Rommel's Solution for Russian Front

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Corvidae:

there is a river called the vitsula,,

There is? Where? Is it a branch of the river Vistula?

I wouldn't have commented, but it gives me an opportunity to also mention that most keyboards have separate comma and period, I'd suggest that you use them both. And also capitalize first letters in sentences and proper names. Makes it faster to read when it's written correctly.

[Sirocco]

With regard to Normandy, 21 PD was in the kind of advanced position Rommel was thinking of, not to intervene as the landing craft were approaching the beach - that was the job of the static divisions - but to throw the invaders back as they were in their initial disorganised state. And it might have had a decisive impact, had the command and control structure been rational.

The reason for that lack of rational control structure - Hitler's intervention - was also the dead hand on the Eastern Front. When the military leaders on the spot, with their knowledge and practical experience, were being overruled and mistrusted, any approach to defensive fighting was almost doomed to failure from the outset.

[Sirocco]

I'm reminded of a conversation Guderian had with Hitler, in which he pleaded with him not to keep reserves too close to the front in a particular area in advance of a Soviet attack. Hitler wouldn't listen, with the result that the reserve was also caught up in the initial bombardment, and was thus reduced markedly in it's effectiveness. Hitler afterwards fumed at the event, and asked what fool had ordered the reserves to be stationed in such a perilous position.

[Elefant]

Michael, the story would have been different at Juno if the forces i.e. panzers, Rommel envisioned had been in place.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Elefant:

Michael, Rommel was absolutely right that the best time to stop an amphibious invasion is at the beach and not when the invaders have had time to land, and bring ashore, tanks, artillery, supplies and a lot more men to consolidate their hold and begin building up for the eventual break out.

If the panzer and panzer grenadier divisions had been at the invasion sector that morning the invasion would have failed.

The best time to stop an amphibious invasion is when the troops are still inside the transports. Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions would not have helped with that. To do that, you need a navy and an air force, or at the very least a lot of intact and effective coast artillery. By June 6, the Germans really had none of those in anything like the strength they needed. Thus there was nothing they could do to prevent the Allied armies from getting ashore, even though they tried very hard.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Elefant:

However, when the boats are heading towards the beach you have to lift the bombardment to land them. Then you are left with DD's closing on the beach and direct firing with 5 inchers which would peel open a tank in 1 shot, but I doubt the accuracy would be very good.

It was good enough to shoot up the pillboxes on Omaha Beach even though they were dug in and camouflaged, and to do it right in front of the advancing troops.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

There was also a German counterattack in the first week or two in the British sector—I hesitate to bring it up because I am so hazy on the details—that was broken up largely through naval gunfire. The German commander reported that he troops simply couldn't move in the face of such heavy bombardment. IIRC, these were SS troops.

Michael

[Andrew H.]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

PaKFront....hmm, let's do a JasonC.

a) how many German divisions were in the line on, say, 1 June 1944?

how many kilometres of front line did they hold on that date?

assume they actually had 200 AT Guns per division, figure out the density of AT guns per kilometre.

Remember that the above is a single line and does not allow for defence in depth.

The Allies faced some pretty dense PaK fronts in Normandy also, and managed to persevere, though admittedly they were helped by the inane counter-attack at Mortain.

I suspect the numbers might show a bit of pie in the sky, even after the silly assertion that 200 AT guns per division was even possible.

The problem with relying on AT guns is that late war armored attackers were pretty much always able to make an initial breakthrough when they wanted to - Mortain, the Bulge, Bagration. This is because, as Mike points out, even if you have a lot of guns per division, the attacker can always achieve local superiority in a narrow sector and almost always break through.

The way the defender wins these battles is by holding the shoulder of the breakthrough and then using mobile reserves to overwhelm the attackers - who are now no longer able to choose a sector in which to get local superiority. This was why Mortain and the Bulge ultimately failed, and the inability to do this was the reason that Bagration succeeded.

But it's really hard to move AT guns around to stop a breakthrough - even if you are using trucks rather than horses to transport the AT guns. It's easy to interdict horse or truck drawn AT guns with a small amount of arty, and they move much more slowly than fully tracked vehicles - in fact, given the sparse road net and heavy rains in the USSR, it's quite possible that you wouldn't be able to move them at all.

And of course the plan also ignores the fact that the Germans were running out of *men,* too.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

There was also a German counterattack in the first week or two in the British sector—I hesitate to bring it up because I am so hazy on the details—that was broken up largely through naval gunfire. The German commander reported that he troops simply couldn't move in the face of such heavy bombardment. IIRC, these were SS troops.

Michael

12th SS Panzer suffered heavily from naval gunfire, as did the Panzer Lehr. IIRC, it was even worse for the German formations attacking the Salerno beach head.

[stikkypixie]

Originally posted by Corvidae:

This is june of 44 we are talking about,, the russians were still in russia, poland was still safely within german hands, and there is a river called the vitsula,, runs from south to north in poland,, dig in on both sides, about say 10 km deep on each side, thats 20 km deep plus the river width,,,, mine the bridges in advance,, and create hidden submerged bridges in areas that can be easily covered from the west bank, clear out all civilian population from the area,, establish amo factorys,, small ones,, easily hidden behind the zone, , At the same time,, build an identical line along the russia/poland border, also 20 km deep,, build up a mobile PzGren force in poland, and train them hard,, untill they know the landscape intimately,, By the time the russians reach poland,( sept or oct of 44) you are ready for them, can you cook bratwurst on a burning T34?? lets find out

You think this could all be done before the Russians attack? If this could be done, you think the Russians would be stupid enough to attack there?

[Jack Carr]

Originally posted by Sirocco:

With regard to Normandy, 21 PD was in the kind of advanced position Rommel was thinking of, not to intervene as the landing craft were approaching the beach - that was the job of the static divisions - but to throw the invaders back as they were in their initial disorganised state. And it might have had a decisive impact, had the command and control structure been rational.

The reason for that lack of rational control structure - Hitler's intervention - was also the dead hand on the Eastern Front. When the military leaders on the spot, with their knowledge and practical experience, were being overruled and mistrusted, any approach to defensive fighting was almost doomed to failure from the outset.

Good point. He was a bit of a strategical dope and a thorn in his military commander's sides at that late hour in the war.

[roqf77]

hmmm well in russia as corvidae has said in a situation like that it could of been acheived. Although on a smaller scale anti tank guns by the british proved very effective at places like gazala and el alamein where rommel himself lost lots of tanks to realy only a handful of medium to small anti tank guns in an location where flanking would of been much easier. perhaps this is where he got the idea?

[roqf77]

Michael, the story would have been different at Juno if the forces i.e. panzers, Rommel envisioned had been in place.

Not neccisarily, i certainly agree that if the germans had been more organised it would of been a much harder fight but the canadians were using the british ddt tanks and they were more careful releasing them from gold and sword beach only 2 sank the rest made it. so it is likely the canadians did the same and would of had direct tank support. especialy as only a hand ful were knocked out by the beach defenders. not saying they would neccisarily succseed in the face of direct tank support but it was only the american beaches that didnt have any. plus it is also a mute point rommel himself did honestly belive that the attacks at normandy were a diversion, so if he had placed his units closer to the beaches they would of been close to calaise im no expert on french geography but that could of been worse.

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

The way the defender wins these battles is by holding the shoulder of the breakthrough and then using mobile reserves to overwhelm the attackers

I can't recall the source, or the situation, but IIRC there was some opposition from higher headquarters to this tactic in favour of holding the line. Which underlines the problems faced by local commanders wishing to use the benefit of their experience.

[Corvidae]

sergi,,,, my spelling and punctuation are bad,, and are unlikely to improve any time soon, it works better after the reader has had a few pints,

[jrrich0000]

Sounds like Rommel wanted to do what the Russians did at Kursk to defeat Citadel

I was thinking the same thing. However, it has been correctly pointed out that for this to work, you need to restrict the battlefield, which would be somewhat difficult in Russia.

[Steiner14]

I want to remark, that Rommels plan only sounds good at the first sight:

1. It would have meant to give initiative freely away to the enemy for months!

2. No matter how much guns, there would have been not a single Landser more available.

For a plan like this to work, there would have been much more infantry necessary.

And not only that: AT-guns need to be manned, too.

3. Only the highly mobile tank-forces made it even possible to hold the thin lines (Schwerpunktbildung) when an attack or breakthough took place.

Additionally i want to remark, that Rommel also made a severe mistake, that led causally to the disaster in NA: Hitler had already decided to take Malta, and the necessary things were already in progress (Luftflotte 1 Kesselring had already started to bomb the docks), but Rommel pledged to let him advance after the fall of Tobruk. And Hitler believed his promises and cancelled the taking away of Malta, which was decisive to lose the war in NA and maybe even the whole war.

So it is completely wrong, if everything that Rommel suggested is rated as right and superb, while the OKW were dumb.

Rommel made the success in NA possible, sure - but he also made it fail in the end.

To me as layman the plan with a more or less static defense without highly mobile forces in the endless areas of the USSR, even more with an army which power came not from the quantity, but only from gaining initiative even in hopeless situations, sounds absolutely not convincing.

[Elefant]

Sorry Steiner, In regards to Malta. From The Rommel Papers by B.H. Libbell-Hart page 203. "After the plan for Malta (Operation Hercules) had been worked out, Mussolini went to Berchtesgaden, for a conference with Hitler. Here it was agreed that the attack on Malta should be launched after Rommels offensive in Africa. But soon after this agreement Hitler showed renewed doubts, that the Italians could not keep anything secret, that they had not the fighting spirit for such a difficult venture, that they would not be punctual in arriving to support the German parachute troops, that their navy would not face the British, and were thus likely to leave the German troops stranded without supplies."

[Steiner14]

@Elefant:

Your quote is only describing theoretical contra-arguments, which were correct and need to be made always. This has nothing to say about the fallen decisions.

And in this quote there is not a date, nor named units, taken measures or cancelled measures.

After the plan for Malta (Operation Hercules) had been worked out, Mussolini went to Berchtesgaden, for a conference with Hitler.

'After'?!

What does 'after' mean? Ofcourse after and not before.

Here it was agreed that the attack on Malta should be launched after Rommels offensive in Africa.

Without any date or a better temporal context, there is the most fundamental info missing.

Maybe Rommel already had reached the cancelling of the operation?

I will have a look in my books for my source later.

[Elefant]

Steiner, I am only reiterating that the decision to not take out Malta was Hitler's, Mussolini's et al. and not Rommels. Rommel clearly understood the importance of neutralizing Malta as most of his POL, reinforcements etc. ended up on the bottom of the Med from attacks originating from Malta and Force Z. Huge mistake for OKW to not invade Malta. Greater mistake for Hitler to neglect the NA Theatre until the very end.

[Redmow]

I don't think adding 200 PAK's to each Infantry XX would have done anything. The Russian arty and air superiority (not to mention the waves of Soviet infantry) would have continued unabated.

All those PAK's would need infantry protection. An armored thrust would have taken a heavy beating but the Soviets would have tried something different with the units they had on hand. They were in a rush to get to Berlin way ahead of the Western Powers and they would have done so at any cost to manpower.

But, it does sound fun to recreate that plan in-game. Hehe.

[TigerTiger]

Hitler should have never attacked the Soviet Union when he did. It was a tactical mistake. It cost him dear, didn't it?

Its just impossible to occupy an enemy territory thats what 20 times the size of your own?

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by TigerTiger:

Its just impossible to occupy an enemy territory thats what 20 times the size of your own?

Empires were built on just such deeds.

[TigerTiger]

But the Soviet Union wasn't exactly a group of kingdoms to take out one by one.

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by TigerTiger:

But the Soviet Union wasn't exactly a group of kingdoms to take out one by one.

That's just what it was, had Hitler recognised with clarity it as such.