Guns vs Armour II

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Andreas:

You'll excuse me if I call you on that strawman. Doubling the army was not the issue, it would have been unsupportable in any event.

perhaps i am mistaken but i believe i saw talk about 5000 additional panzers.

Giving the army the means to sustainably conduct its type of warfare in all seasons in the east was. That means equipping far more divisions with all-terrain motorisation. That means investing more in the logistical support for the frontline troops, by e.g. providing more capacity for the railway re-building and road maintenance effort.

it's not hard for me to agree with that proposition, for that's what i have been arguing for from the beginning.

i don't know where Germans would have gotten all the equipment and personnel, though. fewer but more mobile divisions could be one solution, but then again that would only ramp up the logistical demands and of course it would mean MORE maneuver oriented force, not less.

the fundamental problem for the Germans is still their weak strategical intelligence. it's not very sensible to expect them to act contrary to their intelligence data.

It also means an upgrading of the main AT capability (by a wide margin 37mm guns), which had been shown to be outdated in France by the Char I.

that would be nice.

It meant providing sufficient replacement planes for the short-range recce effort of the squadrons attached to the armoured divisions.

i would rather invest in strategic recce, since German intelligence did well on divisional level.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

You'll excuse me if I call you on that strawman. Doubling the army was not the issue, it would have been unsupportable in any event.

perhaps i am mistaken but i believe i saw talk about 5000 additional panzers.</font>

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Andreas:

That is not equivalent to doubling the army.

true, just the number of panzers.

what's your estimate on how it would effect German army's ability to "sustainably conduct its type of warfare"?

They would get the trucks out of fully mobilised for war industrial plant.

one plant for trucks, one for panzers, one for artillery, one for ammo, one for synthetic fuel. one mine for ores, one for coal, one for oil. one city for workers, one for soldiers. fair enough.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry: </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

That is not equivalent to doubling the army.

true, just the number of panzers.

what's your estimate on how it would effect German army's ability to "sustainably conduct its type of warfare"?</font>

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Andreas:

That fundamentally depends on whether they are meant to be used in new units, or as a replacement/upgrade pool for formations already formed.

medium panzers with long guns and a logistical arm capable of supporting them? sounds great, and i am not being sarcastic.

Okay smart guy, what do you think is meant by 'full mobilisation'? Since it does not appear to include increased truck production and fuel stockpiling, what does it include?

historically speaking it included building long term industrial capacity. interestingly enough it seems that in order for Germans to be better prepared to handle USSR they would have needed to prepare for shorter war (greater early production) and emphasize quality and mobility.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

That fundamentally depends on whether they are meant to be used in new units, or as a replacement/upgrade pool for formations already formed.

medium panzers with long guns and a logistical arm capable of supporting them? sounds great, and i am not being sarcastic.</font>

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Andreas:

And that industrial capacity produces what exactly? Since trucks are not included?

in the end you can produce whatever you like. and sooner as well, if you get the restructuring working from the start of the mobilization. execute Göring or somefink and you get your trucks.

[coe]

question, if sitting on the defense through attrition is the way to win why is it even in prepared defenses that were well sited, etc. the Germans still lost more men than the Allies did when the Allies would attack?

[Sergei]

Originally posted by coe:

question, if sitting on the defense through attrition is the way to win why is it even in prepared defenses that were well sited, etc. the Germans still lost more men than the Allies did when the Allies would attack?

Because you don't attrite much by 'sitting' on the defense. A strong attacker can crush fixed defenses with low cost, while fleeing defenders then become vulnerable to artillery barrages and pursuing enemy - traditionally it is the pursue where most casualties are inflicted. Hence elastic defense measures were preferred (starting from WWI), but Germans tended to end up in situations where that wasn't possible (or allowed by Führer).

[JonS]

attrition =/= defence

[Joachim]

On economics:

Gearing up for total war economy means mass mobilization of workforce. Women were not included into the workforce early on. In 1944 they were.

If you can use women as workforce when producing "consumer" goods (here: tanks) why weren't they used when building "investments" (tank factories)?

So I still don't believe the economy was fully mobilized starting 1941 (or earlier)

On the attrition/maneuver debate:

You can achieve attrition by maneuver. Attrition wins a war. Maneuverism might win - if you achieve political attrition, i.e. take away the power base. Maneuverism won against Saddam, but it did not win the war in Iraq.

Gruß

Joachim

[JonS]

This seems relevant. "The Wages of Destruction" by Tooze (not released yet though).

See also this, Tooze's web page, and in particular the pdf and xls spreadsheet downloadable there (arming the reich).

[ January 15, 2007, 01:45 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[JasonC]

urc - sorry, the pretence that Germany was already mobilized in 1941 evaporates instantly.

The German civilian standard of living fell less, through 1942, than any major combatant. She simply did not reduce domestic civilian consumption appreciably until after Stalingrad.

The first "total mobilization" speeches calling for widespread sacrifice from the people occur in February 1943. Yes you read that correctly.

40% of steel output going to armaments 1942. The rest, not.

Plants switching from army output to u-boats in August 1941 because the war in Russia is supposedly already won. German war plant was still only running one shift a day and the work day was 10 hours.

Germany did invest in a long term autarky plan to get ready for the war, earlier, in the form of the four year plans. Those did involve large scale investment in synthetic oil etc. But no, that program or anything like it was not the reason for limited armaments output in 1940-42.

German output barely budged in those years. In contrast, when the US mobilized, current output rose 40% per year, overall, let alone the focused output in armaments.

The only thing the Germans ramped production of when the war broke out was ammunition and its explosives feedstocks.

They had the same problem sustaining the battle of Britain against UK fighter output, since they tried to wage that one out of a fixed stock rather than an ongoing flow, too.

Milward has shown the reality of the quick war, stock approach of the German war economy, long since.

There is a reason the Russians go to 1500 tanks a month in 6 months and the same increase takes the Germans over 3 years, and it is not that the Germans are already fully mobilized for war.

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

She simply did not reduce domestic civilian consumption appreciably until after Stalingrad.

How much did domestic civilian consumption fall in the US when she was accelerating war material production ? Just for comparison.

40% of steel output going to armaments 1942. The rest, not.

You can not be bothered to actually give us a break down of where that rest 60% of production went ?

Plants switching from army output to u-boats in August 1941 because the war in Russia is supposedly already won.

That was a bad call. In 20-20 hindsight. At the time the attrition of the army assets was being made up by use of captured stock (which was equal or marginally better than their own gear) while the Kriegsmarine was woefully understocked. In their eyes the switch was justified.

German war plant was still only running one shift a day and the work day was 10 hours.

That was what they deemed was enough at the time.

But no, that program or anything like it was not the reason for limited armaments output in 1940-42.

It seems you separate potential from actual measures taken. They are separate and the use of the full potential was a political decision, not a military one.

German output barely budged in those years. In contrast, when the US mobilized, current output rose 40% per year, overall, let alone the focused output in armaments.

You are not taking into account the fact that at the time the focused output of armaments was done it was preseded by an acceleration to fullfil the pledge to become the Arsenal of Democracy. The increased production war materiel output prior to early 1942 was explained to the US population as being designated for Lend-Lease. That was because Roosevelt had not been able to coerse the US political leadership to commit to armed conflict at that time.

The comparison with the US production is valid though because the US political scene (just like the German one) was being prepared for total war while the production was being geared up so that when Roosevelt (Hitler) flicked the switch the production was ready to proceed. It is interesting to note that the US and the German production tempo increased at the same pace and peaked at the same timetable. The US benefitted from the fact that their domestic political preparations and the production facilities were prepared when the country was at peace. The Germans were hurt by the accelerated rate of their plans of conquest which outpaced their domestic political preparations, not their industrial output capacity.

They had the same problem sustaining the battle of Britain against UK fighter output, since they tried to wage that one out of a fixed stock rather than an ongoing flow, too.

By your reasoning the British decision not to increase the production of tanks at the time was a really bad one.

There is a reason the Russians go to 1500 tanks a month in 6 months and the same increase takes the Germans over 3 years, and it is not that the Germans are already fully mobilized for war.

What was the Soviet loss rate at the time ?

You are conveniently forgetting that the Soviets had centralized planning and control, opted to limit their range of models, standardize the components and accept lower standard craftmanship to keep the production flowing.

[bitchen frizzy]

What difference to Jason's point does it make if American domestic consumption fell? Anyway, the United States did introduce civilian rationing almost immediately upon entering the war.

Why does it matter where Germany's steel went? It wasn't going to things that go boom.

If the Germans deemed one shift a day to be "enough at the time," then that was a part of their mistake of not going to full mobilization, wasn't it?

"Political decision" or "military decision" makes no difference to the argument. The German government decided - "politically" or "militarily" - not to maximize armaments production. How does it matter to this argument how you categorize the decision?

So American production was initially, in large part, a part of Lend Lease. So what? Point is, American production ramped up early - you are admitting that happened even before entry into the war. Again, how is it relevant how you categorize it?

Maybe the British decision not to produce more tanks was a bad one. Separate argument. What does that have to do with Germany's bad decisions?

You are conveniently forgetting that the Soviets had centralized planning and control, opted to limit their range of models, standardize the components and accept lower standard craftmanship to keep the production flowing.

So the Soviets did a lot of things the Germans could have done, but didn't. Wasn't the failure of the Germans to do these things a part of their mistakes in preparing for war?

[bitchen frizzy]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

the fundamental problem for the Germans is still their weak strategical intelligence.

Didn't I say that?

i would rather invest in strategic recce

Why? Are you suggesting the Germans could have done better at gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union? Before, you were telling me that there was nothing the Germans could have done better in this area, because the Soviet Union was just too hard to spy on.

[Tero]

Originally posted by bitchen frizzy:

What difference to Jason's point does it make if American domestic consumption fell?

Goes to the relevance of the German domestic consumption (what ever that is) and how it did or did not fall at what point. The same goes to the British/USSR level of consumption and gearing for total war.

Anyway, the United States did introduce civilian rationing almost immediately upon entering the war.

Which was when ? December 1941 or when Roosevelt deglared Lend-Lease was in effect (March 1941).

Why does it matter where Germany's steel went? It wasn't going to things that go boom.

How much went to other war materiel other than armaments ? By definition the percentage of steel going to armaments can not possibly be 100%.

If the Germans deemed one shift a day to be "enough at the time," then that was a part of their mistake of not going to full mobilization, wasn't it?

Indeed. But I think the guestion has been all along wether or not the decision to go to total war footing at such a late date can be deemed to have been wrong by their standards. They did not plan on going to war on two fronts either. When it was seen they could not quit either front they made the decision to go to total war footing.

"Political decision" or "military decision" makes no difference to the argument. The German government decided - "politically" or "militarily" - not to maximize armaments production. How does it matter to this argument how you categorize the decision?

War is the extention of politics with other means.

And that is what the Anglo-American history writing has consistently ignored. You can not detach military decisions from the political framework.

So American production was initially, in large part, a part of Lend Lease. So what? Point is, American production ramped up early - you are admitting that happened even before entry into the war. Again, how is it relevant how you categorize it?

Goes to the growth rate of the US military industry. The level they increased from was not from, say, the 1938 level. I would think the German increase rate is different if you calculate it from, say, 1934 to 1944 or from 1941 to 1944. (Years chosen to depict the political leaderships decision to go to war)

Maybe the British decision not to produce more tanks was a bad one. Separate argument. What does that have to do with Germany's bad decisions?

Goes to the British frame of mind about troops actually landing on British soil. If you diss the Germans for their preconceived notions you have to be able to diss others for theirs.

So the Soviets did a lot of things the Germans could have done, but didn't. Wasn't the failure of the Germans to do these things a part of their mistakes in preparing for war?

The Germans prepared for war waged in manageable bite size portions. The USSR prepared for global revolt of the working masses while at the same time they geared to be able to defend against intrusions by massive multinational forces (which they had experienced in the 20's during the civil war).

[z-warfare]

I'm not confident in this large-scale strategy stuff but one quibble is that the USSR didn't "prepare for global revolt of the working masses" because of 'socialism in one country', no?

Although I guess they did export tons of materiel to Communist govts later.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Joachim:

Gearing up for total war economy means mass mobilization of workforce. Women were not included into the workforce early on. In 1944 they were.

you are simply wrong. already in 1939 the percentage of women working in Germany was higher than it ever got in UK.

If you can use women as workforce when producing "consumer" goods (here: tanks) why weren't they used when building "investments" (tank factories)?

half of the female workforce worked in heavy industry.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by JonS:

This seems relevant. "The Wages of Destruction" by Tooze (not released yet though).

See also this, Tooze's web page, and in particular the pdf and xls spreadsheet downloadable there (arming the reich).

thanks. interesting reading. though judging from the paper i don't see why he thinks he disagrees with Overy. it's hard to see how he can disagree when Overy quotes German authorities themselves, so his book will be interesting reading.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Joachim:

Gearing up for total war economy means mass mobilization of workforce. Women were not included into the workforce early on. In 1944 they were.

you are simply wrong. already in 1939 the percentage of women working in Germany was higher than it ever got in UK.

If you can use women as workforce when producing "consumer" goods (here: tanks) why weren't they used when building "investments" (tank factories)?

half of the female workforce worked in heavy industry. </font>

[bitchen frizzy]

Goes to the relevance of the German domestic consumption (what ever that is) and how it did or did not fall at what point. The same goes to the British/USSR level of consumption and gearing for total war.

How is domestic consumption relevant to this question at all?

How much went to other war materiel other than armaments ? By definition the percentage of steel going to armaments can not possibly be 100%.

A fair question.

Indeed. But I think the guestion has been all along wether or not the decision to go to total war footing at such a late date can be deemed to have been wrong by their standards. They did not plan on going to war on two fronts either. When it was seen they could not quit either front they made the decision to go to total war footing.

I (and others here) are arguing that their standards were wrong. I see no reason not to fault the mentality behind the decisionmaking as well as the decisions. They freely decided to conduct a two-front war. It was not forced on them. So if they didn't plan for it, didn't prepare for it, then went to war anyway then that's a damning indictment of their decisionmaking, is it not?

War is the extention of politics with other means.

And that is what the Anglo-American history writing has consistently ignored. You can not detach military decisions from the political framework.

You are the one that introduced a distinction between political and military decisionmaking into this argument, and presented it as an excuse for German failure to fully mobilize. Why did you do that, if you understand that such distinctions don't really exist?

Goes to the growth rate of the US military industry. The level they increased from was not from, say, the 1938 level. I would think the German increase rate is different if you calculate it from, say, 1934 to 1944 or from 1941 to 1944. (Years chosen to depict the political leaderships decision to go to war)

I'm not niggling over rates of increase and so forth. The central question is whether Germany fully mobilized and prepared for war with the Soviet Union. I'm not clear what point you're trying to make with the comparison to the U.S. Are you arguing the political infeasibility of ramping up the German war economy on par with the U.S. increase?

Goes to the British frame of mind about troops actually landing on British soil. If you diss the Germans for their preconceived notions you have to be able to diss others for theirs.

You are able to diss the British, if you wish. Go right ahead. It's not relevant to the dissing of the Germans, though.

The Germans prepared for war waged in manageable bite size portions. The USSR prepared for global revolt of the working masses while at the same time they geared to be able to defend against intrusions by massive multinational forces (which they had experienced in the 20's during the civil war).

If the Germans could not feasibly prepare for a two-front war against a larger opponent, then their decision to go to war anyway is faulty. If they could have done better at preparation for what they knew would be a life-or-death fight, and didn't prepare, then their decision not to fully mobilize was faulty. Faulty decisionmaking: that's the premise.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by JasonC:

urc - sorry, the pretence that Germany was already mobilized in 1941 evaporates instantly.

your arguments don't hold your claim.

The German civilian standard of living fell less, through 1942, than any major combatant. She simply did not reduce domestic civilian consumption appreciably until after Stalingrad.

German civilian income rates were not comparable to those of Western Allies to begin with. German income was less than half of the Americans and only two thirds of that of the British.

still German civilian consumption fell between 1938-41 22%, where as for example for Brits it fell only 15% during the same period.

there was rationing already in 1938 and trends in civilian food consumption changed dramatically (e.g. from meat to potatoes) well before 1941, not to mention 1943. there was shortage of basic goods already during the first year of war.

concumption of more directly war related material was even more drastic. for example civilian fuel concumption before 1939 was 200 000 metric tons a month. by spring 1940 it's down to 70 000 tons, 1941 50 000 tons, 1942 28 000 tons, 1943 25 000 tons, 1944 24 000 tons. the cut doesn't come 1942-44, it comes 1939-41.

The first "total mobilization" speeches calling for widespread sacrifice from the people occur in February 1943. Yes you read that correctly.

already in 1938 Göring calls for complete turning of economy for war production. by september 1939 you have official full mobilization, War Economy Decree imposing cuts for civilians and by 1940 the calls ask for complete shutting down of everything not of utmost urgency.

40% of steel output going to armaments 1942. The rest, not.

52% of steel and iron production went to direct military orders in both 1940 and 1944. part of the rest went for exports, but most for civilian war related production (construction, machinery, transportation etc).

in metal manufacturing industry of all production the army orders made up 28% in 1939, 69% in 1941, 72% in 1943. cleary the rise doesn't come after Stalingrad, but during 1939-1941. the increase of labour working on war orders is 11% between 1941 and 1943, but 149% between 1949 and 1941.

Plants switching from army output to u-boats in August 1941 because the war in Russia is supposedly already won.

yes, strategic intelligence failed. has nothing to do with when mobilization begun.

German war plant was still only running one shift a day and the work day was 10 hours.

Speer discovered in 1942 that industry had not followed the orders (given two years earlier) of using multiple shifts as standard practice. if you have sources that say it was discovered earlier please correct me.

Germany did invest in a long term autarky plan to get ready for the war, earlier, in the form of the four year plans. Those did involve large scale investment in synthetic oil etc. But no, that program or anything like it was not the reason for limited armaments output in 1940-42.

sorry but it's your word against the word of the acknowledged published experts of this subject. which do you think holds more credibility?

German output barely budged in those years.

exactly and at the same time the resources and labour poured in was the same as it was later.

In contrast, when the US mobilized, current output rose 40% per year, overall, let alone the focused output in armaments.

that's very efficient.

The only thing the Germans ramped production of when the war broke out was ammunition and its explosives feedstocks.

which has nothing to do when mobilization begun.

They had the same problem sustaining the battle of Britain against UK fighter output, since they tried to wage that one out of a fixed stock rather than an ongoing flow, too.

on the contary Germans were increasing their production capabilities to whole new levels.

Milward has shown the reality of the quick war, stock approach of the German war economy, long since.

Milward is a dated source, debunked by Overy and others.

There is a reason the Russians go to 1500 tanks a month in 6 months and the same increase takes the Germans over 3 years, and it is not that the Germans are already fully mobilized for war.

German mobilization took place 1939-41, not 1942-44. that their tank production peaked in late war does not in any way contradict it.

[ January 16, 2007, 09:38 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by bitchen frizzy:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

the fundamental problem for the Germans is still their weak strategical intelligence.

Didn't I say that?

</font>

[pamak1970]

I am sorry for the delay ,but the last weekend and holiday was the only available time for me .

First, as an aside - this is a fine discussion and I thank you for holding up your end of it. It brings out my points quite well

I agree and i will point that the result is cause of an effort from both sides.

Against the NK forces this is true, expect it didn't achieve statemate is won. Against the Chinese it is much less true. There was some tactical counterpunching in 1951, but after that no operational offensive of any scope. The UN forces defended and bled the Chinese to the tune of a million men, and the Chinese called it a day. Gee, they didn't think "since we have the initiative, we are sure to break through and win decisively on the next attack or the one after", did they? Because against enough heavy HE firepower on the limited space of the Korean penisula, they never, ever would have.

The chinese decided to go in,only when they saw that US forces were advancing ready to occupy the whole Korea.Sure they would not mind if they were able to occupy the whole peninsula

At the end both compromised with the middle solution.That is what both sides were willing to pay for.Neither was seeking for a full mobilization of economy and military power for a total war and that is why i am not linking this case with the one we are talking about .

Ignoring the add ons, we have 27.4 million Russian casualties vs. 7.2 million German ones, or about a 4 to 1 ratio.

there are many problems with these numbers as the site also points. .For example feldgrau provides total MIA for wwii for German army of about 2,8 million but the number we find by adding the MIA for each campaign is about half of it.Similar problems exist with the strength of german army since it gives total in strength of up to more than 12 million till 1944 ,but the number of people in service for 1944 is just more than 1 million two hundred.That begs the question of where are the rest of the 12 million people recruited up to 1944..Sure there is a small portion which reached an age of "retirement" each year, but for 7 years and for a combined population of 80 million ,this can not be more than 4 million in total and that is assumming that all members of a certain class survive to retire from the army and ignoring the fact that during the last stages of the war ,German army was forced to have classes that under normal conditions were not fit for service.

I base all this on assumming that a male population of 40 million will provide around 500,000 males that reach age of recruitment each year and a similar number of people that retire .

So the, point is that the given casualties are too low to justify an army that recruited 12 millio people, seeing itself with a strength of 1,2 million in 1944.

Regarding the Soviet official deaths of 8.3 million ,you missed the following

The official total of military deaths is 8,668,400; including 6,330,000 killed in action/died of wounds and 556,000 dead from non-combat causes[7,85] plus an estimated 500,000 MIA and 1,283,000 POW dead out of 4,059,000 total POW.So this figures actually combines kills ,MIA and one fourth of the POWS that actually died in captivity.Under these conditions we can not really say much ,unless we have more accurate data.

Glantz gives estimates of Russian military casualties as high as 35 million

In what book?Are you sure he does not talk about overall casualties ,including civilians?

From what i know 35 million was about the total amount of men drafted in Red army ,so this figure can not be right. The number of people drafted in Red army seems logical since for a nation of 169 million people ,it represents about half the number of male population.

As for my point that even when the Russians won overwhelmingly and were fighting only German infantry formations they still took higher losses, it is readily illustrated by the two cases of Bagration and Prague-Berlin. Bagration was the Russian operational masterpiece and a military success of the first order. They destroyed 30 German divisions and took White Russia etc. But they also managed to sustain 765,000 casualties doing it, against figures for the German side that start at 300-400,000 "permanent military losses" and go as high as 625,000 counting wounded, non-battle, etc. But in no case reach the Russian figure.

Similarly, the Germans lost 2000 AFVs in Bagration, but the Russians lost 2800. This counts as about the most successful Russian operation of the war because it got within a factor of 1.5 on the loss exchange ratio - but it did not pass unity.

so since we are talking now about 1944-1945 ,i assume you do accept that we see a lower german perfomance compared to previous years and an exchange ratio of less than 2-1 which does not surprise me.

As for AFVs in the east, I estimate it at 40,000, mostly just by estimating AFVs elsewhere over the whole war and taking them out of the German total available. Russian tank losses I know are over 100,000, since their production was 102,500 and the fleet expanded, net, by only the amount they received lend lease (confirmed by year by year Russian AFV loss figures, which run 20000 and up). So the AFV exchange ratio ran about 2.5 to 1, to 3 to 1 at the highest - less than the manpower ratio but far above unity. It also means if the rate held and the Germans got the extra 20000 tanks faster mobilization could readily have given them, the Russians would have needed 50000 more, or would have run out first.

Nor have prewar anythings, anything to do with it - all the NCOs that count are made in action, and Germany got them by the boatload. (She even had plenty of NCOs for 2nd line division who were WW I veterans)

First i was talking about the officers and you can not expect to train an officer in six months expecting to see him be as efficient as the rest of the proffesionals.

Second ,the combat efficiency of the German army during the opening stages of Barbarossa was of course linked also to the German NCos of that time who had already a long term training and combat experience.

If they were introducing new blood trained during the period you are talking about , the average efficiency of NCos would be certainly affected depending on the level of the numbers introduced.

Of course war lessons and real experience can train much faster people at lower echelons at least, but this does not change the fact that new German formations would have started a war with green and less efficient troops than the ones deployed historically in Barabarossa.

Now this does not mean that a bigger tank army was not preferable.I accept that a stronger inittial punch (in terms of more numbers) would have given him better chances to exploit the initial shock, and even if additional troops would not have the efficiency of the existing ones,they would still add something extra to the overall force.

The point i make is that when you examine "what ifs" there are many parameters that change.So it is very dangerous to calculate alteranitve scenarios using the same value of parameters.

Hitler might had enough force to avoid Salingrand in 1942 or advance even farther or even capture Moscow.Still it is far from obvious that all those things could win the war against Soviet Union and when i see combat perfomance difference between the two sides becoming more narrow as the time passes.

Sorry, that predicts that the early war formations and the late ones that had all their first pick of recruits would continually rock, and the later infantry formations would all suck. While equipment mix may further that impression, it is not in fact observed. Instead many an infantry division formed in 1944 gives an excellent account of itself.

I do not get the whole logic of what you are saying.My argument can not be supported or refuted by comparisons between different periods,about different armies against different enemies and so on

Yeah well, the war with Russia started in 1941 and German had access to just a little more terrritory by then, and she drafted men out of that territory, too.

Indeed, but should they be rewarded with a German Reich efficiency and should we reward Germans with all casualties inflicted to Russians by all participants that aided Germany in Eastern front and who were a few millions?

Of course I did, I pointed out they ran 50 mobile division at the end and twice the tanks they attacked Russia with, even without ramping synthetic oil capacity. And that they could have, and should have, so ramped said capacity, had they planned on a long warI also along the war showed how being better prepared for the attritionist war that actually happened, would have made it materially more likely for them to lastingly solve their oil problem inside Russia. Baku stuff could have been coming west by mid to late 1943, if there had been 5000 extra tanks for southern Russia by 1942.

You also said that the Russian tank casualties in 1941 were about the same with the casualties inflicted during the next years when the Germans deployed twice the number of tanks they employed the first year.Regarding personnel losses you said that they were higher in 1941 and especially the number of POWs captured during the first year,represents the biggest portion of all Soviet POWs during wwii.

In other words the historical numbers provided by Germans in Eastern front during the peak period do not lead to more Soviet casualties while the casualty exchange ratio is reduced.

If the overall exchange ratio for the whole war is say 3 to 1, that is cause the 6 and 7 to 1 of the first year ,was followed by much lower exchange ratios afterwards , certainly lower than the total average of 3 to 1.

So after a certain time, Germans could not win a war of attrition

I do accept though that if Germans had the ability to deploy a larger fleet during the first year, they could have win the war in 1941,before Russians become more effective or secure Caucasus and oil as you point in 1942 ,but i do not know if they could produce the number that could have given them victory instead of just an extra gain of some hundreds of km,nor i beleive that avoidance of Stalingrand means strategic victory for Germans, or Stalin's actions that could have influence results like acceptance of more risk against Japanese by transfering even more quantity of troops (or more quickly) and so on.

As a side notice,it is interesting that all these high Soviet casualties happened when Germans were attacking with fewer forces compared to the later stages of war when they deployed more troops and had a more passive stance assumming defence.

So as an end , the way i see it, blitzkrieg can put down bigger but less effective opponents , but there is a limitation regarding the theater war depth and size difference that can be negotiated with such an approach.

For each pair of values of theater war depth and size difference there is a "critical mass" that the lower size must have in order to acheive victory.

Hitler had the nessesary critical mass to conquere France ,but he did not have it to beat Russia.

Partially cause from what we know he underestimated the power and numbers of Red Army and the willingless of communists to fight for their country.

Oh OK, I guess I missed that then. Mars. Next argument please

I lost you.Did not they counterattack using operational reserves and eventually trapped numerous Soviet penetrating forces there?

The defensive is the stronger form of combat.

Firepower kills

Which does not contradict the statement about the role of inittiative and attack as the tools that are prerequirements for victory,at least according to the manuals that include both statements about the defence and the attack

Regardless if you agree or not with the above,i point that your theory is actually not linked to any other proffesional one described in any army publication.

"Neither Rommel nor Germans in France could count on prevailing against Allies through attrition

If you can't count on prevailing through attrition, then you can't count on prevailing, because nothing else actually does

"

First of all neither Rommel nor other German generals decide about allocation of forces in a theater.

If you want to blaim Hitler ,that is fine with me .In fact even Hitler did not want to start a campaign there.He interfiered only after the Italian collapse and the real possibility of seeing British establish a new front in Europe while Germans were going to fight deep inside Russia.

Second , you can certainly win a campaign or even a war even if you are inferior in numbers.

That does not mean that you can do it against a much bigger enemy or the rest of the world as Germans tried to do.

There are of course limitations and cases where you can not ignore numbers for sure.

No, they really didn't. You can't point to a war they won that way, unless you want to count beating up minors they could have smashed with attrition. Brief single operations, sure. Those just don't settle anything against first rate powers. Attrition does.

Of course i can.The win against France in wwii was a win against a first rate power that they could not defeat with attrition during ww1.

"there was no hope for Rommel to count on anything else other than qualitative advantage."

Actually, there was British lack of skill at combined arms and use of armor, the limited armament of their tanks, his own men's thorough understanding of gun fronts, 88 Flak, a deep park of perfectly effective Italian artillery, equal infantry manpower, etc

No, to hold. The Allied punches get weaker away from the beach due to logistical difficulties. It is also easier to defend giving ground than trying to keep everything (on which more below). It is also easier to defend if most of your infantry artillery and service stuff gets away, than if it gets outrun east or shot to rags. How does this benefit them? Simple, they get men out of Normandy, they get men out of Biscay, they get men out of the south of France, that they don't get to keep if they try something stupid like Mortain. Then they get replacements and reinforcements as the allies sort out their supply difficulties. All of which means more tanks etc can be sent east to deal with Bagration etc

In essense your argument is that avoiding the Fallaise encirclement would have given Germans more additional troops than what they had historically to oppose allies and Soviets later.

Sure, it is logical but i think not valuable way to study history.

Germans would also agree if they knew beforehand the result of their counteroffensive.

What is more important though is that they did not have such type of knowledge for the future. They did however saw that they could not stop Soviet army even when there was not a western front at all.So from their point of view, it did not make any sense to hope for victory against Soviets when at the same time had to defend the whole front of France.

[ January 17, 2007, 01:45 PM: Message edited by: pamak1970 ]