What IS Realistic Firepower and is it in CM?

[Vergeltungswaffe]

Don't have any of it in my office to list the sources, but Avalon Hill based the mechanics of Firepower, its squad level game of ground combat in modern (at that time) times on all the theories surrounding only a few men in any given group actually doing anything notable in combat. It was such that even in the best trained squads, you could only move and/or fire with a few of your men in a given unit time. Based on my father's Korean War stories, I would say that, at that time, it was reasonably correct. Many soldiers did nothing, even under fire, until a Sergeant, or better, got behind them and yelled in their ear.

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Give a man fire, and he's warm for a day. Set a man on fire and he's warm for a lifetime.

[Beltfed]

Uh actually from what I've read Keegan's estimate of how many people actually shot their rifles in combat is on the high side. I think it was even discussed during a forum discussing the movie "The Big Red One" after it's release. I recall WW2 vets and Vietnam vets comparing their respective experiences and one of the WW2 vets, then a judge (I think. it's been awhile) remarked that there had been a study done after the war and it was found that maybe two in ten would fire their weapons in combat. Most were taking cover or maybe manuevering. This is why crew served weapons like MGs are supposedly very important. They will tend to fire more while a lone riflemen will not. Apparently it was found that the other crew member(s), AG, loader, spotter and the like, are more likely to reinforce and reassure each other as opposed to a scared lone riflemen by himself. Keegan was discussing well trained units not regular or green. So if only 25% of a good unit is firing imagine how little fire is going downrange in green unit.

Also reading a later reply about casualty rates and how they applied to units. Another fact was that as units took even fairly heavy casualties they actually became more combat effective! So a half strength unit would actually fight better than full strength units! It was the food chain. The slow, incompetent, and unlucky were weeded out and the better troops survived. And luckier! Now this applied more to a green unit than veteran but it was noticable in those units too.

Now LTs get popped a lot because of shake and bake schooling, a lot were needed fast so they got less training. Also I found when our LT got his hands on a map things tended to get bad

[This message has been edited by Beltfed (edited 03-30-2001).]

[Terence]

Originally posted by Beltfed:

So if only 25% of a good unit is firing imagine how little fire is going downrange in green unit.

Exactly. So you can see why a unit of concripts who seem to be ALL SHOOTING, could be inconsistent with what Keegan says. Not that Keegan is 100 percent right or the game is wrong, but it sure is an interesting question.

[Michael Dorosh]

Critical Distance - I think Konrad Lorenz talks about this as well, in his work on Aggression in different species. I posted a bit about this before, but most is dimly remembered. Correct me if I'm wrong, but there is a distance that people set for themselves - a threat occuring within a certain range will inspire them to fight, within another range will inspire them to flight instead.

[Forever Babra]

Originally posted by Terence:

what is critical distance?

It is a principle of animal behaviour first theorized by the Zoologist Hediger. As Michael says, it is the "fight or flight" threshold. If you surprise a bear up close, within the "critical distance" you will get what Hediger calls a "critical reaction": It will maul you. If you surprise it from a distance, beyond what he terms "flight distance", it will flee.

Keegan postulates that the same principle applies to humans, especially in a war setting. Short-range engagements tend to have a much higher level of violence, with no-quarter contests common. At greater ranges, the level of violence decreases and troops are more willing to evade than engage. This is a behavioural principle and has nothing to do with weapons effects, though the type of weapons in use can determine the length of the critical distance. Studies on the principle as applied to humans showed that habitually violent men routinely underestimated the distance between themselves and their victims.

EDIT: Some further thoughts. I raise this because if we take the theory as valid, and we also accept the 20% "participation" figure from Marshall, then it would suggest that the majority of infantry combat occurred outside the distance within which men would be driven to participate.

[This message has been edited by Forever Babra (edited 03-30-2001).]

[Terence]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

It is a principle of animal behaviour first theorized by the Zoologist Hediger. As Michael says, it is the "fight or flight" threshold. If you surprise a bear up close, within the "critical distance" you will get what Hediger calls a "critical reaction": It will maul you. If you surprise it from a distance, beyond what he terms "flight distance", it will flee.

Keegan postulates that the same principle applies to humans, especially in a war setting. Short-range engagements tend to have a much higher level of violence, with no-quarter contests common. At greater ranges, the level of violence decreases and troops are more willing to evade than engage. This is a behavioural principle and has nothing to do with weapons effects, though the type of weapons in use can determine the length of the critical distance. Studies on the principle as applied to humans showed that habitually violent men routinely underestimated the distance between themselves and their victims.

Some days I LOVE this forum. I learn such an incredible amount of stuff just by turning up and asking questions.

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by Jasper:

So given that the most dangerous people are removed from a unit - to be replaced with an "average" replacement - how does that change the makeup of the unit?

Or to rephrase the question - again! Is there a porpotion of the groups that 'works'? Example: If everyone is a killer, then does that unit 'work'?

Well, there was the First Special Service Force, recruited from men previously noted for hyper-aggressive behavior. As Jason mentioned, the ones more inclined to be involved in "extra-curricular activities" were thought to be more likely to "get the job done" in combat.

The theory seems to be born out by the FSSF's record in Italy and the Med, where even the rumor that they had moved into the line usually put the Germans opposite into fits. Not unjustified, as the Forcemen took to night "terror" patrols, were they would infiltrate the German positions, slit a few throats, take some ears, and leave the bodies (some times right next to a sleeping kommerade!) to be found the next morning.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

Well, there was the First Special Service Force, recruited from men previously noted for hyper-aggressive behavior. As Jason mentioned, the ones more inclined to be involved in "extra-curricular activities" were thought to be more likely to "get the job done" in combat.

The theory seems to be born out by the FSSF's record in Italy and the Med, where even the rumor that they had moved into the line usually put the Germans opposite into fits. Not unjustified, as the Forcemen took to night "terror" patrols, were they would infiltrate the German positions, slit a few throats, take some ears, and leave the bodies (some times right next to a sleeping kommerade!) to be found the next morning.

The record of the FSSF speaks for itself, especially at Anzio (where their skill at night patrolling allowed them to hold a frontage out of all proportion to their true numbers), but be careful of buying into the myth that they were all Canadian backwoodsmen and American prison-scum. Most were NCOs, which is telling - given the discussion of "natural fighters" here.

Actually, the Gurkhas had even more of a reputation for leaving presents like you describe for sleeping Germans. Much research to be done there, too. I wonder how many Gurkhas were "natural fighters" - and why?

[Michael Dorosh]

dp

[This message has been edited by Michael Dorosh (edited 03-30-2001).]

[Agua]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Actually, the Gurkhas had even more of a reputation for leaving presents like you describe for sleeping Germans. Much research to be done there, too. I wonder how many Gurkhas were "natural fighters" - and why?

Not a lot to add here other than my father fought in CBI in late '44 through the end and his repeated comment was that it was said the Gurhka would slip behind a soldier and tap him on the helment before his throat was slit, just to let him know the end had arrived.

Excellent thread.

[Aacooper]

Sorry be so contrary without having my source (it went back to the library), but Peter Mansoor (in "The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945") says there is evidence Marshall never did all of the interviews he claimed to have done. Marshall left no notes available anywhere, and he would have had to have been a superhuman interviewer to talk to everyone he said he did. At any rate, in combat, the American soldiers who didn't fire (whatever percentage that was) did so not because of inhibitions (which are typically lost when someone in your platoon dies), but because they didn't have a target! They either weren't in the right place, or they couldn't see the Germans. I believe (now I'm treading into soggier ground) the point of giving everyone M-16's was to encourage shooting even when you couldn't see the enemy (e.g. because the jungle was too thick).

[von Lucke]

In the early '90's, when I was stationed in Korea, I went through a Mountaineering course with a squad of Ghurkas from the UN contingent: Most polite, unassuming, good-humored bunch you'd ever want to meet. Not the image of cold-blooded killers. But they certainly left us in the dust when it came to climbing and rapelling...

[Moon]

Hmm, strange, I always thought that study was based more on the fact of sheer visibility of an enemy rather than the shooter's (or non-shooter's) morale/courage. The 25% quoted in the report actually ties in nicely with my own experience in the Army, not in real combat admittedly but training and maneuvers - you do not see the enemy all too often, since he is doing everything he can (just like to) to stay in cover. So even when (by CM terms) you know that an infantry unit is "there", there is relatively little chance to fire your rifle.

From my experience, at least half of the guys on your squad won't be able to fire at a target, simply because they don't see it (are moving, crawling, hiding). If you add the reluctance to raise your head when somebody is firing at you, 25% seems to me to be a realistic/believable figure.

One more thing on casualties in CM - I, too, find casualties sometimes too high, supported by a comparison of historical casualty numbers and historical CM battles. But I think this is to not a small part due to the fact that a player tends to be way more aggressive with his forces from his safe place behind a computer screen than any company leader would be in real life. The god-like view of a player on the battlefield and virtually no communication delays (something like just a platoon attack on a limited objective can take surprisingly long to plan in real life from my experience) adds to the likeliness of high casualty-to-time in battle ratios.

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"An hour has 60 minutes, each minute in action has a thousand dangers."

- Karl-Heinz Gauch, CO 1st Panzerspähkompanie, 12th SS Panzerdivision

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by Aacooper:

...the point of giving everyone M-16's was to encourage shooting even when you couldn't see the enemy (e.g. because the jungle was too thick).

The way it was explained to me was that the M16 was the remedy for most conscript soldiers being unable to hit what they shot at: 5.56 rounds weigh less than the old 30.06, allowing the portage of more ammo, coupled with semi-auto (used to be full auto with the M16A1) allows our non-aiming troops to lay down suppressive fire. Instead of counting on them to actually kill the enemy, they're just expected to keep his head down until he's had enough and goes away.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

In the early '90's, when I was stationed in Korea, I went through a Mountaineering course with a squad of Ghurkas from the UN contingent: Most polite, unassuming, good-humored bunch you'd ever want to meet. Not the image of cold-blooded killers. But they certainly left us in the dust when it came to climbing and rapelling...

It was the same with the Gurkhas I paraded with in 1990. They even held hands with each other off parade, and were famous for mimicking their (English) officers. Their appearance is quite deceptive.

[Forever Babra]

I've never met a Gurkha and I've often wondered if they're reputations aren't just a wee bit overblown. Don't read anything into the hand-holding though -- that's just a sign of friendship in that part of the world.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

OK, whether any of this is realistically covered in CM was the next obvious question, which Terence (as usual) had the sense to ask. I think the answer is "yes". I ran a test to see about this, which I will relate.

Terence wondered in particular whether the firepower of conscripts might not be too high, if everyone is counted as up and firing. Well, in realistic conditions, conscripts are not all up and firing, because they cower rather easily when they take fire. And when they do shoot, they do not shoot particularly straight. I decided to test this in CM in my little mini-scenario lab (mu-hu-hahaha).

So I gave the Germans 1 rifle-44 platoon of conscripts. I gave the U.S. 1 regular rifle platoon, with a single MMG for fire support. I made it a meeting engagement to avoid foxhole effects, but gave the Germans a defensive task in better cover - regular woods, with mostly scattered trees in front of them, seperated by patches of open ground, with occasional brush. The German HQ I gave +1 command only, the U.S. HQ had +1 to everything but stealth. Both sides stayed in command distance almost all the time, incidentally. The odds in men were 45 vs. 31, while the odds in CM points was 138 vs. 65.

Now, the Germans have 3 MG-42, 8 MP-40, 1 Pistol, and 19 rifles. The U.S. had 1 MMG, 3 BAR, 4 SMG, 1 Pistol, 32 rifles. The Germans also have 14-16% cover, vs. the 25-30% average for the U.S. out in scattered trees, with occasional higher figures when crossing particular bits of open ground.

If the Germans were regulars and as well led as the U.S., I'd expect them to hold, or at least make the battle a bloody exhange, since the cover difference, defense, and weapons mix would about make up for the numbers. Notice, in that case the points odds would be 138 vs. 105, or about "probe" odds, and less than the cover differential.

What actually happened? The U.S. lost 6 WIA, 2 KIA and smashed the German platoon. 1 German surrendered and 5 ran off the map, the other 25 were hit. The whole affair took 7 minutes. In addition, however, the effects of the lower morale can be seen in the way the U.S. took its losses.

In the first minute, a conscript fired at ~150 yards at a U.S. squad moving in the open, and flat missed, not even a temporary "alerted" result. Another managed to expose itself in woods at a distance of 175 yards, drawing fire from the U.S. MMG. The MMG fired 51 fp at 14% cover, and the conscript squad hit the dirt. It recovered rapidly enough, but the point is a tiny amount of fire was able to cause cowering.

Half of the U.S. losses for the whole fight, occurred in the 2nd minute. The ranges were between 67 and 100 yards, shooting at men moving in scattered trees. 3 conscript squads were firing, although one of them hit the dirt a few times between shots. They hit 4 men, 2-1-1 on the various U.S. squads. The regulars experienced "shaken" results from these shots, and 1 experienced a "pinned" which rapidly "rose" to a "shaken". By the end of the second minute, 2 U.S. squads were back up to "alerted" and the last was "OK". All were still able to fire, and the conscripts were also still "up".

In the 3rd minute, the U.S. concentrated most of their fire on one, nearest German squad. It was reduce to cowering by half-way through the minute. It never recovered, despite slackened fire at it in the 4th minute. It took 2 hits in the 5th, ran, took 2 more while running, cowered for 2 minutes near its HQ without rallying, and eventually ran off the map when that position was assaulted.

The U.S. took 1 hit in the 3rd minute and 2 in the 5th, from one particularly effective volley by a single German squad. The 2nd German squad cowered in the 5th minute, with the range around 100 yards. As soon as it did, the U.S. rushed. The second cowerer got up a couple times during the rush, but was quickly back down again. A squad with 10 men left (U.S.) closed to point blank, had a moments panic when fired on by the German HQ too (loss of 8th man), recovered to "pinned", and then fought in close combat. The German squad was not defending itself and was quickly butchered.

Fire shifted to the last holdout and losses on it piled up, reducing it to a half-squad. More Americans rushed in the center, had a brief firefight with the German HQ and dispatched 2 of its members, who then ran. 1 more was hit and the other ran off the map. The last half-squad was reduced to 3 men, then those ran, 2 more were hit, and the last surrendered.

The conscripts were able to fire for one minute at the start of the battle with something like full effectiveness. In the period 3rd-6th minute, progressively fewer of them were firing, and U.S. losses were very low, 1 man per minute from ~25 shooters. Under this weak fire, the firepower of the U.S. forces stayed roughly constant, with only a few riflemen down, little cowering, and the range progressively closing, on average, to compensate for what there was of either. As the progressive effect of this constant fire built, 2 men, 4 men, 6 men down, the German force rapidly lost its ability to reply with any effect.

The net result was that 3:2 odds attackers facing a nearly 2:1 cover differential against them, inflicted 3-4 times the causalties they took. Which means there was a large difference in the amount of shooting going on - perhaps 5 times over the whole fight. Some of that was close range fire in the last 2 minutes without any reply to speak of, some was more nearly even firing in the first 2 minutes.

So the conclusion is that the CM morale system will definitely show firepower well below "everyone firing", especially with lower quality troops. If one always fights veteran vs. veteran, then one is indeed likely to get distinctly "un-Marshall-an" outcomes. To me, this only underlines a point I keep repeating every chance I get, that the most realistic fights in CM come when the force mix is green and regular, not all vet, or vet and regular. The good command delay system also matters in fights like that, too.

[Mlapanzer]

Great post by all. From what I have read by different sources getting men to fire was a problem. It does seem that Patton did consider this a problem and was always emphasizing Marching fire in his 3rd army and it's training.Maybe this is what made the 3rd more effect than some of the other Armies.

I know most of these post have been about the U.S Army does anyone have any sources about this problem in other armies? I'm sure it's not just a U.S. Army problem.

The make-up dynamics of units is also an interesting side bar. I work with a Vietnam Vet who is willing to talk to me about his experiences there and the one thing he always brings up is how the strong fighters generally know who the other strong fighters are and stick together. Where the weaker ones tend to stay together also. This also seems to be a common theme in other personal accounts.

As an aside the U.S. army is now experimenting with going back to using some of the older methods of training of marksmanship. It seems now that the pendulum has swung to far and there is now a need to teach more marksmanship along with the area fire technics.

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"PHHFFFFFFT" Bill the cat

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

I've never met a Gurkha and I've often wondered if they're reputations aren't just a wee bit overblown. Don't read anything into the hand-holding though -- that's just a sign of friendship in that part of the world.

My point exactly! I don't doubt for a second they are tough little bastards!

[gunnergoz]

Admittedly, he was writing about elite units (airborne) but one would do well to read Steven Ambrose' Band of Brothers as well as his other works. It was clear to me upon reading Ambrose descriptions of paratrooper's war experiences that most if not all of these elite troops found time to fire their weapons. It was also clear that some were far more effective and deadly at it than others. This was apparently also true of U.S. Marines, certainly an elite force by most standards, and true as well of Rangers and similar commando units like the 1st Special Service Force. Elite units, filled with extraordinary and motivated individuals, give non-standard results.

My reading of WW2 history leads me to conclude that regular US infantry was somewhat less "gung ho" but given the right circumstances and leadership, most units rose to the occasion. Perhaps not every GI would fire their weapon, but enough did to get the job done. When there were failures of morale and leadership, units broke and fled and certainly not many of these men were inclined to stick around to fire their weapons.

I suspect that there is much, much more to the issue of who fires their weapon in combat than can be summarized in a sort of "SLA Marshall was Right" versus "SLA Marshall was exaggerating or making it all up" debate.

Marshall was a complex man. His son's autobiography touches upon some of the issues that made the father quirky and also brilliant.

One must also consider that many pre-war Regular Army officers tended to sneer at and look down upon the mass of citizen soldiers that they had to take to war. To them, these drafted civilians were unkempt, undisciplined and insubordinate. Such officers could not abide an army filled to the brim with amateurs who were not careerists. I suspect that Marshall had a bit of this element in his thinking, even if at an unconscious level. Certainly this army of civilians rankled the likes of Patton, as many of us know.

Even our favorite pet flogging horse, the film Saving Private Ryan attempts to portray this failure to perform under fire when it depicts the soldier who froze and could not bring his weapon to bear against an enemy only inches away. I suspect things like this occasionally did happen. I also applaud Spielberg for "redeeming" the soldier later in the film by having him take action against the enemy, admittedly under unusual circumstances. I vote with Speilberg and personally believe that the tendencies of individual soldiers to engage the enemy in fire combat, varied greatly and depended upon circumstance and context. This view defies easy categorization of the phenomenon, because it is such an individualized experience.

My personal suspicion is that many weapons went unfired at times on the battlefield, and that this was not exclusively a US experience. I also believe that under the right circumstances, most men would find the time and means to use their weapons, the circumstances and context varying with the individual.

Statistically, we know that most infantry casualties were caused by artillery, especially mortars. We also know that prodigious amounts of infantry weapon ammo was expended in order to produce the enemy casualties that are now known to have been caused by light arms.

Somewhere in between these truths lies our deceptive and sought-after generalization. Did men fire their weapons? Yes, sometimes. Did they have an effect? Again, yes, sometimes. Can this phenomenon and effect be quantified for game purposes? There, my answer would have to be...somewhat. The variables are just too great to have pat formulas that would replicate history, and that would please all of us.

So I say keep it simple. Keep playing CM and see if the outcomes appear reasonable. And at the same time, accept that: 1) We'll never know for sure what all the facts were in each historical situation that we model, and 2) We'd probably never all come to agree upon a given formula to calculate this "non-firing factor."

Grogs being grogs, I'm sure that we'll go on for ages debating stuff like this because the truth is elusive and grows more difficult to pin down with the passage of time. So all we're left with in the end is our interpretation of what we've read or been told by others who supposedly have "seen the elephant."

My point: stay flexible, keep an open mind, continue to probe your subject and never expect that you've got the whole explanation for anything.

Oh, yes, be highly suspicious of those who have the right, correct and final answer or analysis to any given topic in the area of history. They are either ignorantly biased, incompletely informed or propagating their pet views and agendas.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

A wise man once said, "the mind is a machine for coming to conclusions. If it can't, it is rusty."

On the reports of he-man-ness recounted by brass polishers and late publicists, I wonder just a tad about selection bias on the vets that get interviewed, or that want to be. I'll let you figure it out.

There is variation in war, and in every type of unit, because human beings are not uniform. It is not actually any respect for them to pretend they were. If it be well weighed, in fact, to claim every man or every man in a given unit was uniformly brave, is a sort of insult to those who actually were.

It is a quite general tendency, you know. Moral characteristics attach to individuals, not to groups, classes, occupations, or categories. Not all businessmen are energetic, not all clergymen are moral, not all scientists are careful, not all judges are fair - and not all soldiers, or paratroops, are brave.

And incidentally, the combat psych studies are at least as much about another subject, that is far more worthy than lack of bravery. Many men are reluctant to kill, without much if any reluctance to undergo danger for the sake of duty, or for others. This is hardly a failing, in human terms.

In fact, the army was at least as threatened by the idea that soldiers resist the whole idea of killing as a duty, as they were by visions of widespread cowardice. The latter is in fact less threatening, morally speaking, to the average professional soldier, than is the former.

He typically knows, rationally, that bravery is more choiceworthy than cowardice, and almost everyone agrees with him about that. He generally knows that he has more bravery than the average person. And almost everyone knows that his duty is an essential one that cannot be avoided. But killing is a dirty job, and many men feel that very keenly, even those who see that sometimes it is essential and someone must do it.

[This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-31-2001).]

[Christian Knudsen]

For a really great discussion of the firepower debate, and the various training methods used to "fix" the non-firing factor, read "On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society," by LCol. Dave Grossman (Little, Brown, and Co., Boston, 1995)

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Cede Nullis - Yield to None

[ferdinand]

Strange that nobody mentioned :

"An intimate history of killing"

by Joanna Bourke, subtitled " face-toface killing in 20 th century warfare"

It's not a military history book, but it should interest all those who followed the thread.

[argie]

If you are enjoying this thread, read this article:

http://www.2am.com/2am/coc/cocpaper.htm

I think the Marshall's work on infantrymen in Korea is in:

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/DL/

but I can access it to check...

I d/l this pdf from somewhere on the net, and I think that as the place.

Ariel

[Jeff Duquette]

My personal opinion on SLA Marshall is that perhaps there is a bit of slop that has been brought out recently regarding his work. However it is typically the case in controversial work that critics will dig into such work with a very fine toothed comb and find any missing dotted “i” or uncrossed “t” and proclaim aha! As pointed out already portions of his work are still maintained on both US ARMY as well as US MARINE suggested reading lists.

This an excerpt of an interview with General William DePuy regarding some of his combat experience in North Western Europe, 1944-45. From: “Changing An Army”, An Oral History of General William DePuy. Seemingly DePuy arrived at basically the same conclusions as Marshall regarding ratios of men employing, or not employing their weapons in a firefight.

INTERVIEWER: Was there anything in particular that you learned about our soldiers, other than what you've already mentioned, in terms of what you could or could not expect of them?

GENERAL DEPUY: Well, I certainly came away with a feeling that only a small percentage of the soldiers did almost all of the fighting. If you just left them alone then some 10 percent of the soldiers were the ones who actually took the initiative, moved, fired their rifles, threw hand grenades, and so on. The other 90 percent would defend themselves if they had to, but would not do the other things unless an officer or a sergeant directly ordered them to do it, in which case they usually would do it. I learned that you couldn't depend on them doing things simply because there was a plan to do it, or because of some generalized order to do it, and this included the junior officers. You had to say, "do this," "do that," "now fire there," "now do this," and "now move there." You would always end up with a good sergeant or a good officer and three or four men doing all of the work

Unfortunately, the rest of them contributed to the casualties. And, to this every day, I'd rather have a 40-man company than a 220-man company, if I could pick the 40 men. I’d pick sergeants and officers and a few natural fighters if I could. So, what I'm saying is that I came away absolutely impressed with the fact that the average man, like nine out of ten, or eight out of ten, does not have an instinct for the battlefield, doesn't relish it, and will not act independently except under direct orders. If they are in a crew they are better. If they are in a tank or with a machine gun, they are better because there is teamwork involved. If an officer orders them to do something eyeball-to-eyeball, most men, even the ones who don't want to do it, have no initiative, and are scared to death, normally will do exactly what he tells them to do. Once, during the Battle of the Bulge, we moved into an attack at night {early morning). We got behind the Germans and prepared to jump off from the edge of some woods across an open, snowy field to seize the little village of Berle, Luxembourg. I had "B" Company in the overwatch and "A" Company doing the attack. Just before we were ready to go, a machine gun opened up on us from the rear, back in the woods. You see, we had gone past the Germans. We had slipped through them at night. And, some of them had turned around, came back, and spotted us milling around in the woodline. So, they set up a machine gun and started firing at our backs. I didn't want to stop the attack because I had the artillery just about ready to go. So, I grabbed the first two soldiers I could find, I didn't know who they were, and I said, "You and you, I want you to go back and knock out the machine gun right now, because we are going to attack that town. Now, get going." And, they did. They were scared to death, but they did it. They would never have done it if I hadn't said, "We have to do it, you have got to do it — now go do it" This means that effectiveness varies directly with leadership actively applied.

DePuy's active military career began as a National Guard officer participating in the Louisiana Maneuvers prior to America's entry into World War II. His early combat service was with the 90th Infantry Division in the hedgerow lighting of Normandy during 1944. Depuy eventually commanded an infantry battalion in the 90th Infantry Division. Depuy was awarded two Silver Stars as a battalion commander during WWII. DePuy would later in wife command the 1st ID in Vietnam.