of destroying the mass of the russian army west of Düna and Dnjepr is accomplished.

It's no exaggeration when I state that the russian campaign was won within 14 days..."

A classic.

[ February 19, 2002, 08:47 PM: Message edited by: ParaBellum ]

[dumbo2]

''"One can now already say that the task of the Heer of destroying the mass of the russian army west of Düna and Dnjepr is accomplished.

It's no exaggeration when I state that the russian campaign was won within 14 days..."''

(de lurks)

Actually Ill step upto the plate for Halder on this one and the T34/ KV1 issue in general.

I think its easy to fall into the trap of mistaking WW2 for a "modern war" in the sense we understand it in 2002. Its easy to forget just how primitive many technologies were in WW2 becuase some of its participants are still living.

I am thinking specifically of recon technology in this case. The Russian and German high commanders got it VERY wrong in the early stages of the war. They had a very large area of land to consider, limited aircraft based intelligence, zero satellite intel, poor human intelligence (at the lower level of formations etc). It must have seemed to the German (and I daresay some Soviet) commanders that the red Army was uncountable somewhere out there in the great ocean of land.

With the information available I can see why Halder thought the way he did (I daresay he wasnt alone either).

Regarding the T34 and KV series one of the great things about the CM game system is that it doesnt fall prey to the "wonder tank" syndrome that I have seen in many other wargames (minatures mainly).

The thing I love about CM is that I find myself having use for units that commanders at the time has use for, Panzer II's? Sure I can use em, Bren Carrier? Awesome, give me more! In this case I can see how I will be wanting some fast moving engineers to finish off troublesome heavys striped of their infantry support.

I dont see their early arrival posing a problem at all to game balance in early war scenarios, in fact it may help foster a new point of view, that the German armies victories in 41 were as hard fought as later battles in the war and certainly not a cakewalk.

Should be fun!

[Claus B]

Regarding the first encounter between the Germans and the T34, it is a question of such trickery that even the Creator of the Panzerwaffe was confused by it:

Panzer Leader p. 143:

It was at the end of July, 1941, that the T34 tank appeared at the front and the riddle of the New Russion model was solved.

and

Panzer Leader p. 162:

On July 2nd I visited this battalion personally...

[sNIP]

...this was hardly surprising since here, for the first time, the enemy deployed his T34 tank...

Claus B

[Foreigner]

I thought I'd add some interesting tidbits about T-34 and how it affected subsequent German AFV development.

As early in 1941 German generals demanded that if a tank comparable or superior to T-34 cannot be designed and produced "from scratch" in short time, then at least a captured one should be copied exactly. It didn't work - not only for "national pride reasons", but because - strange as it might seem - German industry at the time hadn't got the resources and capabilities to do so on a large enough scale, in a short enough time, from the shortage of additives (such as chromium, vanadium, nickel) necessary to make stronger steel armor, to the diffuculty of making a lightweight diesel (T-34's engine was cast alluminum), to the problems of welding thicker armor plate (one of the reasons the Tiger had no sloped armor - sloped armor requires longer welding seams).

When the initial projects for what was to become the Panther were submitted, one was rejected outright because it was too similar to T-34. Again, "national pride" was cited as a reason, but there was another perfectly logical and compelling reason - front-line German commanders feared possible misidentification of the new tank by the German troops on the battlefield.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Foreigner:

I thought I'd add some interesting tidbits about T-34 and how it affected subsequent German AFV development.

When the initial projects for what was to become the Panther were submitted, one was rejected outright because it was too similar to T-34. Again, "national pride" was cited as a reason, but there was another perfectly logical and compelling reason - front-line German commanders feared possible misidentification of the new tank by the German troops on the battlefield.

The DB Panther was rejected due to the lack of a completed turret, december 1942. Also the proposed DB turret was 50mm smaller than the Rheinmetall turret that was to be fitted to the Panthermeaning the Rheinmentall turret could not be retrofitted to the DB VK 30.01. The MAN VK 30.02 offered a more stable firing platform with its interleaved torsion bars vs DB leaf springs. Then when the MAN VK 30.02 weighed 35 metric tons it had a ground pressure of 0.68kg/cm2, the DB VK 30.01 at 35 metric tons rode around on 0.83kg/cm2. (1995,Jentz P 16-18). The MAN Panther ("German") was selected because it was the better tank inspite of Speer and Hitlers intial favour of the DB VK 30.02 ("Russian") Panther.

Front line commanders had no part in the selection proccess, Hitler, WaPruf 6 and other assorted engineers held that role.

[ February 20, 2002, 06:20 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[imported_Wildman]

I'm reading a really good book on this subject I picked up at the base library.

"Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Fron, 1941" Author Bryan I. Fugate.

Looks like a well researched book on the subject, including many Russian sources.