What do you think about how CM depicts European urban warfare?

[Darkmath]

The title says all what I wanted to say.

Some people state that the grid map makes the urban warfare too unrealistic in CM, since it doesn't ressemble to a majority of cities in Europe.

The lack of mouseholing was mentionned too (can be solved with the sewer movement in CMBB, but why the hell do they remove this in CMAK? There were sewer in Italy (Rome was even one the first city to use a sewer system, Cloaca Maxima during the Antiquity, like any other country in Europe in WWII.). :mad: whining whining whining )

[ September 06, 2006, 05:34 AM: Message edited by: Darkmath ]

[Wicky]

CMAK sewer movement discussion thread from 2004

I want Italian mine dogs and commando frogmen in a patch

[DerBlitzer]

For a great (and depressing) war film about sewer movement, check out Andrez Wadja's Kanal , which looks at the Warsaw uprising from the sewer system:

IMDB

You will understand why CMBB makes it a 10% chance of death.

[LongLeftFlank]

OK, I just HAD to resurrect the below classic quote from the 2004 thread (re: why 10% chance of death?):

Originally posted by Sergei:

Getting lost or not finding route/encountering an enemy patrol/booby trap/zombie ninja mummies eating your brains/being incapacitated by methane fumes (or men take a fag break at wrong time...)/alligators/the great flush/etc.

[Darkmath]

Oh , BTW, remember the initial question is what do you think about how CM depicts European urban warfare...

Anyway, thanks for the reply .But I was thinking about sewer movement as a way to simulate mousehole.

[ September 02, 2006, 06:35 AM: Message edited by: Darkmath ]

[Peterk]

Just my take....

The CM games shine in

i) the countryside

ii) really small towns

iii) farmland

Once you get into monotonous terrain...heavily forested maps, large cities, I don't think CM does all that well.

In the cities, the buildings are a little too generic to give much flavor. If there were rooms, staircases in fixed locations, it might be a bit better.

It's not really European, but try to play a long scenario, or a linked set of battles on a Stalingrad type map...gets boring pretty quickly.

[Darkmath]

Yeah ,the lack of building on slope and under 45° angle building doesn't give you a flavour of the majority of the European cities.

Also , a building seems to be modelled as a homogenous low exposure terrain type.

That means a grenade explode in a kind of "large foggy room". If that so, a grenade loose a lot of his effectiveness.

Or maybe, is there special rules when grenade are used in building?

I'm affraid CMX1 doesn't handle correctly urban fighting.

[rich12545]

Imo, CMAK handles urban warfare better than any game I've ever seen. And I've played the game or demo for a lot of them.

It's way better than Steel Panthers. Also better than Silent Storm I believe. And certainly head and shoulders above the first game that tried to do this, Computer Ambush about 25 years ago.

Is it perfect? No. Could it be improved if the devs really wanted to? Probably.

But I can't think of any game at all that's better. And, frankly, I enjoy urban warfare in the game a lot.

[Peterk]

Just to add to my above critique. Computer games...I haven't seen anything better either. Steel Panthers was a joke in comparison.

Board games though, I have.

[dieseltaylor]

The AI generated towns and villages in italy are a bad joke and do a lot to remove realism from the game.

Another naughty is the in game US ability to send tanks through bocage hedges based on WW2 publicity and the limited success in some circumstances. When little Honey's can do it that really hacks me off.

So towns are a bit iffy and artificially created maps designed to aid the us ARMOUR

[JasonC]

It's pretty poor I agree. Scenario designers haven't done the best job with it either, though I've seen a few beautiful Russian towns and Italian villages, which must have taken weeks each. For which kudos.

Most designers put in way too much armor and the urban fighting becomes tanks in the streets etc.

Some game engine issues -

the default "large town" maps give a tiny area of actual town completely surrounded by open farmland, for absolutely no reason. No city in Europe looked or looks like that - a few French villages maybe approach it. The surburb area consists of about 60 meters without pavement with shorter buildings, when in reality residential housing areas stretch for half a km or more.

To get an autogenerated large town you have to ask for a map 5 times the size you want and then crop most of the edges, and it still gives a poor approximation of about 40 acres of city.

The only modeling of interior walls is the inability to move direct from one large stone to another without going out in the street first. This is welcome but a bit too formulaic - there is no variation. Factories allow continuous movement inside and are welcome as a second "setting", but those two exhaust it. The reality is obviously much more complicated than that.

All the smaller houses are forced to have empty around them, that empty never has walls hedges gardens etc. And frequently you can't put them close enough together, especially with any kind of relief in the area - the editor just drops buildings it can't see how to fit. The result is far more open area in urban terrain than there actually was and is.

The streets are similarly forced to be too wide, and large squares with big fields of fire are the rule instead of the exceptional item they ought to be. There are also no thin routes, back alleys etc - though I've seen Berli arrange for them in one Italian scenario, those required weird angles to get chockpoints at corners of two large square building tiles etc.

Pavement is treated as a form of cover marginally better than open. While this is perhaps meant to reflect widespread debris and such, it seems wrong, and the old hazardous movement, bridge-railline-wire like setting should be possible.

Rubble is confined to the site of the building when it should "spill", blocks same level LOS a bit too much, and infantry movement over it is a bit slower than it probably ought to be.

Lack of a "deployment type" is another big drawback. The only thing like it in the game is the way stone walls work - 30% cover if up and firing, 0% if pinned. Well, in urban you should have up and firing, back covering the windows and doors against entry, and fully protected - defensive, possible deployments.

Similarly, cellars are missing, when they were a key component of large cities especially for protection against artillery fire. You can try to approximate them with sewer movement within the same building, but have to time it beforehand (unrealistic and unflexible), and risk loss. Instead they should just get to very high cover but be vulnerable if enemy infantry enters the building.

Hiding infantry inside a building is too easy to find, snipers excepted. The way snipers are handled is fine in spotting terms, but their 100m minimum range is completely wrong for city fighting. Also, as elsewhere their chance of actually hitting a man is far too low, and their chance of even suppressing against a covered target likewise.

I've proposed before a solution to the last one - cover should effect sniper fire as the square root of the exposure rather than the exposure - to reflect that it is purely aimed, and at a momentary target of opportunity, rather than area fire and continual etc. And the hit chance for a typical sniper shot should be around 40%, with cumulative 20% bonuses for higher quality. Meaning an elite simply does not miss a target without cover. Sniper ammo should also be well above the default 10.

HE effect on buildings is too high for the low calibers and too consistently easy for the large. Instead of some absolute blast calculation, stuff below a threshold should have no structural effect, and stuff above it should have a lot more randomness in it, with outliers doing significant damage but many medium caliber rounds having little effect individually. Less cumulative, more "roll high enough" in the algorithm, in other words.

Grenades are more effective in the real deal than CM shows them to be, because they get around the best forms of city cover. Short range infantry type fire, on the other hand, is more effective than it actually is in city fighting. Its real effect is to drive men into building interiors and away from the windows and doors etc.

In CM, you can just sit across the street and shoot them all. The only approximation to the real thing is when large stone buildings allow defenders to position themselves so that they can't be seen from across the street, but can just see to the sidewalk. That is a good approximation to "back" deployments but it is finicky to get and depends on building type and angles etc. (You can't be in the interior toward 2 walls at once e.g.).

Another issue is that cover effects on ammo consumption are off. Basically cover is treated as intercepting a uniform percentage of the incoming fire, so to do damage x to a target in cover 5 times as good, 5 times as much ammo must be used. Instead the fire is much more timed and aimed for occasions of enemy exposure. So the fp per unit time drops by more than the ammo expenditure rises. (The shooters spend more time waiting for a glimpse, less hosing away).

A solution to that is to have ammo consumption go as the square root of the exposure level fired at. So if the target is 10% exposed the chance of using up an ammo point is 31.6% or about 1/3. If he is 25% exposed it is 50%. So instead of units running out of ammo in 5 minutes without hurting the enemy in good cover across the way, the fp per unit time would be no higher than now, but the fp over whole ammo load would be up to 3 times higher in city fighting. And infantry would not be the "one platoon firefight" thing it is now, in urban settings.

The flip side of the ability of units to get into "back" positions inside a building is the need to reduce "borg", and to create the possibility of catching an enemy unit unawares. They don't all face all directions with 100% situational awareness and knowledge of everyone coming etc. In reality, more infantry urban combat is about "getting the drop" on somebody with an unexpected direction or point of entry, than CM can at present depict. Driving from the front windows reduces info and situational awareness etc.

I don't think it is necessary to map out every restroom inside, or to move each man through the rooms. Correcting just the issues above - or a reasonable subset of them - would give us a much between simulation of MOUT.

[Ant]

Originally posted by rich12545:

Imo, CMAK handles urban warfare better than any game I've ever seen. And I've played the game or demo for a lot of them.

The best portrayal of urban warfare I've ever played was the old original classic Xcom game 'UFO enemy unknown'

Well modelled towns, buildings with stairs, rooms, plenty of areas that you could blow up. Even civilians getting in the way so you couldn't just toss a grenade blindly into a house...well, you could, but it was considered a bit naughty to kill civilians

Yes, I know it's not strictly speaking a wargame, but I'm surprised that not a single game released since has come even close to such a great depiction of urban combat.

[Darkmath]

JasonC,

it is always a pleasure to read your posts .

I wonder what are "realistic" town maps made by designers you recommand?

Being in France, I have not ever seen an "european like" urban environnement. Actually, in Paris, for example, the buildings enclose a courtyard.There are few map where I see this represented.

But what do you mean about "one platoon firefight"? The need of using 3 squads against one squad in a building? :confused:

[ September 04, 2006, 12:34 PM: Message edited by: Darkmath ]

[JasonC]

By one platoon firefight, I mean the first time a platoon is committed to close combat against enemy infantry, even if it wins with minimal losses, by the time the enemy is beaten it emerges so low on ammo that it is useless against any one held position. Therefore the most you ever get is an even exchange, platoon for platoon, with yours alive but empty and his dead.

[George MC]

Originally posted by Darkmath:

I wonder what are "realistic" town maps made by designers you recommand?

Check out this

Kharkov City click on the Kharkov Winter 43 link.

Cheers fur noo

George

[Darkmath]

George MC, this map is excellent.

It would be great if other city maps looks like this one.However, I don't find a lot of ETO urban maps/scenario. I agree the auto generated urban map are unrealistic.

I may add another element which makes CMX1 less realistic ; the lack of blocking LOF vehicle.

They could be used as a shield to protect the infantry moving from a side of the street to another. (will be fixed in CM:SF Vehicle will block LOF but not LOS for CPU consuming reasons)

I think again about the lack of mouseholing.

In ETO, since a block of building often surrounded a court/garden , finally you can move through another building without getting wipped out by an enemy fire on the main street.It depends of the map scenario design.

Engineer squad could have enough satchel charge to blow up a light bridge in the game, but can't make hole in a interior wall (whereas it was possible with grenade).The wall between two large heavy building can be considered as an wall which includes both walls from the two building, with a firewall between them (it makes then twice the thickness of an exterior wall). If I recall what I read here, a firewall is quite thick. I don't know if this kind of wall is load bearing, but if so, blowing a hole in a firewall would collapse the building, hence the lack of mouseholing is justified.

[ September 05, 2006, 08:53 AM: Message edited by: Darkmath ]

[George MC]

Hi Darkmath

You could use Pyewacket's map convertor to chnage it into a CMAK map?

Cheers fur noo

George

[RockinHarry]

Urban combat is a good compromise in CM IMHO. It still works well with some imagination, when considering that there´s a lot of abstraction (1 terrain type per 20m tile only and no visual tracking of individual soldiers). Same counts for the Steel Panthers game which is even more abstracted and has even larger terrain tiles (hexes) of 50m size.

While mouse holing surely was an option when there was enough time and well equipped combat engineers around, I rather miss houses in CM having no basements! I think house to house combat in larger cities still was resolved more commonly the usual way, by moving and entering buildings from the streets or backyards. It also depends upon the opponent whether you had to use the mouseholing methods. In Stalingrad there were fanatic russians and in Ortona there were fanatic paratroopers. Affairs like the battle for Aachen (US vs germans) or Goch/Cleve (Operation Veritable, CW vs. germans) surely didn´t feature (or require) mouseholing techniques. However, for any oncoming CMx version that would be a nice tool to have (beside basements, dugouts, DUKW´s & appropiate terrain, snipers or FO´s up in trees/smoke stacks ect. ect. ect.)

[Darkmath]

George MC,

I don't used this map converter, but I saw it is possible to convert CMBO maps to CMAK.

So it would be easier to convert CMBB to CMAK maps. Maps of the quality

JasonC,

Basically cover is treated as intercepting a uniform percentage of the incoming fire

I read that exposure wasn't exactly a hit point percentage? :confused:

I agree the ammo expenditure at close range is extremely too high.I don't understand why a SMG squad burns all his "ready for assault" ammo within 2 turns, especially in a building where half the squad would firing.

Or maybe they have a lot of remaining ammo in

the low ammo status, like 2 SMG magasines?

STUPID SMG SQUAD, USE YOUR DAMNED SELF DEFENSE MAGASINES!!!

[ September 06, 2006, 06:25 AM: Message edited by: Darkmath ]

[MikeyD]

"When little Honey's can do it that really hacks me off."

By coincidence this morning while sitting and... um... reading I happened upon a picture of the good-old Culin hedgecutter welded to the front of an M5A1 Stuart, so the Stuart definitely got the attachment. The only reason why 'Honeys' (M3) never got the Culin hedgecutter was because the M3 Stuart had been all phased out of U.S. service by July 44.

About city play in CM. First you need a GOOD city map and those are hard to come by. Second, it all depends on the scale of play. If you're doing some tiny 600 point platoon engagement city fighting might feel too abstracted to be much fun. If you're doing a 2500+ point combined arms advance - on a good map - you'll have a great time playing armchair General (or at least Colonel) planning your moves while the individual unit abstractions will fade into the background.

The CD QB map 'Grand Blvd' is a fairly respectable city map, though it might be advisable to build a properly thought out scenario on top of it rather than rely on the tender mercies of the QB game generator.

[Darkmath]

Affairs like the battle for Aachen (US vs germans) or Goch/Cleve (Operation Veritable, CW vs. germans) surely didn´t feature (or require) mouseholing techniques

I thought that mouseholing played a big part in Aachen... :confused:

Also, I find few urban scenario in ETO for CMAK.

Is there any scenario about Groningen , Brest, Paris?

JasonC,

I like the square root probability of using an ammo point at close range, which you exposed in a past CMBB thread. But maybe a unit in a building would suppress in order to keep at all cost an HMG down. But you begin your thinking by considering that the 10% exposure equal to "10 hits on 100 bullets fired" (not very realistic though. Even in Hollywood they have a better fire discipline ) . But what is the exposure exactly? I read the exposure is not a hit probability. :confused:

[ September 08, 2006, 08:14 AM: Message edited by: Darkmath ]

[Darkmath]

Bump it or loose it.

[RockinHarry]

Originally posted by Darkmath:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> Affairs like the battle for Aachen (US vs germans) or Goch/Cleve (Operation Veritable, CW vs. germans) surely didn´t feature (or require) mouseholing techniques

I thought that mouseholing played a big part in Aachen... :confused: </font>

[dieseltaylor]

"When little Honey's can do it that really hacks me off."

By coincidence this morning while sitting and... um... reading I happened upon a picture of the good-old Culin hedgecutter welded to the front of an M5A1 Stuart, so the Stuart definitely got the attachment. The only reason why 'Honeys' (M3) never got the Culin hedgecutter was because the M3 Stuart had been all phased out of U.S. service by July 44.

Seeing tanks with cutters on does not mean they successsfully cut through bocage hedges it simply means they have cutters attached.

I could as logically claim the attachment of .5" AAMG's to Stuarts cleared the Luftwaffe from the skies

web page

web page

I find it annoying that heavy 45 ton tanks are not going through tall hedges whilst light Stuart's are based on the hype given at an important time in the Normandy campaign to boost morale.

This is not to say that small hedges were not demolished by Stuarts but true bocage would defeat light tanks. Anyone who has read of the damage Shermans and their crews took when charging across fields to get the necessary momentum will understand the reasons that I doubt Stuarts abilities.

For those that feel Shermans and Honeys could frivously dispose of bocage hedges please explain why they simply did not line up side by side and just roll through hedgerow after hedgerow. If you read the links to Doublers work above you will see the more practical reasons given for US success.

So there we have it. The ability of all US tanks to skitter through tall hedges is based on hype of an extraordinary degree. The fact that these devices teleported to Italy to allow the ahistoricity to continue is just crass.

[dieseltaylor]

Good comtemporary details on bocage fighting. No mention other than of dozer tanks.

web page

Fighting in Normandy" from Combat Lessons, No. 4

A 1944 article "Fighting in Normandy" from Combat Lessons -- Rank and file in combat: What they're doing; How they do it. The purpose of Combat Lessons was to give officers and enlisted men the benefit of battle experiences. The article discusses the unique problems of fighting in the Normandy hedgerows.

FIGHTING IN NORMANDY

Bucking the Hedgerows The terrain in the area selected for the initial penetration of French soil was generally level or gently sloping. However, it was broken up into a "crazy quilt" pattern of small fields separated by "hedgerows." These consisted of an earthen mound or wall 8 to 10 feet in width and 4 to 6 feet in height, covered with a scrub undergrowth.

Along the top of this wall grew rows of trees. Forming an important part of the obstacle thus created was the ditch which ran along one or both sides of the mound. The roads, narrow and winding, ran between these hedgerows, and offered the defenders many advantageous positions for ambuscades or surprise attacks on advancing foot-troops and armor. Observation was normally limited from one hedgerow to the next, although an occasional structure, such as the church tower in a village would widen the horizon.

These peculiarities of terrain led to the development of special operational techniques in the application of tactical principles. Quoted below are some experience reports, from the battlefield, of hedgerow fighting.

[section of Typical Normandy Hedgerow]

Cross Section of Typical Normandy Hedgerow.

The German Defense Ever since August 1940 the Germans have been studying and organizing the beach defenses of the French coast. They are past masters of the art of utilizing the terrain to advantage.

As set forth in a letter from the Commanding General, U. S. XIX Corps: "The Germans have been thorough in their defense. Their weapons are normally sited to provide long fields of fire. The 88-mm dual purpose gun, the ‘Tiger’ tank with its 88-mm gun, or the ‘Panther’ tank which has a 75-mm high-velocity gun, normally takes you under fire at ranges up to 2,000 yards. All weapons are well dug in. The mobility of their tanks is often sacrificed in order to secure the protection of a ditch or the walls of a building.

Sniper Trouble "The German soldiers had been given orders to stay in their positions and, unless you rooted them out, they would stay, even though your attack had passed by or over them. Some of their snipers stayed hidden for 2 to 5 days after a position had been taken and then ‘popped up’ suddenly with a rifle or AT grenade launcher to take the shot for which they had been waiting.

"We found fire crackers with slow burning fuse left by snipers and AT gun crews in their old positions when they moved. These exploded at irregular intervals, giving the impression that the position was still occupied by enemy forces.

"High losses among tank commanders have been caused by German snipers. Keep buttoned up, as the German rifleman concentrates on such profitable targets. This is especially true in villages. After an action the turret of the commander’s tank is usually well marked with rifle bullets.

Enemy in Ambush "On several occasions the Germans have allowed small patrols of ours to enter villages and wander around unmolested, but when stronger forces were sent forward to occupy the village they would encounter strong resistance. The Germans will permit a patrol to gather erroneous information in order to ambush the follow-up troops acting on the patrols' false report."

German Weapons One infantry regimental commander has given a good detailed description of the defensive organization: "We found that the enemy employed very few troops with an extremely large number of automatic weapons. All personnel and automatic weapons were well dug in along the hedgerows in excellent firing positions. In most cases the approaches to these positions were covered by mortar fire. Also additional fire support was provided by artillery field pieces of 75-mm, 88-mm, and 240-mm caliber firing both time and percussion fire. Numerous snipers located in trees, houses, and towers were used.

Our Attack "The most successful method of dealing with these defensive positions was the closely coordinated attack of infantry and tanks, with artillery and 4.2-inch chemical mortars ready to assist where needed. The use of these supporting weapons was severely handicapped by the limited observation."

TANK-INFANTRY COMBINE

Teamwork the Key The great emphasis placed on the importance of tank-infantry teamwork is reflected in the many reports and training instructions that have been issued by combat commanders. For example the Commanding General, VII Corps published the following narrative of such an action in a training memorandum: "The capture of the high ground north of the MONTEBOURG-QUINEVILLE ROAD was accomplished by the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, closely supported by the 70th Tank Battalion, which was operating at a reduced strength of 18 tanks.

"Upon receiving the order for the attack at 1830, 13 June, the tank battalion commander immediately initiated a route reconnaissance to a suitable assembly area and arranged for a conference between his key officers and those of the infantry battalion.

Elements of the Plan "At this conference the following essential elements to effect coordination were agreed upon:

"1. H-hour would be at 0930.

"2. An artillery preparation would be fired from H-15 minutes to H-hour.

"3. When the artillery fire lifted, the tank mortar platoon, from positions immediately in rear of the Line of Departure, would fire on all known and suspected AT gun locations.

"4. Each of the two infantry assault companies would be directly supported by six tanks. The remaining six tanks would be in general support.

"5. All tanks would be held 800 yards in rear of the LD, moving forward in time to cross the line with the infantry at H-hour.

The Advance "The attack jumped off on time, the tanks advancing very slowly, spraying the hedgerows with machine-gun fire. The infantry advanced abreast of the tanks, mopping up as they proceeded. The supporting tank company remained about 500 to 600 yards in rear of the assault companies and covered their forward movement by overhead fire.

"The objective was seized at 1500 after an advance of over 2,000 yards against a well-organized resistance which utilized both open and concrete emplacements."

Corp Commander’s Comment: In discussing this attack the Corps Commander made the following comments on infantry-tank cooperation:

"Tank companies require at least 3 hours and tank battalions a minimum of 5 hours of daylight in which to prepare for an attack.

"Tank assembly positions should be selected well in rear of the Line of Departure.

"Tank officers and infantry commanders should discuss and arrange all details of their cooperative effort by personal conference at some prearranged location. If possible this location should allow visual reconnaissance of the zone of activity.

"The tanks should not be advanced to the LD until the time of the attack.

"Artillery observers should be with the leading wave of tanks.

"Radio communication between the infantry CP and the tanks should be maintained.

"The speed of the tanks should conform to the infantry rate of advance. Gaps should not be allowed to develop between the two elements.

"The infantry can assist the tanks in passing through hedgerows by protecting them from hostile AT personnel using AT grenades or rockets.

"In the absence of definite targets forward infantry elements should fire at the nearest cover to the front and flanks. Rifle fire directed along the lower structures of friendly tanks will discourage enemy use of magnetic mines.

"Enemy AT guns firing at our tanks should be immediately smothered by our mortar and automatic-weapons fire, thus forcing the gun crews to take cover and permitting the tanks to outflank and destroy the enemy guns.

"Tanks should be employed on both sides of hedges when advancing along a hedgerow.

"If at all possible tanks should avoid roads during the attack.

"The tanks in general support should mop up any positions which are bypassed by the first wave of tanks.

"Once the final objective is reached the tanks should immediately withdraw to a predetermined rally point. If they remain with the infantry they will attract heavy enemy artillery fire which will seriously interfere with the infantry reorganization."

Limited Objective A letter from Headquarters, XIX Corps, stresses the importance of the limited objective in controlling the combined infantry-tank action: "The major objective given in corps, division, and even regimental plans and orders is reached by a series of limited-objective attacks by infantry and tank platoons and companies. Thus the designation of the major objective should be considered as indicating an axis of advance and an ultimate goal for the smaller assault units. Here in NORMANDY the normal objective of each attack is the next hedgerow where there will be a pause for reorganization and for planning the next advance. Keep the distance to be traversed short so that the tanks will not outstrip the infantry, thus losing the close support that is mutually necessary to make the fight effective. It is very desirable whenever conditions permit that each limited objective be visible from the line of departure.

Personal Reconnaissance "The closely coordinated team play that is called for in hedgerow fighting requires a maximum of personal reconnaissance. The key to success in each fight from hedgerow to hedgerow is personal reconnaissance by the commanders concerned."

Bulldozer Tanks An infantry battalion commander wrote from NORMANDY: "The light and medium tank equipped with a bulldozer blade was successfully used to plow through the hedgerows, cutting openings through which the other tanks would file to fan out and cover the next field. The steep banks which line the roads would be cut down at predetermined crossing points."

Fighting Infantry Infantry Regimental Commander, NORMANDY: "Fire and movement is still the only sound way to advance your infantry in daylight fighting. Build up a good strong base of fire with automatic rifles and light machine guns. The heavy machine guns are much more effective, but it is difficult to keep them up with the advance. Use your 60-mm mortars to deepen and thicken your covering fire. When you are all set, cut loose with all you’ve got to keep Jerry’s head down while the riflemen close in from the flanks and clean him out.

[Tankdozer vs. Hedgerow]

Hedgerow Hints "Because of the limited range of observation, scouts tended to operate too close to their units. They should try to keep at least one hedgerow ahead of the remainder of the squad.

"Riflemen still have a tendency to wait for a definite, visible target before shooting. Each man should cover with fire any assigned sector which he believes occupied. Only then will he provide the needed protection to his comrades on the move.

"Avoid the areas in the vicinity of large trees when digging in. Enemy artillery fire in these trees will cause tree bursts with the same effect as time fire."

Hedgerow Explosives Observer’s Report, NORMANDY: "The engineers played their part in the tank-infantry team. The sketches show graphically how the closely coordinated tank-infantry-engineer team worked in one of our divisions.

"The tank would place covering fire on the far hedge from a position behind the hedge to be breached. Under this fire the infantry would move into the field ahead to cover the engineer operations. The engineers would place explosive charges to breach the hedge during the infantry advance.

"When the tank fire had to stop to avoid endangering our own infantry, the tank would momentarily withdraw, and the charges would be detonated. The team would then move forward to the next hedgerow to repeat the performance. It was found that two charges of 50 pounds each placed as shown were adequate to breach any type of hedgerow."

[Hedgerow Explosives 1]

[Hedgerow Explosives 2]

[Hedgerow Explosives 3]

Lean on the Artillery Preparation Commanding General, 79th Division, NORMANDY: "Heavy artillery preparation fires, terrifically expensive in ammunition, have been wasted because they were not closely followed up by the attacking infantry. Remember these supporting fires do not destroy the enemy but merely force him underground for a brief period. You must be on top of him when he ‘pops up’ again."

The Useful 4.2 Infantry Battalion Commander, NORMANDY: "The 4.2-inch chemical mortar has proved to be a wonderful close-support weapon. Captured prisoners stated that they feared it more than artillery shell because they could not hear the projectile. The Germans have shown a marked dislike for WP, and on many occasions a few rounds, thrown in their hedgerow positions have caused their precipitate withdrawal.

"We fired the mortars like artillery pieces, using forward observers with the assault rifle companies. The mortars did their best work at ranges of 1,500 to 2,000 yards, but on occasion they have done deadly execution at 3,500 yards."

Battlefield Recovery Under Fire Letter, First U. S. Army Group, NORMANDY: "A tank battalion used the following procedure to recover one of their tanks which had been immobilized only 200 yards from the German lines:

"An infantry platoon was placed in concealment in the hedgerow facing the German position and disposed so that its fire would cover the disabled tank. An 81-mm mortar was emplaced on the right flank of the infantry platoon. Then the tank recovery vehicle (T-2) started forward. Almost immediately a German machine gun opened fire but was silenced in short order by the mortar.

"When the recovery vehicle reached the disabled tank, the German infantry opened fire and moved forward, but the heavy fire from our infantry platoon, coupled with a concentration from the mortar, caused their precipitate retirement. The recovery vehicle hooked on to the tank and towed it to safety with no further difficulty and no casualties."