Kursk

[Darryl60]

One of the things that killed the Northern attack was the reliance on Ferdinand assault guns to punch a hole through the Soviet defenses.

They sent approximately 90(All the ones they had at the time) of them into battle. I am not sure any of them survived. While they could destroy any tank in existance at the time,and were basically invulnerable to tank or AT gun fire,they had a fatal flaw. No machine guns.

Soviet infantry had a field day killing those beasts,since their infantry support got pinned down and couldn't follow the Ferdinands.

That loss seriously screwed up the Northern attack.

On a side note,they were built by Porche(A subsidiary of Krupps at the time)...and Porche had a very bad habit of not putting machine guns on any tank. They also built a few Tiger tanks(Without machine guns of course) which saw action at Kursk...with the same result. Knocked out by Infantry. I think those were also used on the Northern side of the bulge.

And let's face it. Model was no Manstein.

Now here's a "what if for you". What if Rommel had been transferred to the Eastern front? Rommel Commanding the Northern attack and Manstein the Southern? Would it have made any difference?

Darryl

[ January 11, 2003, 03:02 AM: Message edited by: Darryl60 ]

[SgtMuhammed]

I think only about 5 Ferdinands made it out of Kursk alive. Porsche also designed the original turret for the King Tiger. The made about 50 before switching to the final design.

I don't think Rommel would have done appreciably better. He was good at wideopen manuever warfare but tended to falter when trying to crack strong defensive positions.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Darryl60:

One of the things that killed the Northern attack was the reliance on Ferdinand assault guns to punch a hole through the Soviet defenses.

They sent approximately 90(All the ones they had at the time) of them into battle. I am not sure any of them survived. While they could destroy any tank in existance at the time,and were basically invulnerable to tank or AT gun fire,they had a fatal flaw. No machine guns.

Darryl

Considering 50 made it out of Kursk to fight during the early snows before being pulled out in Oct to be modernised to Elephants standard and that they were credited with over 300 AFV kills I think your conclusion are a bit false. Esp when one notes that Model opens his attacks with Infantry Divs and not with PzJager battalions.

I suggest you check your sources along with the unusual statement that Tigers were being used by front line units sans MGs by Porsche.

[mididoctors]

And let's face it. Model was no Manstein.

Now here's a "what if for you". What if Rommel had been transferred to the Eastern front? Rommel Commanding the Northern attack and Manstein the Southern? Would it have made any difference?

[/QB]

not realy the whole premise for the offensive was whack..... Model wasn't that bad a general was he? I guess your saying he wasn't brilliant like Manstein....

No amount of military panache was going to do the buisness here.

Boris

London

[Hortlund]

I'm not sure about Model. He was an excellent defensive General. In fact, I think he and Heinrichi were the two best defensive commanders the Germans had.

But Im not convinced about Models offensive capabilities...His desicion for Zitadelle to use infantry divisions for the breakthrough proved disasterous, and might very well have been the factor that led to the northern shoulder bogging so very fast. In the south, Hoth did the complete opposite, focusing as much of II SS Pz Corps tanks in one spot (on top of unlucky 52nd Guards Rifle Division).

[Andreas]

Zhukov in his memoirs states that Soviet attention was focused more heavily on the northern shoulder, and it was more highly fortified. That may just be a "Matsuri-go" (Japanese for 'after-the-event') excuse by Zhukov for the failure to contain II. SS Panzerkorps in the south. I don't know if that is correct or not.

One big reason was that parts of the follow-on forces in the north (e.g. 12.PD) were drawn into the defense of Orel by the well-timed Red Army spoiling attack there, which turned out to be very dangerous. 12.PD had already concentrated about 35km north of the frontline, and according to its history was due to attack to reinforce the northern push as a breakthrough force.

[mididoctors]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

[QB]I'm not sure about Model. He was an excellent defensive General. In fact, I think he and Heinrichi were the two best defensive commanders the Germans had.

What are your thoughts on Kesselring as a Defensive General? not in same league?

Boris

London

BTW andreas if your reading this I am working in a studio in N London today (now!) so will not make it have a good time.

[kevinkins]

Not sure if this was brought up in the long thread ...

The battle did not stop when the Germans decided to stop their attack. The Soviets had always planned a counter offensives to the north (Orel Bulge) and south (Operation Rumantsyev).

These and follow on attacks forced the Germans

back to the Dniper. Although it soon became a willing German withdrawl the Soviets beat them to the river and held the most important bridgeheads in WW2. The Eastern Wall was cracked from the very start.

Given the Soviets obtained a huge strategic success I would have to say they won the Kursk Campaign. The Germans gained nothing long term and the creation those bridgeheads shortened the war.

Kevin

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by mididoctors:

What are your thoughts on Kesselring as a Defensive General? not in same league?

Personally I see Kesselring as a German version of Eisenhower. Although the Italian and African theaters are not my strong side, my impression is that Kesselring was good in the same way Eisenhower was. A good "huge unit" leader, good with logistics, a good team builder, good at finding the right man for the job. In short, the type of guy you need at the top of the organizational chart.

But I would not trust either of them with the actual planning and execution of neither offensive or defensive operations.

I think Kesselring would have been an excellent choice for OKH/OKW-CiC if Hitler had realized the limits to his abilities.

So to answer your question, no, he is not in the same class as Model or Heinrici.

[coe]

So from what I understand, Model decided to commit the infantry to eat through the defensive zone first? That failed? I thought that's what the Allies tried to do (on both fronts) post Kursk. Even at El Alamein, from what I understand, the idea was the infantry were to have a go at it first. I like the Elefants - you know it's funny that the same guy who made the small sports car made a whole bunch of large tanks!

(I wonder if a soldier could outrun an Elefant)....

As a last gasp measure perhaps they could have

fired a machine gun down the barrel of the

88mm gun. Ha ha

[Darryl60]

Not all the Porche Tigers were converted to Ferdinands and since the germans(Hitler mostly),wanted as many tanks at Kursk as possible,the unconverted Tigers were sent there as well.(Not a bright decision,but then Hitler hadn't made a bright decision since the Munich agreement.).

Darryl

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by coe:

So from what I understand, Model decided to commit the infantry to eat through the defensive zone first? That failed?

It is often pointed out as the difference between the northern and southern pincers, and thus a possible cause of the northern pincer's failure. I'm not sold on that though, first of all as was pointed out the soviets have claimed that the northern pincer was their best side. And that can be substantiated somewhat by the fact that several units intended for the northern pincer never actually made it there because of soviet actions, and the counterattack on the northern pincer did indeed start before the german offensive was called off (IIRC the southern counter-attack force wasn't even properaly positioned for a counter-attack at the time).

Also there is the issue of the composition of german forces, I don't have any references handy but of the top of my head I would say that Manstein basically had the cream of the german panzer force while Model had a more infantry heavy force.

Anyway that's just a very global assesment of some of the factors involved, I hope some of the experts can go into some more detail.

[Hortlund]

Well, the problem with using infantry to crack open the front is that you need lots of it, and you have to be able to accept heavy losses.

Using infantry for initial penetration was standard procedure for the soviets in the later parts of the war. Normally at the schwerpunkt they would outnumber the German defenders 5-1 or higher. That combined with lots of artillery and a Russian approach to own losses made this tactic a very good way to achieve breakthroughs. Use the cheap infantry for the penetration, then send in the expensive tanks for exploitation.

Same with Monty at Alamein. I dont remember the numbers exactly, but I know the Brits had a large superiority in infantry at the point of attack, and I also know that those british units suffered heavy casualties.

This is why using infantry to achieve penetration really never was a good idea for the Germans. They didnt have alot of infantry, and they could not just throw them away.

As for relative tank numbers in the north and south. Combined number of tanks and assault guns in the north: 920; in the south 1508. South also had a better tank to assault gun ratio. To add to this, Model chose to go infantry first. This made him extremely dependent on the Luftwaffe.

On the first day, the combined number of tanks and assault guns that Model threw in the attack

on the 5th July were:

Tanks

505 Sch Pz Abt: 31 Tiger

20th Pz Div: 15 Pz III, 35 Pz IV

Other units: 31 tanks

Assault guns (various units):

89 Ferdinand

45 Sturmpanzer IV (Brummbär)

229 StuG III

[Aragorn2002]

Where can I obtain the new book on Kursk from Jean Restayn? I could not find it on Amazon.com or anywhere else.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

[it is often pointed out as the difference between the northern and southern pincers, and thus a possible cause of the northern pincer's failure. I'm not sold on that though, first of all as was pointed out the soviets have claimed that the northern pincer was their best side. And that can be substantiated somewhat by the fact that several units intended for the northern pincer never actually made it there because of soviet actions, and the counterattack on the northern pincer did indeed start before the german offensive was called off (IIRC the southern counter-attack force wasn't even properaly positioned for a counter-attack at the time).

Also there is the issue of the composition of german forces, I don't have any references handy but of the top of my head I would say that Manstein basically had the cream of the german panzer force while Model had a more infantry heavy force.

Anyway that's just a very global assesment of some of the factors involved, I hope some of the experts can go into some more detail.[/QB]

I don't see how the North being for the Soviets stronger could be a sufficient explanation. For one thing it would indicate either a massive failure on the part of Soviet intelligence in not noticing that army group south had most of the Panzers, infantry and Luftwaffe supporting it. Or a surreal Soviet understanding that for Kursk the main German effort would be made by the weaker army group centre completely at odd with previous German operational conduct. This failure is Soviet intelligence is inconceivable for a army that was able to gain the exact time of the start of the offensive to the extent that soviet air strikes and arty bombardment began before the Germans.

The fact that Vorzney front (southern) sector was unable to carry out timetabled counter attacks may have more to do with the excessive casualties suffered versus Army Group south’s Armour heavy attack, eg the emasculation of 5th Guards Tank after a single day of combat. AKA reserves were being committed to fill rents in the defensive line that had lost 32km in the first three days settling down to 6.4km per day for the first week. (US advance for Operation Cobra was 8.1km per day for the first week).

[Grisha]

Using infantry for initial penetration was standard procedure for the soviets in the later parts of the war. Normally at the schwerpunkt they would outnumber the German defenders 5-1 or higher. That combined with lots of artillery and a Russian approach to own losses made this tactic a very good way to achieve breakthroughs. Use the cheap infantry for the penetration, then send in the expensive tanks for exploitation.

Lt. Hortlund, these latter penetration attacks were strongly supported by all manner of heavy weapons: artillery, mortars, mgs, ATRs, direct fire field guns, and especially, SUs and medium & heavy tanks. The SUs and tanks were from either separate tank/SU regiments or brigades which had been subordinated to a rifle division for infantry support. Coordination and cooperation was the keyword in the penetration phase, resulting in a formidible display of combined arms warfare. The IS-II was made primarily as a breakthrough tank, which meant that it was most often used during the penetration phase in support of infantry.

Generally, at the main attack axis the Soviets outnumbered the German defenses considerably in just about everything, from infantry to artillery to mortars to SUs and tanks.

[Hortlund]

Yes, quite correct. But as you say all those units were either part of the infantry division or subordinated to it.

I was not being clear enough when I said "using infantry for initial penetration". What I meant was "using infantry divisions (Corps) for initial penetration".

It is the same thing with northern shoulder really. Although I said Model tried to break the soviet lines using infantry (which he did really), that infantry was supported by over 300 assault guns and 100 tanks, 700something Luftwaffe fighters and bombers and masses of artillery.

[coe]

So the major difference it appears is that in the initial break through stages, the tanks are subordinate to the infantry (that is in breaking the defensive zone) but after that it changes (exploitation)....?

[Andreas]

I think the major difference is that the Soviets used infantry with support weapons when they had decisive local odds for them. See also this thread where I dicussed that a while back.

The Germans on the northern shoulder had local odds against them.

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

Using infantry for initial penetration was standard procedure for the soviets in the later parts of the war. [..] and a Russian approach to own losses made this tactic a very good way to achieve breakthroughs. Use the cheap infantry for the penetration, then send in the expensive tanks for exploitation.

Same with Monty at Alamein. I dont remember the numbers exactly, but I know the Brits had a large superiority in infantry at the point of attack, and I also know that those british units suffered heavy casualties.

Allied commanders didn't use infantry for the breaktrough because they were inhumane, or because 'men are cheaper than tanks'. Such tactics were used quite simply because that is what worked (for them anyway). In fact rather than this method being Dumb & Wasteful experience had shown that using the tanks to lead the way was wastefull and ineffective, so they should be commended for using the infantry effectively and not slammed for being soldier-killers.

[White Phosphorus]

Originally posted by coe:

So the major difference it appears is that in the initial break through stages, the tanks are subordinate to the infantry (that is in breaking the defensive zone) but after that it changes (exploitation)....?

No, there are special armored units standing by that will exploit after the penetration has been achieved.

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by Bastables:

I don't see how the North being for the Soviets stronger could be a sufficient explanation.

I'm sorry if I implied that, I was merely trying to sketch that there was more to it than "Manly Manstein's uses tanks as the spearhead, GOOD" versus "Stuffy Model uses his infantry in front of the tanks, the silly man, which is BAD".

For one thing it would indicate either a massive failure on the part of Soviet intelligence in not noticing that army group south had most of the Panzers, infantry and Luftwaffe supporting it. Or a surreal Soviet understanding that for Kursk the main German effort would be made by the weaker army group centre completely at odd with previous German operational conduct.

It doesn't have to mean that, at all. It seems to me that the soviet plan all along had been to counter-attack near Orel first. This makes a lot of sense because the Northern Pincer was percieved to be weaker (I'll stop there because if I credit the duhssians with any more "planning" I'll be slammed for attributing to them skills and insights they did not have ).

The fact that Vorzney front (southern) sector was unable to carry out timetabled counter attacks may have more to do with the excessive casualties suffered versus Army Group south’s Armour heavy attack,

I don't have a good reference handy, but IIRC the counter-attack forces intended for the attack into the Kharkov bulge were not actually in postion for an offensive at that point. And those to the north obviously were, since they were able to go on the offensive while the Kursk fighting was still going on.

That is what I'm getting at; Model was the main target for the initial soviet counter-offensive that would unbalance the offensive so that the southern pincer would be weakened (as units were pulled out to save the general situation) making it ripe for the second soviet blow near Kharkov.

In the North things went more or less as planned, but in the south the germans weren't slowed as much as expected and this led to the bloody counter-attacks. And while the losses inflicted on the commited reserves did push back the Kharkov offensive some weeks it was not the initial reason for the southern forces attacking later.

Or to put it in a more simple way, if the soviets had decided to mount their initial counter-offensive in the Kharkov area rather than near Orel Model would have been more succesfull (or at least would have had an easier situation), while Manstein would have been less succesfull than he was historically.

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

Or to put it in a more simple way, if the soviets had decided to mount their initial counter-offensive in the Kharkov area rather than near Orel Model would have been more succesfull (or at least would have had an easier situation), while Manstein would have been less succesfull than he was historically.

I'm sorry but I dont think your arguments support this conclusion. By the time the northern offensive started, Model was hopelessly bogged down and his attacking forces were pretty much spent. The counteroffensive is not the reason Model failed, crappy desicions on the part of Model to some extent, and Harpe (CO 41st Pz Corps) were the main reason for the faliure.

Model was not the right man for this attack. First, he himself did not believe that he could break through the soviet lines, and generally you dont want someone with that attitude leading your attack. Second he decided to go infantry first, something the Germans had never done before. Infantry first is possible under two conditions, one you have to have sufficient numbers at the schwerpunkt to overwhelm the defender, and two, you have to be able to accept the heavy losses that always come from an infantry assault. At the northern shoulder, the Germans were outnumbered, and they could not possibly accept the losses of a prolonged infantry assault. Third, Model relied heavily on the Luftwaffe to disrupt Soviet artillery and troop movement. The Red airforce tried, but were unable to stop the Luftwaffe attacks, but two other factors limited the LW efficiency. One is fuel, FW 190, the best german fighter at the time used 95 octane fuel, but during June, the 190 units had been using 95 octane fuel at double the rate they were recieving new fuel shipments from Germany (every delivery took 10 days from Germany to the airfields in the northern shoulder). When Kursk started, the partisan activity behind the front increased, meaning that the stretched fuel situation became critial. Two is crew fatigue, during the opening days of the offensive, the Luftwaffe pilots flew 6-7 sorties per day. Such intensive use of crews and aircraft can only be maintained a couple of days. The results of these problems for the Luftwaffe were that when airsupport was needed the most a couple of days into the battle, the luftwaffe units were exhausted and low on fuel.

Harpe on the other hand was the one who came up with the brilliant idea to let the Ferdinands lead the way into the soviet defensive lines "like mobile pillboxes". The idea was to use the radio controlled tanks to create paths through the minefields, and have the Ferdinands use these paths to get into the enemy lines. It turned out to be a really bad idea.

Manly Manstein's uses tanks as the spearhead, GOOD" versus "Stuffy Model uses his infantry in front of the tanks, the silly man, which is BAD".

I suppose this is how you interpret my posts on the subject of leading with infantry vs leading with tanks.

Let me just say this. Manstein was a "hands off" leader, meaning that he set the general goals for his units, and generally let the unit commanders themselves decide on how to reach their objectives. Breaking through tough defensive lines was something that the German units were very good at, in fact that was pretty much what they had been doing since 1939. German offensive doctrine was simple, well thought through, and it was known to the lower units. If you take a look at a "normal" german division sized attack in 41, 42 or 43 you will see how it works like clockwork. The units involved all know what they are supposed to do, but more importantly, they know what the units next to them are supposed to do too. In short, they know how to do attacks like that. Manstein let the southern units "do their stuff". Model had the northern units "try something new". Bad idea when you are taking on the most heavily entrenched and prepared defensive line the Germans ever faced.

If you look at the II SS Pz Corps, they really did acheive a "clean" breakthrough on July 5-6. In 36 hours they penetrated 30 km's into the soviet defensive lines. That proves that the "normal" German attack tactics worked, even against rediculously prepared defenses, given that you had well motivated, well trained and well equipped troops.

[ January 12, 2003, 01:08 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />

Manly Manstein's uses tanks as the spearhead, GOOD" versus "Stuffy Model uses his infantry in front of the tanks, the silly man, which is BAD".

I suppose this is how you interpret my posts on the subject of leading with infantry vs leading with tanks.</font>

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

[

]It doesn't have to mean that, at all. It seems to me that the soviet plan all along had been to counter-attack near Orel first. This makes a lot of sense because the Northern Pincer was percieved to be weaker (I'll stop there because if I credit the duhssians with any more "planning" I'll be slammed for attributing to them skills and insights they did not have ).

[/QB]

Really, so the Soviets managed to "put" their strongest Defensive army versus the weaker German Army group north. I’m Sorry, would it not be more logical to have greater reserves earmarked for the Soviets Oral counter attack while the stronger defences faced south to increase attrition of German Panzer Divs? Without actual proof

These arguments are all starting to sound like Monty's “Normandy Plans by hindsight”: ‘No really Normandy went exactly to (my) plan, we meant to fight an enemy quater of our size while they held us in the bridgeheads for three months.’

Lt Hortlund also has it in that Models plan had already sputtered to a halt before Soviet counter attacks. Whereas in the south Reserve units for Vrozney front where being thrown in to plug rents in the defence and catching the Soviet counter attacking forces out of position. Model also tried the Infantry first in the Ardennes with the same poor results relative to Panzers first carried out by 5th Panzer Armee.