BTS: Soviet Nighttime Capabilities

[Grisha]

To BTS,

I really think you should consider some form of modelling the advantages the Soviets had at night. If you go to the Combat Studies Institute site, and read Paper No.6 by Maj. Sasso, it could be grounds for reconsidering this. Admittedly, during the first period of the war, Soviet night capabilities were mostly of a tactical nature, but the gist of it is that the Germans were actually very poor in nighttime combat capabilities from a psychological point of view - as would anyone who didn't seriously train for such a thing. The Soviets had nothing to lose and found night to be a combat equalizer against the Germans, which only increased their training and experience in nighttime operations. There are many Soviet operations that were done at night, including river crossings, and one Soviet source in the Sasso paper claims that 40% of Soviet operations from 1944 were at night.

As for how something like this would be modelled, I'd say that it was mainly a psychological thing as far as combat is concerned. Nighttime would restrict all operations, but the big factor is psychological, since the night has a tendency to get under our collective skin, so to speak. At least initially, it wasn't so much that the Soviets were greatly improved at night, as it was that the Germans' performance from a morale basis degraded. C&C would still be limited for both sides, and visibility wouldn't change, but from a morale perspective, the Germans' should be reduced at night.

[Sailor Malan]

I haven't been able to get the full copy of the note you referenced (site down or something), but from the synopsis, and what I know already, here are some thoughts.

By 1944, everyone was routinely doing night operations. The synopsis seems to imply that the difference with the Soviets was they would plan (and execute) large scale operations, and this is what made them different. These are too large for CMBB, since these would be what sets the scene for the scenario, not what happens inside it. If you like, a coordinated night op means you get your entire force, free set up. A badly executed one means you get part of it, tired, and uncoordinated.

I find it very hard to believe that the German infantry "had psychological difficulties" with the dark. I would suggest that as the German army took losses during the Russian campaign, the average quality of their troops declined, and they became less capable in the dark (=green troops, less good command and control etc). Conversely the Russians got better (slightly). On the larger scale, the regiment/brigade/divisions may have got better at night ops, but as I said, that just provides the background to the scenario.

I think it would be a mistake to penalise any nation for "psycological" difficultes, when a mechanism already exists in troop quality. Now, giving green/conscript troops extra penalties in the dark (shorter command rad, lower moral etc) I would think might be worth considering.

Final point, if you want a well executed large night operation, look at the British (Commonwealth) break out towards Falaise, in Aug'44 (Totalize 1).

Just my 2p worth (UK 2cents, worth more!)

[ February 03, 2002, 05:38 AM: Message edited by: Sailor Malan ]

[Grisha]

Sailor Malan,

Sorry, but I hadn't thought about it being a US military site. That may be the reason for it seeming to be down. The document is over 9Mb in any case. I have a T3 line at work, so it's not a problem to d/l

The document states that since the time of the Ottoman Turks the Russian have shown a 'prediliction to night operations and considerable skill in conducting them'. It states that in WWI the Germans acknowledged that the war proved Russian night training was superior to their own. "General Guenthar Blumentritt, chief of staff of the 4th Army before Moscow in 1941 called the Russian 'night happy,' and noted that an excellent infantry division in the 4th Army was considered unreliable at night because it had suffered heavy losses to Soviet night attacks at Smolensk, and later at the Desna River, before the Moscow campaign got underway."

There are two paragraphs that discuss how the Germans felt the Russians were much "closer to nature"(quote from Blumentritt) and generally conceded the ability of the Soviet soldier.

There is mention of the use of night operations from operation Uranus to the Dnepr battles to the liberation of the Crimea to Bagration and Berlin. Reconnaissance in force were many times employed at night (4am) to initiate a major offensive, such as Bagration.

During Bagration a Soviet Rifle division was surrounded by Germans and not even a tank corps could breakthrough German antitank defenses. A mass tank attack at night was therefore planned to extricate the rifle division. The attack, with headlights on, resulted in the destruction of 80 German tanks, and the capture of 60 guns and 1,200 German prisoners.

I'm only touching on points here and there, since the document is roughly 40 pages long(not including appendix, notes, and bibliography).

[ February 03, 2002, 06:40 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Sailor Malan]

Originally posted by Grisha:

The document states that since the time of the Ottoman Turks the Russian have shown a 'prediliction to night operations and considerable skill in conducting them'. It states that in WWI the Germans acknowledged that the war proved Russian night training was superior to their own. "General Guenthar Blumentritt, chief of staff of the 4th Army before Moscow in 1941 called the Russian 'night happy,' and noted that an excellent infantry division in the 4th Army was considered unreliable at night because it had suffered heavy losses to Soviet night attacks at Smolensk, and later at the Desna River, before the Moscow campaign got underway."

There are two paragraphs that discuss how the Germans felt the Russians were much "closer to nature"(quote from Blumentritt) and generally conceded the ability of the Soviet soldier.

There is mention of the use of night operations from operation Uranus to the Dnepr battles to the liberation of the Crimea to Bagration and Berlin. Reconnaissance in force were many times employed at night (4am) to initiate a major offensive, such as Bagration.

During Bagration a Soviet Rifle division was surrounded by Germans and not even a tank corps could breakthrough German antitank defenses. A mass tank attack at night was therefore planned to extricate the rifle division. The attack, with headlights on, resulted in the destruction of 80 German tanks, and the capture of 60 guns and 1,200 German prisoners.

I'm only touching on points here and there, since the document is roughly 40 pages long(not including appendix, notes, and bibliography).

I was not saying that the Russians could not fight at night, merely that (to some extent) all nations did. The dividing line is likely to be general troop quality and level of training. This can be modified somewhat by style/content, so poor/less well equipped troops extensively trained at night could lessen the penalties for so doing. A good example is naval - early war, the Japanese navy did very well at night, against radar equipped allied naval vessels, because they trained for it, and the allies did not to the same extent. My point is that this training probably best shows at a level ABOVE CM. I.E. the effect is shown by the Russians(or whoever) being present in a scenario in good order, with free set up, as opposed to straggled out etc.

I have a suspicion that the Russians found that night attacks to some extent (certainly with poor troops) become a lottery. When you are completely outclassed in the day, a lottery is a huge step forward! Also airpower is a factor of course.

All troops could get rattled/demoralised in certain circumstances - I haven't got the references to hand, but there are several cases of Allied troops in the Pacific being thoroughly 'spooked' by Japanese night attacks/charges. I just say this shouldn't be viewed as a national characteristic.

Your final example of a mass tank attack with headlights strikes me as a very bad one for 'superior night capabilty'. Against troops even half prepared, that sounds like suicide (you can spot headlights miles before you are seen in them - literally). I think it must show a complete breakdown in German command control or manoevre capabilty at an operational level, rather than poor quality at CM level. Certainly, it doesn't represent what I would term an advantage in night fighting at CM level, more a total dominance of the operational battlefield.

I guess I have an inbuilt distrust of assessments of national characteristics. There are battalions and higher units in the British army in Normandy that were positively gun shy (due to too long in operations/high casualties). They even pulled one btn out completely for it (6DWR)). This doesn't mean it's a national characteristic. I think any system worth its salt should be able to simulate a range of effects like this using its normal rules, not 'bolt on' national characteristics. (Never did fully agree with some of the SL/ASL rules!)

Interesting dabate. Also, alas probably academic, since I would guess CMBB is already well advanced!

[Grisha]

Sailor Malan,

I actually posted the 'closer to nature' quote to just point out that unique nazi German perspective Actually, what Blumentritt attributed to racial tendencies was more the result of a long history of nighttime operations among the Russians. The Soviets were better than the Germans at night operations, because they had been doing it for quite some time - including Tsarist Russia times.

It's a shame you can't read this document, since my few quotes do it no justice. I wonder if I could upload it to a page for you without incurring the wrath of my government. Anybody know???

[Andreas]

As seems often to be the case with the CSI site, the PDF DL won't work, but the HTML DL should. It is nicely formatted too that way. Looks like an interesting read.

[Sailor Malan]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Sailor Malan,

I actually posted the 'closer to nature' quote to just point out that unique nazi German perspective Actually, what Blumentritt attributed to racial tendencies was more the result of a long history of nighttime operations among the Russians. The Soviets were better than the Germans at night operations, because they had been doing it for quite some time - including Tsarist Russia times.

It's a shame you can't read this document, since my few quotes do it no justice. I wonder if I could upload it to a page for you without incurring the wrath of my government. Anybody know???

Still can't get it. Also if it is really 9Mb I might have to give it a miss anyway (56k wet string connection)

I must admit, I have a question on how effectively the Red Army managed to achieve a continuity of capabilty from Tsarist times, through the revolution, to the late twenties, and again through Stalin's purges. I studied Russia at school (1905-1945, excluding both wars - talk about leaving out the good bits!). The purges of anyone who had any initiative at division level and above were phenomenal. I presume being a bright young colonel might have been a career limiting job as well. How did the Reds manage this continuity? Most stuff they had to relearn in a real hurry.

[ February 03, 2002, 08:04 AM: Message edited by: Sailor Malan ]

[Grisha]

I must admit, I have a question on how effectively the Red Army managed to achieve a continuity of capabilty from Tsarist times, through the revolution, to the late twenties, and again through Stalin's purges. I studied Russia at school (1905-1945, excluding both wars - talk about leaving out the good bits!). The purges of anyone who had any initiative at division level and above were phenomenal. I presume being a bright young colonel might have been a career limiting job as well. How did the Reds manage this continuity? Most stuff they had to relearn in a real hurry.

Well, you've got me there. My theory is that it left the Russians/Soviets 'predisposed' to such things. I already know your distrust of arguments of 'national traits', so this one most likely won't fly with you as well

In any event, my theories are unimportant, since the document makes a convincing case based on what actually happened, using both German and Soviet source material as well as others, and it's my hope that Steve gives this paper a read.

[WWB]

One thing to keep in mind WRT russian night attacks (really infiltrations) is that the German front line was far from solid. It was closer to a string of strongpoints, with some zones in between covered by firepower (ie mortars, MGs). Meaning that, in daylight, the Russians would probably pay dearly for trying to slice through the line, but at night, they might well be able to get through under the proverbial radar. Which makes night attacks alot more useful than they would have been on the more compressed western front.

WWB

[Grisha]

Originally posted by wwb_99:

One thing to keep in mind WRT russian night attacks (really infiltrations) is that the German front line was far from solid. It was closer to a string of strongpoints, with some zones in between covered by firepower (ie mortars, MGs). Meaning that, in daylight, the Russians would probably pay dearly for trying to slice through the line, but at night, they might well be able to get through under the proverbial radar. Which makes night attacks alot more useful than they would have been on the more compressed western front.

WWB

You are talking about infiltrations, but what I'm talking about also covers reconnaissance in force, breakouts, and general night attacks, including fortified positions with minefields and tank traps. I really can't emphasize enough that you read this paper to understanding what I'm talking about.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Andreas:

As seems often to be the case with the CSI site, the PDF DL won't work, but the HTML DL should. It is nicely formatted too that way. Looks like an interesting read.

I think that happens if you have an old version of Acrobat Reader(pre 5.0). I d/l'ed the pdf, then printed it out. Just right click and select 'Save Target As...', I believe.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Err, no - but thanks for trying. It simply does not DL. I d not even get as far as opening it. The DL starts and ends after about 1 sec - the file is unreadable.

[chrisl]

Downloaded fine for me-- had to do a save as, since it's not properly tagged for Netscape to launch Acrobat. Because it's a .mil site it's possible that they limit dl's to IP addresses identifiable as US, even though the material may not be classified in any way.

[Jeff Duquette]

I think this study should be taken with a grain of salt as the bibliography contains works by the notorious Von Mellenthin and Paul Karl Schmidt (alias ex-Nazi uber Storm trooper Paul Carrell). I was also taken aback when I noticed Albert Kesserling's writings on "Night Combat" were relied upon heavily. To top this list of unreliable authors off both H. Guderian and Blumentritt are cited. For shame Greg! What is it your trying to pull over on us?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

I think this study should be taken with a grain of salt as the bibliography contains works by the notorious Von Mellenthin and Paul Karl Schmidt (alias ex-Nazi uber Storm trooper Paul Carrell). I was also taken aback when I noticed Albert Kesserling's writings on "Night Combat" were relied upon heavily. To top this list of unreliable authors off both H. Guderian and Blumentritt are cited. For shame Greg! What is it your trying to pull over on us?

Shame on you Jeff - to mention von Mellenthin and Carell in the same context... To mention any soldier and Carell in the same context...

I wonder what a paper like that would look like today, after the partial opening of Soviet archives?

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Correct me if i'm wrong, but was'nt it the Cossaks from the Ukranian region who specialized in night fighting? They were well versed in it dating back to the Crimean war.

[Simon Fox]

Timid German performance in night combat has been widely commented upon in both British and Commonwealth sources and is related in accounts stretching from early 1941 (Greece and North Africa) to 1944/45 (NWE).

[Grisha]

Oh well, I had to try. Steve responded - rather obliquely, I might add("What do I need to do, Steve, send cash?") - to a similar query of mine in Michael Dorosh's thread, NOTES FROM THEATRES OF WAR ... Oh well - at least Jeff is my friend

[Tero]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

Timid German performance in night combat has been widely commented upon in both British and Commonwealth sources and is related in accounts stretching from early 1941 (Greece and North Africa) to 1944/45 (NWE).

Finnish sources comment upon the poor German performance in forest combat. They surmise one of the main reasons for this was psychological. The Germans supposedly had a fear of deep woods (a sort of Hansel and Gretel syndrome ? ).

Better C3 should not be an issue because the Germans had more radio equipment than the Finnish troops. Did they have a need to see what they were doing to be able to visualize it ?

The Germans excelled only in day time, preferably in perfect summer weather conditions in a familiar (or comparable, arid but not arctic or subarctic) terrain ? Right ?

[ February 04, 2002, 06:26 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Battlefront.com]

Grisha,

Thanks for the info. I'll try my luck at downloading this late into the wee hours of the morning. Hopefully I'll have better luck!

It is highly unlikely this will change anything in the game, however. As the regulars know, we are VERY much against adding "national modifiers" or, more exactly "nationalistic/racist/anecdotal bias". Even when there is more than a grain of truth to a blanket statement, we must keep in mind that without REALLY strong reason to make some sort of change (like simulating Soviet C&C differently than German) we open up the floodgates to any and all national based modifiers. "The Germans were better at starting up campfires, so allow them a readiness bonus because they got more hot meals" It would quickly become a mess.

However, I think much of what is in this report is simply outside of the scale of CM. As I said in that other thread, I think the success of Soviet night attacks was more because a) they were tried again and again, and it neutralized many of the advantages the Germans had depending on the phase of the war (like long range weaponry, more flexible artillery, higher training standards, Startegic and Operational initiative, etc.).

Another thing to keep in mind is that just because the Germans didn't practice large scale offensive maneuvers at night doesn't mean that they were inherently poor at counteracting attacks by the Soviets at night. Just as the Soviets got better and more comfortable attaking at night, so too did the Germans get better at defending. Sure, they might not have liked it... but who said a soldier has to LIKE the position he is in to do a good job?

The Germans also noted that their troops weren't as good at fighting in forests as they were in mixed/open terrain. This is because their forest training before the war and combat experience before Barbarossa were minimal. But I don't think it is fair to say that in 1942 a veteran German formation would still be scared of the Big Bad Wolf I also think the lack of desire to fight in deep woods was, like with night fighting, due to the fact that their superiorities over the Soviets were largely neutralized.

Look at today's US military. They like to fight at night and with overwhelming force. Why? Because they are good at it and it yields better results. Do you think a standard US Infantry Division would like to fight in conditions which neutralized their advantages and instead had to make up for it in blood? But to penalize the individual soldier for this beyond the added casualties which are likely to come about is either unfair or outside of CM's scope (i.e. we can NOT force the player to employ realistic doctrine).

Steve

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Grisha:

As for how something like this would be modelled, I'd say that it was mainly a psychological thing as far as combat is concerned. Nighttime would restrict all operations, but the big factor is psychological, since the night has a tendency to get under our collective skin, so to speak. At least initially, it wasn't so much that the Soviets were greatly improved at night, as it was that the Germans' performance from a morale basis degraded. C&C would still be limited for both sides, and visibility wouldn't change, but from a morale perspective, the Germans' should be reduced at night.

Sounds to me like you already have the solution in hand. If you that believe that there should be a bonus for Soviet/penalty for German forces in night fighting, the answer is very simple. Use lower quality German forces in night fights. Presto, German forces that don't fight as well, and no need to change anything in the game.

[gredeker]

Has there been any thought about increasing the LOS at night near burning buildings and/or vehicles? Or does that fall under "dynamic lighting" and is on the list for the rewrite? Just curious...

[MikeyD]

Sounds like this info would come in handy more for scenario design than for actual coding. A headlong charge into Nazi lines by Russian troops in the dead of night might have significantly different results than the same charge in broad daylight.

As to the German line being thin, this reminds me of the N. Vietnamese practice of attacking isolated U.S. firebases at night.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Do you think a standard US Infantry Division would like to fight in conditions which neutralized their advantages and instead had to make up for it in blood?

....seems a hint of the Hurtgen.

But to penalize the individual soldier for this beyond the added casualties which are likely to come about is either unfair or outside of CM's scope (i.e. we can NOT force the player to employ realistic doctrine).

Agreed on the first statement. On the follow-up statement, I concur to a degree that a CM player can never be "forced" to play a "historical" style. However, I don't see it so as "forcing" a player to use his forces in a specific way, rather than applyinig effective "constraints" in the game design as to put the player into more of a "historical setting" on how he chooses his tactical options. By example, a player can't be forced not to attempt a complex maneuver with a conscript force, but some attendant penalties for doing this should be in hand, of course.

Now, on the note of night-fighting and how certain troops might recognize some "edge" to it without tying it to nationality, here is a possiblity: add "improved night-fighting experience" as a scenario editor toggle, similar to fanaticism. And if not the case now, also tie in night-fighting effects more closely to troop experience.

Right now, I don't think that I see quite so much "negative" effect in CMBO for troops moving around in night; sure, visibility is reduced and ambush probability is heightened, but otherwise, I haven't seen so often that troops moving around at night might get "lost," such as moving in an unplanned direction, or having a movement order nullified. As anyone seen otherwise?

Or to Steve, is night-movement something that might be on tap for changes in CMBB?

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Marlow:

If you that believe that there should be a bonus for Soviet/penalty for German forces in night fighting, the answer is very simple. Use lower quality German forces in night fights. Presto, German forces that don't fight as well, and no need to change anything in the game.

It's a partial solution, but not entirely satisfactory if you're fighting an operation with a number of night turns. Still, I think that the Germans will lose a number of advantages at night (in addition to those mentioned above, the widespread employment of Soviet submachinegun infantry also being key in low visibility situations) and in general the night during the first period of the war will generally be a friendlier place to the Soviets than the daytime.

Scott