Combat Mission Napoleonic Style...

[Screaming Flea]

Originally posted by Tweety:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Screaming Flea:

No WAY would I buy LGAA without first playing a demo....... I have spent altogether too much mullah on complete Napoleonic turkeys to do so again without a demo.... gotta have a DEMO.

Wargamer Project Napoleon 1813, by any chance? Gods, that was criminal. </font>

[Lempereur]

Why are the Napoleonic games so far behind? Cossaks Napoleonic wars looks like an improvement but the formations look stiff.

[dieseltaylor]

It is hard to say whether JasonC is being provocative or he his expertise does not include the Napoleonic wars.

"Wellington was nothing to write home about. He was a competent defender, that is about all that can be said for him."

I suppose we will just call him lucky actually. I am not sure if he ever lost a battle but lets say his win/loss record was exceptionally good. Now he might have been a bit underhand and only fought battles he knew he would win. And then again to always [nearly] to arrange to fight in defensive positions was no doubt a tribute to the enemy in bringing him to battle. Definitely a lucky general.

I agree absolutely with JasonC terrain limitations to army size. But I think the willingness to take English gold by Continental nations and fight on was helped by the knowledge that the Spanish, Portugese and English were able to give the French serious grief in Spain.

OOh! JasonC recanting a little

"I say Wellington was a fine defensive commander not because he never attacked .."

Well I suppose it beats "..was a competent defender"

[Joachim]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

"I say Wellington was a fine defensive commander not because he never attacked .."

Well I suppose it beats "..was a competent defender"

As von Clausewitz put it, the advantage is on the defense. If time is on my side, and the enemy is/has to be aggressive, I'd always opt for the defense (quick flag-grabbing and going over to defense anybody? Letting the enemy grab the flags and blow him up with arty? Both are defensive tactics, as you want to let the enemy come to you - except the latter is a defense against the former . ).

A commander who is able to fight all his battles as a defender is an operational genius and/or has the strategic situation playing in his favor. If strategic situation is in his favor, and he risks to attack, he proves he is incompetent in strategical art (ie he can't even read the situation). If he does attack just to prove to the world that he is able to attack, then he's an incompetent selfish glory-hunter playing with the lives of his soldiers, not a good commander.

If you never attacked, nothing can be said about your attacking skills. If you never attacked but the strategic situation demanded to attack - your strategic skills lack (ie reading the strategic situation and operationally/tactically acting accordingly).

Looking at Wellington, he did everything right. He won his battles, and the French always accepted them. His mission was not to decisively beat the French and throw them out of Spain, but to keep them occupied, drain forces and just to be there - to show you can resist. To encourage the Spanish resistance (we are not alone, we have an ally that can defeat the French!) and the other continental powers (France ain't invincible).

The French knew about the psychological moment and wanted to end the war in Spain, and that's why they attacked. Wellington knew the French knew that, and that's why he stayed on the defense. The same goes for the 100 days. Nappy had to attack. Wellington used the advantage of the defense. Again: Why give up such an advantage?

In the defense of Nappy at Waterloo and his Marechals in Spain: They had to attack in the battles. Strategic situation was against them, after all they were the attackers on the strategic scale! Not to stir the "who was the attacker"-debate again: The French had a revolution. They changed something. Everybody else with some power wanted to keep his power and thus the system that guaranteed it. Nappy disturbed that system, so he was to be removed. His power was based on military success. Everybody else could loose some wars and was still in power. Not him. In the long run, the allied resources were larger, an attritionist approach would favor them. So he had to attack.

Regarding the importance of the UK: Just as in WW2, a constant thorn in the side is important. But it can't win the war on its own. It might just be able to drain resources (even if it is just the occasional hour of Nappy thinking about Spain when he had to concentrate on Russia), to keep up morale of the allies - or to help them economically (1800: money, WW2: as a base for shipping lend lease to Russia). It might be completely unnecessary, but it might have been just the little bit necessary to tip the balance in the allies favor.

Gruß

Joachim

[Ex Bellator]

Ok before this first post can I say that I love discussing Napoleonics and am not in any way trying to get into an argument, just here for the joy of talking with others in the know. However this first post regarding Uxbridge's charge and Waterloo will still disagree with virtually everything Jason said

First let's start with D'Erlons formation. He put his 20,000 man Corps into four huge Divisional columns, and here is the major contributor to the disaster. I have read that it was Napoleon who ordered him to use that formation, as he had a low opinion of the Anglo-Dutch troops opposite and expected the sight of this solid mass of men to cause them to panic and rout by itself.

Jason contends that the French did not make mistakes at Waterloo. Well, this formation is one of many. Regardless of who decided on the formation, it immediately shows them underestimating their enemy, a cardinal sin of war. Also, because Wellington had almost all of his troops behind the ridge, Napoleon and D'Erlon had no idea what they were marching this mass of men into, so why they chose this formation instead of a more usual advance by battalion cannot be supported by any sound military logic.

I also said D'Erlon was unsupported, and maintain he was. No horse artillery came forward, instead they just relied on the Grand Battery banging away over their heads against unseen targets onto the reverse of the ridge, firing by guesswork and at a much reduced effectiveness as a result. The only cavalry which came forward were Dubois' Cuirassiers on D'Erlon's left. These hooked around to the left of La Haye Saint anyway (D'Erlon was on the right of the farmhouse) which took them away and out of the action. Although they rode down some Dutch in line, they were subsequently smashed by the charge of the Household Brigade which went forward in support of the Union Brigade.

The four huge columns were perfect targets for the few British guns opposite them and suffered accordingly, the right flank column dropped back but the other three reached the hedgerow behind which the Allies were waiting, and routed some Belgian and Dutch militiamen. However this was when Uxbridge launched his perfectly timed attack. Just after the head of the columns was shot apart by musketry, the Union Brigade walked up the reverse slope, around the infantry and walked right over D'Erlons columns stalled at the hedgerow, there was no charge as such.

The solid Divisional columns meant that the French infantry could not deploy against any new threat, especially cavalry. The French infantry were helpless against the sudden appearance of the Union Brigade in the middle of their formation and it was a slaughter.

The Union Brigade then rode over the Grand Battery before Jaquinot's Lancers came up and virtually wiped them out. AFAIK they did not overrun any cavalry after routing D'Erlon, although the Household Brigade did rout the Cuirassiers in a seperate action as above. In fact they didn't do any real damage to the Grand Battery either, it was soon back in action when the gunners returned after the Lancers had finished the Union Brigade.

Therefore I still contend that the rout of D'Erlon was not luck. It was a brilliant stroke by an excellent cavalry commander, and entirely what could have been expected of him looking at his past achievements. The damage they did was hugely amplified by bad French mistakes in the formation and compostion of D'Erlon's Corps.

Jason then goes on to say that the French had no infantry to support Ney. This first of all goes against his assertion that numbers don't count in Napoleonic warfare, and secondly is just plain wrong. Although D'Erlon was routed at 2pm IIRC he only suffered at maximum 4,000 casualties and the rest of his 20,000 Corps reformed throughout the afternoon. Certainly a large part of it would have been available to Ney by the height of his attacks at 5pm, in addition to the unused Guards and the useless men of Reille's Corps bogged down around Hogoumont. D'Erlons reformed Corps went forward again en masse to take La Haye Saint and support the Guard attack just after Ney had given up on his cavalry charges. Again another bad mistake by the French.

OK that wraps the Waterloo section of my posting up Or should I waffle on more French mistakes and why Wellingtons command of 'the infamous army' was so breathtaking IMO...

[Ex Bellator]

OK I'm back for the second part if anyone is still awake, and yes I have waaaay to much time on my hands today :cool: As I'm going away tomorrow I like to think that I'm doing my weeks worth of posting right here...

To respond further to Jason. Wellington and the British definitely made a conscious decision to try to keep the Spanish populace on side by supplying themselves. Just because they could afford to do it didn't mean that they must, after all there are many ways of spending money. I will find anecdotes some time, but it is obvious that they needed the support of the Spanish, and if they had behaved like the French then the populace would have treated them as another invader. Also witness the strict discipline imposed for a reason, which was usually effective at keeping his men away from mischief.

Now I get to the point I really have a problem with. After admitting that Wellington did win offensive battles, you straight up say that they don't count as offensive wins because he never destroyed an enemy army of 100,000 men. You also say that 100,000 men was a usual size force to command in a Napoleonic battle. This is ridiculous.

Most importantly Wellington could (and always did) only beat what was put in front of him. Next, this arbitrary figure means that you straight away discount was is supposed to be Napoleon's offensive masterpiece at Austerlitz. Do we seriously also discount the others (including Waterloo) as not worthwhile?

Off the top of my head I can only think of Borodino, Wagram and Leipzig which meet your criteria of battles with enough men involved per side for a worthwhile offensive win. Patently battles of 100,000+ per side were not usual at all Unfortunately for Napoleon I see a draw, a win, and a loss in those three which must probably means he is a poor offensive commander as well.

I would also like to hear of any occasion where anyone ever 'destroyed' an army in Napoleonic warfare. Even the total victory of Austerlitz only resulted in 25,000 out of 85,000 casualties for the losing side. Of course that didn't count anyway

Anyway, by the time of the battle of Vitoria Wellington's Army had grown to 80,000 men plus 20,000 reliable Spanish troops, so that's some Corps! I would like to return to the Peninsular and a few further reasons why I believe it was so important.

French casualties in the Peninsular have been estimated at a quarter of a million men, and during the six year period of the conflict there were around a similar number deployed there at any one time. I cannot agree that even the costs in money alone was inconsequential for the French, let alone the costs in manpower. Half a million young men all told from a country with a total population of only 37 million is a big investment, and their discipline and morale suffered while there too.

Even accepting your statement that the Grand Armee of 1812 was as big as could be sustained and there was no point trying to add to it (which I'm not sure I do ) perhaps it would have been better if instead of relying of foreign troops 250,000 of their places were taken by veteran Frenchmen. I also suggest that another quarter of a million troops in the field on, or not far from, friendly terrain defending against the Allied onslaught of 1813 and 1814 would have made a huge difference.

Politically disaffection with Napoleon by the French people grew because of ever increasing conscription which was a direct result of the Peninsular and helped to pave the way for his downfall at home. Diplomatically it was a rallying point for those fair weather friend nations who could take heart in seeing the French run ragged and throw in their lot with England and Spain when they wished to do so.

OK that's way more than enough for now. I'm holidaying in and around Vienna next week and (w00t!) will be sure to visit Austerlitz and Wagram if I can. Meanwhile have a good thread and here's a line from Napoleon's memoires written while at St Helena:

"It was the Spanish War that overthrew me. All my disasters can be traced back to this fatal knot".

[Joachim]

Originally posted by Rex Bellator:

OK that's way more than enough for now. I'm holidaying in and around Vienna next week and (w00t!) will be sure to visit Austerlitz and Wagram if I can.

Happy holidays! And make sure you do not look for Austerlitz on any maps of Austria

Gruß

Joachim

[JasonC]

There is nothing inherently mindless about divisional columns, and nothing ordinary about battalion ones. A large column of attack won Wagram. The typical French formation through most of the wars was a regimental column, or regiment in ordre mixte - meaning a frontage of 4 or 6 companies (each in 3 ranks) for a regiment.

Nor is it at all obvious that wasn't pretty much what D'Erlons used at Waterloo. Wargamers and minituare fans ascribe far too rigid a meaning to the words "column" and "line", as though they were metaphysically tied to the battalion level, when in fact commanders of the period used them simply to mean "one behind another" or "one beside another", with the meaning fixed only by the addition of the term describing the echelon level meant. As in column of companies, line of battalions.

Divisional columns meant that each division advanced side by side with its own frontage. It does not mean the frontage of each division was 25 men or something ridiculous like that. The ordinary French way of forming a divisional column would be a brigade up and a brigade back, each in two side by side regimental columns. Each regimental column was two side by side battalion columns, formed up with no more interval between them than usual between companies in a battalion column of attack. In column of attack those were 2 companies wide by 3 companies deep.

It would look like 4 solid blocks of men simply because the intervals between the regiments side by side would be filled by a skirmisher screen. Which in effect made something akin to an "ordre mixte", thinner in the middle and thick at the corners.

A division in that formation can e.g. form 4 squares at its corners - it needn't form 1. There is nothing particularly vunerable to cavalry about it as a formation. On the contrary, a thin line would be an anti-infantry formation while a "box" of regimental columns is much closer to anti-cavalry formation.

It is meant to be flexible. Napoleon consistently advised his Marshals to fight the men in regimental column precisely because it was easier for them to rapidly form square and repel cavalry from a regimental column than from line.

D'Erlons was supported by an entire *corps* of heavy cavalry, not just one brigade. Only a portion of that cavalry had charged. The rest was partly swept up in the infantry rout, and the British cavalry ran through others on their way to the grand battery.

The French infantry had not "been shattered by musketry" or any such nonsense. It was however in the middle of an infantry fight at the crest at the moment of the charge, and some portions were in the act of deploying. (Nobody who thinks they were in a solid mass by division has ever explained how they think they could be deploying).

Also, some of Picton's men had attacked into the front of one of the divisional "columns" before the charge. This was probably at the skirmish screen between two regimental columns, rather than head on into one. In typical wargame terms, the point was simply that some of the leading French formations were already in disorder from previous fighting.

More than a brigade of the Allied infantry defenders had already been routed and the fight with Picton's steadier infantry was about even at the moment the Brit cavalry attacked. The Brit batteries were already unmanned (temporarily, of course), the crest having been reached.

Nobody who thinks some other formation should have been used instead has every explained how a 3 deep line would supposedly fare better when charged by heavy cavalry than regimental columns did. Or how so many men were supposed to fit on the frontage in 3 rank line.

Line does not appreciably increase firepower compared to column when both nearly cover the entire frontage. It just requires fewer men to cover that frontage. The whole point of getting that from thick columns some places and thin skirmish screens others was to be steadier against cavalry in the thick parts.

Which is the overall formation the French were in when hit. It just didn't matter. The front bits did not get to square. Some were in the act of deploying into their intervals - so they had intervals, note - which prevented the evolution toward square; they are opposite movements.

But that the rear regiments did not form successfully was an outlier, a panic effect. When they didn't and the first bits routed the whole corps dissolved into a crowd. There was no great slaughter before that, because supposedly infantry can't fight cavalry or any such nonsense. They took their losses when they ran, as usual.

As for the idea of using them later in the day after they reformed, it is unrealistic. They were pretty worthless after the rout. Secondary diversion stuff by best elements against skirmishers at a farm, fine. They'd run again in any heavy action. In the later defensive portion of the battle that evening, there are no reports of I corps leftovers putting up any serious fight.

A typical result of a well time cavalry attack of that size in that situation against that formation would be the destruction of 1-2 regiments along the front line, with the rear portions making it into square and stopping further progress. Then the supporting French heavy cavalry would countercharge through the resulting intervals and drive off the British cavalry. You can find any number of occasions when that kind of thing happened in other battles, from Austerlitz to 1814.

That is the whole reason an infantry corps was supported by a cavalry corps, and was in a deep formation. It was supposed to form into 4 seperate knots of squares of regimental size when charged, and be ready to get right back into column and keep going as soon as their own horse (helped by musketry from said squares) drove off the enemy horse.

As for the no horse guns comment, sure there were. But they were not essential at that moment because the grand battery hit the middle portion of the ridge (where the slope fails to shelter everyone - it is a saddle really, along the road to Mt. St. Jean), and because the whole point was to get infantry onto the ridge, in order to protect movement of guns onto it.

You can't fire canister through a ridge. The forward slope was already "beaten" by the grand battery and swept clear. Somebody then has to crest the ridge first. Infantry ready to form square or to fight infantry was obviously the right thing to have go first. That means infantry in strong columns, not thin lines. Strong columns are precisely what they sent.

There was absolutely nothing senseless about it. Which is not surprising. It was the plan of one Napoleon Bonaparte, who was obviously a complete piker who didn't understand what every 12 year old with toy soldiers does about combined arms in his own era. That's why he only commanded at 60 major battles, won most of them, and conquered most of Europe - because he didn't know what every 12 year old boy thinks he knows.

There was every reason to expect the Brits to throw in whatever reserves they could to win the struggle at the crest. It was perfectly expected. But it was also expected that would be a see-saw affair, iterating as each side threw in a new fresh reserve.

Throwing in the first is not usually the way those are won - having the last is. The Brit heavy cavalry was countered of course, and defeated by the fresher French light cavalry. It just happened after a ton of damage had been done instead of a modest amount. That is what made it an outlier.

Why did all 4 divisions run, instead of just the forward regiments of one of them (or at most, one full division and say the forward or left half of another), and why did the French heavy cavalry lose instead of stopping the Brit heavy cavalry? Those are the questions about the Brit charge that have never been answered.

As for Wellington supposedly being invincible, he had a tiny army with a small number of engagements in a secondary theater. How many corps commanders were there in the Napoleonic wars? How many do you expect to win a coin toss 5-6 times? Besides, he was driven back into Portugal once. There was nothing monotonic victorious about the overall campaign there.

Why didn't he manage to not just hold off, but to destroy Ney at Quarte Bras, or at least to send help to the Prussians a few miles down the road? He had an entire army - though arriving in stages - against 1 corps. Davout's record as a corps commander is sometimes compared to Napoleon's. He ate the Prussian main body at Auerstadt with a corps. Wellington couldn't eat a corps with an army.

His great victory for which he deserves full credit is just Waterloo. He would not be lionized as he is without that one. It was an achievement because he defeated Napoleon and that is a rare thing to have done. His side also outnumbered the French 3:2 by the time the Prussians arrived, and got to defend for most of the day at even odds. (The French had no numerical superiority just detaching VI corps to delay the leading Prussians).

If that is supposed to be hard, what is Austerlitz supposed to be? OK, maybe it wasn't so hard but it was so convincing a win. In end result yes, and it was the last needed against Napoleon which is why it is so storied. It was hardly the only time Napoleon was beaten.

And it was quite close, by the winner's own account. And on analysis it is clear why he said what he did about it - because just holding required an outlier success at a critical moment. How many battles would have been won outright as crushing and immediate victories, if it were entirely normal to send 2k horse and destroy entire corps with them inside 20 minutes?

Can you name any game system in which the historical effects of Uxbridge's charge are possible? What else does it allow? How rare must it make such things, to get scores of equally large charges e.g. at Ligny, Quatre Bras, and by the French themselves later in the day at Waterloo, correct?

"Oh, when some don't make square and dissolve, that is what allows a spreading rout". OK, the French cut up some battalions slow to get into square at Quarte Bras - why didn't whole allied corps run away? "Well, it only happens when lower quality infantry runs" OK, more than a brigade of poor quality allies ran right before the charge in question - why didn't they spread disorder back through the British side? "It was because the French formations were too large" OK, then why did MacDonald's much larger one at Wagram work just fine? Why didn't it dissolve in rout as soon as somebody looked at it funny?

You can't make the result normal rather than an outlier, without making tons of other things that happened all the time into weird coincidences.

As for claiming I said numbers don't matter in Napoleonic warfare, that is a straw man. I said there were logistic limits on the sizes of armies and therefore extra men beyond a certain size could not be concentrated and used in the same spot. Who has the larger force at a given spot of course matters, but it does not depend simply on how many men one has overall. It is non trivial to get them to the right spot.

As for the deliberate misreading of the 100k comment, I mean that is the order of magnitude of Napoleonic era armies, as opposed to seperate corps and secondary theater actions. 51k is that order of magnitude, as is 149k.

You find smaller forces than that only in a few campaigns (early in Italy e.g. the armies are 25-35k, some of the disjointed 1814 maneuvering gets back down to that scale), larger ones essentially only at the close of the 1813 fighting - and in the last case only because several forces in that size range briefly converge on the same point.

Did Wellington's force eventually grow to full army size? Yes, but his enemy's did not. It was a pretty deterministic outcome at that point - entire armies usually beat corps (Davout notwithstanding). Most of his record in Spain is in charge of a force the size of Ney's at Quatre Bras, if that.

The Waterloo campaign was the first time he faced Napoleon and almost the first time he had full army command against a full army enemy, commanded by anyone. Blucher, in contrast, had been wrestling with Napoleon-led full sized armies for years. The same can be said for a number of the Russians.

It is a little like saying so and so won my local poker game regularly so he must be the best in the world series of poker. Spain wasn't the world series of poker. Russia and Germany were. Waterloo and Quatre Bras were the only times Wellington even played at the top table - with as it happens a good hand both times.

[ July 04, 2003, 12:33 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[eichenbaum]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

"I say Wellington was a fine defensive commander not because he never attacked .."

Wie Bitte ? How did he ever turned to beef?

[dieseltaylor]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

"I say Wellington was a fine defensive commander not because he never attacked ..."

And I was quoting JasonC who had commenced this part of the thread with :

"Wellington was nothing to write home about. He was a competent defender, that is about all that can be said for him."

I must say I think that certainly there were very good Allied commanders - notably Blucher [and his staff!]. But JasonC is still dismissive of the Duke on the basis of his record in the 100,000+ class. Well it's unfortunate he only had a played one won one record but then as it was a knock-out that was it!

Still can we look at his previous history of being lucky and extrapolate a bit?

Salamanca 1812 French losses 14,000 out of 49,500 and the British/Portugese/Spanish 4,762 out of 51,562.

Admittedly the Duke did not pursue the broken French and his seigecraft did not look good but not everything was great.

Vittoria 1813

French @ 57,300 losses 8,008

Allies 88,726 losses 4,927

Not an overwhelming result but a large force in difficult terrain in which to bring numbers to bear

If you look at the way Wellington turned the line of the French defences along the river Bidassoa you must admire his skill in getting what he required with minimal loss of manpower Again demonstrated at the crossing of the Nivelle line!

And he did quite nicely in India too! Come on JasonC upgrade him slightly!!!

[Malcom987]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

"I say Wellington was a fine defensive commander not because he never attacked ..."

And I was quoting JasonC who had commenced this part of the thread with :

"Wellington was nothing to write home about. He was a competent defender, that is about all that can be said for him."

I must say I think that certainly there were very good Allied commanders - notably Blucher [and his staff!]. But JasonC is still dismissive of the Duke on the basis of his record in the 100,000+ class. Well it's unfortunate he only had a played one won one record but then as it was a knock-out that was it!

Still can we look at his previous history of being lucky and extrapolate a bit?

Salamanca 1812 French losses 14,000 out of 49,500 and the British/Portugese/Spanish 4,762 out of 51,562.

Admittedly the Duke did not pursue the broken French and his seigecraft did not look good but not everything was great.

Vittoria 1813

French @ 57,300 losses 8,008

Allies 88,726 losses 4,927

Not an overwhelming result but a large force in difficult terrain in which to bring numbers to bear

If you look at the way Wellington turned the line of the French defences along the river Bidassoa you must admire his skill in getting what he required with minimal loss of manpower Again demonstrated at the crossing of the Nivelle line!

And he did quite nicely in India too! Come on JasonC upgrade him slightly!!!

[Malcom987]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

"I say Wellington was a fine defensive commander not because he never attacked ..."

And I was quoting JasonC who had commenced this part of the thread with :

"Wellington was nothing to write home about. He was a competent defender, that is about all that can be said for him."

I must say I think that certainly there were very good Allied commanders - notably Blucher [and his staff!]. But JasonC is still dismissive of the Duke on the basis of his record in the 100,000+ class. Well it's unfortunate he only had a played one won one record but then as it was a knock-out that was it!

Still can we look at his previous history of being lucky and extrapolate a bit?

Salamanca 1812 French losses 14,000 out of 49,500 and the British/Portugese/Spanish 4,762 out of 51,562.

Admittedly the Duke did not pursue the broken French and his seigecraft did not look good but not everything was great.

Vittoria 1813

French @ 57,300 losses 8,008

Allies 88,726 losses 4,927

Not an overwhelming result but a large force in difficult terrain in which to bring numbers to bear

If you look at the way Wellington turned the line of the French defences along the river Bidassoa you must admire his skill in getting what he required with minimal loss of manpower Again demonstrated at the crossing of the Nivelle line!

And he did quite nicely in India too! Come on JasonC upgrade him slightly!!!

[JasonC]

Austerlitz - 85k vs 94k, losses 9k vs. 27k

Jena - 50-100k vs. 40-50k, losses 5k vs. 25k

Eylau - 85k vs. 76k, losses 25k vs. 15k

Friedland - 80k vs. 60k, losses 8k vs. 20k

Aspern-Essling - 70k vs. 96k, losses 21k vs. 23k

Wagram - 170k vs. 147k, losses 32k vs. 40k

Borodino - 133k vs. 120k, losses 30k vs. 44k

Berezina - 40k vs. 64k, losses 25k vs. 20k

Lutzen - 110k vs. 75k, losses 20k vs. 18k

Bautzen - 200k vs. 96k, losses 20k vs. 20k

Dresden - 120k vs. 170k, losses 10k vs. 38k

Leipzig - 195k vs. 365k, losses 73k vs. 54k

Ligny - 80k vs. 84k, losses 12k vs. 25k

Waterloo - 72k vs. 140k, losses 41k vs. 22k

Battles at which the loser only lost 8k aren't even in the league...

[ July 05, 2003, 01:02 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Holdit]

Originally posted by Thin Red Line:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Louie the Toad:

Dear Thin Red Line,

I think players like to try their hand at familiar maps/battles, regardless of the age in which they were fought. Even if it means having armor on the Waterloo battlefield.

Just an observation....... Toad

Louie,

Where you the author ? I hope you didn't misunderstood me, when i said very interesting, it was not ironic at all. I found the map really good, i spend time studying them, not playing though, just imagining the cuirassiers brigades assaultings the russian or english strongpoints, the lightning of hundreds of bayonettes, the roar of the 12pdrs batteries, and wishing there was a Napoleonic CM...

Especially they looked relatively small to me, knowing the number of men who fought there. Men density was probably extraodinary on those battlefields.

An excellent work. </font>

[dieseltaylor]

A certain amount of dogmatism and pigheadedness is necessary in science." - Karl Popper

JasonC ... now I see it was a well-chosen motto by you

Obviously no point in quoting examples of Wellington acheiving objectives without too much loss then.

I give-in Wellington was not major league. But how do we convince the rest of the world??? It is awkward that he never played in the major league but then he in the sub-100,000 class along with Marlborough, Gustavus Adolphus, and Frederick the Great.

Perhaps can we not agree that he was an extremely able corps commander with strategic vision, organisational and political skills. And he was very lucky. ?

[Guest Mike]

I always thought D'Erlon's columns were doomed from the start because of their structure.

They columns were of battalions in line, that is each battalions was deployed in a battalion line, and then one behind the otehr with, IIRC, a 12 pace interval.

In this formation the front battalion of each column could fire, but none of hte others, PLUS they could not deploy anywhere else either - they could not form squares, turn to a flank, or do anythign at all.

The front battalinos aouldn't do anythign except move or fire to their front either.

As columns go it was a piece of dog-sh1t, and not to be compared to the likes of MacDonald's at Wagram for example, which had battalions in line at the front, and in battalion columns extending the flanks and across the rear. This formation was quite well suited for the attack in which it was used.

Jason's objection to Wellington isn't completley unreasonable, but it ignores the reality of the times.

Wellington rarely commanded a homogenous army of good troops - in many of his battles he had to rely upon his fractious Spanish allies, whiel at Waterloo he had to hope and pray that Blucher would arrive, in the meantime he withstood an attack by the French with a hodge-podge army many of whom had been fighting FOR Napoleon only a year before!

Wellington also rarely attacked because he was more often on the strategic defensive - so why should he? His offensive manouvres were usually on the strategic level, and he had a good nack of forcing the enemy to make attacks in circumstances that suited his own defence.

What is not admirable about forcing your enemy to fight at a disadvantage??

[ July 06, 2003, 09:02 PM: Message edited by: Mike ]