Battlefront pay attention for CMAK! This is how the Second World War was fought :-)

[Michael Dorosh]

Doing some research at our local archives, tripped over some Battle Questionnaires. I will reproduce a handful on one of my sites. Lot of interesting stuff in here, even though the sampling is rather small (ie one person)

http://members.shaw.ca/calgaryhighlanders/queslyster.htm

Note the importance of engineer tasks, and answers to simple questions that don't get covered in most histories, like how did you mark targets and communicate, how often did you run out of ammo, was air support effective - all the things you need to know when making a game on the scale of Combat Mission.

Note especially the use of the PIAT as a mortar - would love to see this in CMAK, if indeed its use was common. This officer seems to have been in love with the idea.

Also note the common practice of going into action shorthanded, ie 5 or 6 men to a 10 man section. Scenario designers note, for the British and Canadians, anyway, that this was normal, even for full strength units (note reference to "Left Out of Battle" personnel).

One is tempted to trace many current tactics and methods to some of the questions on these questionnaires - the questions themselves are quite leading, ie "how often did you use smoke to cover an advance". It is SOP today to use smoke grenades, obviously not so then (as the CMBO manual indicates).

Also note the question regarding size of the infantry section, and the reference to using only 5 or 6 men. I think most modern armies have smaller rather than larger sections - is this due to the size of their personnel carriers, or perhaps these tactical lessons learned in 1944?

Or both?

Dare I suggest the rewrite take into account moral effects of weapons, and tie it in to experience level?

ie note the comment that the 88mm became scarier the more experienced troops got, while the Moaning Minnie and MMGs became less scarier (all things being relative, of course) - at least in one man's opinion (bearing in mind also he commanded at the platoon and company level and observed the effects of these weapons in addition to no doubt discussing these matters with his men/other officers).

[ June 07, 2003, 11:32 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[foamy]

Michael - - That was a very enjoyable form to read - It brought back very strong memories of those useless 18 radio sets. When I was about 10 years old my friend and I brought two sets from an Army surplus in London back in the 1950's.

Got a few garbled words at 100 feet for about 20 minutes before the power gave out. Valves were so unreliable the set came with a pouch containing spares.

We also bought the 38's which were much better quality but less portable.

Do you have any more sources of those "After Battle Forms"

[Michael Dorosh]

http://members.shaw.ca/calgaryhighlanders/queslbacon.htm

Here is the second one. Notice some contradictions with the first.

Note also the comments on the use of the PIAT as a mortar.

Both these guys mistook the army's use of the word "wastage". When the army wants to talk about how many men were killed or wounded in battle, they called it "wastage"; Bacon in particular thought it referred to how much food was being thrown out.

Guess the Army is too subtle sometimes.

I also liked his use of exclamation marks.

Also note the description of the .50 browning as a "medium" machine gun! You really have to be careful with period documents; they did not always define things the same back then as they do now; I would have assumed the Vickers was the medium they refer to on this form. As always, take with grains of salt.

I've never had to use the 18 set, but the 77 sets we use (PRC-25, as the Yanks called them in Vietnam) are probably just as bad.

For those who thought the WASP in CMBO was "gamey" - note also Bacon's comment that it was "always available."

[ June 07, 2003, 09:40 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Michael Dorosh]

http://members.shaw.ca/calgaryhighlanders/quescamb.htm

The last one I was able to photocopy. This one has a detailed example of how a Canadian operations order may have looked. Would be more useful if I had a copy of the two map sheets, but the general style is of interest as well as some specific comments regarding difficulties encountered with short falling artillery and night operations in general.

Note allocation of support units - assault sections of pioneers, which are mentioned in the other two reports also. German Pioniers get a lot of press, but I am getting the impression that they were rather well used by Canadian and British infantry battalions as well in assaults.

[ June 07, 2003, 11:31 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JonS]

Good stuff Mike! I haven't had a good look at them yet, but I look forward to it.

Regards

JonS

[Andreas]

Chalk up another reference for the use of the PIAT as a mortar in 'The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby'. He was also in Bella Italia.

[Cromwell.]

The author of that last report was in hospital in Marston Green, Birmingham. I was born in the same hospital some years later. Small world ....

The use of the PIAT at high angles and against structures is mentioned in a book I have (Anti-Tank Weapons, by Terry Gander). An effective range of 350 yards is quoted, which agrees the reports here. The PIAT apparently had a bubble sight to allow the desired angle of elevation to be set - apologies if this is common knowledge.

Bryn

[Andreas]

Great work BTW Michael. Would be interesting to see more of them, in particular some dealing with the Italian theatre.

[Lou2000]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Chalk up another reference for the use of the PIAT as a mortar in 'The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby'. He was also in Bella Italia.

Not only the Piat. I've seen a couple refs to Shrek being used in indirect fire mode and a mortar ... and also to start avalanches !!

Not sure of the link (its on my work PC) - but I'll post it if I can find it again.

[_Axe_]

Thanks Michael. That's some very interesting reading.

Cheers,

Jason

[Vergeltungswaffe]

Originally posted by Lou2000:

I've seen a couple refs to Shrek being used in indirect fire mode and a mortar ... and also to start avalanches !!

Sorry, but this elicits a picture of "Shrek" performing some horrible bodily function in an indirect mode, and having it start an avalanche.

:eek:

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Vergeltungswaffe:

Sorry, but this elicits a picture of "Shrek" performing some horrible bodily function in an indirect mode, and having it start an avalanche.

:eek:

I told you you shouldn't eat that third burrito.

Michael

[Dave H]

Thanks for posting these, Michael. All three of those documents are fascinating insights into the impressions of men on the ground, in the foxholes. What I found especially interesting in the form completed by William Lyster was the scarcity of German threats taken for granted in CMBB. From October 1944 through April 1945, he said his men were the target of grenades one time. In the same period, he said his men were NEVER attacked by German aircraft, flamethrowers, armored cars, or tanks. Seems amazing, since the Germans in CM always have tanks and/or assault guns. Maybe his information helps explain all the "How did the Germans lose when they had all of the great hardware?" questions.

[-E]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Note especially the use of the PIAT as a mortar - would love to see this in CMAK, if indeed its use was common.

Being as we never got motorcycles ridden by horses for CMBB, I think we should at least get the scream of empty beer bottles being dropped by British plane at night to stop the Germans from sleeping. So please BTS... please give us randoms whistles/screeches during night turns for accuracy's sake! *grin*

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Dave H:

Thanks for posting these, Michael. All three of those documents are fascinating insights into the impressions of men on the ground, in the foxholes. What I found especially interesting in the form completed by William Lyster was the scarcity of German threats taken for granted in CMBB. From October 1944 through April 1945, he said his men were the target of grenades one time. In the same period, he said his men were NEVER attacked by German aircraft, flamethrowers, armored cars, or tanks. Seems amazing, since the Germans in CM always have tanks and/or assault guns. Maybe his information helps explain all the "How did the Germans lose when they had all of the great hardware?" questions.

It's interesting too the different viewpoints; Campbell's report was done after only two battles in July 1944, and consequently, I think, the other two carry a bit more weight. One (Lyster) was an infantry company commander, the other was in Support company. Interesting to see how their viewpoint differed.

Lyster was also writing several months after a lot of his experiences, and while recovering from wounds. His first battle experiences were in October 1944, and he was writing in May 1945. The bulk of his fighting was done in February-April 1945 - in October he was a replacement platoon commander fresh from Sandhurst and after a couple weeks of fighting in South Beveland, the Highlanders went into static positions from November to the end of January.

I dearly hope I can lay hands on some more of these little gems; two of the regiments represented by the local museum fought in Italy, I will try and scour their archives if possible to see what they can offer.

Note the emphasis placed on how changing plans adversely effected morale. I remember one of the Squad Leader designers noting that in a truly realistic wargame, getting one's forces to do any little thing at all would be a tremendous victory. I am sure BFC has wrestled with the problem of how much the Tac AI should be allowed to deviate from the player's command. Would be worth revisiting in the rewrite perhaps - the player would enter a general set of orders before the game began - advance to this point, move here, defend there - and then if forced to deviate during play, the confusion would have adverse effects in the form of extra command delays?

Campbell discusses Operation Spring in detail, and this is a good example. The lead companies moved to a village that was supposed to have been cleared of the enemy; the Start Line (Line of Departure, as we call it today) was still contested by "snipers" and MGs. I call them "snipers" because one can suspect a little of the 88mm Myth and the Sniper Myth in these reports - ie, every gun was an 88 and every rifle shot directed at them was from a "sniper" with scoped rifle.

So what happened? The company had to clear its own Start Line. But it didn't matter because the enemy was in underground mine shafts and was able to emerge undetected in the Highlanders' rear later during the battle. Campbell doesn't mention this point, but it is significant.

Hill 67 and May sur Orne (part of "Spring"), the two battles Campbell participated in at this point, were not well executed by either the Highlanders, who nonetheless fought well, or by some neighbouring units. The latter battle was where the Black Watch crossed their Start Line with 300+ men and had but 15 report for duty the next day. Yet the report still maintains a professional quality to it.

[ June 09, 2003, 12:03 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Tero]

From Lysters paper:

(2) Weapon with the next greatest adverse moral effect, ie Nebelwerfer (Moaning Minnie) effective because rapid rate of fire - blast effect - accuracy

Assesment based on one time fluke barrage or general perception of the weapons system and its capabilities ?

[tar]

Note the emphasis placed on how changing plans adversely effected morale. I remember one of the Squad Leader designers noting that in a truly realistic wargame, getting one's forces to do any little thing at all would be a tremendous victory. I am sure BFC has wrestled with the problem of how much the Tac AI should be allowed to deviate from the player's command. Would be worth revisiting in the rewrite perhaps - the player would enter a general set of orders before the game began - advance to this point, move here, defend there - and then if forced to deviate during play, the confusion would have adverse effects in the form of extra command delays?

I think you can easily get at least some of this effect by greatly INCREASING the command delay of the HQ sections. If you assume that the major long-term movements of units follow their headquarters, then giving the HQ units longer command delays will force more advance planning of those movements, and consequently impose more delays for major changes of plan. Minor changes of plan due to local initiative of the HQ would not be affected, since the squads would have the same responsiveness they have now. It is only the larger units (as represented by the platoon HQs) that would have longer delays.

As it is now, I think the HQ units are too responsive. This also leads in part to the somewhat controversial tactic of using HQs to close assault tanks, because they are better at it.

In any case, I would also support adding a command delay to the cancelation of movement orders as well. For dealing with emergencies where you really need to stop immediately, an emergency halt something like the current WITHDRAW command could be implemented. You can cancel the movement orders immediately, but with a morale penalty.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Tero:

From Lysters paper:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />(2) Weapon with the next greatest adverse moral effect, ie Nebelwerfer (Moaning Minnie) effective because rapid rate of fire - blast effect - accuracy

Assesment based on one time fluke barrage or general perception of the weapons system and its capabilities ? </font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tero:

From Lysters paper:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />(2) Weapon with the next greatest adverse moral effect, ie Nebelwerfer (Moaning Minnie) effective because rapid rate of fire - blast effect - accuracy

Assesment based on one time fluke barrage or general perception of the weapons system and its capabilities ? </font>

[Lou2000]

Found it ....

A 1000m range is reachable only through the use of a parabolic trajectory, and I imagine that more than one round was fired. (...) Parabolic-trajectory firing of the RR80 was not cited in the manual for fighting enemy infantry emplacements (I suspect the tactic went against Wehrmacht doctrine as well and was used by soldiers as an ad hoc alternative to mortar fire) but it was allowed for avalanche detachment

Using shreks and piats as ad-hoc mortars couldnt have been very accurate !!

Panzershrek

Some interesting reading for those wanting to fire shreks from within buildings ... especially operators of the early models having to wear a fire proof poncho and gas mask !!

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Lou2000:

Using shreks and piats as ad-hoc mortars couldnt have been very accurate !!

Maybe for the Panzerschreck, but if the PIAT indeed had a bubble sight, and out to 350 or so metres, I can not see much of a problem. I believe that even out to the maximum range for DF you would fire at an angle, because of the low muzzle velocity?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by tar:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> Note the emphasis placed on how changing plans adversely effected morale. I remember one of the Squad Leader designers noting that in a truly realistic wargame, getting one's forces to do any little thing at all would be a tremendous victory. I am sure BFC has wrestled with the problem of how much the Tac AI should be allowed to deviate from the player's command. Would be worth revisiting in the rewrite perhaps - the player would enter a general set of orders before the game began - advance to this point, move here, defend there - and then if forced to deviate during play, the confusion would have adverse effects in the form of extra command delays?

I think you can easily get at least some of this effect by greatly INCREASING the command delay of the HQ sections. If you assume that the major long-term movements of units follow their headquarters, then giving the HQ units longer command delays will force more advance planning of those movements, and consequently impose more delays for major changes of plan. Minor changes of plan due to local initiative of the HQ would not be affected, since the squads would have the same responsiveness they have now. It is only the larger units (as represented by the platoon HQs) that would have longer delays.

As it is now, I think the HQ units are too responsive. This also leads in part to the somewhat controversial tactic of using HQs to close assault tanks, because they are better at it.

In any case, I would also support adding a command delay to the cancelation of movement orders as well. For dealing with emergencies where you really need to stop immediately, an emergency halt something like the current WITHDRAW command could be implemented. You can cancel the movement orders immediately, but with a morale penalty. </font>

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I've never had to use the 18 set, but the 77 sets we use (PRC-25, as the Yanks called them in Vietnam) are probably just as bad.

Minor correction. Your 77 is probably the US PRC-77. The older PRC-25 looked about the same as its replacement the PRC-77, but it used tubes where the PRC-77 was solid state. The 77 was in use in some training schools as of the early 1990s.

[Other Means]

this has probably been debated to death but i'd like to be able to fire a mortar into areas without LOS, as i think this is primarily what they were used for.

even to be able to hit the reverse slope of a hill or further into a treeline would be good.

there would be a decrease in accuracy but i could live with that, and if we could do the same with PIAT's, shreks even HMG's that too would seem more true to life.

maybe if there was a greater delay involved for this, i.e. the mortar could be set up to fire within LOS in a certain amount of time, but there is a further calibration time to allow the gunner to judge his angles & distances.

[Bil Hardenberger]

this has probably been debated to death but i'd like to be able to fire a mortar into areas without LOS, as i think this is primarily what they were used for.

This CAN be done as long as the mortar is in command and it's HQ has LOS to the targetted area.

Bil