Kursk

[Stormhouse]

I'm not entirely sure about the obsession of what II ss panzer division was doing. The conversation is about kursk not what the II ss division was doing are how well. This is some wishful thinking that if the Division was still moving a few more days would have turned into victory.

Here is the link I promised, about the russian defence doctrine.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz2/glantz2.asp

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

As far as attributes and insights go, the soviets made a consious decision to allow the germans to attack in the hope that they would spend themselves, and allow the soviets to use the aftermath of the german offensive as the starting point for theirs. That happened at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk and I would therefore say that all three are soviet successes, high losses and german near breaching of the defense notwithstanding.

Again, you are drawing conclusions that just isnt based on the facts. You are using hindsight to motivate Soviet desicions. "Oh but there were a counterattack on Dec 6th just outside Moscow, and that counterattack lead to the front line being pushed several miles to the west. Therefore, the soviets were just waiting for the Germans to overextend themselves before they struck." Suggestions like that gives the reader the impression that this was all parts of some Soviet master plan...first to lure the Germans to attack and exhaust themselves, and then to attack. This is not how it was in reality.

The counterattacks outside Moscow were desperate attacks to push back the Germans. But they were not deliberately planned any more than "attack west". Then you had the Soviet offensive to encircle AG center which was very much planned. That one ended in an abysmal faliure though, with most of the Soviet units surrounded and eliminated.

As for Stalingrad, the main Soviet winter offensive in 1942/43 was directed at AG center. But since that one too failed miserabley, and the offensive directed at 6th army in Stalingrad succeded better, not many people know that. Anyway, the Soviets did not lure the Germans to Stalingrad so they could surround them and defeat them. The situation simply arised when it was clear that Stalingrad would not be captured in days, like Rostov, or weeks like Voronezh. Suddenly the Soviets realized they had a golden opportunity to strike at an overextended foe, and they grabbed that opportunity, but it was not something they originally planned.

That's just not right. The fact that it was called of was an admission of failure, not the cause.

I find it utterly pointless to argue over semantics here. The fact remains, Zitadelle was aborted by Hitler. When Zitadelle was aborted, II SS Pz were still advancing.

Do you really think that if the offensive was still viable it would have been called off?

The northern pincer ground to a halt, the southern pincewr penetrated only on a very narrow axis, pinching off the entire saillant had become unrealistic, and the units were thus better used elsewhere.

Well, lets see shall we...could be interesting. Lets take a look at what really happened around Prokhorovka.

July 12th

At dawn on July 12th, 5th Guards tank army under Rotmistrov has over 800 tanks and SP guns. Roughly half of these belongs to 18th and 29th Tank Corps who attack LAH positions at 0830. LAH has roughly 80 tanks in the lines. At the same time 2nd Guards Tank corps attack DR to the south of LAH, and further to the south east Group Trufanov with 150 tanks (units from 26th Guards tank Brigade from 2nd GT Corps, 11&12th Guards mech brigades from 5th Guards mech Corps) attacks 6th Panzer division.

Casualties:

II SS Pz Corps reports 850 casualties, where 522 is from LAH and DR. LAH claims 192 Soviet tanks knocked out or captured. Soviets reports losing 300 tanks and 5 500 men.

48th Pz Corps was in the process of regrouping on the left flank of II SS Pz Corps. A Soviet counterattack led by 184th Rifle division was beaten back with heavy soviet casualties. Germans report 500 men and two tanks lost. Soviet casualties 4 700 men, 30 tanks.

Army Detatchment Kempf was in the process of consolidating a bridgehead on the Donets near Rzjavets on the right flank of II SS Pz Corps when Group Trefanov (mentioned above) attacked. German casualties 600 men, 2 tanks. Soviet casualties 7 400 men, 16 tanks.

Combined, the soviet losses on the whole southern flank on July 12th were at least 21 000 men and 334 tanks and SP guns. Note that these are the total write offs, i e the ones that are either captured or burned out, the rest are not counted. Using normal knocked out-burned out ratios, it becomes very clear that the soviet tank losses on July 12th were appaling. The Germans on the southern flank lost 5 500 men and 25 tanks and StuGs (total write offs).

In these counterattacks, the Soviets failed to gain any ground in. SST continues to advance NE from their position north of the Psel.

July 13th.

North of the Psel, SST is continuing its advance north, effectively outflanking 5th Guards tank army. On the 13th, 24th guards tank brigade, 10th guards mech brigade and units from 5th guards army are regrouped to a line NE of SST to halt that advance. SST spends the 13th fending off various Soviet counterattacks.

Meanwhile, SSDR attacks east to link up with 7th Pz division attacking west from Army detatchment Kempf. Between the two units, the Soviet 69th army is holding a wedge-like position extending south. This attack continues over the 14th, and on the 15th of July SSDR and 7th Pz link up. 69th Army has withdrawn from its positions though, so no pocket is formed.

THIS is the interesting point in the battle. Right here the Soviets are reinforcing their positions in and around Prokhorovka. The link up between SSDR and 7th Pz had secured the German right flank. Manstein decides to shift the axis of attack from NE to N towards Obojan. Manstein can use II SS Pz Corps together with the completely fresh 24th Pz Corps taken from army reserve to attack north against 1st Tank army and 6th guards army, both these soviet units are spent after heavy fighting. 24th Pz Corps consists of SS Wiking and 17th Pz division.

This is where it would have become interesting. But as SST is regrouping from the north side of the Psel to shift focus north, Zitadelle is called off.

On the 4th of July the soviet forces facing the southern pincer numbered 625 000 men and 1 700 tanks. During the battle these forces were reinforced with an additional 300 000 men and 1 200 tanks. The German forces on the southern pincer numbered 330 000 men and 1 500 tanks.

So you have a situation where a numerically inferior attacker is attacking a heavily entrenched opponent, who is prepared and waiting. And that defender is inable to halt the advance.

What if..? Is not only something that we indulge in, but it is also what the military leadership basis it's plans on. And that's what I mean with no real hope for succes, not that it could never ever have possibly succeeded. But simply that there was no realistic cause for hope, and that was the case at Kursk. Whether or not II SS was still moving or not is immaterial, it could not hope for more than local gain. They could not expect to create a penetration that was deep and defensible enough to allow any real gain.

I disagree. In fact, I have no idea how you reach the conclusion that the movement or non-movement of II SS Pz Corps is irrelevant. I do not know where you get the idea that it could achieve anything more than a local gain. You have to base your statement on something more than just your word.

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Stormhouse:

I'm not entirely sure about the obsession of what II ss panzer division was doing. The conversation is about kursk not what the II ss division was doing are how well. This is some wishful thinking that if the Division was still moving a few more days would have turned into victory.

The reason II SS Pz Corps comes up in any discussion about Kursk is because the southern pincer was the only one making any real progress. The unit leading that progress was II SS Pz Corps. That has got nothing to do with any wishful thinking on my part at least. WW2 ended 60 years ago.

[Foxbat]

So do you reckon things "just happened" for the Russkies? Because you really do make them sound rather backward, as if they only ever do things when forced by circumstance or providence and even then they screw up.

I wonder how they decided on their Kursk StratUHgy?

Stalin "Us attack first-us?"

Zhukov "Nuh, not attack we"

Stalin "But wot if not attack?"

Zhukov "Uh.... defend!"

Stalin "And after defend wot we do then"

Zhukov "Well ..uh.. we ..uh.. how can me know that wot has nut happUHnd yet?"

It could be just me, but I was always under the imrpession that they were a bit more savvy then that

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

So do you reckon things "just happened" for the Russkies?

Of cource not. But I dont attribute some mythical skills of war at the operational level to them either. For some reason, many people seem to be almost idolizing the Soviets during 44-45. I suppose this is a counterreaction to the mindeless horde-image that was prevailing after the war, but the current image is equally one sided and wrong.

[jgdpzr]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Foxbat:

So do you reckon things "just happened" for the Russkies?

Of cource not. But I dont attribute some mythical skills of war at the operational level to them either. For some reason, many people seem to be almost idolizing the Soviets during 44-45. I suppose this is a counterreaction to the mindeless horde-image that was prevailing after the war, but the current image is equally one sided and wrong.</font>

[MickeeMao]

Did the Russians win at Kursk? Let's have a look at a few simple facts.

Strategic objectives obtained by the Russians: Some

Strategic objectives obtained by the Germans: None

The Russians won. Not only did they win, but they were able to follow up their victory with successful offensive opertations that continued to drive the Germans back.

You can debate the reasons for this happening, or you can specualate as to what might have happended had different decisions been made, but in the end, the Germans lost.

As far as Russian operational superiority goes, it was good enough to beat the Germans, and in the end, that's what mattered.

[Stormhouse]

I really get the feeling that some posters on this board attribute all Russian success's to there superior numbers and to the weather. It has been mentioned many times on the board how good Russian intelligence was about the enemy as oppose to the Germans. How good Russians were at fooling Germans about where they were going to attack. Yet it is never acknowledge by some people that are only interested in pointing out how one German guy took out 10 Russian tanks in his Tiger... Russians had tank ace’s too, how come we never hear about them???

Also I think we should look at and no body ever does at the cost of producing a Tiger and the cost of producing a T-34 and as to how many could be fielded. A Cadillac (meaning Tiger) is great but if you can only have one for 10 km of the front and you can have 10 t-34 for the same length of the front which tank is really better. Too many people get into this Tank vs Tank thing. It’s a bit more complicated then that, look at the production costs... Also too many people are always ready to point the Tigers strong points never its weakness’.

Russian were getting really good at waging war in the second half of the war, I’m sure a lot of it had to do with the defeats they suffered at first. They were willing to learn and leave nothing to chance. As for the Germans all they had was victories and any set back was always attributed to bad weather or superior Russian numbers. No new lessons were drone up after a defeat. I say this because I have read numerous German point of view memoirs.

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by MickeeMao:

You can debate the reasons for this happening, or you can specualate as to what might have happended had different decisions been made, but in the end, the Germans lost.

Mr Einstein I presume?

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Stormhouse:

I really get the feeling that some posters on this board attribute all Russian success's to there superior numbers and to the weather. It has been mentioned many times on the board how good Russian intelligence was about the enemy as oppose to the Germans. How good Russians were at fooling Germans about where they were going to attack. Yet it is never acknowledge by some people that are only interested in pointing out how one German guy took out 10 Russian tanks in his Tiger... Russians had tank ace’s too, how come we never hear about them???

Because they didnt survive long enough? Compare if you will individual probability of survival in a T-34 and in a PzVIB. Anyway, that is not what we are discussing now (but we can if you want).

You are indeed correct, the Soviets excelled at deception, intelligence and counterintelligence. These are operational level considerations. And they were indeed very good on the operational level. On the tactical level they pretty much relied on superior numbers and/or superior firepower.

Also I think we should look at and no body ever does at the cost of producing a Tiger and the cost of producing a T-34 and as to how many could be fielded. A Cadillac (meaning Tiger) is great but if you can only have one for 10 km of the front and you can have 10 t-34 for the same length of the front which tank is really better.

The Tiger. You just have more of the inferior tank.

Too many people get into this Tank vs Tank thing. It’s a bit more complicated then that, look at the production costs... Also too many people are always ready to point the Tigers strong points never its weakness’.

How did this turn into a "pros and cons of the Tiger tank" discussion? Lets just say that tank vs tank mattered alot on the tactical level, and not very much on the strategical level and leave it at that. Everyone knows what tank is good and what tank is bad.

Russian were getting really good at waging war in the second half of the war, I’m sure a lot of it had to do with the defeats they suffered at first. They were willing to learn and leave nothing to chance. As for the Germans all they had was victories and any set back was always attributed to bad weather or superior Russian numbers. No new lessons were drone up after a defeat. I say this because I have read numerous German point of view memoirs.

No new lessons learned on the German side from 1941 to 1945? What kind of memoirs do you read anyway?

[ January 03, 2003, 01:24 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

[MickeeMao]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by MickeeMao:

You can debate the reasons for this happening, or you can specualate as to what might have happended had different decisions been made, but in the end, the Germans lost.

Mr Einstein I presume?</font>

[White Phosphorus]

Hey Lyn, Does that book cover late war memoirs? Because according to battlefield.ru there is another book of Loza's memoirs "Fighting for the Soviet Motherland" which covers the early war.

[Stormhouse]

Ok so what are we looking at then, some people are talking about Tactical level and others are talking about Operation level successes. One person points out the operational level and another starts arguing about the tactical level...

No i didnt mean this to become a tiger vs other tanks discussion.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Stormhouse:

Ok so what are we looking at then, some people are talking about Tactical level and others are talking about Operation level successes. One person points out the operational level and another starts arguing about the tactical level...

That's why this discussion is moving at cross purposes. There are at least three levels under discussion: tactics, operations and strategy. The German performanced varies depending on which level we're looking at.

1. Tactics: Germans are still excellent here in July '43, and arguably superior to the Soviets.

2. Operations: This is debatable. I'd give the edge to the Soviets, but I am guessing an argument can be made for the Germans.

3. Strategy: Clearly the Soviets have the edge here, both because their plan was better and more realistic and because they actually won: they achieved many of their strategic goals while the Germans achieved none.

I would suggest that there's a fourth level, grand strategy, which would involve providing the materials of war for the armies to fight with and coordinating with their allies on a world-wide level to achieve an effective global strategy. Here again, the Soviets have the clear edge. They massed materials of war in the right place to an extent that the German army could not overcome them, and the Allied attack on Sicily threw off the timing of the German offensive in a way that was probably not decisive but which nontheless aided the Soviet goals. Thereafter, the German army would consistently suffer from a one-two punch as the US/UK and Soviet armies alternately launched offensives.

So, as I see the battle, only on the tactical level did the Germans have a definable edge. They were losing ground to the Russians operationally by 1943 and had arguably already lost the war on the levels of strategy and, particularly, grand strategy.

[ January 03, 2003, 03:52 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Stormhouse]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Stormhouse:

Ok so what are we looking at then, some people are talking about Tactical level and others are talking about Operation level successes. One person points out the operational level and another starts arguing about the tactical level...

That's why this discussion is moving at cross purposes. There are at least three levels under discussion: tactics, operations and strategy. The German performanced varies depending on which level we're looking at.

1. Tactics: Germans are still excellent here in July '43, and arguably superior to the Soviets.

2. Operations: This is debatable. I'd give the edge to the Soviets, but I am guessing an argument can be made for the Germans.

3. Strategy: Clearly the Soviets have the edge here, both because their plan was better and more realistic and because they actually won: they achieved many of their strategic goals while the Germans achieved none.

I would suggest that there's a fourth level, grand strategy, which would involve providing the materials of war for the armies to fight with and coordinating with their allies on a world-wide level to achieve an effective global strategy. Here again, the Soviets have the clear edge. They massed materials of war in the right place to an extent that the German army could not overcome them, and the Allied attack on Sicily threw off the timing of the German offensive in a way that was probably not decisive but which nontheless aided the Soviet goals. Thereafter, the German army would consistently suffer from a one-two punch as the US/UK and Soviet armies alternately launched offensives.

So, as I see the battle, only on the tactical level did the Germans have a definable edge. They were losing ground to the Russians operationally by 1943 and had arguably already lost the war on the levels of strategy and, particularly, grand strategy.</font>

[von Lucke]

Irresistable Force / Immovable Object = Kursk.

(Formula courtesy of Einsteins-Brain-in-a-Jar™)

[SgtMuhammed]

Unfortunatly, or fortunatly depending on how you look at it, history is full of wars where the side with the tactical advantage looses because of poor strategy (2nd Punic, WWI, WWII, Vietnam, to name a few).

[Darryl60]

You also have to factor in the fact that the Soviets had better intelligence than the Germans did.

The Sovs had agents in Berlin,while the Germans had no agents in Moscow.

Kursk was won by the Sovs through intelligence.They knew the Germans were coming...they had a good idea of how and with what equipment the Germans were planning on attacking with,and had enough information to be able to accurately guess at the places the Germans intended on penetrating at. The only thing they didn't know was the exact date for the attack.(Though they found that out from a few prisoners that were taken a few hours before Zitadelle began).

Regardless on what Manstein's AG suceeded in doing,Zitadelle failed the moment the Northern Pincer ground to a stop.

Darryl

[Hortlund]

I dont think anyone is arguing that Zitadelle was a German victory. Zitadelle should not be held up as an example of how the Soviets managed to defeat a German blitzkrieg offensive though.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

Zitadelle should not be held up as an example of how the Soviets managed to defeat a German blitzkrieg offensive though.

It certainly is an example of a Soviet defeat of a German offensive. Whether the Germans were attempting a blitzkrieg or not might be considered a matter of interpretation--at most a minor semantic distinction.

An argument could be made that the notion of "lightning war" was obsolete by 1943, but the Allies managed some pretty good late war imitations of blitzkrieg with the Cobra-Falaise breakout in the west and the destruction of Army Group Center in the east.

I'm guessing that if the Germans at Kursk had achieved swift breakthroughs north and south and the rapid encirclement of the Soviet armies in the salient, they would have been happy to call it blitzkrieg.

[Grisha]

As I said, I agree that the Kursk offensive failed. It was a strategic offensive that failed due to the inability of the northern pincer to meet any of its objectives. The offensive was cancelled due to strategic considerations (Sicily). But the advance on the southern pincer was never stopped by enemy resistance, therefore I think it is wrong to hold up Kursk as an example on how the blitzkrieg failed. Frankly, I dont think Kursk has anything to do with Bitzkrieg at all, since there is no German attempt att "blitzing" or how you want to put it. Manstein knew he could not blitz those defenses, instead what we see is a slow but steady advance led by II SS.

Lt. Hortlund,

The southern pincer was not stopped when the operation was called of, but it was going at a snail's pace. The Germans would plan for an attack, planning to use specific units for that attack, then never see some of those units, because they had to respond to a Soviet attack on the flanks of the spearhead. Because of a lack of sufficient forces, German gains would be minimal, and sometimes even lost after a counterattack. German progress on the south pincer was painfully slow by German blitzkrieg standards.

Soviet losses were large, 6:1 to 8:1, just take a number. That they were large is not particularly surprising. That a German offensive in mid summer was halted was world news in 1943. German losses were nothing compared to the Soviets, but on 13 July tank totals for some SS units, including repairs, were:</font>

• Leibstandarte - 50 tanks, 20 assault guns</font>
• Das Reich - 83 tanks, 24 assault guns.</font>
• Totenkopf - 54 tanks, 20 assault guns.</font>

When you realize fully equipped SS Panzer Divisions had around 290 tanks (command and light tanks included), the numbers above are telling. The southern pincer was extremely narrow and fragmented - mostly due to Soviet counterattacks. Could this single push by a depleted armored force continue on in the face of three fresh rifle armies and a tank and mech corps (one rifle army was deploying on A.Det.Kempf's right flank, the rest were positioning themselves NE of Prokhorovka)? That's the question.

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Lt. Hortlund,

The southern pincer was not stopped when the operation was called of, but it was going at a snail's pace. The Germans would plan for an attack, planning to use specific units for that attack, then never see some of those units, because they had to respond to a Soviet attack on the flanks of the spearhead. Because of a lack of sufficient forces, German gains would be minimal, and sometimes even lost after a counterattack. German progress on the south pincer was painfully slow by German blitzkrieg standards.

Soviet losses were large, 6:1 to 8:1, just take a number. That they were large is not particularly surprising. That a German offensive in mid summer was halted was world news in 1943. German losses were nothing compared to the Soviets, but on 13 July tank totals for some SS units, including repairs, were:</font>

• Leibstandarte - 50 tanks, 20 assault guns</font>
• Das Reich - 83 tanks, 24 assault guns.</font>
• Totenkopf - 54 tanks, 20 assault guns.</font>

When you realize fully equipped SS Panzer Divisions had around 290 tanks (command and light tanks included), the numbers above are telling. The southern pincer was extremely narrow and fragmented - mostly due to Soviet counterattacks. Could this single push by a depleted armored force continue on in the face of three fresh rifle armies and a tank and mech corps (one rifle army was deploying on A.Det.Kempf's right flank, the rest were positioning themselves NE of Prokhorovka)? That's the question.

Well, first you have to take into account that the SS divisions did not start Zitadelle at full strenght, otherwise those numbers will be misleading.

Then you have to remember the nature of the fighting on the southern pincer. You cannot hold Zitadelle up to blitzkrieg standards and compare the two. The Germans were attacking while tactically outnumbered more than 2-1 against a heavily entrenched enemy who on top of everyhting knew exactly when and where the attack would come. When II SS Pz Corps were moving to the jump off points during the pre dawn hours on July 5th, they were hit by a Soviet barrage...that tells us something on how good the Soviet intel was, and it should give a clue as to how desperate the Germans must have felt. Frankly, to me it is surprising that the Germans made any progress whatsoever. The northern pincer gives an image of what you should expect when attacking under such conditions. Nevertheless, the southern pincer managed to make some excellent progress under these conditions.

Anyway, if we jump to July 15th we have a very interesting situation on the southern pincer. I disagree that it was fragmented. Because as I was saying earlier, during the 13th-15th, SSDR and 7th Pz managed to link up almost capturing 69th Army in the process. This linkup consolidates and shortens the German front enormously, now army detatchment Kempf can cover the right flank of II SS Pz Corps all the way to S Prokhorovka. Meanwhile ever since the failed counterattack on the 12th, the Soviets have been reinforcing Prokhorovka and the area NE of SST (SST is roughly directly west of Prokhorovka, but if they want to get there they would have to cross the Psel again).

This is when Manstein decides to shift the axis of attack. Now say what you will about the Soviet abilities on the operational level, and I might be inclined to agree that generally the Soviets had the Germans licked on the operational level in 44 and 45 (we might disagree on the reasons why though), but Manstein was probably the most able operational level leader Germany had during the war. And on the operational level he was a really tough opponent for the Soviets. And he succeded many times to turn seemingly hopeless situations into brilliant victories (2nd and 3rd Kharkov would be two examples of this) This axis shifting is something that the Germans were good at, and at the same time it was something the soviets always had problems with countering. I suspect the general quality of lower level officers and general initiative ability comes into play here. At the same time, Soviet operations rarely included such axis shifts in case they were becoming bogged down.

Drifting a bit from the subject here I see, back to July 15th. If Manstein had shifted the axis of attack N and at the same time committed his reserves, July 16th-17th would have seen a force of two panzer corps (possibly more if Manstein had chosen to commit 48th Pz corps too) hitting north towards Obojan. The II SS Pz Corps had suffered casualties in the offensive so far, but they were far from spent (something that the battles following Zitadelle shows if nothing else). And they would be reinforced by two divisions from 24th Pz Corps (Wiking and 17th Panzer). Against these units the soviets only had two spent units who had suffered severe losses in the previous fighting, 5th Guards Army and 1st Tank Army.

This situation, where the Soviets have spent/are spending their last reserves "in the wrong place", and where the Germans seem to have identified the key moment to commit the panzer reserve is a very interesting one. And I for one am far from sure that the Soviets would have been able to halt that attack before Obojan. And once passed Obojan, the Germans would actually have broken through all the Soviet defensive lines. From there, anything could happen.

I know many think that reaching Obojan would mean little in "the big picture" or they stare themselves blind at comparative numbers of the forces involved. But those same people might fail to realize that warfare is as much about psychology as it is about hardware and numbers. The two failed Kharkov offensives all ended with numerically inferior German forces encircling and destroying superior Soviet forces.

Lets just say that the situation on July 15th is far from decided, and if the offensive had been allowed to continue the Germans might very well have been able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.

[ January 03, 2003, 08:16 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

[Grisha]

Lt. Hortlund,

Regarding Soviet superiority against the Germans, that's not quite the correct picture. One of the big problems for Vatutin was in determining the German main axis. He didn't quite get it right, and it showed. Nothing against Vatutin really, since the Germans did have a number of directions to pick from in the south. And though the Soviets knew pretty much when Zitadelle was going to happen and where to a general degree, knowing the actual main axes is a big deal. The Soviets later used this to great effect against the Germans in 1944-45, masking scale and location, for the most part, in their offensives.

Another thing to bear in mind is that the attacker determines the location of the attack, thereby creating initial favorable conditions in numbers and surprise. What saved the Soviet was in the deployment and employment of their reserves. Without them the German assaults would've been much more devastating.

As to the SS panzer divisions not being at full strength, this may be the case to some degree, but they still were all assigned an additional heavy tank company that was very large, as companies - even German companies - go.

von Manstein was an amazing military commander, and his intuitive understanding of operational art was on par with anyone at the time. However, I'm not so sure he could have pulled off a miracle, which is what he would need to do. I'm at a loss as to what he could've done, since he would've been making a breakthrough from a single point. Certainly, he would've wreaked havoc, but from an operational-strategic level any move that went too deep into the Soviet operational depths would be very dangerous. There were still very strong Soviet forces on the flanks of the Kursk salient, and they most definitely would've been employed in containing von Manstein, or even cutting him off. At the very most, the result might've been a trade-off: destruction of the SS Panzer Corps for the calling off of the Soviet counteroffensive.

Another point to note regarding von Manstein is that the Soviets were learning fast. In late 1943 after the 3rd Guards Tank Army broke out of the Lyutezh bridgehead north of Kiev, von Manstein conducted a 'backhand blow' at Rybalko's tank army. It failed.

I really think the most favorable result the Germans could've realistically expected would've been a stalemate. And since you speak of psychology, I would expect any extended attempts by the Germans to turn the south pincer at Kursk into an operational victory as an operation bathed in extreme angst. The north pincer has failed utterly, and all that remains is an attack sector, 50km wide, that must somehow do amazing things in the Soviet operational rear without being cut off.

[Leit]

You all foget that armies must be not only surrounded but exhausted. Surrounded battlegroup wich potecial lager then atacker (as it was at Kursk) gives nothing to germans but danger to full route for all divisions wich are to the east of surrounding russians.

In view of subsequent very successful conteroffencive to the West of the Russian armies, I am represented very ridiculous to assert, that if the ring has closed it would be a victory...

Yes, probably you consider that Germans would keep 20..50 kilometer corridor and crushed those armies what have broken German defense on hundreds kilometers?

[T-34\85]

I find it utterly pointless to argue over semantics here. The fact remains, Zitadelle was aborted by Hitler. When Zitadelle was aborted, II SS Pz were still advancing.

That's not semantics. You committed the false cause logical fallacy.

And to assert that Citadel failed only because it was called off is utterly incorrect. Do you intend to backup your claim that

Zitadelle failed for one reason; it was called off.

with any evidence?