Guns vs Armour II

[pamak1970]

Attrition works in limited wars as well as total ones

I disagree .The political implications and the willing of participants to pay a certain cost is much more important.If these wars was a matter of attrition then Vietnam would have been a triumph for Americans.

As a side note it is interesting that Americans did not stop the North Koreans and Chinese by buying time and be on the defensive .They had to inititate an offensive of operational proportions to acheive the stalemate and push the North back.

The statement that they could not have achieved such levels of performance if they a larger army cannot withstand scrutiny. They did have a larger army later in the war and the outperformance compared to the Russians did not go away.

In previous posts you talk about a Soviet to German casualty ratio of 3 or 5 to 1 and now you claim that you beleive that a bigger army would not affect the perfomance or quality of Germans by focusing on historical experience later in the war.

Now i am going to ask for the numbers that can back up your opinion.

In fact i will ask you to provide numbers similar with the ones you provide for ETO when you defend the American perfomance compared to the German one.

For example, since we talk about attrition and we focus on strategic implications ,can you give me the number of German tanks or AFVs destroyed in eastern front?

Is the Soviet number 3-5 times higher than the German one?

Same with personel (military) including KIA MIA and POWs since all of them are casualties and lost for each side.

I doubt you will find such a ratio and i doubt that during the second half of the war the germans showed a similar perfomance compared to the earlier years.

As for the idea that superior German equipment is a result of a quality over quantity focus, it does not stand scrutiny either. The Germans continued to produce lower quality stuff throughout the war, precisely to use all available productive capacity

I thought you were saying that germans did not feel the need for full mobilization of economy till it was too late (which i accept).

Now you are saying that they produced lower quality stuff throughout the war to use all available productive capacity.

By the way, even the light German tanks had radios while for Soviets and for a big part of the war ,this was restricted to command vehicles.

Things become even more confusing when earlier you say that

German equipment was on the whole excellent from midwar on, and probably did provide some portion of their margin of outperformance.

continuing

The Germans had a better, more professional officer corps at the middle and lower levels, better professional staff work, resulting in better employment of the right weapon for the right jobs in a combined arms sense. They achieved higher unit cohesion and developed superior NCOs at the tactical level. The manpower of the army was better educated, was pushed to excel by a long military tradition, etc.

and i say that all these high standards could not be maintained if they had to employ a much larger army .It is similar with the modern idea of smaller proffesional armies compared to bigger ones by utilizing drafting.

For Germans the officer and NCO pool was very limited cause of the treates after wwi and inpite the fact that there were breaches of these treates, they did not train and educate a high quantity of officers.

Some numbers are very instructive.

After 1935 when Hitler introduced the compulsory military service and during this time span he was able to train only 4000 officers while the French army had a pool of 39000 active duty officers.

All this is from the book "the blitzkrieg legend".

You do not just recruit people expecting to have a bigger army maintaining quality.

Attrition would be first felt on the level of officers replacements.

Assumming that Hitler could take up his time trying to build and train a larger army before invading Soviets and gain victory is total speculation.

Soviets would not stay idle and they could recover for the massive army persecutions of 1937, British could certainly recover and always look for the opportunity to start a second front (they did it in Balkans during wwi -do not confuse it with the Dardanielles failure ),not to mention the Africa problems and the failure of Italians to stop them.

Next you are simply factually wrong about the manpower ratio. Russian population in 1941 was only 150 million, not 165 million. And German population was 80 million

The first number is 169 million for January 1939 according to http://www.aaabooksearch.com/ISBN/5020134791

which is actually a book about demographics.

As to the German population it is 69 million within the 1937 borders.

The figure you provide includes population after the annexation of certain provinces which were not part of the German Reich .

As for supplying them, the Germans were running tank fleets twice as large throughout 1943 and 1944, and did so without any problems, until the bombers smashed the synthetic oil plants and the Red Army seized Rumanian

First of all it was not without problems .They had to be strict in allocating oil to their units and any loss during transportation cause of air activity was not easily replaced.

Second You do not address the argument of their situation if they had to produce and sustain a much larger fleet of what they deployed historically.

Answering another argument here from another poster that larger fleet would result in similar consumsion cause of less movement of reserves , i will disagree unless you want to commit reserves piecemeal or in general advance retreat or move a portion of the fleet simply because you want to maintain lower levels of consumsions ignoring the operational nessesites.

If by standing on the defensive, I can destroy a whole enemy army for even the loss of a whole corps worth of casualties,

IF you could do that ,then i would agree.

I asked You to give me such cases during wwii where you could annihilate the enemy army by simply defending without seizing inititative through an attack or counterattack of operational proportions and you did not come with anything particular.

"You have confused the debate of attritionists and maneuverists. All beleive that it is only the attack that brings victory."

Wrong. I don't believe that statement. And I am an attritionist.

If you do not beleive that statement is that you are not familiar with the debate in proffessional community i am talking about.

You,like me are just amateurs that love to read about such stuff and have different opinions.

I would like you to give me sources from American Soviet German or French manuals that diminish the value of attack not accepting that it is the only method that brings decicive victory.

In fact French infantry regulations of 1929 state that the only form of operations that can bring decisive results is the offensive.

This is the army that was far behind in formulating a blitzkrieg concept and maneuver warfare

American army manuals of 1950s ,even before air-land doctrine mention in a paragraph about defensive operations, that the basic aim should be the destruction of the enemy through counterattack or counteroffensive.

When Rommel dashes for the wire or runs to El Alamein or counterattacks at Kasserine, he is worshipping the initiative. Salerno is worshipping the initiative. Lehr counterattacking straight into a full corps advancing on St. Lo is worshipping the initiative. Mortain is worshipping the initiative. Arracourt is worshipping the initiative. The Bulge is worshipping the initiative. Hungary 1945 is worshipping the initiative. They do it all the bleeding time.

Neither Rommel nor Germans in France could count on prevailing against Allies through attrition,therefore they had to find another qualitative factor if they were aiming to win.

Inittiative and surprise was their only hope and threy actually made it happen often against superior numbers.

If Axis stood for so much time in Africa it is exactly because they were aggressive, otherwise the Alamein type of defeat for the Axis would occur much earlier somewhere around West Lybia.Whenever the british got the offensive posture ,the Axis found itself in difficult situation and inspite skillful defence they could not match the numerical superiority of British.Since Hitler was not paying too much attention to this theater while for British it was the only and naturally more important theater of operations against Axis , there was no hope for Rommel to count on anything else other than qualitative advantage.

The deep advances were not of course aimining to capture ground.

They were aiming in destroying the retreating armies and transform them in thousands of thirsty men hoping actually to become prisoners and save their lifes in a matter of few days,not giving them any time for possible regroup and organization of a new defences, retreave tanks and trucks laying on the battlefield,both German and British and so on.

There is no such thing as proffesional comanders that do not do mistakes or wrong judgments.

All will do mistakes and did .It is more a matter of who is going to do the most critical ones and who will be able to take the most advantage of enemy's mistakes.

The only ones that do not do mistakes are the armchair generals.

And no it was not at all a stalemate, it was an outright and complete military victory achieved by sustained bloodletting

You have a strange definition of complete military victory.

The Germans were simply not able to take advantage strategically of any military success there

.Maybe if it was only Russia against Germany in wwi ,they could be able.

Maybe if Russians did not have the civil war between whites and reds and the general anarchy inside the state ,would be more efficient.

Maybe if Germans were trying to push farther deep into Moscow, they would encounter similar problems like Hitler or Napoleon ..

We do not really know and it is bizarre that you are so sure about "what ifs" in history.

What we do know however is the irony of you talking about the sucess of Germans in wwi in Eastern front which was actually a result of offensive actions and not a product of defence and delaying actions .

Visualize an entire extra army group complete with panzer armee romping through southern Russia and the eastern Ukraine in 1941, on top of all losses to the forces that move on Moscow being fully replaced

I see ,speculations again.

Since you have the crystral ball,can you tell me what you visualize about the proficiency of Red army officers if Soviets had additional time to train and replace the officers that fell victims during the army persecutions?

You claimed it, but it is not so. Once away from the beaches, the allies encounter their own logistical problems

Are you going to claim now that this period of time gave more advantages for Germans for initiating a counterattack ?

I thought that Your main beleif up until now,was that Germans are simply stupid whenever they try to attack nomatter if it is Mortain or Bulge.

Even if Allies encountered logistical problems, how would this benefit Germans if they were staying idle ,waiting for the Allies to solve their logistical difficulties and assume the advance again?

But then they rarely achieve the rates for which they planned. 10km per day against an intact defender, that "upsets their timetable" quite enough. They hoped to break through and get the 50 km per day figures that come from exploitation drives in the country. The easiest way to get them that is to stand too far forward, too rigidly - that is what causes breakthroughs in a defensive doctrine sense.

Are you familiar with the Soviet operational research?

No the numbers are not just about exploitation.

Same with american research.

In any case an no matter about which method you prefer, there are things you do not clarify

.On one hand you talk about a number of rate of advance against an "intact defender" ,on the other hand you talk about a force that does not stand forward too rigidly.

Rates of advance are depended on many factors according to both Soviet and American view.

They are certainly educated estimations,based in large part on historical data from history and sure they are open for debate for both Soviets and allies but we can not pick an number just because we like it without clarifying some things .

If you beleiev that defence should not be too far forward and not to rigid (which actually begs a definition of what you accept as rigid or too far forward), then you can not apply advace rates of Soviets against an intact defender all the way from the borders to the main line of defence.

In theory at least, you apply advance rates against a delaying force which is different (more) compared to advance rates against an "intact" defender.

Second, you do not talk at all about the ratio of combat power which again according to theory affects the rate of advance.

Since the delaying force would have a much less combat power compared to the attacker , this will add to the advance rate of Soviets.A 4-1 advantage can lead to 30-40 km per day advance against a delay or hasty defence (American perspective ).

Sure you can debate about the accuracy of the number but it is interesting that you do not have problem to accept the American calculations for the arrival of American reinforcements in the theater nor you mention the arrival of Soviet reinforcements rates in the theater during the first weeks of the war.

Third, you ignore political implications.You can not convince German army to abandon their country in order to win the war at sometime at someplace other than inside Germany.

Then what is the purpose of having Nato?.

You also can not prepare elaborate defences and minefields during piecetime away from borders in the middle of countries that live peacefully and have a normal economic activity.When you want to have a deep territory of many dozens of miles full with successive defensive positions , you need a lot of time and manpower,not to mention the material restrictions.

Soviets did not prepare Kursk salient in a few days.

There are numerous other things i can say in addition of the above.

The covering force for example can not be too far away from the main forces and expect that it will be capable to perform its mission well .

You certainly do not want to see the enemy force approach your main defence the moment the covering force has lost cohesion and being unable to link its actions with the main defence.

You certainly can not expect to move large units envisioning some type of shoot and scoot actions.

Withdrawal is the most demanding form of maneuver and always difficult to execute ,especially if it involves disengaging from the enemy.

Stuff work for large units operational movements for withdrawal is more demanding regarding synchronization compared to large units movements during an advance .

The force that withdraws has much less room for timetable upsets compared to the force that advances and so on.

As a last point,nomatter if the line of defence is already prepared before the arrival of the forces, there will still be the nessesity for the defender to have much available time to organize his defence after his arrival, and many day light hours.

[ January 09, 2007, 02:57 PM: Message edited by: pamak1970 ]

[JasonC]

First, as an aside - this is a fine discussion and I thank you for holding up your end of it. It brings out my points quite well

"The political implications and the willing of participants to pay a certain cost is much more important."

What are costs? Attrition. What drives up the enemy's costs? Attrition. When the enemy can decide to continue the war indefinitely, indeed when this option in open to both sides, the only useful frame is that supplied by attrition analysis. Seeking quick decisive victories in limited wars is delusional, the enemy can simply fail to accept the verdict you want taken as decisive and continue the war.

"If these wars was a matter of attrition then Vietnam would have been a triumph for Americans."

Militarily it was. Nam was lost in the watergate building, not the rice paddies. The political end state of ARVN backed by US air was quite sufficient militarily, as the 1972 easter offensive showed. Nor was it difficult even politically to continue that level of support, once the draft had been ended and ground forces withdrawn - Nixon won reelection in a landslide against the peace now candidate. But he also broke laws and got caught doing it. Those electing the 1974 congress to clean out his crooks were not thinking of Nam which seemed over, but that congress freely chose to prevent air support to the ARVN in the 1975 offensive. Which, in case everybody forgot, was a typical armor heavy annihilation battle attack, not limited or guerilla anything.

"They had to inititate an offensive of operational proportions to acheive the stalemate"

Against the NK forces this is true, expect it didn't achieve statemate is won. Against the Chinese it is much less true. There was some tactical counterpunching in 1951, but after that no operational offensive of any scope. The UN forces defended and bled the Chinese to the tune of a million men, and the Chinese called it a day. Gee, they didn't think "since we have the initiative, we are sure to break through and win decisively on the next attack or the one after", did they? Because against enough heavy HE firepower on the limited space of the Korean penisula, they never, ever would have.

"Now i am going to ask for the numbers that can back up your opinion."

German losses in the east through the end of November 1944 are given by feldgrau from German records at 1.4 million KIA and just under 1 million MIA, plus WIA of just under 3.5 million. Glantz gives a high estimate for the remainder of the war of 2 million additional German losses total, 67% of them in the east, which would bump that to 7.2 million total, roughly 40% the worse than wounded categories.

It is incidentally untrue that all causalties are lost to their military in a long war. Wounded are not, with a portion of lightly wounded returned to service within the month and a larger portion after 3-6 months. Of Germany's whole war total of wounded on all fronts, 1.6 million were considered permanently disabled after the war, less than half the total. But since wounded make up similar portions of the major combatants, this isn't all that important for comparative purposes; it matters more for understanding the total scale of losses the nations were able to withstand.

Russian military losses are conservatively given by official figures as 8.7 million killed and 4 million more PW but returned after the war. Military wounded were 14.7 million, of whom 2.6 million were permanently disabled. At least another half a million died fighting as partisans, and some estimates put unrecorded military losses as high as 2 million (including e.g. draftees of 1941 who were surrounded before they made it onto the official strength lists and the like). Estimates of Russian civilian deaths from all causes start at 14 million and go higher, so these are believable portions for such categories. Ignoring the add ons, we have 27.4 million Russian casualties vs. 7.2 million German ones, or about a 4 to 1 ratio.

Glantz gives estimates of Russian military casualties as high as 35 million, hence the possible 5 in my range. On the other hand, if axis minor losses are added to German ones, the denominator might reach as high as 9.1 million and yield my 3 times figure. Non battle military deaths (accidents, disease, etc) are estimated at around 550,000 for both Germany and Russia, though, which would slightly boost the ratio for battle causalties.

As for my point that even when the Russians won overwhelmingly and were fighting only German infantry formations they still took higher losses, it is readily illustrated by the two cases of Bagration and Prague-Berlin. Bagration was the Russian operational masterpiece and a military success of the first order. They destroyed 30 German divisions and took White Russia etc. But they also managed to sustain 765,000 casualties doing it, against figures for the German side that start at 300-400,000 "permanent military losses" and go as high as 625,000 counting wounded, non-battle, etc. But in no case reach the Russian figure.

Similarly, the Germans lost 2000 AFVs in Bagration, but the Russians lost 2800. This counts as about the most successful Russian operation of the war because it got within a factor of 1.5 on the loss exchange ratio - but it did not pass unity.

As for Prague-Berlin, this refers to the two major Russian operations of the last 3 weeks of the war, from 16 April to 7 May, against those capitals. The Russians sustained losses in just those 3 weeks of 93,000 dead and 414,000 wounded. (About what the US lost in Korean and Vietnam combined). Under about the most favorable possible conditions of odds and strategic situation. Of course nobody knows exact German losses for the same period, and if prisoners giving up are counted who knows, maybe it approaches unity. But the period is 3/400ths of the war, so a typical German loss rate for a comparable period would be 50,000 men. Any way you slice that, the Russians spent men in the best conditions far faster than the Germans did.

As for AFVs in the east, I estimate it at 40,000, mostly just by estimating AFVs elsewhere over the whole war and taking them out of the German total available. Russian tank losses I know are over 100,000, since their production was 102,500 and the fleet expanded, net, by only the amount they received lend lease (confirmed by year by year Russian AFV loss figures, which run 20000 and up). So the AFV exchange ratio ran about 2.5 to 1, to 3 to 1 at the highest - less than the manpower ratio but far above unity. It also means if the rate held and the Germans got the extra 20000 tanks faster mobilization could readily have given them, the Russians would have needed 50000 more, or would have run out first.

As for loss timing, the German losses look pretty much like a line, with occasional small bumps for major battles, and shallower slopes before and after during build up periods. Only summer of 1944 is a significant one-time "step up" along that line. Russian losses are higher in 1941, particularly PWs (up to 3 million that year, in a "year" only 6 months long - some of which turn into killed in capitivity). Russian tank losses aren't, particularly - they rapidly lose the prewar fleet, but then there isn't as much to lose from, and they finish the year with their smallest fleet (7k, the size the Germans' at its largest pretty much). But there is no question the ratio remains not only above unity, but above 2, for the rest of the war.

As Dunn has pointed out, in fact, the Russians were able to sustain their late war offensives only by drafting men from the liberated territories to replace the losses sustained taking back each province. These replaced approximately half their combat losses in major operations. Return of wounded also helped. Without those they would have flat run out of men, and as it was Russia lost more of her population than any major combatant (not country, though - both Poland and Yugoslavia lost a higher portion, most of them civilians to harsh occupation policies etc).

"I thought you were saying that germans did not feel the need for full mobilization of economy till it was too late (which i accept)."

Correct.

"Now you are saying that they produced lower quality stuff throughout the war to use all available productive capacity."

Correct, they retained all lines rather than focusing on just high quality items. They did little to expand those lines early, and ran more through them late. I pointed it out to refute the notion that they conciously picked quality over quantity from the begining. They weren't trying to stop the Stalingrad counterattack in Pz 38 ts because of their excessive devotion to quality. They just didn't ramp any of them really. Then they ramped them all. The last few lines (V and VI chassis models) made the highest tech, latest stuff, certainly. But they never superceded the older lines, or even matched them.

And by lower quality stuff, I was not comparing Pz 38 ts to T-70s, but to Pz IIIs and IVs. The point being made was about German production practices, not a cross country comparison. They did not achieve quality at the expense of numbers by throwing away the lighter lines and devoting themselves exclusively to Panther and Tiger production. They achieved low numbers by not turning any of the lines to the full "on" position for a year and a half.

"these high standards could not be maintained if they had to employ a much larger army"

Sorry, that predicts that the early war formations and the late ones that had all their first pick of recruits would continually rock, and the later infantry formations would all suck. While equipment mix may further that impression, it is not in fact observed. Instead many an infantry division formed in 1944 gives an excellent account of itself.

It is true that training time helps materially. The way you get training time is you draft the men 6 months before you throw them into combat instead of 6 minutes. It is also true that cadres help significantly. The way you get cadres is you pull formations off the line using depth and relief practices. When that threatens wholesale collapse, though, you leave them in the line to be burnt to cinders. Pound foolish. Nor have prewar anythings, anything to do with it - all the NCOs that count are made in action, and Germany got them by the boatload. (She even had plenty of NCOs for 2nd line division who were WW I veterans). Nor is the comparison to professional vs. drafted armies on point - Germany was of course entirely draft based, with huge reserve classes prewar.

"As to the German population it is 69 million within the 1937 borders."

Yeah well, the war with Russia started in 1941 and German had access to just a little more terrritory by then, and she drafted men out of that territory, too.

"They had to be strict in allocating oil to their units"

After the allied bombers smashed the synthetic plants and the Russians seized Rumanian, grounding the Luftwaffe, and freeing both the bombers and tac air to go after the rest of the oil and transport target sets, sure. But before then, no, not in any serious sense. The Luftwaffe is keeping thousands of fighter aloft every day over Germany, and over the front, and all the mobile divisions are galavanting around the map to maneuverist's lasting delight. Germany was not out of oil and wasn't going to run out of oil, unless and until such events took away her own production.

"You do not address the argument of their situation if they had to produce and sustain a much larger fleet"

Of course I did, I pointed out they ran 50 mobile division at the end and twice the tanks they attacked Russia with, even without ramping synthetic oil capacity. And that they could have, and should have, so ramped said capacity, had they planned on a long war. I also along the war showed how being better prepared for the attritionist war that actually happened, would have made it materially more likely for them to lastingly solve their oil problem inside Russia. Baku stuff could have been coming west by mid to late 1943, if there had been 5000 extra tanks for southern Russia by 1942.

"I asked You to give me such cases during wwii where you could annihilate the enemy army by simply defending without seizing inititative"

Oh OK, I guess I missed that then. Mars. Next argument please.

"If you do not beleive that statement is that you are not familiar with the debate in proffessional community i am talking about."

On the contrary, I am familiar with it and I take part in it, did in the past and still do. What I deny is that you speak for attritionists in that debate, or are qualified to select their arguments as having or not having merit. And I deny that the arguments I supply for the attritionist side of that debate, are in any way inferior to or less than, any other arguments anyone else has ever advanced on the attritionist side of that debate. (Equal to, sure). If you are confronted with an attritionist who denies your favorite dictum that "the offensive is the only decisive form of warfare" as a piece of dangerous nonsense, you really can't pretend no attritionists deny your favorite dictum and call it an argument. The man in front of you refutes the claim by his very existence.

"You,like me are just amateurs that love to read about such stuff"

Speak for yourself.

"I would like you to give me sources"

The defensive is the stronger form of combat.

Firepower kills.

Ring any bells?

"In fact French infantry regulations of 1929 state"

The French of 1914 are the ones most guilty of the whole thing. I call them the boys in blue pants. Historians call them the GrandMaison school, and refer to the issue as "the cult of the offensive". They were given their head in WW I, and wrecked everything they touched. Some people learned from it, and some people didn't. Some of those who didn't and want to believe that the initiative is more important than attrition, try to pretend WW II - or selected parts of it plus fantasies, more like - invalidate those lessons. But they are wrong - attrition decided WW II as well, and most since. (You can count the exceptions on one hand). All that is left to them is the sophism, since eventually the loser defends, attacking wins. What actually wins are the bigger battalions.

"Neither Rommel nor Germans in France could count on prevailing against Allies through attrition"

If you can't count on prevailing through attrition, then you can't count on prevailing, because nothing else actually does. The issue, of course, is how to conduct attrition best, and one does not know until one exerts oneself to the limits of one's powers, just what those limits are. If they are one to one then counting noses can tell you something about what attrition can do. If they are 2 to 1 - as they were for the Germans in WW I and in Russia - then you have to count noses rather more carefully. And if they are 10 or 20 to 1, as they were for the US in its Pacific wars last century, for example, then you can do rather a lot with attrition.

"Inittiative and surprise was their only hope and threy actually made it happen often against superior numbers."

No, they really didn't. You can't point to a war they won that way, unless you want to count beating up minors they could have smashed with attrition. Brief single operations, sure. Those just don't settle anything against first rate powers. Attrition does.

As for the supposedly inferior numbers and superior quality of the Axis in Africa, I have one word to say to both - Italians. The Axis in north Africa was not appreciably outnumbered by the British, before the US showed up to help. The closest they got to being so was when they stuck themselves at the end of excessively long supply lines at El Alamein. Which was real maneuveree - sitting opposite giant mine barriers for months at a time waiting for the trucks to bring up enough bullets and beans. And for quality, DAK might claim that, but the Axis as a whole?

"there was no hope for Rommel to count on anything else other than qualitative advantage."

Actually, there was British lack of skill at combined arms and use of armor, the limited armament of their tanks, his own men's thorough understanding of gun fronts, 88 Flak, a deep park of perfectly effective Italian artillery, equal infantry manpower, etc. His main drawback was insufficient port capacity and naval thruput. Transport links, not attention of the dictator (why should he give it attention? It was a sideshow in a backwater from start to finish) determined the size of forces that could be used.

"The deep advances were not of course aimining to capture ground."

Ha, I say. I claim the cult of the offensive thinly hides a deep seated focus on mere ground control. I see it in the claim that retreat is difficult and dangerous, I see it in the claim that only the offensive is decisive, I see it in the mindless hold at all cost orders coming from the same set of martinets, I see it in the death rides to glory, I see it is talk of not wishing to pay for the same real estate twice, I see it in assessments of giant battles that wipe out half a million enemy troops called "pointless" and "indecisive" because the net change of ground is measured in miles not hundreds of miles, I see it in the claim that WW II "restored movement" and thus ended attrition, when actually there is nothing incompatible about them and it was decided by attrition.

I claim that in his heart of hearts, the maneuverist thinks he can win the war by scoring a touchdown by getting into the enemy backfield and running him out of room, without having to fight all those scary guys with guns up at the front line. And I think that is an understandable wish, certainly, but it isn't true, and that the attempt is frequently unsound. As in big push, win the war today, over the top, unsound.

"There is no such thing as proffesional comanders that do not do mistakes or wrong judgments."

There is such a thing as an entire school of thought that continually makes the same mistake and shows the same wrong judgment, that ignores evident considerations readily apparent to other professionals, who point it out to them at length. And there is such a thing as ideologues of such schools who resist instruction and correction, simply to avoid the imputation of error, or having to learn another set of methods on top of those they know.

"You have a strange definition of complete military victory."

Don't see why - when the enemy army comes apart in the field, and your own can go anywhere it likes and take whatever it pleases, and the enemy gets out of your way, and his politicians come to you begging for peace, and let you dictate terms, and keep stuff you grabbed, and take reparations, I call that a complete military victory. Germany completely defeated Russia in WW I. It occupied most of the Ukraine, shipped out freight yards of grain, kept whatever it wanted with a handful of forces while sending the bulk of its armies west, and was given whatever it asked for at the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

"Maybe if Germans were trying to push farther deep into Moscow"

"An advance on Moscow takes us nowhere" - Falkenhayn. He planned attrition, he got it, it worked. Deal with it. As for what finally made the Russians come apart and rebel, it was the failure of the Kerensky offensive.

"visualize about the proficiency of Red army officers if Soviets had additional time"

Who is giving them any additional time? I am planning mobilization in December 1940, and executing it at the end of June 1941, the day of the invasion. Also, I am visualizing the fearsome peacetime frackups and party crackkissers and what they managed to do with a glorious mech arm with 20,000 tanks, and I have my doubts about what 6 more months of let's pretend military maneuvers would have gained them. If you had said, more T-34s in the field, that might be at least a minor real consideration. What improved the Russian army of WW II was the fires of war, and the realism it forced on the Soviet system. Plus the extra motivation of knowing you are fighting for your life in a holy cause.

"Are you going to claim now that this period of time gave more advantages for Germans for initiating a counterattack ?"

No, to hold. The Allied punches get weaker away from the beach due to logistical difficulties. It is also easier to defend giving ground than trying to keep everything (on which more below). It is also easier to defend if most of your infantry artillery and service stuff gets away, than if it gets outrun east or shot to rags. How does this benefit them? Simple, they get men out of Normandy, they get men out of Biscay, they get men out of the south of France, that they don't get to keep if they try something stupid like Mortain. Then they get replacements and reinforcements as the allies sort out their supply difficulties. All of which means more tanks etc can be sent east to deal with Bagration etc.

(This one isn't a real quote but a rhetorical point) "But this doesn't win them the war in an afternoon". Gee, neither did Mortain. But it did throw away all of the above advantages, which actually were readily available if they had used their armor more sensibly.

"Are you familiar with the Soviet operational research?"

Certainly. I am also familiar with their general staff studies of what actually happened in their WW II operations, and of Glantz's studies of the ones they don't like to talk about, and with the op and planning orders and memoranda that he prints full in his books. And I see the op orders planning on such rates of advance all the time, and I see the actually operations failing to achieve them, all of the time. And instead becoming running brawls with the defender's reserves. Occasionally they do get such breakthrough rates of advance - but not with intact defenders in front of them.

"a number of rate of advance against an "intact defender"

Yes, exactly. Advances with an intact defender ahead of the attack are slow, sometimes only a couple of miles a day, sometimes five miles a day. Not 30 or 50 miles a day.

"on the other hand you talk about a force that does not stand forward too rigidly."

No "on the other hand" about it, the way to have an intact force remaining in front of an attack is to not stand forward too rigidly. And the way to be broken through inside 48 hours, after which the attacker can indeed get 30 to 50 mile per day rates of unopposed advance, is to "hold at all costs" all up, online.

Apparently defensive theory is so poorly taught that this obvious fact is counterintuitive. Perhaps the ground control subtext is coming out again, too, and the always attack belief is going hand in hand with an idea about defense that emphasizes not giving up an inch. After all, not giving up an inch holds the promise that soon the line may move the other way. While everyone knows if the line is moving toward you, gosh, you are just doomed. Not.

Why does it work this way? Well, attackers seek breakthrough by concentration at chosen points. In other areas they are screening or conducting holding attacks, only. A defender dead set on holding all ground will see all the places those are defeated as great triumphs, and wish to retain them. To retain them he will leave many forces opposite the thin attack areas, and thus retain most of his initial line. This counts as "standing too far forward too rigidily".

Then, act the second, at one or two of his points of chosen concentration, the attacker gets some sort of force past the defenders in that areas, annihilating some and simply driving past others on either flank - because those are "standing too far forward too rigidly". This sets off act the third, whose logic is parallel pursuit. That is the Russian term for the race for the defender's rear that commences as soon as any force it through the defender's tactical zone. Which will be lost by default if the defenders are "standing too far forward too rigidly".

At this point, act the fourth, the ground loving defender, unwilling to relinquish his precious ground holding victories at all of the points the attacker didn't bother to hit him anyway, tries to retrieve the situation in the one or two other embarrasing areas, by "seizing the initiative" (in his own mind - actually, gambling in denial). He scrapes together what he can and tries to cut off the penetrations from their flanks, feeling all maneuveree and clever that he isn't just fighting them head on. But the attackers have all their depth behind the break-ins by now, and the result is a brawl between the defenders' only reserves and the attackers 2nd or 3rd echelon, while his 1st or 1st and 2nd combined, keep playing parallel pursuit.

Leading to act the fifth, in which the defender realizes that all his oh so gloriously holding forces "standing too far forward too rigidly", and his death ride gamble reserves, are about 50 miles closer to the enemy army than the enemy lead elements are. They start to wonder whether bullets grow on trees. And the attackers commence fanning out behind them, dropping layer after layer of *tactically defensive* blocking positions between the defenders "standing too far forward too rigidly", and his supplies and reinforcements etc. Then the defenders become attackers in glorious possession of the initiative, and get shot to rags trying to get out of the pocket.

Not the way to defend. The way to defend is, screen where he screens and mass where he masses. Flock to the heavy points. Give ground where not too pressed, just to save forces. Ignore ground control, focus entirely on losses, preserving your force and attriting the attackers. Everybody backpeddles to stay tolerably on line. A little channeling to lead the attacker to a point of your choosing, reserves flock there from three sides, strongest right in front of his chosen direction. Abatis and mines and blown bridges delaying everywhere. The idea is to fight only his forward echelon with your entire reserve, then back up and do it again. Sure, take a few cheap shots at the screeners and holding attacks, but as soon as they let up, skedaddle back to the main event.

The whole idea is to keep a force in being *in front of* the attackers. Not *behind* them. You may think you are getting clever and initiative-ee, all you are really doing is making it easier for him to surround more of your people, and to get those unopposed 30-50 mile rates, and win his parallel pursuit to your rear.

When there is a force in being ahead of the attack, the attackers find every defile registered for artillery, or mined. They find every bridge blown, half the roads blocked by abatis or hasty mines, screening forces on every particle of the road net, and they never know which will have a serious ambush force backing it up. To deal with all that, he has to deploy. He has to get out of column, off the road. He has to send infantry ahead to scout, or conduct several iterations of recon escalation over several roadblocks and then pick one to hit. All of which keep him from getting as many miles a day as he would, with nobody left in front of him. Which will be the predictable consequence of trying to hold too rigidly everywhere.

"You also can not prepare elaborate defences and minefields during piecetime"

How about peacetime (joke). Don't need 'em. Registered arty, arty delivered bomblet mines, blown bridges, blown trees, etc. The maneuver elements are doing ambush and fall back drills, which they should know how to do in their sleep. (All the ACRs did).

"The covering force for example can not be too far away from the main forces"

How about if I don't have any main forces, just a sea of covering force skirmishers layer after layer deep? The role of the main forces, such as they are, is to feed the skirmish line. And maneuver behind it, to be sure, but first and foremost just to feed it, keeping up the fire whatever the attacker does. If or when you have a heavy point drawn far enough into your defense, and without trying to hold any ground in the matter, you can get a sizable group around it, kill sack fashion, great. If it is too strong, don't bother trying, just screen it, fall back, and call down hell from the skies. The tighter he keeps his fists, the more damage the firepower arms do to him with each shot, and the more the obstacles and terrain delays gum up and waste his combat power and time. If there is no decision, fine there is no decision. You don't have to win the war today. Just shoot wisely and stay alive.

"You certainly can not expect to move large units envisioning some type of shoot and scoot actions."

Every brigade sized force should be fully trained in the shoot and scoot practices of the ACRs. As surely as they need to know how to clean their own rifles, as an absolutely elementary necessity of combat. A force that does not know how to fight on the defensive, confidently and doctrinally, not as something shunned or frowned upon but as a core competence, is a force hopping on one leg and a cripple. And sound defense in modern times is not static, it is fluid - and it is attritionist.

[JasonC]

Oh and on the politics point. NATO existed to defend Europe and win a war agains the Warsaw Pact, should the latter choose to start one. If that could be done by deterrence great. If it could be done by threats of escalation and politics, great. If it could be done by sharp limited actions at the border because the Russians got cold feet, great. None of those things were to be expected.

What was to be expected was an all out, not a limited attack, deterrence having failed, and escalation being avoided. This was to be expected because it was the case that mattered, not necessarily as the most likely etc.

And in that case, what was needed was a way of winning the war conventionally. Not a way of holding every scrap of ground. There wasn't a way of holding every scrap of ground, and certainly not with the standing armies the western democracies were willing to fund and stand up in peacetime (for political even more than economic reasons).

If the Russians took Germany, the Germans would fight on. De Gaulle did. The Poles did. The Poles had an armored division and an airborne brigade in the west in 1944, and others in Italy. The French fielded a quarter of a million men before D-Day and more than twice that by the end, once metropolitan France was regained. But if they don't, if they sold the existing force reasonably dear, they'd have done their bit. The US and the rest of the west would do the rest, and in the end Germany would be free again.

If the war remained conventional, in the long run the US would win it. It led a bloc with 10 times the economic potential of the Warsaw Pact, better tech, and a vastly larger population. Even if portions of the last were subjugated, it would not change the ultimate outcome. Only nukes might, really. Which is probably why it didn't need to be tested, in the event.

The US high card, in other words, was its old standby - its eventual strength in an attrition war. As long as it relies on that, the US will only lose wars it doesn't care much about - though it will certainly lose those whenever it feels like it.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

bitchen frizzy,

the fundamental German error was that they didn't realize that, unlike Nazi Germany, USSR was a full blown 100% mature totalitarian state. they thought USSR was fragile and ineffective, while in reality USSR was very united and had great capacity for extremely drastic actions previously unseen in history.

Germans had been spying on USSR for a decade, collecting statistics on economics, infrastructure, military production and so forth. the problem is that USSR was extremely hard nut to crack intelligence-wise, as was seen still decades later during Cold War. Germans didn't lack good intelligence on USSR because they wouldn't have tried, they lacked it because they couldn't penetrate USSR. their signals intelligence and air recon could penetrate only couple hundred kilometers into USSR and almost all of their agents were Soviet double agents (of course Germans didn't know this). on some parts, like for Soviet basic infrastructure (e.g. roads, railroads), they overestimated things, for some others they underestimated. there is little the Germans could have done better what comes to some of the most crucial stuff, like for example they estimated that some 10% of Soviet industry was located at Urals, while in reality it was up to 40%. other single crucial thing was that while Germans estimated that Soviets had some 12 million man reserves, they estimated that Soviets couldn't mobilize them effectively (due to corrupt nature of USSR, lack of properly trained officers, insufficent armament, command & logistical shockwave caused by the invasion etc). finally, they estimated that the great majority of Soviet forces (estimated 5-6 million strong) were located on the European side of USSR, within some hundreds of kilometers of the border. the effectiveness of these forces they estimated low, due to the lack of trained officers and Red Army's abyssmal performance against Poles and Finns.

the German plan was to destroy Red Army within the first 500 kilometers (remember that their intelligence data indicated that most of Red Army was by the western border). this would take up to five months, and in total they prepared for 12 months of war (yeah, they did have winter uniforms, they just didn't get them to troops soon enough due to logistical problems, but more about that later). they estimated they had full fuel supply for only up to three months of war, though fuel logistics would improve once they could ship fuel directly from Romania to conquered Soviet territory (yeah, fuel was a real problem for Germans, unlike some claim). for the invasion Germans almost doubled the number of fielded divisions.

once the operation got running the Germans naturally quite soon realized that their intelligence data was weak and incorrect, that Soviets had a lot more divisions than they had estimated, but they thought it didn't matter because of the gigantic losses they had caused to Red Army. they also noted that they were right about the state of Red Army (save that they had thought Soviets had only obsolote tanks and nothing equal to panzer divisions) and the superior quality of German forces. their intelligence data predicted that they had just destroyed most of Red Army and what was left were some scattered reserves fighting desperate delaying actions. all that would be needed was to push forward and destroy these last reserves. and then destroy yet these other last reserves. and yet other. Germans begun to doubt the general picture they had of Soviet strenght already in August, but it wasn't till the Soviet winter counteroffensives begun later in 1941 that Germans fully recognized that their intelligence was critically erroneus.

at that point their logistical situation had developed into a nightmare. the problem was not the number of produced locomotives, Germans had more locomotives than they needed or ever used during the whole war, the problem was that Soviet railway system was weaker and more different than they had estimated. basic construction was too weak for heavy locomotives, water stations were too far apart, Soviet locomotives used different fuel, Soviet train car size was too small and so forth. the real logistical bottleneck was the transition point between German and Soviet railway system, not lack of railway equipment as such. though it didn't help that Germans had no experience in using Soviet locomotives in extreme conditions of late 1941, with the result of blown locomotive engines. still the fundamental problem was that the German plan was to defeat Red Army (and paralyze Soviet military industry) within the first 500 kilometers - that is, in the range of the truck transportation fleet - and thus troops allocated for railroad activities were too small for the situation Germans faces later in 1941. Germans also overestimated the quality of Soviet roads and were shocked to find out that truck columns turned Soviet roads to muddy tracks in just a few days.

but enough of this, as by now we should have a clear disagreement about Barbarossa.

[Guest Mike]

I recall reading somewhere that in later battles in the Penninsular war (1808-1812) Wellington fielded so many skirmishers against attacking French columns that on at least one occasion they were surprised to find formed troops behind them - they thought they had already broken through the main lines.

Plus ça change and all that.

[bitchen frizzy]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

but enough of this, as by now we should have a clear disagreement about Barbarossa.

Yes, I suppose we will have to disagree. I don't disagree with the facts you've marshalled concerning the difficulties of Barbarossa. I disagree with your conclusion, which boils down to your assertion that there was nothing the Germans could have done better in preparing and executing Barbarossa, and all problems were circumstances beyond their control. You start by conceding that Germany thoroughly underestimated the Soviet Union, you argue my point that their intelligence services were bungling and ineffective, and you list shortcomings in their logistics but try to claim that these were insurmountable. For instance, you point out that they had three months of fuel for an offensive they estimated would take at least five months and decided to attack anyway, but you draw none of the obvious conclusions from that - overconfidence? inadequate fuel production and stocks? refusal at the highest levels to acknowlege glaring deficiencies?.

Then you turn around and argue that Germany could not have done anything better. :confused:

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by bitchen frizzy:

I disagree with your conclusion, which boils down to your assertion that there was nothing the Germans could have done better in preparing and executing Barbarossa, and all problems were circumstances beyond their control.

Germans could have done things better, and they certainly were very optimistic and confident, made errors and screwed up, but their decisions were based on normal reasoning rather than extraordinary insane delusions.

You start by conceding that Germany thoroughly underestimated the Soviet Union, you argue my point that their intelligence services were bungling and ineffective, and you list shortcomings in their logistics but try to claim that these were insurmountable.

logistical shortcomings were largely a result of weakness in strategical intelligence. if Germans don't get better intelligence data they are doomed to have logistical shortcomings. it was hard to get good intelligence data about USSR still decades later when there were satellites etc.

For instance, you point out that they had three months of fuel for an offensive they estimated would take at least five months and decided to attack anyway, but you draw none of the obvious conclusions from that - overconfidence? inadequate fuel production and stocks? refusal at the highest levels to acknowlege glaring deficiencies?.

on the contrary they were very aware of the situation. they estimated major operations would last UP TO five months, but would likely be over sooner than that, so they wouldn't need full fuel supply for all the units. they also expected to capture Soviet fuel dumps and fuel transportation would become more effecient once transportations could be done directly from Romania to USSR. in case of running out of fuel they would do what they did: leap frog units and run operations in sequence.

[Joachim]

Some people might think they drew an optimistic scenario, a pessimistic scenario and the expected scenario, but found themselves with only two scens in the end...

But whatever they did, their expected scen was too far towards the optimistic scen. If you put all at stake, you better pay your insurance fee (aka pay the cost for full mobilization of the industry).

Gruß

Joachim

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Joachim:

But whatever they did, their expected scen was too far towards the optimistic scen.

how?

If you put all at stake, you better pay your insurance fee (aka pay the cost for full mobilization of the industry).

yeah, those insane Nazis never fully mobilized their industry. they should have done that at least in 1942 once they got data that USSR was not about to collapse. oh wait...

[Joachim]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Joachim:

But whatever they did, their expected scen was too far towards the optimistic scen.

how?

</font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:yeah, those insane Nazis never fully mobilized their industry. they should have done that at least in 1942 once they got data that USSR was not about to collapse. oh wait... [/QB]

Err, they still lost, or are you living on a planet where that is not true? So obviously 1942 was not good enough.

So maybe they should have mobilised their industry in 1940, or even better in 1939?

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

Since URC is actually arguing with me - continuing a past discussion long after its shelf date - to the slight incomprehension of third parties - I will explain his specific thesis as I understand it.

He thinks Germany was mistaken not to mobilize for war but that it was a rational decision given the limited information available to her at the time, and that the clear need to fully mobilize before attacking the USSR is only clear in 20 20 hindsight, and was not at the time. The specific thesis this is intended to dispute, is my own, that it was reckless to make the attack without mobilizing the economy, and could readily be seen to be reckless at the time.

I understand the contention but I do not agree with it. I think maneuverist inspired overconfidence is a standing inducement to such mistaken assessments, and a strategic doctrine that great power wars are almost always affairs of attrition is quite sufficient to avoid such errors. And I consider that bit of doctrine entirely obvious from all of history, and something that can be expected of any military professional.

Men think they are being inspired and are geniuses when they go against such history and the professional, consensus lessons it teaches. They think they are avoiding the dinosaur-ish stick in the mud stupidity of hindbound narrow minded blockheads fixated on the last war. They think their newfound methods and audacity will sweep all historical lessons into the dustbin and let them write their own version "military law" or doctrine.

And they are predictably wrong.

(Rumsfeld, call your office. No wait, it isn't your office anymore...)

[coe]

hold on a second, isn't maneuverism the same thing as attrition. You are supposed to destroy the other side's capability to resist...

You can maneuver and cut off large forces which get "destroyed" due to lack of supplies, or you can go to some place the enemy wants and sit there build defenses and let the enemy come, or you can somehow destroy the logistical or command part of the enemy so that the enemy is confused and can't resist. Either way you are also attritioning in some way the resistance capabilities - in some methods are done slightly incrementally, some are done in larger leaps. Depends on how you look at it, encircling one division and destroying it can be a maneuver, but doing that same thing repeatedly can be seen as attrition?

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Since URC is actually arguing with me - continuing a past discussion long after its shelf date - to the slight incomprehension of third parties - I will explain his specific thesis as I understand it.

He thinks Germany was mistaken not to mobilize for war but that it was a rational decision given the limited information available to her at the time, and that the clear need to fully mobilize before attacking the USSR is only clear in 20 20 hindsight, and was not at the time. The specific thesis this is intended to dispute, is my own, that it was reckless to make the attack without mobilizing the economy, and could readily be seen to be reckless at the time.

I understand the contention but I do not agree with it. I think maneuverist inspired overconfidence is a standing inducement to such mistaken assessments, and a strategic doctrine that great power wars are almost always affairs of attrition is quite sufficient to avoid such errors. And I consider that bit of doctrine entirely obvious from all of history, and something that can be expected of any military professional.

Men think they are being inspired and are geniuses when they go against such history and the professional, consensus lessons it teaches. They think they are avoiding the dinosaur-ish stick in the mud stupidity of hindbound narrow minded blockheads fixated on the last war. They think their newfound methods and audacity will sweep all historical lessons into the dustbin and let them write their own version "military law" or doctrine.

And they are predictably wrong.

(Rumsfeld, call your office. No wait, it isn't your office anymore...)

Does the remark (paraphrasing) "We have to only kick down the front door and the whole edifice will come crashing down" ring a bell ? That pretty well sums up the German take on both the mobilization and projected enemy ability to resist issues. It was not manouverism that was the undoing of the Germans, it was the poor account the Red Army gave of itself during Winter War which accelerated the German plans beyond their (then) present industrial gearing. They did not plan to invade USSR until somewhere in the mid 40's until the Red Army show of force made them rethink their strategy of not going to war on two fronts.

[JasonC]

coe - no maneuver is not the same thing as attrition, and the fact that either may make use of defeating particular bits of the enemy army is not sufficient to make them so. Any more than you are your mother because you both have noses.

[coe]

ok I'm open ears to the distinction that is beyond the noses - is the distinction based on one physically destroys enemy stuff and the other forces the enemy to surrender (lack of supplies etc.) or is it attrition is more positional? Guesses here on my part.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tero:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JasonC:

Since URC is actually arguing with me - continuing a past discussion long after its shelf date - to the slight incomprehension of third parties - I will explain his specific thesis as I understand it.

He thinks Germany was mistaken not to mobilize for war but that it was a rational decision given the limited information available to her at the time, and that the clear need to fully mobilize before attacking the USSR is only clear in 20 20 hindsight, and was not at the time. The specific thesis this is intended to dispute, is my own, that it was reckless to make the attack without mobilizing the economy, and could readily be seen to be reckless at the time.

I understand the contention but I do not agree with it. I think maneuverist inspired overconfidence is a standing inducement to such mistaken assessments, and a strategic doctrine that great power wars are almost always affairs of attrition is quite sufficient to avoid such errors. And I consider that bit of doctrine entirely obvious from all of history, and something that can be expected of any military professional.

Men think they are being inspired and are geniuses when they go against such history and the professional, consensus lessons it teaches. They think they are avoiding the dinosaur-ish stick in the mud stupidity of hindbound narrow minded blockheads fixated on the last war. They think their newfound methods and audacity will sweep all historical lessons into the dustbin and let them write their own version "military law" or doctrine.

And they are predictably wrong.

(Rumsfeld, call your office. No wait, it isn't your office anymore...)

Does the remark (paraphrasing) "We have to only kick down the front door and the whole edifice will come crashing down" ring a bell ? That pretty well sums up the German take on both the mobilization and projected enemy ability to resist issues. It was not manouverism that was the undoing of the Germans, it was the poor account the Red Army gave of itself during Winter War which accelerated the German plans beyond their (then) present industrial gearing. They did not plan to invade USSR until somewhere in the mid 40's until the Red Army show of force made them rethink their strategy of not going to war on two fronts. </font>

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

It's still execrable planning, which is the point everyone is making.

Agreed. The fact still remains though that the plans were drawn based on data at hand.

Before Winter War the facts on the Red Army were: 20 000-odd tanks, millions upon millions of troops, huge airforce, advanced tactics and doctrine (deep penetration as rehearsed with the Germans) etc. Based on that the Germans plans did not call for a confrontation with the Soviets before 1943 (IIRC).

After the Winter War the facts were: 20 000-odd tanks all defeatable by the 37mm gun or otherwise totally devoid of combat value due to lack of mobility, huge airforce of dubious combat value, WWI era tactics and doctrine, millions upon millions of dismally and mechanically led troops. That change in the projected abilities of the enemy was the basis the entire idea behind Barbarossa rested. I think there was no command level German officer or political leader who dreamed of war on two fronts before the Red Army showed its abilities against the Finns during Winter War.

The Übergermans got it flat out wrong, and not only that, they had themselves convinced by their erroneous assumptions to a degree that they did not even conduct worst-case planning in case they were wrong. That is a separate, inexcusable mistake.

IMO that particular error was not separate. It was compounded in the entire train of thought in the minds of the German planners.

The Eurpean armies were push-overs. The Red Army was perceived to have been proven to be a paper tiger. What could possibly be the worst case scenario when all the calculations and formulas had already been proven to work, to be accurate and based on valid data ? The war in the West was stagnating and the UK/CW was gearing up and getting an influx of resourced from the Americans. With the Red Army being that weak and guarding huge resourced what was the next logical step but to attack east and beat the enemy there before the West got stronger. With the Eastern resources the American help did not matter, the British were doomed.

Anyone not agreeing should easily be able to apply for and get the contract to write Rumsfeld's authorised biography.

I think everybody is in agreement with the basics. It is only the motivation and reasoning behind the faulty planning that is being debated.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tero:

IMO that particular error was not separate. It was compounded in the entire train of thought in the minds of the German planners.

I see it as separate, but not disconnected.

Error 1: The Red Army is a giant with clay feet. It will be defeated in the border battles, and then we rail our troops to the Urals, as we did in 1918. Here is our Plan A to do so.

Error 2: Nobody asked for a Plan B.

Both errors were required to cock it up as badly as they did.

All the best

Andreas

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I see it as separate, but not disconnected.

A matter of taste really.

Both errors were required to cock it up as badly as they did.

Totally agreed.

The URC vs JasonC debate is based on the disareement about what caused these two fatal errors to cohabit the same master plan.

IMO URC is more correct because it was not manouverism which inspired the overconfidence. The overconfidence was based IMO on reliance on "scientific and methodolical" calculation and projections. The parameters for these were in turn set down by politicians with little or no heed to long term strategic planning.

All was based on the assumption the war would be swift and victorious. With each glorious victory there was no need for long term worst case scenario planning because the battles had been won easily in the tactical level and totally in the political level (and this is where I think Jason loses as he totally discounts the political aspect). The victories were won with minimal resources to boot so Barbarossa planning was only about the extent of the preparations, not the outcome which was a given from the outset.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

my argument is not that it was reasonable for Germany not to mobilize before 1942. on the contrary i argue that Nazi Germany planned for lengthy total war (of attrition) right from the beginning in early 1930ies and had fully mobilized their industry for total war already by 1942.

the reason why their industrial output was greater in 1944 than in 1941 was not because the level of mobilization would have been greater in 1944, but because it was managed more efficient in 1944.

the reasons for this are of course several but boil down to few big ones. first, WW2 developed to full large scale war sooner than the Germans expected / wanted and thus much of German industrial production went for the built-up of core industry still during the early part of WW2: Germans foresaw that WW2 would be long total war of unseen proportions and much of their early industrial production was in "depth" (industrial capacity) rather than "width" (produced armament). much of their industrial capacity never got to be fully utilized in production - they got caught in middle of transition. second, due to political realities and too much emphasis on lessons of WW1 German industrial production was not as effective as it could have been: double bureacracy and military meddling in industry led to inefficiencies. this was largely fixed by the rationalization program launched in early 1942. third, Germans had great problems in motivating the public for the total war mindset, as the public (unlike the military leadership) were amazed by the early easy victories and believed in quick peace.

there are great many myths regarding German industrial mobilization, like full mobilization only in 1944 or 1942 or that Germans wouldn't have used women in industry (where as in reality in % used them more than for example UK) or that they would have believed it was better to have less high-quality armament than more medium-quality armament. many of these myths have been shown to be urban legends or statistical illusions by people like Overy who have specialized in Nazi economics.

now, to get back to the discussion regarding Barbarossa, Germans thought that in mid 1941 they had army as large as the armies of the allied combined. if someone is suggesting that they double their army for 1941 i expect to see some reasons why they should have thought they would have needed such an army and some proof that they could have done it. especially if it is claimed that Germans didn't do it just because they were delusional lunatics too lazy to try.

[ January 15, 2007, 02:27 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[undead reindeer cavalry]

i think my disagreement with JasonC is also based in different data. i don't think he is fully aware of studies made on German mobilization and planning. i was asking him to read Overy already in our earlier discussion he is talking about. i have access to database containing numerous military history journals and am quite tempted to post some Overy's earlier papers as PDFs, but doing so would of course be flat out criminal activity. in my honest opinion these modern studies show it beyond reasonable doubt that Germans did plan for long war of attrition and that they had full total war economy very early on.

in most points i totally agree with JasonC. in general, and i have pointed this out numerous times, i don't as much disagree with what he says but what he does not say. Germans certainly made great many errors and the emphasis on offence was often times in practice a weakness. still there were often "behind the scenes" reasons for these failures. for example the counterattack against Operation Cobra was in core a one man's decision to consciously launch a total failure of an operation just to prove his loyalty (which did not exist) to Hitler.

[Tero]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

in my honest opinion these modern studies show it beyond reasonable doubt that Germans did plan for long war of attrition and that they had full total war economy very early on.

That would tie in with coes depiction of attrition warfare (call it attrition-lite).

The conventional wisdom is the total war economy was postponed due to domestic political considerations. That does not rule out actually having a total war economy, the Germans just needed to keep the "business as usual" facade up longer than others.

From what I have read the German plans were drawn with the minimum of slack and overestimation or overengineering. The overkill was in a way built in their equipment designs, the actual plans were drawn with the economy of force in mind. When they succeeded they usually succeeded spectacularly and often over projected results. When they failed the failures were equally spectacular and over projected results.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Tero:

The conventional wisdom is the total war economy was postponed due to domestic political considerations. That does not rule out actually having a total war economy, the Germans just needed to keep the "business as usual" facade up longer than others.

that indeed is the conventional view, but a view that in my understanding has been shown to be false by the later studies on German economy. the so called "Blitzkrieg Economy" would be as much a myth as "Blitzkrieg War".

EDIT: Blitzkrieg Economy being economy that plans for series of short operations instead of long full scale war.

[ January 15, 2007, 03:52 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

now, to get back to the discussion regarding Barbarossa, Germans thought that in mid 1941 they had army as large as the armies of the allied combined. if someone is suggesting that they double their army for 1941 i expect to see some reasons why they should have thought they would have needed such an army and some proof that they could have done it. especially if it is claimed that Germans didn't do it just because they were delusional lunatics too lazy to try. [/QB]

You'll excuse me if I call you on that strawman. Doubling the army was not the issue, it would have been unsupportable in any event. Giving the army the means to sustainably conduct its type of warfare in all seasons in the east was. That means equipping far more divisions with all-terrain motorisation. That means investing more in the logistical support for the frontline troops, by e.g. providing more capacity for the railway re-building and road maintenance effort. It also means an upgrading of the main AT capability (by a wide margin 37mm guns), which had been shown to be outdated in France by the Char I. It meant providing sufficient replacement planes for the short-range recce effort of the squadrons attached to the armoured divisions.

All the best

Andreas