Guns vs Armour II

[Joachim]

New Topic cause the old one has 300 posts and might crash.

Gruß

Joachim

[flamingknives]

Tsk, you could have been more original with the title. Having long ago veered from guns against armour to tank destroyers to tank destroyer doctrine to grand strategy.

[pamak1970]

continuing the discussion from another thread

Germany could readily have beaten Russia with an attrition strategy. The US, if in, would have been harder in the long run, but victory in Russia was the only way to deal with that anyway.

Germany could have beaten Russia with an attrition strategy because you can't lose an attrition war to 2 to 1 odds when you are racking up 3 and 5 to 1 kill ratios in all combat stances. Not if you are trying and using your odds as much as the enemy is. (Consider, the US stalemated China in Korea simply by establishing a 10 to 1 exchange ratio through superior firepower arms).

And the only reason Germany was outproduced in tanks by Russia alone, was that it did not use an attrition strategy, did not mobilize its economy for war the instant it decided to attack Russia, but instead gambled recklessly on odds not mattering.

Germany's industrial potential fully equaled Russia's, not counting Russian material losses in the first year. And Germany received as much from exploiting occupied Europe as Russia received in lend lease. Germany was outnumbered in manpower depth, but by less than 2 to 1. It also had numerous minor allies for manpower depth, and knocked out a third of Russia's manpower base on the first year, by losses and occupation of territory.

If Germany had mobilized as soon as it attacked, its tanks available by the time of Stalingrad would have been at least double what it actually had to that date.

Indeed, German relative strength fell during a period in which is was inflicting 10 to 1 losses on the Russians. Which can only happen, and did only happen, because there was no German replacement and reinforcement strength to speak of. The side losing the 1 didn't replace even that 1 - more like 1/2. While the side losing the 10 replaced it all, basically.

Russia did not have 20 times the production capacity or manpower depth of Germany. Germany just didn't use her industry or her depth until she had to. Precisely because they believed the nonsense you are preaching. It is in fact the error that lost them the war.

It is dumb not to plan on and prepare for a long war of attrition. If you can't win such a war, you shouldn't start the fight in the first place. And if you can win such a war, you can happily take the benefits of a cheaper victory of enemy mistakes or cluelessness drop one in your lap. The downside is purely to civilian side costs, and are vastly outweighed by the downside of getting into a long war of attrition without being prepared for it.

The illusion of cheap and easy victory over forces one fears are superior in the long run, is just that, an illusion.

As for the claim that being on the defensive will eventually lose you the war to some single enemy offensive, I deny that any competent force is vulnerable to that outcome. With a competent force that understands defensive principles, there is no risk of a defeat without prior attrition loss.

The Germans confused the results of specific enemy weaknesses in their first few campaigns, with a special virtue of their own doctrine. It did not have one. As an example, Russian command actions in 1941 would have entirely sufficed to stop the attack if their mech arm had been ready for prime time (purely tactically and CSS, C3 terms, not operational direction), and had performed even half as well tactically as comparable German side forces. They were not.

As for imagining that it was sensible to continue to attack with 30 AFVs, it was certainly not in the case described, and it was obvious at the time. Study September in Lorraine if you doubt it.

Nor was pushing to the El Alamein position with a handful of remaining AFVs a glorious accomplishment. It was an error, and led directly to defeat of German forces in North Africa. Only a silly focus on ground control can fail to see this. DAK was vastly stronger 1000 miles nearer its own bases, there was no chance of winning a build up there, and there was never any prospect whatsoever of 30 tanks conquering all of Egypt.

You said you do not find instances of operational consequences to merely defeating the enemy's attack. Once Rommel lost the last stages of the Kasserine attack, what was the operational consequence? (No, build up afterward cannot retrieve it, it can only build the endgame PW bag).

You declare in theory that the offensive requires specific prior conditions, and then excuse gambling and continuing to attack with shoestring forces, which clearly violate those prior conditions. You declare there is nothing wrong with accepting loss of the initiative and defending, regarding it as temporary, and then proclaim that holding at the Seine is impossible.

As for WW I lessons, WW I was won by attrition, and the lesson is that attrition is perfectly decisive. Russia was knocked out of WW I by attrition. It is true Germany lacked the manpower to beat the US as well as the end (bringing it in had been an "own goal" caused by military gambling in the form of the unrestricted submarine warfare campaign). It is also true that her army basically came apart due to the losses taken in the 1918 offensives, which were gambles on knock-out blow victory and as such unsound.

In WW II, tech was different and available exchange rates considerably more favorable, particularly in Russia. Capital was important as well as manpower in both wars, in the first for shells mostly, in the second for tanks. Germany was not inferior to Russia in that respect in either war. In WW II, it also had the considerable benefit of France being out, Italy being on its side instead of the enemy's, England being off the continent and able to engage only with tiny forces by land. And at the time of the attack on Russia, the US was not in, either.

They not only gambled in the attack on Russia, they did so without really knowing they were gambling. They thought it would be easy - "kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will fall to the ground". And their early successes reinforced this delusion. When in should have evaporated in front of Moscow, half the command was sacked, instead of admitting and adapting to it realistically.

This is not a record to emulate.

Russia and the US saw from day 1 that the war would be a long one decided by attrition processes. This wasn't just a choice, or a guess, it was correct. It was correct because it was sound and professional, rather than a species of gambling and overconfidence. The gamblers told themselves they were genuises every time they avoiding rolling "7". But the bankers beat the tar out of them; the bank always wins.

You cannot improve your military situtation by playing let's pretend. Let's pretend everything I do will work and the enemy will makes scores of huge unforced errors - it not a sound strategy. It is a good way to win a few operations (which is all Germany ever won) and lose the war. Every one of their supposedly decisive penetrating victories was a merely operational success in a long war of attrition.

Nor is it possible to achieve breakthrough against a competent enemy by mere concentration, without first laying the groundwork for it in attrition battle. Incompetent enemies, sure. Attitrion methods kill them too. Maneuver methods might be helpful force multipliers and exchange rate boosters against incompetent enemies, and even against sound ones after you have enough edge from other methods. But precisely what they are not is a strategy alternative to, or substitute for, a focus on global odds and exchange ratios. Every calculation based on that belief proved a delusion, in both wars and in every one since.

As for the claim that Germany had no chance in a long war of attrition because of material shortages, it does not stand examination, especially in light of the actual production accomplishments of 1944, the manpower actually fielded, the 25000 AFVs, despite much heavier bombing than anything they had to worry about in 1941-1943.

The German economy was not oil based, it was coal based. So was the rail transport system. Oil was needed for vehicle fuel only, for military vehicles in particular. It was produced in adequate quantities synthetically from coal feedstocks, and in a way that was easy to disperse and to ramp, for all fuels except av-gas.

Av-gas depended on Rumanian imports and on the output of a few large hydrogenation plants, but the Allies never figured out the special importance or vulnerability of the latter. And only hit them, pretty much by running through all kinds of targets, in mid 1944.

Had Germany been winning in Russia, moreover, the Rumanian source would have been secure. (The air raids there never seriously disrupted output for any length of time etc). If they won there completely in 1942-3, Baku would have been available, although transport difficulties would have kept the use of that low for 6 to 12 months, minimum.

Basically, though, the German economy was not resource limited - it readily substituted for scarce goods, though at an economic cost (forgone coal and investment in synthetic plant etc). But it also wasn't output limited - as late as mid 1942, only about 40% of total steel output was going to the entire war program.

That is why e.g. AFV production was able to quadruple by mid 1944, despite bombing and more workers transfered out to the military etc. The Germans simply did not fully mobilized the economy for war, because their strategy was to win without odds mattering - so they scaled output to cover losses, pretty much. They did increase production after the battle of Moscow, but not by much and not anything like the total mobilization the US and Russia performed as a matter of course. After Stalingrad, they saw it would be a war of attrition and pull out the remaining stops.

(Actually, in manpower terms, they still had plenty of stops in until the simultaneously collapse of OB West and AG Center - they then held at the German borders by pulling those, too. That got them infantry but was also the proximate cause of economic output peaking).

As for the importance of modern firepower, it does not turn just on ATGMs, it turns on the smart weapon revolution generally, and other advances in firepower arms, communications, mobility for all force types, etc. Tanks no longer possess the near invulnerability to massed indirect fires they had in WW II, etc. (Even then, it broke combined arms etc).

Sure dispersion may reduce specific lethality, but it does so at the cost of making local concentration less effective.

As for the specifics of the cold war central front, reforger involved doubling the NATO force on a time scale of 6 weeks, with significant new forces reaching theater by week 2. This was made possible by prepositioning equipment. Remember, NATO was vastly superior in overall military capacity, it was only the standing force that was kept smaller, for economic and social reasons. So it was easy to field the capital of twice the force, and fly the men to the weapons when needed.

Of course the stream coming by ship would take more like 2-3 months to arrive, and would grow in volume over time. That is quite sufficient - nothing the Russians could do in so short a time could end the war in their favor, even including conquering west Germany or that and France. That didn't win Germany anything lasting in WW II either. In the end, this (and also of course nukes, and the air match up etc) were no doubt why the Warsaw Pact was fully deterred.

Every war against a major power risks becoming, and most actually do become, long wars of attrition. A military doctrine that does not squarely face this fact is unsound. Wishing it were not so is not facing it, and hoping there is a way around it is not a way around it. If you are fully prepared for it to be so, plan on it, and are ready to win anyway (and avoid fights you can't win under those conditions), then if short and inexpensive wars fall into your lap, well and good. But you will be ready if, as is likely, they do not. If, on the other hand, you gambled on short and inexpensive wars against powers you believe you cannot defeat in long wars of attrition, the predictable, observed, and catastrophic typical consequence is not short and inexpensive victories in non-attrition wars, but long and agonising defeats in attrition wars for which your nation, force, and doctrine are utterly unprepared.

I will not look at Korean war which was certainly not a total war .

Regarding the kill ratios of Germans and their ability to win an attrition strategy i will disagree.

First of all the kill ratios that they acheived was a result of their "bold agressive" attitude going for the "cheap win" as you put it.

Second their quality superiority that permitted them to be more efficient could not be retained to such levels if they were going to employ a bigger army going for attrition.

The German army cause of the restrictive treates after wwi had trained a much smaller group of proffessional officers and it was a part of this group that permited them to employ a doctrine and gain advantage in battlefield.

If they were going for the attrition strategy then they had to trade quality with quantity and it is wrong to assume that under these conditions they would acheive similar kill ratios .

If they were not risking carelessly as you say for the "cheap victory" which you do not accept as a realistic expectation and instead they were following your advice, they would be much less efficient.

If they were not building superior equipment and focused on less sophisticated ones in larger quantitites ,they would not have the kill ratios they had historically.

Germany ws oupowered by Russians more than 2 to one .The Soviets had about 165 millions compared to 65 millions of Germans ,so their potentials were much greater and it is pure speculation to beleive that germans could start a massive program of expanding their army before invading Soviets ,while the latter would sit idle watching them.

In other threads you claim that some times the restrictive factor is not the number of tanks but the number of trained troops.

As to the industrial production , the potential ability of each country is limited by the weakest link.

For some countries it might be oil,for others it might be some type of another nessesary raw material.

You talk about the ability of Germans to produce oil from coal but you ignore that this was not some type of final solution.

If you compare oil production of Soviet Union and Germans ,the first has an advatnage of around 5 times more.

The Germans had always to be carefull in oil consumsion and that is for feeding an army and equipment much smaller than the one you propose.

I wonder what would have been the situation if they were producing an armor or truck fleet double the size of the one they had historically,going for the attrition strategy you propose.

Your claim that being on the defensive will not lead to defeat if you are a competant opponent, might be accepted as long as you talk about a defensive posture which is "offensive oriented" .

A defensive posture can still count on maneuver warfare and the belief that only an attack can bring victory.

Otherwise no matter if you are equally competant with your enemy ,

if you constantly leave him the opportunity to have the inititative and assume an offence of operational dimensions ,you will be defeated.

Initiative is an advantage that can make your equal opponent more effective at some point.

You have confused the debate of attritionists and maneuverists.

All beleive that it is only the attack that brings victory.

The difference is that some beleive that this attack should aim at destroying the enemy's strength while the others beleive that they can defeat the enemy by aiming at his weakness avoiding collission with his strength.

As some put it , the center of gravity is for some the enemy's strength while for others it is the enemy's weakness.

You talk about the operational dimensions of the first battle of Alamein that stopped Rommel to justify how defence can bring victory.

In fact this battle was decisive only because it let British the time to organize and initiate their OFFENSIVE that actually defeated Germans.

Without this type of offensive , the first battle of Alamein would not mean anything today.

Regarding the number of handfull AFVs do not prove anything without seeing the situation on the other side of the hill.Cyrenaicca was conquered by Rommel with a handfull of tanks during the opening stages and against a victorious enemy (Wavell).

Everything is a matter of judgment of your situation compared to the one of the enemy.

That is why i asked you to give me any details regarding the intelligence estimation of German stuff before the attack .

It is this type of information that can lead me to describe the whole desicion as simply a wrong judgment or stupidity.

If someone knows that he has not fullfilled some nessesary conditions to stage an attack and inspite of that he attacks anyway, then i can understand hard critisism.

However in most cases real commanders do not have the full picture that armchairgenerals have and in this case ,even if things are uncertain i can understand a decision to go for an attack and accept high levels of risk when you are in a desperate situation

Unfortunately i do not have so much free time to study every case is discussed in this forum but i think it is a reasonable expectation to ask for details as i try also to do.

Regarding the Russia knocked out by attrition during ww1 we disagree again.

You forget the communist revolution and civil war in Russia or the fact that the situation between Germans and Russians was actually a stalemate, or the fact that at those years The Charist Russia was actually much more behind regarding industrialization .

I will agree though about the underestimation of Soviets by the Germans ,or the overestimation of the blitzkreig effectiveness against an opponent of that size , or the slow rate of fully mobilizing the German economy.

Our argument is that i do not see how Germans could beat Soviets counting on attrition.

If you do beleive that,then you actually do the thing you blaim the opponents do.

You assume that the opponent would not be competant enough to avoid defeat although he posseses greater numbers.

So as you see, whatever strategy you choose whenever you are a smaller guy ,you have to assume that you have some type of advantage in order to gain victory against a bigger guy.

This is not a characteristic of the offensive doctrine you blaim.It is shown in your own version of doctrine also.

If your argument was that the Germans should not start a war against Soviets in the first place ,then i could agree but you actually seem to beleive that it was the inferiority of their doctrine that led them to defeat and i am not going to agree with that.

The other thing i want to comment about is the

contradiction you seem exists when i claim that you can temporary give the inittiative and my argument that retreat from Normandy would mean defeat.

First of all when we talk in general terms we can certainly claim that you can surrender the initiative and accept a defensive posture and still acheive desicive victory (always through an attack).

That does not mean that you SHOULD do it always or that you are able to adopt such an approach in every case.

In each particular situation you have to see the specific situation and decide accordingly.

Both options (offensive or defensive posture) are available in general but for every situation the optimum one may be different.In some case you might not even have a choice at all and be restricted to only one approach.

The concept of preemptive strike for example,which is very expensive politically is accepted exactly because in some cases the leadership judges that there is no option of defensive posture.

Regarding the especific example of Germans in France i told you that it was irrational for them to acceet that they had better chances to stop allies all along the France when they could not do it on a much more smaller front in Normandy , when a successful German attack would require a much shorter operational depth for breakthough and exploitation for desicive results and when the Allies were much weaker since they had captured limited numbers of ports .

As to the comment about reforger and the plans for sending troops in Europe, you talk about a field that i know quite well.

When you mention about 6 weeks time to double strength of US forces or two weeks to send signifficant amount of troops , you choose to ignore the plans of the other side.

The Soviets were planning for a 500-800 km advance in two weeks.

That is actually a depth that includes western Europe reaching Atlantic.

A 40 -50 km advance per day is sustainable for a campaign of two weeks duration according to Dupuy historical data and quite beleivable for a modern war of 24/7 operations.

This is relative with the argument that there was not big operational depth for Nato initial forces to buy time without engaging and going for an operational victory which would upset severely the Soviet timetable. .

[ January 06, 2007, 11:53 AM: Message edited by: pamak1970 ]

[Joachim]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

Tsk, you could have been more original with the title. Having long ago veered from guns against armour to tank destroyers to tank destroyer doctrine to grand strategy.

I considered that. Stayed with the original title cause everybody can find it easily - I know the intellectual capacity of our forum members.

Gruß

Joachim

[Wicky]

As to the comment about reforger and the plans for sending troops in Europe, you talk about a field that i know quite well.

When you mention about 6 weeks time to double strength of US forces or two weeks to send signifficant amount of troops , you choose to ignore the plans of the other side.

Just being inquisitive - Do you know what the Soviet plans were for obvious bottlenecks for reinforcements from UK to the continent i.e Harwich / Hook of Holland (requestioned civvy ferrys) etc. ?

[JasonC]

"I will not look at Korean war which was certainly not a total war."

If one is meant to justify the other, this does not follow.

Attrition works in limited wars as well as total ones.

"the kill ratios that they acheived was a result of their "bold agressive" attitude"

I deny it, based on sensitivity analysis. Your position predicts changes in German relative performance over time and as their stance changes, that are not observed.

They did achieve their best ratios in 1941 in large surrounds which you may wish to award to offensive maneuver boldness. As similar surrounds did not result from later similar attempts, however, I award the majority of that higher than German-normal performance to the unpreparedness of the Russians in 1941, and particularly the weakness of their Mech arm.

Analysis of the 1941 campaign compared to later ones shows that all the necessary reserves to stop German thrusts, by later standards of unit performance, existed in 1941 and were properly deployed to meet them operationally. However, those Mech formations evaporated on contact, without any appreciable result.

Russian reaction to those failures were at first uncomprehending and made matters worse, but the root of the failure was simply that entire Russian mechanized corps hit single German IDs or PDs and evaporated in less than a week. Whereas when a full German mech corps hit a single Russian RD it penetrated it without appreciable loss in less than a day. The main tactical cause of this difference can in turn be traced to non-existent CSS on the Russian side.

The Germans continue to achieve high exchange ratios later in the war, when on the tactical defensive.

Moreover, the Germans are clearly outplayed by the Russians at the strategic level from, at the latest, the fall of 1942 onward, and at the operational level from, at the latest, the middle of 1943 onward. No supposed extra virtuousity of command at those levels can be used to explain remaining, clear, and large German outperformance in Russia. Russian loss rates remain several times Germans ones long after Russian operational direction is in every way superior. Ergo, the lion's share of German outperformance can be isolated to the tactical level. It was not the result of having smarter generals. Their generals flat were not smarter, not in the actual orders they gave and moves made on the map.

It also fails to move directly with changes in technical specs of armaments in the field. The period of lowest German edge in pure technical specs of the rival tank fleets, for example, is a period of high German outperformance. The period of highest German edge in pure technical specs of the rival tank fleets, is a period of better Russian performance compared to what they got previously, but still not equality. Nor does it change with stance, beyond the unprepared 1941 case above. German equipment was on the whole excellent from midwar on, and probably did provide some portion of their margin of outperformance. But the outperformance is there when there is no equipment edge and it goes lower when that edge goes higher. Ergo it is not the driving cause.

The sensitivity analysis can be extended.

Germans outperformed Russians when neither had heard of tanks, when JFC Fuller had not put pen to paper, when the doctrine of breakthrough by concentrated armor striking for deep objectives did not exist, and when the stated and practiced German doctrine stressed victory over the fielded forces of the enemy in annihilation battle.

Ergo, that outperformance was not caused by the existence of tanks, by Fuller's ideas as adopted and improved by Guderian, by a deep breakthrough doctrine that existed only on paper even during the actual war (the Germans maintained a commitment to annihilation battle at the operational level throughout) etc.

The causes are not far to seek. The Germans had a better, more professional officer corps at the middle and lower levels, better professional staff work, resulting in better employment of the right weapon for the right jobs in a combined arms sense. They achieved higher unit cohesion and developed superior NCOs at the tactical level. The manpower of the army was better educated, was pushed to excel by a long military tradition, etc. Tactically, the Germans employed flexible maneuver as an effective multiplier, when not hamstrung by dumb orders from higher echelons (of the "stand fast" or of the "always attack" variety).

The statement that they could not have achieved such levels of performance if they a larger army cannot withstand scrutiny. They did have a larger army later in the war and the outperformance compared to the Russians did not go away. The Russians were improving and attacking and their equipment improved drastically. But even in defeats, even with infantry formations, the Germans still inflicted higher losses than they took themselves, against the Russians. Russian tactics have plenty to do with this, too - they were stubborn and aggressive, but hardly smart or efficient. In fact, if attacking boldly were the secret to success, the Russians would have been inflicting 5 times what they were taking instead of the other way around. Nobody ever accused them of pussyfooting around.

As for the idea that superior German equipment is a result of a quality over quantity focus, it does not stand scrutiny either. The Germans continued to produce lower quality stuff throughout the war, precisely to use all available productive capacity. Pz 38 chassis found lots of other uses but never went away. The Pz III and Pz IV remained the middle 2/3rds of the production distribution right to the end, with only a sixth of German output superior types. Those superior types used comparable levels of resources - a Panther wasn't appreciably more expensive than a Pz IV - they just used different purpose-built production facilities and the older ones continued to operate, making the old stuff.

German production was demand limited. The portion of German total output going to armaments was lower than the other major combatants through midwar, and the portion going to land armament in particular only took off seriously after Stalingrad. In August of 1941, German factories were switching away from output for the army in the belief that the war in Russia had already been won. When they finally did decide to produce tanks flat-out, they readily ramped AFV production more than fourfold.

The only particular of truth in the claim has to do with vehicle design lead-times. Clearly, a tank that was first fielded, with bugs, in mid 1943, would not have been available for mass production in 1941 regardless of when Germany decided to mobilize her economy. The higher output a more rapid mobilization would have made available by the time of Stalingrad, would have been lots more Pz III longs and Pz IV longs, not Panthers or Tigers. Since in reality they had to try to stop the Stalingrad counterattack with about 50 Pz 38t and about 20 Panzer IV shorts, I leave it to the reader to decide whether 5000 more of those types would have been helpful.

The Panther is an excellent tank, and it is quite fast for so large a vehicle. But it can't travel backward in time. If you want to win the war in Russia before you start losing it, the Panther will not help. But 5000 extra tanks equal to or better than the T-34, *in time*, before the end of 1942, would have made a vastly larger difference to the course of the war, than 200 teething Panthers at Kursk.

And yes, faster mobilization would have meant at a minimum 5000 extra main battle tanks by that date. Just look at the German AFV production curve, and shift it a year and a half to the left. That is what mobilization the day of the invasion gets you compared to mobilization after Stalingrad. As already stated, German AFV output in 1944 matched Russian AFV output 1942-1944. But the Germans only got 1 year of it, after it was too late, while the Russians got 3 of them when it mattered.

It is criminally stupid to attack a state as powerful as Soviet Russia without mobilizing the economy for war. The cause of that stupidity was overconfidence, in particular an overconfident belief in the ability of a maneuver warfare strategy to make odds irrelevant in modern warfare. Odds are not irrelevant in modern warfare, and states that pretend they are, are predictably going to lose.

Next you are simply factually wrong about the manpower ratio. Russian population in 1941 was only 150 million, not 165 million. And German population was 80 million - the Reich was at its largest, geographically speaking. The Russian areas the Germans occupied in 1941 had a prewar population of 40 million. While some undoubtedly escaped east, several million PWs were also taken from other areas. So the Russian manpower edge was never more than 2 to 1, and after the German victories of 1941 it was only about 3 to 2.

You don't lose 2 to 1 or 3 to 2 wars of attrition while racking up 5 to 1 loss ratios - *if you try*.

Incidentally, in the course of 1941, Russian losses were frequently so high that their fielded forces ratio was falling despite their huge replacement stream and the non-existence of a German one. (The German replacement stream of 1941 covered about half of their losses, and failed to get even that to the front line formations). In November 1941 just before the final push toward Moscow, the fielded forces on the two sides were roughly equal, with the German force actually larger.

By mid December, the Russians had avoided another massive loss of the scale of a Minsk or Kiev or Bryansk, and their fielded forces rose absolutely and passed the Germans. By that time, their losses to date equalled their fielded force. The loss ratio had run 10 to 1 against them, with the absolute scale sufficient to "eat" their entire prewar force. The entire force in the field, marginally larger than what they started with, had been drafted equipped and fielded inside of six months. While the Russians were doubling their "force to date" to keep their army alive, the Germans could not be bothered to replace losses one tenth as large.

This was mobilization, not capacity. Germany fielded almost 10 million additional men after that date, raised output sixfold, sustained 4 years of warfare with losses on a scale far greater by the end than those of 1941, and on more fronts. Clearly, Germany had enourmous remaining unused capacity in 1941. She didn't use it because her doctrine, command, and hopes told her it would not be necessary. It was necessary. By the time this was admitted, it was not sufficient.

And there it no need to begin a massive build up before invading - although the Germans had 6 months warning and thus planning time that the war was about to start, more than the Russians had. It would have been quite sufficient to start that massive build up the day of the invasion. Presumably with a bit of advanced planning. The Russians in 1941 managed to evacuate something like 20% of their prewar industrial base, lose 40% of their manpower to occupation, and still double their force in the field, without those months of warning, and with a purged officer corps, incompetent Mech arm, world-historical losses, etc.

If they Germans had come even within a factor of 2 of that accomplishment, under vastly superior conditions and with all of Europe to drawn from then late 1941 and all of 1942 would have looked nothing like what they did look like. There is no reason for the Germans to get weaker in the course of the 1941 campaign. Their losses are piddling. Their own army should have expanded by a factor of 5/4 to 3/2, improving as to mix and vehicle weight the while.

In 1942, the Russians rebuild all their 1941 losses in AFVs with a vastly superior mix to the prewar one. The German fleet practically stands still, in comparison. That is when the Russians achieve their armor odds edge, not later due to German attrition (they lose tanks later in about their fielded strength ratio, and the German fleet expands, but modestly, as their slow production ramp is about matched by ramping losses). If the Germans had matched the Russians in vehicle output in 1942 instead of in 1944, they would have had at least 2 times the fielded armor ratio they actually labored under. For the whole rest of the war.

Maneuverists should be able to grok that sometimes time is critical. In production, time is critical. You can't afford to wait a year and a half to see if you will need tanks. You will need tanks if it is a war of attrition. You had better plan on it being a war of attrition, because that is the war you might lose. Boldness is one thing, recklessness is another. Planning for the best without contingency for the worst is reckless planning, and it predictably leads to disaster.

As for your attempt to argue that Germany produced her full possible output and was limited by raw materials, it is nonsense. Her full possible output *rate* was seen in the first half of 1944, and not seen before then. That rate was fully available earlier, had she chosen to switch it on. What goes away is the extra 18 months of cushy civilian life before Barbarossa and Stalingrad, and a lot of pointless long term construction projects started in that period (remember, only 40% of steel output is going to the war program) that would only "pay back" over 20 or 30 years. When you fully mobilize an economy, you throw away some of that long term and you drastically "tax" the people in time and sweat and foregone consumption. But you get the tanks.

As for supplying them, the Germans were running tank fleets twice as large throughout 1943 and 1944, and did so without any problems, until the bombers smashed the synthetic oil plants and the Red Army seized Rumanian. Even then, they still got enough from distributed synthetic production to run the tanks, just not the Luftwaffe. They were not going to run out of oil in 1941-1943 just because they had too many tanks. And with six more months to plan on that larger fleet, they could have just upped synthetic capacity. It has a year of lead time and it costs money, but if you are planning on a long war with lots of tanks rather than a short one with 3000, obviously you do it.

"might be accepted as long as you talk about a defensive posture which is "offensive oriented".

No, I am talking precisely about trashing offensive orientation forever as a comprehensively dangerous myth. You can attack when attacking makes sense, of course. But the frame that decides whether it makes sense is annihilation-battle attrition and not "initiative." Defense is not a means of temporarising until the initiative can be recovered. The goal of operations is not to possess the initiative. Possession of the initiative is not decisive in modern war.

Maneuver warfare theory thinks it is, and it is just another way it is completely wrong.

If by attacking I can destroy a whole enemy army group for trivial loss, of course I should attack. If by standing on the defensive, I can destroy a whole enemy army for even the loss of a whole corps worth of casualties, and I can sustain those rates operationally and strategically, unless I have better before me, I should also welcome that. If on the other hand I have an opportunity to seize the initiative and attack, with a 20% chance of beating one enemy army, and an 80% chance of getting one of my own killed, then the initiative be damned and boldness be damned.

I don't care which way the line moves on the map. I care about the losses, his and mine. I pick my stance to maximize his and minimize mine. And I reject as utterly unfounded, any doctrinal teaching that one or the other stance will always maximize his or minimize mine. It isn't true, empirically. Which stance to take depends on the circumstances, odds, strategic situation etc. It is not dictated by any fear that the mere possession of the initiative by the enemy will defeat me. It simply will not.

"You have confused the debate of attritionists and maneuverists. All beleive that it is only the attack that brings victory."

Wrong. I don't believe that statement. And I am an attritionist. And I have an excellent attritionist reason to think that it is not only the attack that brings victory. As an attritionist, I think that it is a great whopping fielded forces ratio that brings victory. And everything else is a mere means. Enemy losses are a means - they raise that ratio by lowering its denominator. Force preservation is a means - it raises that ratio by preventing reduction of the numerator. And reinforcements are a means - they raise that ratio by directly adding to that numerator. Anything that reduces enemy reinforcements is likewise a valuable means, because it prevents increases in the denominator.

If moving from the Egyptian border to El Alamein will not help the fielded forces ratio, then it is a mistake. If gambling on the Bulge has a negative expected impact on the fielded forces ratio, then I don't care what gamblers think or what initiative worshippers expect from a change in the direction of motion of a line in the newspaper.

And as an attritionist, I always believe that the enemy's center of gravity is his fielded forces and his means of adding to same, and against them I wage my war. It cannot be waged by ignoring my own means of adding to my forces, promising recklessly to NCAs what I only hope will happen.

"In fact this battle was decisive only because it let British the time to organize and initiate their OFFENSIVE that actually defeated Germans."

The battle was over when Rommel crossed the Egyptian frontier. The rest was a forced mate in two and a deterministic "splat", and not a battle. The odds ratio began moving inexorably against DAK that moment, and nothing was left that could possibly stop it from doing so continually. That was decisive.

"Cyrenaicca was conquered by Rommel with a handfull of tanks during the opening stages and against a victorious enemy (Wavell)."

Notice the fetishism again, thinks it matters whether ground is gained and whether an opponent was previously "victorious" or not. Rommel took Libya the first time because there were not many Brit tanks left in theater, his own force fully matched them, and he achieved operational surprise. Bully for him, it was well executed. It didn't decide anything, though. It just set up the actual fight - as always, between both side's full forces, all they can get to the theater - around the Tobruk position and Egyptian border.

"I asked you to give me any details regarding the intelligence estimation of German stuff before the attack."

Go read about it, you are perfectly welcome. They counterattacked the whole 3rd army with the equivalent of an understrength panzer corps. After it was fought out, it was left to the infantry to sustain the fight, which they managed to do. Further immediate gain by the US was limited by lowered logistic support. And the Germans had no armor left to defend Lorraine, for the rest of the year.

"If someone knows that he has not fullfilled some nessesary conditions to stage an attack and inspite of that he attacks anyway, then i can understand hard critisism."

It is their responsibility to know those conditions. I can point to any number of competent assessments by professionals that accurately assess such conditions.

When Manstein says Kursk needs 25 additional infantry divisions to have a chance to succeed, he is simply correct. When they roll their eyes at the statement as though he said "when pigs fly" and attack anyway, they are worshipping the offensive instead of assessing its necessary conditions. When Vatutin explains why the Russians should stand and receive the German blow first, and only attack after stopping it, he is accurately assessing the necessary conditions for operational offensives and he is simply correct. When Ridgeway in Korea decides to pull back below the 38th parallel until the Chinese offensive is logistically exhausted, and only then indulge tactical counterattacks, he is accurately assessing the necessary conditions for attacking and he is simply correct.

When Rommel dashes for the wire or runs to El Alamein or counterattacks at Kasserine, he is worshipping the initiative. Salerno is worshipping the initiative. Lehr counterattacking straight into a full corps advancing on St. Lo is worshipping the initiative. Mortain is worshipping the initiative. Arracourt is worshipping the initiative. The Bulge is worshipping the initiative. Hungary 1945 is worshipping the initiative. They do it all the bleeding time.

They see a few externals of their earlier successes, and not knowing what was actually necessary for them to work, they simply try the same few externals again, and pray. It is the cargo cult of the offensive.

"You forget the communist revolution and civil war in Russia or the fact that the situation between Germans and Russians was actually a stalemate"

Hardly, I diagnose Russia coming apart as caused by attrition, which is perfectly decisive. Attrite a nation enough and give them an attractive enough political alternative (which the German general staff arranged, in case everybody forget - they sent Lenin to Russia) and they stop obeying their leaders and shoot them instead.

And no it was not at all a stalemate, it was an outright and complete military victory achieved by sustained bloodletting.

Yes Russia was stronger in WW II than in WW I, because of greater industrialization first and foremost. Germany was also in a vastly stronger position than she had been in WW I, as already explained.

"Our argument is that i do not see how Germans could beat Soviets counting on attrition."

Visualize an entire extra army group complete with panzer armee romping through southern Russia and the eastern Ukraine in 1941, on top of all losses to the forces that move on Moscow being fully replaced. Visualize halting as soon as the weather gets too awful, not worried at all about doing it in one year, able to pick lines to defend as you like. Visualize an extra 4000 tanks by the time of the 1942 summer offensive. Visualize the diverging arms headed for Stalingrad and the Caucasus each being as strong as both combined actually were, and a third stronger still aimed farther north, east of Voronezh, from August on. Now visualize every Russian counterstroke facing the same 2 full corps of reserve armor that made Mars a bloody shambles. Now for 1943, with all that taken and not a battle lost yet and far fewer Russian recruits from the areas under German control, attack north on a line east of Moscow, while repairing rail lines and building pipelines to Baku. No rush at all. Time never on the enemy's side.

"You assume that the opponent would not be competant enough to avoid defeat although he posseses greater numbers."

There are always factors between numbers and effective strength. The attrition frame insists they are always bounded and that therefore odds always matter. It does not remotely insist that they are always "1". Germany achieved 3-5 to 1 exchange ratios in Russia and was equal to Russia economically and within a factor of 2 of her in population. So there was no reason to lose a war of attrition to Russia alone, had she tried. She lost decisively to attrition despite those ratios, because she did not try (until it was too late), not because she could not do so even if she did try.

"the Germans should not start a war against Soviets in the first place,then i could agree"

If they think they can avoid that, it is obviously the safer course, sure. But if they think a war with Russia would come sooner with advantage or later without, I do not fault that bit. If they do decide they need to, or will, attack Russia, however, and then don't bother mobilizing the economy because they think they won't need it because it will all be over by Christmas, then they are delusional and stupid. Which is what actually happened.

And yes, their military doctrine materially contributed to that delusion and that stupidity. They believed their press releases. Of course, so did their political doctrine, etc, but that is another story and tolerably obvious.

If you think there is anything idiosyncratic about my claim about faith in maneuver warfare possibly leading to dangerously unsound military decisions at the NCA level and resulting in deterrence failure, read "Conventional Deterrence" by John Mearsheimer.

"and still acheive desicive victory (always through an attack)."

It is like a nervous tic with these people.

"it was irrational for them to acceet that they had better chances to stop allies all along the France when they could not do it on a much more smaller front in Normandy"

You claimed it, but it is not so. Once away from the beaches, the allies encounter their own logistical problems. Which stalled them out at the westwall even against token opposition. Against a much more coherent opposition with twice the intact armor, it would have stalled logistically, too. Perhaps all the way at the westwall, but later in time and with more of the German force getting away successfully, due to the time the fighting withdrawal bought the infantry, Bay of Biscay and southern France forces, etc. Perhaps well in advance of it. That is would halt was predictable, and that the mission was to preserve as much of the force as possible through that period was and is obvious.

"The Soviets were planning for a 500-800 km advance in two weeks."

But then they rarely achieve the rates for which they planned. 10km per day against an intact defender, that "upsets their timetable" quite enough. They hoped to break through and get the 50 km per day figures that come from exploitation drives in the country. The easiest way to get them that is to stand too far forward, too rigidly - that is what causes breakthroughs in a defensive doctrine sense.

And it still would not matter, even if they took Germany and France. It in the process the rate of attrition were favorable, and US forces in Europe doubled, the initial balance of strength would evaporate in a short period of time. Recovering the ground once you have the odds is feasible enough. (Have they taken Italy? Spain? Etc). What you don't want to do is lose lopsidedly on the force-to-force exchange, in the period of the enemy's force ascendency. That was the danger - that they blow through the NATO force KOing several to 1 and get all that stuff as a bonus. You won't make that less likely by shoving forces farther east on attack stance missions.

[Corvidae]

Point # 1

Anti tank guns generaly have the advantage over tanks.

Point # 2

Tank destroyers generaly have the advantage over tanks when properly deployed.

Does anyone see any flaws in my two points??

[michael kenny]

originaly posted by JasonC

The Germans continued to produce lower quality stuff throughout the war, precisely to use all available productive capacity. Pz 38 chassis found lots of other uses but never went away. The Pz III and Pz IV remained the middle 2/3rds of the production distribution right to the end, with only a sixth of German output superior types.

All Pz I,II,38(t) and Pz III tank production was ended late '42.

If we are talking about tanks then all types of Pz I to PzIV (and including 35(t)/38(t)) gives a total of 20000.

'Superior' types (I presume Panthers and Tigers?) add up to 7800.

Hardly a sixth.

originaly posted by JasonC

As for supplying them, the Germans were running tank fleets twice as large throughout 1943 and 1944, and did so without any problems

Twice as large as....... what?

The German tank park was some 5300 at the beginning of Barbarosa. It rose to 6000 by the end of 1942. The Stalingrad losses helped it dip to under 4000 at the start of 1943. The numbers slowly climbed(Feb '44 before it got back to June '41 levels)until it was around 7400 in the spring of 1944. Slipped back to 5000 by October only to rise to 6000 again in January.

There were more German tanks available for action in 1945 than in nearly all the previous years of the war.

The problem they had was that production was concentrated on major AFV's and they neglected to produce enough spares to sustain the fleet.

The major error was the lack of any transport. Even at the start of the war there was not enough wheeled transport to go around. Whilst tank production increased by a factor of 6 motor vehicle production only went up by less than 2. Even that was only for brief periods. A Panzer Division had to rely on horses (about 1000) for some of its supplies. Supplying them was a problem from the start and it got worse as the war progressed.

[Joachim]

Originally posted by michael kenny:

The problem they had was that production was concentrated on major AFV's and they neglected to produce enough spares to sustain the fleet.

The problem is not producing the spares - the problem is having the right spares where you need them when your army consists of too many vehicle types. Having spares for a PzIV does not help much in repairing the PzVs of the other btn.

Even with computers this would be a logistics nightmare.

An economy geared for total war (which is a long-time concept) would have resulted in banning all the minor designs that were used as (economically) cheap stopgaps in an economy that focussed on short-time production numbers.

Gruß

Joachim

[JasonC]

AFVs, not turreted tanks. And the 38 chassis production lines continued to produce flat out right to the end of the war. The last was the Hetzer, before that Marders and Grilles and Flakpanzers. The II chassis went from turreted tanks to Marders and Wespes. Only the I chassis was discontinued at midwar. The IIs reverted to making Lynx for recon at the end but spent most of the second half of the war making SPAT and SPA.

As for the IIIs, not only were they not discontinued, they remained numerically more important than any of the top tier types right to the end. (E.g. there are more StuG III than Panthers produced in the latter's peak year, 1944). StuGs were the main III chassis item in the second half of the war, of course. StuH and Hummels and Nashorns also used some (part III chassis part IV chassis for the latter two).

IV chassis in 1944 came to 6000 types, only about half of them turreted tanks. The others included over 1500 Jagdpanzers, 1000 StuG on IV chassis, and minor amounts for SPAT and SPA.

As already explained, III and IV chassis constituted the middle 2/3rds of the AFV distribution throughout the war. Heavier types were only the top standard deviation sixth, and were balanced by the bottom standard deviation sixth, the lighter II and 38 chassis varieties.

Just as the Russians used their light tank production throughout the war, for T-60s and T-70s and then SU-76s, the Germans continued to use their lighter production lines. And just as the bulk of Russian production was centered in their medium T-34 chassis, with only a marginal component of heavier KV and IS and ISU types, so German output was centered in their III and IV chassis, with only a marginal component of their heavier Panther and Tiger chassis.

Total German production of AFVs was about 47,500, not 20,000. The 1944 rate was 18700 vehicles, and that reflected a peak in the summer and higher start and end points. Thus the peak rate was about as many AFVs per year as the turreted tank total you gave for the whole war.

The 1941 production rate was only 3700, and in 1942 6000, in 1943 11650. Total for those four years is thus 40,000 - there were 3500 made 1940 and earlier and 4000 made in the first months of 1945.

Moving the production curve a full year and a half to the left would mean the 1944 peak rate is achieved in 1943 and the 1942 rate is between the 1943 and 1944 historical rates, or about 15000. The 1941 rate would be the amount historically seen in 1942. Thus you could get 21000 tanks in 1941 and 1942 combined, vs. a historical 9700, or a gain of 10000 tanks by the time of Stalingrad.

Being less generous and moving the curve only 1 year to the left, gives 2300 extra in 1941 (use 1942 rate rather than 1941 rate) and another 5650 extra in 1942 (using 1943 rate etc), for a total of about 8000 tanks by the end of calendar 1942. So my 4-5000 extra estimate is extremely conservative, and the real gain from faster mobilization could easily be twice that size.

If the higher integral were obtained, besides 11300 vehicles when it counted the most, before the end of 1942, you would also see at least 7050 more in 1943, for a net gain of 18350 vehicles. If the higher summer peak 44 rate is used for the tail end (no further increase assumed in the remaining time), that could be worth another 7900 or so.

The net gain to total output over the whole war period is 40-65% depending on such assumptions. With no increase in the peak rate, just getting up to it sooner and staying at it longer. If that prolongs the war a year it of course brings another 20000 tanks; of course the Russian total would also rise with another year of output. Russia would still have more tanks, total integral. But only by a factor of 3 to 2 or so, and that would not have been sufficient to cover the difference in AFV loss ratios the Germans readily achieved, in all periods and all stances.

These are conservative production possibilities, as shown by the Russian example. The Russians, from the same prewar industrial production (as measured by steel output, etc) and a much greater disruption to their economy, were able to reach a production rate of 1500 AFVs per month in a very short time, by the end of the 1941 campaign.

As for fleet size, they sent 3000 AFVs into Russia; and panzer Is can hardly be counted as AFVs. (I do not include them above, any more than armored cars or halftracks). They readily maintained ~7000 later in the war - which was the size of the Russian fleet at its nadir at the end of 1941.

As for trucks, the Germans readily expanded their mobile division total from a dozen early in the war to fifty by the end. The basis of their transport system was rail anyway. And vehicle production suffered from the same delays in full economic mobilization as the AFV fleet.

[Joachim]

Originally posted by pamak1970:

I will not look at Korean war which was certainly not a total war .

Regarding the kill ratios of Germans and their ability to win an attrition strategy i will disagree.

First of all the kill ratios that they acheived was a result of their "bold agressive" attitude going for the "cheap win" as you put it.

Can't see why they should use a strategy which produces worse ratios when they have more assets. After all the early elements of Blitzkrieg - going for HQs first to disrupt the enemy and then take out the leaderless troops - were successfully tested in late WW I. The bold aggressive attitude was not an attitude but the knowledge that only bold aggressive plans break the stalemate of trench warfare.

Second their quality superiority that permitted them to be more efficient could not be retained to such levels if they were going to employ a bigger army going for attrition.

The German army cause of the restrictive treates after wwi had trained a much smaller group of proffessional officers and it was a part of this group that permited them to employ a doctrine and gain advantage in battlefield.

The Germans ignored that treaty after '33. In '35 they moved troops into a demilitarized zone openly ignoring that treaty. That is at least 4 years to train a bigger army. I doubt those 100,000 troops allowed in the Versailles treaty do matter much in the overall quality of an army of 5 or 10 millions.

If they were going for the attrition strategy then they had to trade quality with quantity and it is wrong to assume that under these conditions they would acheive similar kill ratios .

If they were not risking carelessly as you say for the "cheap victory" which you do not accept as a realistic expectation and instead they were following your advice, they would be much less efficient.

If they were not building superior equipment and focused on less sophisticated ones in larger quantitites ,they would not have the kill ratios they had historically.

"Your men don't belong to you but to the Führer." (Some German Army handbook) This does not sound like an order allowing to carelessly risk soldier's lifes.

Contrary to your opinion, having more soldiers would have resulted in less need for urgent replacements and more time to train replacements. The heavy losses of the late war were due to badly trained personnel. And it mostly was not the vets dying - it was the inexperienced noobs.

"Badly trained" means less than 6 months. 6 months for all German males under age 45 can easily be achieved in 4 years - if you are ready to pay the economic cost.

Germany ws oupowered by Russians more than 2 to one .The Soviets had about 165 millions compared to 65 millions of Germans ,so their potentials were much greater and it is pure speculation to beleive that germans could start a massive program of expanding their army before invading Soviets ,while the latter would sit idle watching them.

a) I thought it was 80 vs 135 millions.

The Soviets were not idle - they already had a low output for consumer goods and could not decrease production of consumer goods in favor of military goods like the Germans could (but didn't until too late)

As to the industrial production , the potential ability of each country is limited by the weakest link.

No. Economic theory says (almost) all goods can be substituted - at a cost. Just like the Germans did. Not enough rubber available? Use something else to make tires. No crude oil? Use coal.

The Germans had always to be carefull in oil consumsion and that is for feeding an army and equipment much smaller than the one you propose.

I wonder what would have been the situation if they were producing an armor or truck fleet double the size of the one they had historically,going for the attrition strategy you propose.

The moves of an army are not proportional to its size. No need to wildly shift armored divisions as fire brigades when you have twice the number.

Much better rear area security means less loss during transport.

Attritionist and Maneuvrist do not exclude each other. Maneuvrist operations can result in strategic attrition - see the early successes of Germany.

Gruß

Joachim

[michael kenny]

D/P

[ January 07, 2007, 04:32 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

AFVs, not turreted tanks.

But you clearly said " The Pz III and Pz IV remained the middle 2/3rds of the production distribution right to the end"

Why not say you meant the derivatives on the chassis of the tanks instead of the tanks themselves.

As for the IIIs, not only were they not discontinued,

As above, the Pz III was discontinued in late '42/start of '43. The Chassis CONTINUED in production. By applying the same logic we can say that US forces were using the Grant M3's to the wars end because the chassis of the early M7 105mm SP was the M3!

As for fleet size, they sent 3000 AFVs into Russia; and panzer Is can hardly be counted as AFVs. (I do not include them above, any more than armored cars or halftracks). They readily maintained ~7000 later in the war - which was the size of the Russian fleet at its nadir at the end of 1941.

First you compare a 'fleet' of 3000 instead of a tank park of 5000. Then you try and use the max. tank park figure of 7000 to try and say that supporting such a 'fleet' was no problem. The tank park of 7000 existed for a very short time(3 months) and once the Allied offensives began the German losses were catastrophic.

As for trucks, the Germans readily expanded their mobile division total from a dozen early in the war to fifty by the end. The basis of their transport system was rail anyway.

Well the Germans started the invasion of Russia with a shortage of 2700 trucks. By August transport losses began to outrun production. In October losses were 6000, double the production figures of 2752.

110000 trucks were lost Jan-Aug 1944, more than the entire production for 1943.

There were 48 Panzer/Panzergrenadier Divisions by the wars end.

Tank strengtht were reduced during the war and the 1944 Divisions were rarely fully equiped.

The tank park was fairly static throughout the war.

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by michael kenny:

Sorry - it's not the same logic.

They kept making new Stug III's on new III chassis.

They did not continue making new M3 chassis for later M7's - they were built on M4 Sherman chassis.

[JasonC]

"Pz 38 chassis..."

Beyond lame. Read the paragraph, nitwit.

[michael kenny]

OK then try:

'The US used M7's that were built on an M3 chassis right throughout the war. Therefore the Grant was still being used up to 1945.'

Here is a 'Grant' in April 1945 at Okinawa

Total German production of AFVs was about 47,500

I see the full total of tanks, SP Artillery, command tanks, flamethrowers ect as 54,500

not 20,000.

The number I used was 20,000 +7,800, i.e. 27.800 tanks. 3000 were built prior to WW2.

The total of 54,500 does not include some 3000 rebuilds or conversions of earlier obselete types. i.e. the Pz II chassis used for SP Artillery, captured French chassis ect..

Originally posted by JasonC:

"Pz 38 chassis..."

Beyond lame. Read the paragraph, nitwit.

ooohh you are a devil!

I suppose the puerile name calling helps you avoid the thorny problem about trucks?

oh and it is Pz.38(t).........

[ January 07, 2007, 09:34 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

[Corvidae]

Arent you done yet?

[Guest Mike]

And Rams on M3 chassis were used right to the end of the war too - but the point wasn't about use - it was about production.

When you guys discuss the info instead of semantics it's great - otherwise you both look like morons.

[coe]

On a separate note, seeing the picture of the Priest in the Pacific, I wonder how different things would be if the japanese had decent anti-tank assets - e.g. lets say the Germans were able to get their designs for the Pak 40 and Panzerfausts/schreks over to the Japanese who were able to produce them. Or better yet a japanese Tiger or Panther cruising down the road in China/Burma or the Philippines. Assuming you could shield the AT weapons from artillery things would be a lot slower and trickier.

Anybody want to switch the topic to AT guns vs. Tanks in the pacific theatre?

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

And Rams on M3 chassis were used right to the end of the war too - but the point wasn't about use - it was about production.

Not about production at all. It is whether or not you can say everything built on the chassis of a tank is still the tank itself. A Stug.III is not a Pz.III.

Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

When you guys discuss the info instead of semantics it's great - otherwise you both look like morons.

Equality will do for me!

[undead reindeer cavalry]

IMHO German decisions and plans were for most parts based on rational and valid reasoning. you don't need to be insanely delusional, not to mentional criminally lazy, to make errors.

when pointing out those errors one should remember that we benefit 60 years of hindsight and detailed study. it's not realistic to expect Germans to react to Soviet strength prior to 1942. at that point Germans have already lost the war (not because of tank production numbers, but mainly because of logistics and strategic intelligence).

[bitchen frizzy]

Eh?

The Germans weren't reacting to anything. They invaded the Soviet Union by choice, with a plan of their own making, at a time of their choosing.

Their errors were due to hubris and poor planning - and, I agree, poor intelligence. They weren't forced to react to unexpected circumstances. I must also say that there was in fact quite a bit of delusional thinking going on, too.

They could have - should have - known that taking on a country twice their size would require a greater war effort.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by bitchen frizzy:

They weren't forced to react to unexpected circumstances.

the whole USSR was an unexpected circumstance.

I must also say that there was in fact quite a bit of delusional thinking going on, too.

anything special you have in mind?

They could have - should have - known that taking on a country twice their size would require a greater war effort.

what would those greater efforts be and why should have they known that they needed them?

[bitchen frizzy]

Double post

[bitchen frizzy]

Originally posted by bitchen frizzy:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by bitchen frizzy:

They weren't forced to react to unexpected circumstances.

the whole USSR was an unexpected circumstance. </font>