Calling Grogs! Help me choose my next WWII reading...

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

Right now I'm reading the auto-bio of another less-than-stereotypical officer: Popski's Private Army.

Read that sometime around 1980. If you like it, you should look for a book called Tobruk Commando. I don't recall the author's name off the top of my head, but I'll try to have it when I get my recommended North Africa reading list together (coming soon!) (it's a long one).

Michael

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Grisha:

As Andreas points out, Glantz' work is refreshing in that it finally mades a serious effort in providing a more balanced picture through the inclusion of the Soviet perspective and source material. His work isn't spotless, but whose truely is? Regarding Zetterling and the Dupuy Institute staff, they aren't without their biases either - the result of an over-reliance on statistical data. My advice is to read material from both sides of the fence, so to speak, then make your own informed decision.

I disagree, because several of Glantz books have purported to be the definitive word on the conflict. I also prefer actual statistical data that can be proved/sourced/disproved than wishy washy reliance on proven faulty 2nd Soviet sources. Reading from "both sides of the fence" still does not make Glantz any more balanced, it may give the reader a more balanced view but it still requires one to reject Glantz as the ultimate view of the Soviet vs "Axis" war.

As to the 2000 casualties figure, it is a pretty major blow if those casualties are suffered by the infantry regts. I don't see how TDI members could actually support 2000 as "only a flesh wound" unless they're referring to a "Green knight" unit of monthy python fame.

[ May 28, 2003, 06:42 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Bastables:

I also prefer actual statistical data that can be proved/sourced/disproved than wishy washy reliance on proven faulty 2nd Soviet sources.

Unfortunately we don't have that data for a lot of battles, in particular those that would show very serious improvements on the Soviet side, i.e. 1944/5, thus the statistical data in existence (even assuming that it is actually correct) is skewing your potential research and the outcomes. This is a very serious problem, and one that has to be acknowledged by those relying on statistical data. It basically means that while you are able to do in-depth work on Kursk, you will never be able to do the same statistical analysis of e.g. Iassy-Kishinev (where the war diaries of 6th Army and most of its subformations were lost - there are still >100,000 MIA cases from that operation on the German side). If that is all you can do, you will never be able to draw any conclusions of the Soviet-German war as a whole, you will always be limited to isolated vignettes.

BTW - I really don't care whether Glantz' books purport one thing or another by the way. I treat them the way I outlined above.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bastables:

I also prefer actual statistical data that can be proved/sourced/disproved than wishy washy reliance on proven faulty 2nd Soviet sources.

Unfortunately we don't have that data for a lot of battles, in particular those that would show very serious improvements on the Soviet side, i.e. 1944/5, thus the statistical data in existence (even assuming that it is actually correct) is skewing your potential research and the outcomes. This is a very serious problem, and one that has to be acknowledged by those relying on statistical data. It basically means that while you are able to do in-depth work on Kursk, you will never be able to do the same statistical analysis of e.g. Iassy-Kishinev (where the war diaries of 6th Army and most of its subformations were lost - there are still >100,000 MIA cases from that operation on the German side). If that is all you can do, you will never be able to draw any conclusions of the Soviet-German war as a whole, you will always be limited to isolated vignettes.

</font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Bastables:

Although Zetterling does make comments to the effect "if they (germans) did so well versus the allies they must have been as equally competent at causing casualties among the soviets. The total casualties figures of both Russian and Germans from 1941 till the end of 44 do tend to support this.

Well, I am having very serious trouble with this statement. He is very clearly comparing apples and oranges, since routs of the magnitude of Iassy-Kishinye and Bagration never happened in the west. To make such arguments on the basis of total casualty figures smacks of some sort of bias to me. IMO that is only an attempt to cover up the fact that he is in no way able to pronounce on what happened in the east in summer 1944 with his research methodology.

[SgtMuhammed]

When reading any historical sources one has to remember that all historians have their own view of what "really" happened. They will write to support those views. Most competent historians will not lie but will manipulate data by only using sources that support their view.

The unfortunate truth is that what really happened about any event is almost impossible to know and you can find evidense for nearly any interpretation you want to put forth.

[Andreas]

Don, I am also not very happy about this arbitrary cut-off point of 'end of 44' - presumably on the grounds that in 45 the total figures are either:

1) hard to establish because records were no longer kept

2) include lots of POWs in collapsed pockets skewing the figures

3) both of the above

This conveniently ignores a number of issues that would show up the Germans rather badly WRT their combat effectiveness, such as e.g. the Vistula-Oder operation, or the Silesian operation. THe POW argument does not hold their either, because in the east the collapse was not as total as in the west, it happened much later.

Bottomline is, statistical analysis is only getting you this far either. Whether Zetterling believes one thing or another for the later war years in the east is irrelevant, since he has not got the data to back up his beliefs, nor is he able to get it, because it does not exist. E.g. in the Iassy-Kishinyew operation the following Grosseinheiten were lost almost entirely, and with them their records:

6. Armee parts of 8.Armee:

- Korpskommandos: IV, VII, XXX, XXXXIV, LII

- Infanterie-Divisionen: 9, 15, 62, 79, 106, 161, 257, 258, 282, 294, 302, 306, 320, 335, 370, 376, 384

- 153. Feldausbildungs-Division

Additionally large numbers of Heerestruppen.

Some parts of these divisions escaped:

- 10. PzGrenDiv

- 13. PzDiv

- 76. Inf.Div

This information is from Joerg Wurdack at the forums of www.panzerlexikon.de.

In terms of effectiveness, one can then debate on whether the Romanian losses should be counted into it or not.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

I can see that this has turned into a discussion on the merits, or otherwise, of Glantz and Zetterling. Happily, this is now a debate that can be brought to a conclusion, to the limited extent that these matters are ever finally concluded.

A recent book, just out this spring, deals head on with the claims of Zetterling with regard to his most famous work, on Kursk. The Book is called Kursk, The German View by Steven Newton. It is a “must have buy”, in my view, for those with an interest in Kursk. The final section of the book is made up of four 10-20 page essays on the most controversial topics to emerge over the last ten years with regard to Kursk. It carefully goes over the topics and tries to reach conclusions in a balanced way. In the case of the Zetterling claims Newton goes back to the same sources Zetterling has dug up, but digs even deeper, and reaches very different conclusions as a result. It turns out that Zetterling is a very fine researcher, but would make a poor intelligence officer in that his interpretation of the data he finds, is way off the mark.

Before I explain how Zetterling dropped the ball, a brief word on Steven Newton. He comes out of the US military education and intelligence establishment, as does Glantz. He is now professor of history at Delaware State University and is the author, or editor, of many fine books on the war in the east. Go to Amazon.com and do a search under his name, and you will see what I mean. Now back to Zetterling’s claims.

The figures that follow relate to the northern part of the Kursk front, but as Newton points out, the same form of analysis and the same conclusions would apply equally to the southern Kursk front.

At the heart of Zetterling’s claims is the fact that the German Ninth Army only lost 6.6% of its ration strength over the first five days of Kursk, from 4th to 9th July. The problem is that in a WWII German army only 21%-25% of the army’s strength is made up of troops in combat formations. A rough rule of thumb is that, at full strength, half the troops in a German army were Corps or Army troops, half divisional. In the divisions themselves, roughly half were combat troops, the rest support troops. By combat troops Newton makes clear that he means all the battalions that stood any chance of ending up actually doing the fight. He does not take a narrow definition, but even includes engineers and Military Police. He lists infantry battalions, engineers, Panzer and so on.

Anyway…. It turns out that Ninth Army’s losses amongst combat troops amounted to 26% over the five days, not 6.6%. Further, of the twenty three divisions in Ninth Army all those losses are spread between just fourteen divisions. The other nine divisions saw not combat at Kursk itself and over the period suffered losses such as 0.1%. Of the divisions that did any fighting over the period losses amongst combat troops were 45%. As all on this forum will know, if a battalion of 500 men lost 225 in combat, amongst the rifle platoons this will most likely mean 60%-75% losses. Newton describes the Ninth Army as “gutted” after just five days.

If one takes all of July, and all combat troops in Ninth Army and Second Panzer Army, that is all German forces in the so called Orel salient, losses amongst combat troops amounted to 56%. Again, this would most likely translate into 75% plus in the rifle platoons. By the end of July both Ninth and Second panzer Armies were just hollowed out shells. The Soviets had effectively extracted all the German armies’ teeth.

Zetterling makes similar mistakes in his analysis of replacements. Roughly speaking, for every 100,000 German replacements in 1943 only around 25,000 were combat troops. Yet for every 100,000 losses, around 75,000 were combat troops. All will have understood what is going on here.

Anyway… enough said. Steve Newton’s book is not a hatchet job on Zetterling. Only a small part it directly related to Zetterling. But amongst many other matters he does deal with the controversy thrown up by Zetterling head on. Zetterling described German losses at Kursk as “only slight”, hence Kursk in many ways being a draw or may be a type of victory for the Germans. In fact German losses were devastating. Platoons that in three and half German armies started July with between 30-35 men, in CMBB terms maybe 25% veteran and 75% regular, ended July with 6-10 men often no doubt rating no more than conscript or green due to combat exhaustion. And this in three plus armies.

All good fun,

All the best,

Kip.

[HarryInk]

You might find Rommel's little memoir entitled "Attack!" rather than 'infantry tactics'.

It's nifty, but the maps make sense of it...Did some twit really publish it without his little doodles?!!

One thing it shows... Rommel spent a goodly portion of WW1 with Gebirgsjaegers. With that fire power, no wonder he found attacking was usually the best option!! Especially against Roumanian peasants.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by HarryInk:

One thing it shows... Rommel spent a goodly portion of WW1 with Gebirgsjaegers. With that fire power, no wonder he found attacking was usually the best option!! Especially against Roumanian peasants.

I would be very surprised if:

a) WW1 Gebirgsjäger had anywhere near the firepower their late-WW2 brethren had and

if the Romanian army did indeed consist of more peasants than the Gebirgsjägers of WW1, who I am quite sure were much less pipe-smoking, slipper-wearing, port-quaffing middle-class types than you appear to believe.

[SgtMuhammed]

Originally posted by HarryInk:

One thing it shows... Rommel spent a goodly portion of WW1 with Gebirgsjaegers. With that fire power, no wonder he found attacking was usually the best option!! Especially against Roumanian peasants.

I might agree with you were it not for the fact that he started with just a regular line unit (namely 7th Company 124th Infantry (6th Wurttemberger) and believed in the power of decisive action from the very beginning. Rommel descovered quickly that people have a tendency to want to think about things. If you can get inside their decision cycle you can usually beat them.

[David Chapuis]

Originally posted by Malakovski:

Still, no one has commented on the small unit tactics books sold by Battlefront (not the ones in the long biblio). Surely someone has ordered them?

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Cpl Dodge:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Malakovski:

How about the four books Battlefront sells re: German and Russian Infantyr and Tank tactics? I assume some people here have ordered them, and they are a much more reasonable $20...

I also am interested in what people think of these. </font>

[Wallybob]

[ June 03, 2003, 05:44 PM: Message edited by: Wallybob ]

[Wallybob]

Well, here goes.

Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far

The Longest Day

The Last Battle

Whittaker, B. Rhineland

Raus, Gerhard Panzers on the Eastern Front

Forgot the authors name Soldat

Cooper, Belton Deathtraps

[Apache]

I have the four BFC books relating to infantry and armour tactics of both Soviet and German forces. They are OK but I personally didn't get a lot out of them that I found to be useful for CMBB. There is (and this is not a criticism) a heavy emphasis on the various activities/routines that commanders at squad and company level had to perform with detailed accounts of how to conduct movement and maneuvers. All well and good if that is what you wish to learn (and the books are advertised as tactics of etc etc, not the CMBB guide to...) but I would not recommend them for someone wanting to improve their CMBB. The problem is you don't get the level of control over individual squads to benefit from the detail that these books go into. I personally would place them in this order in terms of usefulness for CMBB

1) Soviet Armour tactics

2) Soviet Infantry Tactics

3) German Armour

4) German Infantry

With 1 being best. I am not sure that you couldn't get the information that is of use to CMBB euqally as well from perhaps more generalist books on company/batallion level tactics. That is just my view though, others may differ.

I have just bough a couple of books: Closing with the Enemy by Michael Doubler (US tactics 44-45) and The Art of Maneuver by Robert Leonhard. Not read either yet but the first came highly recommended by some US military contacts. The second is, I think, pitched more at the strategic/theory level.

I also have Infantry Attacks by Rommel. Found it OK but am not sure it is written in a style which lends itself to readers actually learning what tactical points he tries to make. Again, just my view. Certainly not my favourite, found it quite a labour to struggle through to the end because of the repetitive style of his accounts. In many cases I found myself asking "Yeah...and...the point is????" Hope this is of some use.

[ June 07, 2003, 09:05 AM: Message edited by: Apache ]

[SgtMuhammed]

One thing the remember about "Infantry Attacks" is that Rommel wrote it as kind of a book length resume. Still I found it a pretty good read but it did tend to bog at times, especially, as you said, at the end.

[Guest lmgroth]

I just wanted to wish Major General F.W. von Mellenthin a happy 100th birthday today!

He was born on 8/30/1904 and served with Rommel in the Afrika Corps as a Staff Officer as well as other positions throughout the entire war.

I am currently reading his book "Panzer Battles" and although he covers the tactics at an Operational/Strategic level I am enjoying it.

Happy Birthday!

[Alkiviadis]

"Closing with the Enemy" by Michael Doubler

(How the GIS fought the war in Europe 1944-45)

An excellent & detail analysis of the small unit tactics that worked & didn't in the ETO

[ August 30, 2004, 09:07 PM: Message edited by: Alkiviadis ]

[Ketil]

While its a good read, one of my old favorites from school days, I am curious why y'all are recommending Keegan's Face of Battle? It covers Agincourt, Waterloo and The Somme quite well but isnt really about WW2 at all.....

For WW2 reading I HIGHLY recommend the Spike Milligan quartet if you can find it. Paul Fussel's new book The Boys Crusade was pretty good, if a little short. Doubler is good as well. Bill Mauldin's books are also a fine read and give a slightly different perspective as well as some damn funny cartoons. On To Berlin by Gen. James Gavin also comes to mind.

Oh yeah, for OOBs ya simply cant beat George Nafziger.... Nafziger Collection

[John Kettler]

Haven't gotten far with it yet, but everything I've read so far of Wolf Heckmann's ROMMEL'S WAR IN AFRICA has been first rate. The book was originally written and published for a German audience, and it demythologizes Rommel, showing both the good and the bad, while painting a vivid, higly detailed picture of the war from the German side. The English edition bears a highly complimentary foreword by General Sir John Hackett (of THE THIRD WORLD WAR fame). Got mine on remainder at Borders.

Please see my thread "three fabulous books" on the CMBB Forum for some great Eastern Front choices. Also, suggest you find a copy of THE RUSSIAN WAR: 1941-1945, Mrazkova and Remes, Eds. (Dutton, 1977).

It's Russian combat and related photography and will immerse you in the war there so fast your head will spin. Gripping!

Regards,

John Kettler

[ September 01, 2004, 02:32 PM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[Herr Kruger]

If "An Army at Dawn" is really that good, what would be a great book that covers the earlier parts of the war in North Africa to complement it?

Has anyone read "Fighter" by Deighton? I have it but haven't yet read it.

Thanks!

[Runyan99]

If you're interested in the Eastern Front, I'll also recommend 'In Deadly Combat'. I have to admit I never finished it. As the book progresses, the author's combat fatigue becomes apparent, to the point he can hardly describe the battles anymore. Still, his accounts of the fighting he saw in '41 and '42 are worth the price of the book.

I have a few of the tactical manuals that BFC sells. I think I have one covering German infantry, the Soviet infantry, one about Soviet armor, and maybe one covering German or American armor. I also have one about German tactics in the desert, although the material in that one is sort of a mishmash.

Basically these are reprints/translations of field manuals. They give you some interesting info about company level tactics as they were tought at the time. This is stuff that you can either get for free online...or cannot find anywhere else!

Overall, I'd recommed the Soviet editions best, as they are about the only place I have seen small unit Soviet tactics laid out in a comprehensive format. Start with one or two of those, then you can decide if you want more.