Combat Mission Napoleonic Style...

[Guest konrad]

Originally posted by Thin Red Line:

...the roar of the 12pdrs batteries...

[Ex Bellator]

What a godawful painting. It took a lot of men to service one cannon, so how exactly did they operate the one in the middle

[Louie the Toad]

"What a godawful painting. It took a lot of men to service one cannon, so how exactly did they operate the one in the middle "

Those guys are literally 'out of the picture'

Charging the cannons.... Toad

[Santi]

Originally posted by Rex Bellator:

What a godawful painting. It took a lot of men to service one cannon, so how exactly did they operate the one in the middle

Have not you guys heard of the almighty Spanish three-barreled thingy?, a bit unwieldy and cumbersome it was, but devastating indeed. Notice the fellow with the funny hat on ( there is just one thing missing: a couple of flamenco dancers ) as he crouches to set the fuze alight.

Pity forum rules forbid gore pictures since the follow up one would show those Polish lancers blown up sky-high

[Joachim]

Originally posted by Thin Red Line:

Especially they looked relatively small to me, knowing the number of men who fought there. Men density was probably extraodinary on those battlefields.

The British "outpost" line in Waterloo consisted of 4 farms. Given the usual size of these farms in Western Europe, I'd guess a size of 40*40m max. Defended by 1, maybe even 2 companies of infantry. Now what would you do with a cluster of 4 heavy buldings (maybe a factory) containing a company or two in CM?

My favourite options:

1.) sIG 15cm (biggest bang for the buck). Factories in rubble for about 60 points - and you will have half of the ammo left.

2.) (I)SU 152, Brummbär, ...anything with a gun of at least 15cm. Keyholing, nothing can stop you. Still a good buy!

3.) Sturmtiger - not cost efficient, but... Louie, where is that Waterloo map???

4.) Any (non-rocket) FO from 20cm upwards... anybody ever witnessed the impact of 24cm on a factory? Hint: Direct hit not necessary.

Gruß

Joachim

[Louie the Toad]

Thin Red:

No I was not the author of the maps. But a few months ago, I built a scenario based on some WWII small actions and hypothetical maps. Out of curiosity (research) I looked at the Gettysburg map. Having walked that battlefield I wanted to see how the author constructed it. I was especially interested in the distance relationships between the historic areas. For instance how the distance between the town and Little Round Top 'felt'.

Based on that observation I concluded that I wanted to lengthen distances when I constructed my map.

That is all...... Toad

[Le Tondu]

Originally posted by Belico adalid:

Have not you guys heard of the almighty Spanish three-barreled thingy?........

Pity forum rules forbid gore pictures since the follow up one would show those Polish lancers blown up sky-high

I count only four wheels for three guns....

Yet, the next frame might not be all that gory for the Polish Lancers if they had charged after the gunners fired and before the gunners were able to reload.

I believe that is exactly what the painting is depicting. The painting appears to be of the storming of Somosierra Pass on December 4th, 1808 where the Poles overcame the Spanish defenders with a tremendous feat of valor that impressed Napoleon and all who witnessed it. If this is true, then it would explain why the guns are so "close" to each other.

[Santi]

I count only four wheels for three guns....

I was writing in jest obviously, there is no way the three guns can fit in such a small space without being one on top of another

Yet, the next frame might not be all that gory for the Polish Lancers if they had charged after the gunners fired and before the gunners were able to reload.

...alright , agreed

[Spook]

Reviving these earlier comments....

Originally posted by Marlow:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by lenakonrad:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Marlow:

He was an amoral butcher who had some initial military success, but was ultimatly brought down by better military minds.

Hilarious . </font>

[Spook]

As for adapting CM to Napoleonic battlefield combat --- FORGET IT. That's asking BF to bend the game engine to cover more than for what it was optimized for.

It might seem alluring to be able to "zoom down" and see all the soldiers arrayed of a Napoleonic army as for CM, but the video 3D load would be horrific. And playing out historical major battles (some running several hours) in 1-minute time increments would be TEDIOUS to plot orders for.

Don't force CM to be other than it was designed for. I argue this emphatically.

Now, others have noted the Breakaway sequels to the Sid Meier tactical battle games (Waterloo & Austerlitz). While the graphics for the unit & terrain could stand some MAJOR improvements, the scale and fields of view are right to me. I don't need to zoom down to look an Imperial Guardsman in the face, I just want to go down low enough to pick out the units and recognize how they differ in appearance. The Breakaway games already accomplish this.

But the Breakaway games have two fundamental problems:

1) As from the Sid Meier system, the "command and control" aspect is just plain crap. The later Napoleonic sequels did provide "activation" as a new feature, but once units are activated, they have no time-contraint limits to react to orders. CM in contrast has been doing this for years. Leaders just serve mainly for rallying purposes.

2) The real-time game clock does indeed make playing a FULL battle problematic.

Now --- apply a viable command & control system (as would truly distinguish a Davout from a Bernadotte) AND also apply WE-GO with about 5-15 minutes worth of execution between giving orders... NOW we're talking.

Probably never happen, though, unless both Sid Meier & Breakaway see fit to sell the game engine to BF.

[Joachim]

Originally posted by Spook:

Reviving these earlier comments....

In the strategic sense, I don't think that any of the Allied leaders -- even Wellington --- were quite of the measure of Nappy IN HIS PRIME. But for the years 1812-15, that was part of Napoleon's downfall; he wasn't in his prime anymore. He had gotten steadily more lethargic and steadily more predictable. Thus by the 1813 campaigns, although I don't think of any of the Allied leaders as "better" than Napoleon on a personal basis, they regardless had not only the sum strength and determination to resist, but also a better sense of what Nappy would or could do.

There are other factors:

Nappy improved the arty and its usage - but the Allies did catch up and maybe even got better.

In the early years, The allies had formations which had trouble fighting small units (A full volley of a company on 6 men??? And what with those other teams running around? Split fire? WTH is that?). Forced draft armies where you have to keep your men from deserting can't use these techniques. Late war, the allies knew how to fight these small units and had motivated volunteers able to serve in skirmish troops, too - though I actually never heard (read) of any widespread usage.

Looking at Waterloo, the usage of any skirmish troops was negated by fortified positions where the British defenders probably shot individually - and by reverse slope.

While everybody had lots of Battles of Napoleon to study, there were not as many for Wellington or Blücher - especially not ont heir improved styles after they adapted to Napoleonic warfare.

Then there is the strategic factor: Napoleon had time on his side in the early wars. He acted quick to surprise the enemy, but these battles were risks, not gambles. He could recover from a lost battle. In the 100 days, he was under immense pressure. A loss or a slow campaign would oust him, as he ruled a war weary country were many of his former followers had changed sides to consolidate their gains from his early reign. How would nappy react to their earlier betrayal after he was successful? If they supported him too much and he would lose, would the old rulers again be lenient and leave them with their gains or even still accept them as theirs? And I bet Nappy knew this problems of his "supporters". He was hard pressed to win - fast and decisive! Only a total victory would strengthen his position. Tactics in a do or die situation differ from those you do when you only need a victory (as in CM - if I go for a minor victory, it is much more likely to get a victory. )

In a war there is no runner up. If the others get better and you remain the same, you will find yourself running away, not up.

Gruß

Joachim

[Styopa]

Late war, the allies knew how to fight these small units and had motivated volunteers able to serve in skirmish troops, too - though I actually never heard (read) of any widespread usage.

AFAIK Austria had both Grenzers and Jaegers as early as 7-years' war, well before 1792. Jaegers were very small units, and few in number, but the Grenzers were a significant fraction of the standing army. I don't believe Grenzers were used against the French until 1805 at the earliest, more likely 1809. Clearly, they were considered second-rate troops and deployed as such, until the rough experiences with the skilled French skirmishers taught them a thing or two, then Grenzers were used more aggressively. (They never were Elite in any sense of the word, however.)

BTW: BTW, Napoleon didn't really improve the artillery itself, just deployed it in massed batteries. Gribeuval (sp?) (working as a Royalist before the revolution) significantly improved French artillery by adapting Austrian carriages and limbers and refining them slightly.

[Noiseman]

One thing that people tend to overlook about Napoleon in the 1813 campaign was that the armies had gotten too large to be effectively controlled by just about anyone, Napoleon included. Many times he came to the cusp of great victories, only to be brought short by command breakdowns (and lack of cavalry).

Consider that by the next time that armies of comparable size were fielded in the mid 1800's, telegraphs decent roads and railroads were in existence to speed communications.

Wellington, while a brilliant tactician and strategist, generally commanded relatively small armies against mediocre opponents who were fighting in hostile territory. I have a hard time considering him to be Napoleon's superior. Don't forget that at Waterloo Napoleon was also running all of France while forming a government in addition to fighting the campaign.

[Runyan99]

Originally posted by Spook:

As for adapting CM to Napoleonic battlefield combat --- FORGET IT. That's asking BF to bend the game engine to cover more than for what it was optimized for.

We are getting a whole new game engine with CMX2. Maybe it will be flexible enough to adapt to different periods.

It might seem alluring to be able to "zoom down" and see all the soldiers arrayed of a Napoleonic army as for CM, but the video 3D load would be horrific.

Hey, CM was designed in 1998, and the computers are getting faster.

And playing out historical major battles (some running several hours) in 1-minute time increments would be TEDIOUS to plot orders for.

Agreed, but who says we have to keep 1-minute turns? How about 5 minute turns?

Don't force CM to be other than it was designed for. I argue this emphatically.

Don't limit your imagination only to what we already have.

BTW - I still want the American Civil War before the Napoleonic Wars, but I could play either one.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

Don't limit your imagination only to what we already have.

I'm not. Maybe someone altogether new concept can give the "holy grail" of a compelling Napoleonic tactical game that can also provide PLAYABLE major battles.

But IF weighing between CM and the Sid spinoffs --- CM is much farther removed. First of all, BF has not expressed an interest in Napoleonics, nor to adapt even their CMX2 game engine for same. That's asking BF to crank out a "universal" tactical game engine, and they've stated their views about this earlier. Second, I don't consider the CM 3D system as compelling to utilize. Maybe some want to zoom down to count uniform buttons, but I'll pass. YMMV, although I really do not see a groundswell of Naps gamers wanting this as a first-order priority anyway.

Actually, if instead still wanting a truer 3D view, but comparing the CM scales/zoom to that of the "Total War" series (Shogun & Medieval), the latter would also do much better than CM.

I still believe that a revision of "what we have" in the Sid sequels --- so for it to provide WE-GO and a better C&C system, as well as some updated graphics --- would do the trick for many Nap gamers, with the following added hook: it would allow real-time resolution of a major Naps battle through PBEM. Thus greater game access altogether.

[JasonC]

Wellington was nothing to write home about. He was a competent defender, that is about all that can be said for him. The Brit elevation of him to some sort of storied great captain is ridiculous. The Brits had remarkably little to do with actually defeating Napoleon anyway, on land. They funded coalitions, but it was Russian and Prussian armies (especially) that won the wars.

But 1813 was hardly a slow attritional affair. Napoleon was outnumbered certainly, but he had overcome similar odds before (on about half the scale, or less, it is true). He did not actually lose the campaign until Leipzig, however. Which was a winnable battle, just not won.

The Allied moves before it would be studied as a masterful Napoleonic maneuvere sur derrieres if he had executed rather than suffered it. The key decision that brought it about was Blucher's (he ignored a threat to Berlin, refused to retreat eastward, and instead moved west against the French communications at the critical moment).

What really happened is (1) Napoleon took on more than he could when he invaded Russia (2) he lost that campaign through total logistic breakdown (3) he lost the subsequent campaign because the new Prussian as well as the Russian army had become competent enough professionals by then that he could no longer baffle them.

His 1814 campaign is operationally stunning to be sure, but strategically futile and all his adversaries knew it. As for 1815, it was a desperate gamble that need to "double up" 4 times in succession to succeed, and failed on the second "throw".

Not because Wellington was a genius or the French stupid - his own testimony is that it was the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life. Anyone who has read the details e.g. of the Brit heavy cavalry's charge can see what he is talking about. The Brits just rolled "boxcars" at a critical moment.

You can search the length and breadth of the Napoleonic wars for a charge that small that did that much and you will not find it. Murat's at Eylau did perhaps as much, but required an order of magnitude more to do so. If it had gone like most such attempts typically did go, Napoleon's basic plan against the Brits would have worked fine.

Whether that would have won is an open question - at any rate it would have split the Brits and Prussians for that day's fighting. There were still the Russian and Austrian armies forming up in Bavaria, and Blucher had already shown that just one defeat was not going to destroy a Prussian army any more.

Odds are somewhere along the whole streak of successes the French could not live without, they wouldn't get lucky or one of their opponents would. That it happened to be Uxbridge's couple thousand horse was just one of those things, the kind that led to the dictum "war is friction".

That the odds were already stacked was due to the French decisive defeat at Leipzig. That they faced odds at Leipzig was due to their decisive defeat inside Russia. You can call Waterloo the nail in the coffin, and you can call Russian logistical nightmares post Borodino the tipping point, if you like. But in military terms, France lost the war at the Battle of Nations. There was nothing inevitable about the outcome before that point, and there practically was afterward.

One man's opinion...

[OZ77]

Two men's opinion.

[Ex Bellator]

One man's counter opinion

Wellington and his Army were absolutely crucial to Napoleons defeat on land. Without his victories against the odds in the Peninsular Napoleon would have had hundreds of thousands of more men to command against anyone he wished. Thanks to Wellington Spain became a running sore tieing down huge amounts of veteran French units for SIX YEARS, without him and his army the whole theater would have been wrapped up almost immediately.

He repeatedly beat anything the French put against him, no matter who commanded. As for the 'defensive' piffle, off the top of my head I can think of Salamanca which was a brilliant offensive win, and I'll get my Peninsular books out later to check the others. Of course he also won offensive battles against absolutely incredible odds in India as well, and those armies were also officered by Europeans and equipped with European guns.

I admire him because although strict (a man of his time) he was also a humanist. He broke down on seeing the carnage at the breach at Badajoz, and there was his famous saying about the only thing being worse than a battle won. His constant attention to detail to supplies bonded his men to him, and meant they did not need to forage from the land, which showed he cared for the local populace as well.

His victorious command of the polyglot Army at Waterloo, with untried Brits (his Peninsular veterans were keeping an eye on you Yanks ) and unreliable Europeans (many of whom had fought alongside Napoleon until 1815) against supposedly the best Army and best commander in the world was another superb achievement.

Discuss (or better yet actually read up on the Peninsular)

[Edit] Uxbridge's charge at Waterloo was most certainly not 'luck'. Even before then Uxbridge was recognised as a superb cavalry commander and had almost as many victories to his name as Wellington. He saw unprotected infantry marching in a solid mass within range and launched the most devastating attack in cavalry history, routing a Corps with a single cavalry Brigade. It was no accident, he knew exactly what he was doing and when to time it, and perhaps it could have been prevented if Napoleon had thought to order cannon and cavalry to go forward with D'Erlon.

[ July 02, 2003, 10:45 PM: Message edited by: Rex Bellator ]

[OZ77]

First of all Spanish partizans did most of the job in Spain not Wellington. Therefore Napoleon's veteran troops and Marshals couldnt win the war in Spain.

Second Spanish front was only secondary front in Napoleons wars, otherwise Napoleon would spend all his time in Spain, not in Germany Russia and Austria. Size of the Wellington's army in Spain was not comparable to armies in Europe. It was too small. Comparing to battles in Europe(Leipzig,Borodino,Eilau,Vargram)Wellington's "battles" in Spain were only skimishes.

As for Waterloo I think it is a stolen victory. It was stolen from Blucher, because BLUCHER had saved Wellington from total defeat when he came to Waterloo with his 30.000 Corp.

During "100 days" Napoleon was only deadly wounded lion and he was wounded by Russians, Germans and Austrians in 1812,1813,1814 of course not by Wellington.

Finnally Russia, Germany, Austria would win Napoleonic wars with out Britain not vice versa.

[OZ77]

I am waiting for surge of anger from British members of the forum

[JasonC]

Of course I know all about the penisula campaigns, but they do not amount to more than competent independent command of a corps.

Wellington did not provision his men as he did because he was especially virtuous but because he enjoyed the luxury of an abundant supply of hard cash. Which was a byproduct of the wealth of England and the tiny size of his armies.

If Wellington had lost every battle in Spain it still would have been a drain on the French treasury. If he had never brought a British force there, British gold would still have found hands. If Britain had not supplied the resistence to French rule, there still would have been resistence to French rule.

The fundamental issue in Spain was simply that the French imposed line was regarded as illegitimate by the mass of the people. Talleyrand explain to Napoleon, "you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them" - meaning rule peacefully.

But it is still a mistake to regard the Spanish side show as important to the outcome of the wars on land. It is based on the false assumption that soldiers were scarce, that an army not supported in one place would mean an army of the same size supported in another, etc. None of which was true in that era. The fundamental limits on army sizes were logistical.

The French went into Russia with well over half a million men. They came out with less than 40,000. If they had gone in with a million, they would have come out with maybe 45,000, and another half million would have been lost.

Numbers had little to do with it. They could not possibly be supplied, therefore they could not possibly be massed. At Borodino, the French had around 125,000 men - less than a quarter of the force that entered just a few months earlier. They had won every battle and the weather was still fine. They won Borodino too. Didn't matter.

Extra men in Spain or in southern France meant absolutely nothing to the question whether a French army east of Smolensk could eat or would starve.

After losing essentially the entire Grande Armee in Russia and having his sometime Prussia allies turn on him, and neutral Austria mobilize, on top of the Russians who had chased them out - the French still fielded 200,000 men by April 1813 and more than half a million in the course of that year.

Conjuring armies out of the air was not a problem. The regular recruit system only produced 135,000 trained men in each annual class, but they could and did just draft men from three annual classes at a time. Quality was harder to retrieve, as was horseflesh, but neither had been noticably used up in Spain.

"But if they had men, why didn't they call them up earlier and send a larger force right off?" Expense. No obvious need. No way to feed them.

Napoleonic battles generally occurred between forcs of 100,000 men on a side for a reason. Sometimes it was half of that, rarely was it moderately more. Even that total reflects massing for battle. While on the march it was necessary to break down into corps of 20,000 men.

Larger forces simply could not be supplied, or moved over the existing roads. A single corps walking in files on either side of the road could stretch 10 miles. If they didn't leave the middle for the cavalry and vehicles they might cut that in half. It still made it a matter of half a day for a corps to close up. Putting ten of them nose to tail along the same road would mean it would take week to close up and deploy for battle. Thus, parallel columns of corps size.

And those had to be somewhat seperated or they would forage out the entire countryside within a day's radius of their route of march, without finding enough to feed themselves. In Russia forest country, armies of hundreds of thousands evaporated in a few weeks. Stragglers evidently preferred the contingent risks of desertion to certain starvation.

In the 1813 campaign, the armies did get noticably larger, and the battle of Leipzig featured almost a million men overall. But that was because they were operating in some of the richest provinces on earth, with developed cities full of markets and merchants, and a dense road net.

And it still only came about through the convergence for a tiny period of time of armies in the hundred thousand range from all points on the compass. If they had tried to sit still on that battlefield, 80% of them would have died within a month without firing a shot at each other.

Also keep in mind that WW I was the first in human history in which losses to wounds outnumbered losses to disease. Before there were railroads, all supplies had to come by foot, which except for tiny forces or the very rich meant foraging a strictly limited distance around the force. Which strictly limited the size of that force.

Giant armies are only possible in the post railroad age, when megatons of stuff can be delivered daily to within a few miles of any important spot.

Before, fewer men in one country could not be "traded" for far more men in another, because the limit in both places was who could be supplied - set by local conditions in each place - not by a central manpower pool.

There were 200,000 men in Spain because Spain could feed 200,000 men without total economic collapse. Countries having "carrying capacities". The combatant nations were not manpower limited, the operating areas were "men here now, alive" limited.

I say Wellington was a fine defensive commander not because he never attacked, but because he never really had to, not on the full army scale. He never destroyed an enemy army of 100,000 men. Even the French force at Waterloo was a wing, not the whole army, defeated mostly by defensive action and by Prussian attack.

Then there is the comment that Uxbridge wasn't lucky, just good. Um, "unprotected infantry" my eye. Cavalry charged infantry rather a lot in the Napoleonic wars and only rarely got the best of it. Even under the best conditions.

A typical result was to freeze the infantry, perhaps break up a few elements, and get the cavalry reduced somewhat by the reply fire, and blow the horses. Whether that helped depended on coordination with additional moves, like whether the enemy could throw in his one cavalry to ride off the blown attackers.

With Uxbridge, 2000 men not only broke an entire corps of infantry, but they kept right on going through heavy cavalry that outnumbered them, supporting that infantry. And ran over a grand battery. And chased elements of all of the above a mile across the valley. *Then* the French light cavalry delivered its riposte.

Any way you cut it, that was "boxcars". It never happened before and it never happened again. Under anybody. The only thing that comes close is Murat's breaking the Russian center at Eylau - which required not 2000 but more than 10000. Even that just stabilized a losing battle without actually winning it.

Many a commentator blames French mistakes, like Ney supposedly not knowing enough to support the French cavalry with infantry. Sure, it had never occurred to him. He was a Marshal of France because he looked good on coins.

Um, what infantry was that supposed to be? VI and the Young Guard were delaying the Prussians. I was blown by the cavalry disaster. II had fought Quarte Bras a few days before and had been delivering its holding attack feint all day. Was it suppose to run an entire army 3 times its size off their feet in one go?

The original plan was to use I corps to get a position along the ridge to the right of the French grand battery and under its fire. The next obvious step would be just to move that grand battery onto that ridge. There isn't any other place to stand in front of Mt. St. Jean. Once the French guns were up there, the Brits would have two choices - retreat or be slaughtered where they stood.

When the Prussians and Uxbridge took infantry numbers out of the equation - but got a big portion of the Brit cavalry cut up in the process - that was no longer possible with the infantry numbers the French had left.

Cavalry to lock them in square and guns to shoot them up was just a fallback expedient, with only a slim chance of being enough. The battle had already basically been lost, as soon as I corps ran.

Sometimes stuff happens, and a single passage of arms decides a day. Waterloo was one of those times. Wellington himself never claimed otherwise - that only comes in with his flatterers.

[ July 03, 2003, 03:38 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Santi]

Very interesting thread.

On who won the Peninsular War: well nobody has mentioned the Spanish Army. Sure it was crap and Spanish Cavalry was even crappier but one thing easily overlooked is that every time a battle was lost the beaten forces rallied to fight back the French in no time, something the French were definitely not used to. Before 1808 it had been one decisive battle won and a Peace Treaty signed inmediately.

First defeat of a French Army after the rolling victories of early 1800s was at the hands of lowly Spaniards at Bailen ( admittedly a massive stroke of luck )

On a Napoleon CM game:

As mentioned above, no need to be same scale as current thing. I am no grog and the thing that hooked me up on CM was its 3D look. For me it was the right mix. My brother owns all Battleground titles but they all look as unwieldy and ,let me say ,boring as old boardgames , never fell in with it...but CMish Nappy with the amount of detail these guys put into their products and the simplicity of the interface, oh man!

[Screaming Flea]

No WAY would I buy LGAA without first playing a demo....... I have spent altogether too much mullah on complete Napoleonic turkeys to do so again without a demo.... gotta have a DEMO.

[cyrano01]

Originally posted by OZ77:

As for Waterloo I think it is a stolen victory. It was stolen from Blucher, because BLUCHER had saved Wellington from total defeat when he came to Waterloo with his 30.000 Corp.

I must confess that I have always felt that the argument that Wellington was saved from defeat by Blucher and Waterloo was a Prussian victory to be no more true than the one that says Waterloo was a victory for the Anglo-Dutch army with the Prussians getting an honourable mention for a walk on cameo role at the end.

I have always felt you have to see both the battle and the campaign as a whole as an Allied victory. Wellington would not have stood at Mont St. Jean unless he had been pretty sure that the Prussians were going to arrive on his flank before close of play. Similarly Blucher would not have arrived there if the Anglo-Dutch army hadn't fought the bulk of the French to a stand-still (or more accurately Gneisenau would not have so arranged the arrival).

The whole thrust of the Allied operational concept for the campaign was a battlefield concentration of the two armies to trap and destroy the French. Having failed to achieve this at Quatre Bras/Ligny for various reasons (British perfidy or run of the mill cock-up and misunderstanding depending on your point of view) they did so at Waterloo with the desired result.

[Elmar Bijlsma]

Originally posted by Screaming Flea:

No WAY would I buy LGAA without first playing a demo....... I have spent altogether too much mullah on complete Napoleonic turkeys to do so again without a demo.... gotta have a DEMO.

Wargamer Project Napoleon 1813, by any chance? Gods, that was criminal.