Schürtzen

[ASL Veteran]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mattias:

The threat developed throughout 1942 (Again, the 14.5 mm ATRs where not available at the start of the war in the East), it was not until early 1943 that it was addressed in a concerted manner. We are talking about a number of months here, even if there was a war on things still didn’t happen at the drop of a hat.<hr></blockquote>

See my post above. Hopefully that should be sufficient to show that the ATR threat was real prior to 1943. The statement that the ATR threat didn't develop until 1942 is patently false.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>This difference was not so great as to completely abolish the use of ATRs in the German army. They where used in the west and the desert and they certainly brought a few into Russia as well. In fact the development of new ATRs for German service continued into 1942 when they finally went out of fashion.<hr></blockquote>

I'll give you an opportunity to either recant this assertion or to provide actual facts that back that assertion.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>See above, all the Germans had to do was to ask their tank crews if they felt a bit of extra protection would be a good idea.<hr></blockquote>

Indeed, I couldn't have said it better myself. I'm sure those tank crews were screaming for more protection in 1939 - which is backed up by the last report I quoted in the previous post.

[ASL Veteran]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mattias:

No problem ASL Veteran, opinions differ.

But the next time, please extend me the courtesy of not distorting my words or belittle my opinion the last thing you do before leaving the discussion.

M.<hr></blockquote>

If you feel that I quoted you incorrectly then please post the specific reference and the exact distortion - along with any correction as necessary.

[Herr_B]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by ASL Veteran:

ATRs had been around before the war started (in fact, the Germans had one in 1918). If the Germans had intended to protect their vehicles against ATRs then why didn't they start hanging these skirts in 1940? It would seem that the ATR threat would have well known prior to 1943?<hr></blockquote>

I don't know much of Schürtzen history so I wont argue on the reson why, to this I can only say just because it's a good and simple idea someone has to tink of it the first time and then convince someone that it's a good, simple and effective solution.

The world is full of things that didn't exist before someone inveted them and got someone else to beleve in the idea.

Patrik

[Patgod]

"hey fritz, congrats on that kick ass victory in france."

"thanks hans, i had expected a much tougher fight out of the 'greatest army in zee world' heh"

"yeah, damn frogs. well, i'm here on buisiness."

"oh?"

"yes, see the general staff wants to know what problems you faced, other then french whores and having to chase the retreating frogs."

"humm, well ATRs took a heavy toll on my panzers, the frogs would wait in ambush to get side shots. we lost quite a few tanks that way"

"ouch, that sucks. were you able to combat them though? i mean did you find a way to deal with them?"

"yes, infact we did. often the[atr teams] hid in buildings near the roads, or in forests. after we started burning those buildings casualties went down considerably"

"humm, ok i'll pass this onto the general staff. great talking to you bro"

"yeah man, you should stop by my field office more often. and bring brewskies next time would ya? its hard getting good beer out here, damn french only drink girly 'wine'. loosers couldnt handle a real drink"

"will do"

and so, it was not till late 43 that schurtzen were commonplace. all because of 2 friends, and some brewskies.

[ASL Veteran]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Patrik:

I don't know much of Schürtzen history so I wont argue on the reson why, to this I can only say just because it's a good and simple idea someone has to tink of it the first time and then convince someone that it's a good, simple and effective solution.

The world is full of things that didn't exist before someone inveted them and got someone else to beleve in the idea.

Patrik<hr></blockquote>

An interesting response. Of course someone has to invent something the first time. However, you are more likely to spend resources on solving a problem that needs solving than a problem that doesn't need solving. Hanging skirts on tanks isn't a trivial matter. The extra weight of the skirts can make the vehicles difficult to steer or even effect the vehicles range. If the ATR threat is diminishing to the point of insignificance by 1943 (because tanks are more and more heavily armored) then why would you hang a bunch of heavy skirts on a vehicle for a threat that is diminishing? Doesn't make any sense to me.

[ASL Veteran]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Patgod:

"hey fritz, congrats on that kick ass victory in france."

"thanks hans, i had expected a much tougher fight out of the 'greatest army in zee world' heh"

"yeah, damn frogs. well, i'm here on buisiness."

"oh?"

"yes, see the general staff wants to know what problems you faced, other then french whores and having to chase the retreating frogs."

"humm, well ATRs took a heavy toll on my panzers, the frogs would wait in ambush to get side shots. we lost quite a few tanks that way"

"ouch, that sucks. were you able to combat them though? i mean did you find a way to deal with them?"

"yes, infact we did. often the[atr teams] hid in buildings near the roads, or in forests. after we started burning those buildings casualties went down considerably"

"humm, ok i'll pass this onto the general staff. great talking to you bro"

"yeah man, you should stop by my field office more often. and bring brewskies next time would ya? its hard getting good beer out here, damn french only drink girly 'wine'. loosers couldnt handle a real drink"

"will do"

and so, it was not till late 43 that schurtzen were commonplace. all because of 2 friends, and some brewskies.<hr></blockquote>

Thanks for your insights. If you have anything relevant to add to the discussion then please don't hesitate.

[tabpub]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by ASL Veteran:

...If the ATR threat is diminishing to the point of insignificance by 1943 (because tanks are more and more heavily armored) then why would you hang a bunch of heavy skirts on a vehicle for a threat that is diminishing? Doesn't make any sense to me.<hr></blockquote>

I would think that the upcoming operation "Zitadelle" to eliminate the Kursk salient, would be one of the good reasons to mount additional protection for older tanks that were about to be tasked with penetrating a Russian defense zone that would probably have quite a few ATR's distributed among the infantry divisions the Russians had deployed there. Of course, they also had ATG's and armor;but the Germans in their optomistic way discounted the amount of resistance by about a factor of 3.

[Paul Lakowski]

ASL , Troop commanders recognizing a threat and actually getting the immensely thick bureaucracy to do any thing about that threat are two entirely different things....and yes they are often a year behind the curve. When the first Russian heavies were meet many battle commanders demanded bigger guns and heavier armor for the pz and this didn't happen for about a year....and that was a high priority item. defense against ATR was a recognized threat that was never really addressed until the side skirt were proposed.Maybe it wasn't until some bright soul showed how this could be done with out totally rebuilding the tanks , that it finally was implemented

As early as 1948 it was shown in ballistic research that layering plates of differing materials would boost HEAT resistance and yes their was a HEAT threat even back then. So why did it take the tank designers until the 60s and 70s to finally get around to doing something about that threat?

And I don't agree , it seems that Hitler was the 'rate determining step' in allot of the tank development in Germany.

Rgds Paul.

[Panzer76]

Just a question:

I would say that the ATR is a more proberly reason, and when even H. Guderian says so, then I really don't know why we have this discussion?!

I mean, is there a more reliable source? What the allies *think* about why the skirts were mounted, isn't of much value, they don't *know*. Guderian *knew*!

I could understand the discussion if no reliable german sources existed, but thats not the case.

I don't care what any grog says about this, I'll take Guderians word for this anyday over yours!

Am I missing something here? (Proberly! )

[Mattias]

ASL,

Could you, please, try to actively prove that HC munitions was the main impetus behind the development of the skirts, instead of continually trying do disprove the ATR as the threat behind this development.

Though your tactic is, to a point (that you have reached), perfectly valid in a court of law it is rather less productive in a forum that tries to establish a historical fact.

I don’t care what the original purpose of skirts was as long as I emerge knowing what it really was.

Yes, the ATR was a threat before the campaign in the East. But it was not a threat of such a nature that it required special attention. German tanks received progressively heavier armour in response to the increase in threats throughout the war (as we all know). However, the addition of skirts was a special answer to a specific threat, in a specific situation.

Now, naturally, my reference to the ATR threat emerging in 1942 was to be understood as referring to the increasing capability of the Soviet forces in this respect.

To increase the armour thickness to at least 40mm in the areas eventually protected by the skirts would have been more expensive in terms of time, money, weight and production than the fitting of the simple skirts. And one has to remember that the vehicles in question, mainly Pz III, IV and derivatives, though very usable, did not represent the future in German armour.

M.

P.S.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> ASL Veteran regarding German ATRs:

I'll give you an opportunity to either recant this assertion or to provide actual facts that back that assertion.<hr></blockquote>

Which part in particular are you interested in? The deployment of ATRs or the development of the same?

[Amedeo]

Just my two cents worth post about the 'genesis' of the ATR threat.

I found a couple more quotations from German AARs that could be interesting.

1. The ATR threat before Barbarossa was little. Considering the most important German foes in the 1939-41 timeframe one sees that France had no ATRs while the British ones were 'rare' and considered of uncertain effectiveness "the British ATR can possibly penetrate only the PzKpfw-I and II at close ranges (little experience)", excerpt from a 3. Panzerbrigade report, June 1940.

2. At the start of Barbarossa the RKKA practically had no ATRs, those weapons started to be used in sizeable quantities only by the end of the year (1941).

3. It's obvious that the ATR gives its better performances in closed terrain at at very short ranges, in a report from the 24, Panzerdivision, dated October 1942, it's clearly stated that the "most dangerous enemy weapons [are] a. ATRs, usually appear only at close range and are difficult to spot and fight b. Snipers".

Thus I presume that the _perception_ of the ATR threat reached the peak in the close quarters fightings at Stalingrad.

Regards,

Amedeo

[Jeff Duquette]

Paul:

You posted this over @ Group:sci .military.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>"Journal of Battlefield Technology" Vol 1-1 pp 1 a article was published on HEAT developement and standoff penetration chart was published for Steel,Copper and Aluminum cone shaped liners.....here are provisional figures taken from the chart.

----------------Standoff in cone diameters

Liner-------1.0---2.0---3.0---4.0---5.0---6.0

Aluminum:-----1.0---1.5---2.0---2.4---2.5---2.5

Steel:--------2.8---3.1---3.5---3.5---3.2---2.8---Vs mild steel?

Steel:--------3.0---3.5---3.5---3.1---2.6---2.1---Vs ~ 180 BHN

Copper:-------3.1---4.1---4.8---5.0---4.3---3.8---Vs mild steel?

Copper:-------4.2---4.4---4.2---3.8---3.4---2.8---Vs 340BHN

Result is the penetration in cone diameters<hr></blockquote>

If I am reading this correctly the optimum stand-off for a steel lined shaped charge vs. 180BHN plate falls-out at 2 to 3 cone diameters. Penetration at this stand-off is 3.5 times the cone diameter. Beyond three cone diameters penetration begins to drop off.

Several Questions:

In the case of the M1A1 or M9 “bazookery” cone diameter is slightly less than 2.36”. So optimal standoff is 4.72” to 7.08”? And Penetration at 2 to 3 cone dia stand-off is 3.5 X 2.36”? The tip of the ogive on a bazooka round sits a good 1 to 1.5 cone diameters in front of the actual charge?

[Paul Lakowski]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Paul:

You posted this over @ Group:sci .military.

If I am reading this correctly the optimum stand-off for a steel lined shaped charge vs. 180BHN plate falls-out at 2 to 3 cone diameters. Penetration at this stand-off is 3.5 times the cone diameter. Beyond three cone diameters penetration begins to drop off.

Several Questions:

In the case of the M1A1 or M9 “bazookery” cone diameter is slightly less than 2.36”. So optimal standoff is 4.72” to 7.08”? And Penetration at 2 to 3 cone dia stand-off is 3.5 X 2.36”? The tip of the ogive on a bazooka round sits a good 1 to 1.5 cone diameters in front of the actual charge?<hr></blockquote>

As I measure it the distance from the cone to the ogive tip is 1.9 cone diameters so against mild steel that should get ~ 3.1 -3.5 cone diameters penetration. Ogorkiewzc tells us that HEAT penetration into mild steel is 67% [ 100BHN] -80% [180 BHN] of RHA [270 BHN]. So that should generate 2.3 to 2.4 cone diameters [Cd] penetration into RHA or 5.4 to 5.7 inches or 138-144mm penetration. If the standoff goes out to 12 'Cd' or more [ standoff the side skirts should offer], then the penetration should drop off to about 1.7 -1.8'Cd' into mild steel [ 100BHN] or ~ 1.1-1.3'Cd' into RHA . Thats about 2.7- 3.0 inches or 65-76mm. The 10mm mild steel plate should offer ~13mm and the back plate ~ 30mm , so the Bazooka should be able to penetrate the side hull clealy from straight on.

[ASL Veteran]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mattias:

ASL,

Could you, please, try to actively prove that HC munitions was the main impetus behind the development of the skirts, instead of continually trying do disprove the ATR as the threat behind this development.

Though your tactic is, to a point (that you have reached), perfectly valid in a court of law it is rather less productive in a forum that tries to establish a historical fact.<hr></blockquote>

Up to this point, the argument supporting the skirts vs ATR has rested on the assumption that the ATR threat was the motivating factor. Therefore, I am simply making a direct response to that portion of your argument. Since I am only focusing on the timeline - I am simply reinforcing the fact that the timeline for the development of skirts favors the Bazookery argument over the ATR argument.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>I don’t care what the original purpose of skirts was as long as I emerge knowing what it really was.<hr></blockquote>

I'm not sure I follow you there

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Yes, the ATR was a threat before the campaign in the East. But it was not a threat of such a nature that it required special attention. German tanks received progressively heavier armour in response to the increase in threats throughout the war (as we all know). However, the addition of skirts was a special answer to a specific threat, in a specific situation.<hr></blockquote>

A specific threat that was diminishing as the war progressed.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>To increase the armour thickness to at least 40mm in the areas eventually protected by the skirts would have been more expensive in terms of time, money, weight and production than the fitting of the simple skirts.<hr></blockquote>

I'm not sure about this one ... the mounting of a skirt seems to be a great deal heavier than mounting smaller plates directly to the side of the vehicle since the area of the skirts will be much greater than the area of the added plates. The Pz IV was up armored in the front a few times during the war - why couldn't it be uparmored in the side in the same manner?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Which part in particular are you interested in? The deployment of ATRs or the development of the same?<hr></blockquote>

Either or both - whatever you feel the most capable of commenting on.

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Paul Said:As I measure it the distance from the cone to the ogive tip is 1.9 cone diameters so against mild steel that should get ~ 3.1 -3.5 cone diameters penetration. Ogorkiewzc tells us that HEAT penetration into mild steel is 67% [ 100BHN] -80% [180 BHN] of RHA [270 BHN]. So that should generate 2.3 to 2.4 cone diameters [Cd] penetration into RHA or 5.4 to 5.7 inches or 138-144mm penetration. If the standoff goes out to 12 'Cd' or more [ standoff the side skirts should offer], then the penetration should drop off to about 1.7 -1.8'Cd' into mild steel [ 100BHN] or ~ 1.1-1.3'Cd' into RHA . Thats about 2.7- 3.0 inches or 65-76mm. The 10mm mild steel plate should offer ~13mm and the back plate ~ 30mm , so the Bazooka should be able to penetrate the side hull clealy from straight on. <hr></blockquote>

A couple things:

• The ~3.1 to 3.5 cone dia penetration adjustment for RHA….should it not result in 80% of 3.1 to 3.5 cd penetration. The resultant range being 2.5 to 2.8 cone diameter penetration into RHA?
• You appear to be extrapolating the data provided in "Journal of Battlefield Technology" Vol 1-1 to arrive at equivelent cd penetration at a stand-off of 12 cd’s. (12 cd’s of the bazookas 2.36” dia apparently being equal to stand-off of Schurzen)
  
• Assuming the relationship between cd stand-off and cd penetration is linear, the resultant penetration at 12 cd’s in 180BHN steel is zero. See the following data plots:
  
  http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff6/stuff6.html
  
  
• Based upon the data from "Journal of Battlefield Technology" Vol 1-1, it seems logical to assume that increased hardness of target plate will shift the respective penetration vs stand-off curves downward and to the left. So a curve for RHA with BHN 270 might peak at a stand-off of cd = 1.5 to 2 instead of the cd = 2.5 we are seeing for the 180BHN target plate. This would seemingly match well with the intrensic stand-off built into 2.36" bazooka ammunition (tip of ogive is approx 1.9 cd's from charge).
  
• Extrapolating a curve that is shifted down and to the left might very well result in zero penetration at stand-off of only 8cd’s. This assumes that the shape of a 270BHN curve resembles that of mild steel and 180BHN steel.
  
• It is also possible that penetration relative to stand-off does no decrease linearly, but may very well drop off exponentially somewhere past the peak penetration…i.e. penetration relative to stand-off is quite likely to drop to zero for say 180BHN at something less than the 10.5cd’s as shown on my plot of the data from "Journal of Battlefield Technology".

[ 11-01-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[Paul Lakowski]

Jeff the regression lines are linear until about 4-6 Cd standoff and then start to move asyemtotically to a certain value.In the 1948 paper where a scaled bazooke warhead is tested @ 6 cd the value is 2cd into mild steel and its almost linear out to 1.2 cd @ 12Cd standoff.

[Mattias]

ASL Veteran

In answer to you wondering

-Which part in particular are you interested in? The deployment of ATRs or the development of the same?

-Either or both - whatever you feel the most capable of commenting on.

I feel positively cosy about commenting on both of them:

ATRs where part of the TO&E of German forces in the early campaigns in the west, as where it in the desert and in Russia. Supporting this statement is, amongst a host of other “lesser” sources, “The German Order of Battle” (in this case “Panzers and Artillery”) by George F, Nafziger.

Literally on every second page among the Panzer Grenadier divisions you find references to the 3 PzBu 39 that where organic to the Grendier Kompanien. Take, for example, the 3rd Panzergrenadier division (formed on the 23 June 1943, found on page 262) as of September 1943 OKH records show that in each of the 4 Kompanien that were part of the 3 Bataillonen of Panzergreadier Regiment 8 there were, as mentioned above, 3 PzBu 39. The 3rd PzG was the destroyed in the battles around Stalingrad.

And it is the same with all it’s contemporaries, all PzG Div. have ATRs in their TO&E. And though I do not have Nafzigers work on the Infantry divisions you may rest assured that the references to ATRs made in other sources place this weapon among the footsloggers too.

Looking at references to the weapon type itself we find a nice picture of a an ATR (PzB 39) foxhole from the Afrikakorps. And looking on the next page Chamberlain presents the Swiss made 7.92mm M SS 41 that was with the comment that it was deployed on the Eastern front and in Africa (Chamberlain & Gander, “Enzyklopädie Deutscher Waffen”).

Fleisher & Eiermann comments that the PzB 39 that where organic to the PzG Kompanien where over time replaced with the Granatbüchse 39 and still later, the Raketenpanzerbüchse 54. This might serve to put things into perspective but it is certain that the old ATRs where marching into Russia with the rest of them, and stayed there.

As for the research work progressing into 1942 I must correct myself. In fact the research continued throughout the war, it was the military ran projects that were finally stopped in 1942. Among the later models we find PzB 40 in two different models, which developed into the PzB 243 (13/7.92mm), which in turn moved on to PzB 244 (13mm) and finally landed in the shape of PzB 42 (15mm). But then, in 1942 that is, the interest in the military establishment cooled off.

From that point on the designers tooled on in private with more conical barrel designs and automatic ATRs.

So there was definitely an interest in developing the ATR concept beyond the pre war designs.

Why, you may wonder?

I suggest you ask the people from Steyer who are marketing an 14.5mm (?) ATR today. Indeed the idea still lives on in all sub cannon calibre weapons that can be used to fire special AP rounds. It is simply a good thing to have a weapon that can defeat light armour without having to rely on excessive use of force.

A specific threat that was diminishing as the war progressed. (The ATR)

Yes. But, as we all know, not in a linear fashion.

I'm not sure about this one ... the mounting of a skirt seems to be a great deal heavier than mounting smaller plates directly to the side of the vehicle since the area of the skirts will be much greater than the area of the added plates. The Pz IV was up armored in the front a few times during the war - why couldn't it be uparmored in the side in the same manner?

On page 252 onwards of Spielbergers Begleitwagen, Panzerkampfagen IV the author presents the efforts made to improve the Pz IV design, and the problems associated with this (best read the whole book actually). I suggest you read it instead of me having to explain the complexities associated with tank design in terms of time, money, weight and production. Suffice to say that the Pz IV design was reaching the end of the road as far as improvements was concerned and that it is not just a matter of “slapping” on a few plates of armour.

The skirts represented 600 kg of mild steel that where easy and quick to manufacture and introduce into production. They where a quick and dirty solution, in a quick and dirty time.

Now, your contribution to this subject so far is duly noted but lets take it one step further.

Lets, for sake of argument, say that the Soviet ATRs were not the threat that skirts were suppose to counter. Then what was that threat? It has been my impression that you favour HC munitions as that threat in this case. If this is indeed the case could you please “provide actual facts that back that assertion”.

Do not try to make ATRs improbable any more, make HC munitions a certainty instead.

M.

[ 11-02-2001: Message edited by: Mattias ]</p>

[Claus B]

Of course the Germans faced enemy anti-tank rifles before 1942, they even used them themselves.

The only vehicles mentioned in your qoutes to be vulnerable to damage from AT-rifle fire are PzKpwI, PzKpw II, and Neubau – PzKpfw IV (i.e. Neubaufahrzeug). These tanks sported 13-15mm of armour on most surfaces, even the front.

Since the Poles, Norwegians and the French were overrun with no undue losses and Germany was moving towards more heavily armour tanks, I fail to see an anti-tank rifle threat against the German army post-1940.

The Red Army did not deploy anti-tank rifles against the Germans until November 1941 and then only in very small numbers.

In fact, if you read on in Panzertruppen, you will find a report from 3. Panzerdivision from about May 1942 that refers to the Soviet anti-tank rifle as something new. Incidentally, the same report states that the anti-tank rifle penetrates the side hull armour of the Panzer III and IV.

In other words, the anti-tank rifle threat re-emerges in 1942.

If you read on until page 249, you will see a report from 24. Panzerdivision dated October 11th 1942, dealing with the fighting in Stalingrad. It says: "Most dangerous enemy weapons:

a. Anti-tank rifles usually only appear at close

range and are difficult to spot and combat.

b. Sharpshooters."

Claus B

[Andreas]

Having studied organisations in quite some depth, and being acquainted through reading with some of the organisational chaos that governed German war production and research pre-Speer, I find it highly unlikely that the German bureaucracy - mind you, the same organisation that decided that the 50L42 was sufficient for upgunning the Panyer III in 1941(?) - would have reacted that quickly to the Bazooka.

Looking at development time-lines and super-imposing threat development over it while assuming the usual bureacratic inertia makes it much more likely that the ATR was the threat that Schürzen were supposed to counter than any sort of mythical HC weapon encountered in Russia.

FWIW

[JasonC]

Total Russian production of 14.5mm ATRs by the end of calendar 1941 - 700.

Total Russian production of 14.5mm ATRs by the end of calendar 1942 - 247,000.

The threat emerged in 1942. The Russians didn't have ATRs before the invasion because they mistakenly thought German tanks would be substantially armored. They found in the event that this was not the case, and that 12.7mm MGs could often penetrate them. So they mass produced ATRs, developed during 1941 but going into mass production only in 1942.

In the meantime, they also made some use of captured German ATRs. They also received British ATRs through Lend Lease - one came on every Carrier, because they specifically asked for the Boyes Carrier (with attached ATR) rather than Bren Carriers (with attached LMG). Most of the LL was received after 1941, however.

ATRs were added to planned TOEs late in 1941. In early 1942, the amount in TOEs was substantially expanded, but then reduced against somewhat in the summer of 1942, to the overall level that remained, with only minor changes (shifts between units within a division e.g.), for the rest of the war. The higher amounts planned in March 1942 were not achieved in practice in the field. They probably reflect planning from known production, but based on estimates of combat loss rates that were too low.

There is some confusion in the Russian TOEs, because it is not always clear whether ATRs at level A and level B are truly seperate and supplimental, or are alternate deployments of the same establishment (held at regimental level, or distributed to battalions - they weren't distributed below battalion level). But the overall number per rifle division was 100-200 any way you slice it. Notice that the 1942 production was enough to meet these levels throughout the TOE, even with an average field life of an ATR of 2-3 months.

It is also worth noting that Russian training emphasized that ATRs could hurt AFVs only by hitting them at vunerable points - not because of penetration difficulties but because only hits at certain points would do significant damage on a successful penetration. The sides of the turret could kill crew members, and the lower rear side hull could ignite fuel or at least make it leak, the drive sprocket could immobilize the tank, sights and such could blind it, aiming for the gun and MGs themselves could disarm it even without penetration. The large favorite target areas - lower hull and turret side - are where the skirts went.

[PzKpfw 1]

It has been brought up that Schürtzen was developed to counter Shaped Charge rounds, yet when we trace the history of Schürtzen it becomes apperent the development resulted from ATR use on the Eastren Front. Specificly the increase in Mid 1942 - July 1943 of the effectiveness of the Soviet 14.5mm round.

Even the Panther suffered from 14.5mm vulnerability on the lower side hull 40mm @ 0^. So much so that that had the addition of Schürtzen not been succesful the Panther II would have entered production in 1943.

Concerning the argument that Schürtzen was in fact an attempt to defeat SC rounds i would point out that Schürtzen, was a direct result of the battles on the EF. The Soviet's had no real SC capability at the start of the war & in fact their

later SC rounds developed for basicly Artillery wpns were inferior attempts to copy German SC round technology, these rounds were inferior do to poor workmanship etc, and were only available in limited quantaties.

Yet from Mid 1942 on we see an huge increase in the use of the 14.5mm ATR in Soviet forces, with th largest use being during Zitadelle in carefuly designed AT kill zones etc.

The large scale use of SC rounds was an Allied, German Infantry development with Panzerfausts, Panzerschreks, Bazookas PIATS, etc, the Soviet infantry had no man portable SC weapons.

German tanks 1st began encountering heavy use of man portable SC weapons after the Allied invasion of Normandy, over a year after Schürtzen was 1st

developed & employed.

Had Schürtzen been a response to SC rounds then we would not have seen schürtzen development until after June 1944, when SC rounds became an real viable battlefeild threat Ie, the Soviets, from mid 1944 on began useing bed springs, mesh, etc, to try & counter German Infantry SC round capability.

Regards, John Waters

[Jeff Duquette]

Zaloga in Red Army Handbook places Soviet ATR production in 1941 at 17,700 not the 700 figure quoted earlier. I’m not sure what TO&E’s were being examined that were confusing…this is from Zaloga:

ATR TO&E For Red Army Rifle Divisions during the war is as follows:

13 Sep 39____60 ATR’s

5 Apr 41______0 ATR’s

29 Jul 41_____0 ATR’s

6 Dec 41_____89 ATR’s

18 Mar 42___279 ATR’s

28 Jul 42___228 ATR’s

10 Dec 42___212 ATR’s

15 Jul 43___212 ATR’s

18 Dec 43___107 ATR’s

Jun 45______111 ATR’s

The 1941 TO&E is verifiable from Glantz’s “Stumbling Colossus” which compares German Infantry Divisional TO&E with Soviet Rifle Division TO&E for Jun of 1941.

German Infantry Division, Jun 41___81 ATR’s**

Soviet Rifle Division, Jun 41_______0 ATR’s

So peak TO&E ATR strength isn’t occurring until Mar of 1942. Given lag time between changing TO&E on paper and realizing the change in the field (throw in a general suspension of mechanized warfare in Russia during razputitsa) and it seems reasonable that not until Operation Blau, (start June 27, 1942) are German Panzertruppen beginning to experience large concentrations of ATR’s in Soviet Rifle Divisions.

================================

**Note: “Handbook of German Military Forces, US War Dept” places German Infantry Divisional ATR strength @ 81ATR’s in the three grenadier regiments (27 per regiment), and 9ATR’s in the divisional pioneer battalion.

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Paul Said: "In the 1948 paper..."<hr></blockquote>

Birkhoff's work with Aberdeen? The M20 super-bazooka sure was a different beast over its dad the M9.

[Paul Lakowski]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Birkhoff's work with Aberdeen? The M20 super-bazooka sure was a different beast over its dad the M9.<hr></blockquote>

No Jeff it was a WW-II warhead, they refer to german and american steel lined shaped charges along with a diagram of what looks like the Bazooka's M6A3 warhead in American Arsenal. Then a series of test with similar shaped steel lined shaped charges 1.63 inches in diameter where tested against a series of targets and standoff distances [ ~ 330 shots in total] .Its been shown that scaling has little impact in shaped charge penetration results so as long as the cone angle and liner material and liner thickness are the same it should generate the same penetration figures when scaled up.

[JasonC]

Jeff, the March 1942 TOE was apparently never more than a paper planning exercise, when they saw how many ATRs they would produced. There is no evidence any unit every actually met it, and given the number of ATRs available so soon it is distinctly unlikely. The flood came over the whole course of 1942.

The revisions in July 1942 were the ones actually aimed for. It has to be understood that they were equipping units with ATRs as the weapons themselves became available, and the issue in the first half of 1942 was how many ATRs in a formation to stop at, before moving on to the next, to top up the next unit.

I suspect the March TOE was based on an optimistic projection of how long the weapons would last before being lost, in the field. They hadn't fielded enough, for long enough, to have a good sense of that yet. The July TOE revised the figure downward, probably to accomodate the size force they planned on, to whatever loss rate they saw. (We know losses are strongly involved because the number made through the end of 1942 would equip 1000 divisions at TOE, and they never had that many divisions).

The confusing aspect of the July and later TOEs is whether the full compliment was actually issued at every level of the TOE strength listed, or whether some levels were considered alternates or substitutes for full strength at other levels. Thus each rifle battalion was supposed to have 9 ATRs in the July TOE, and the regiment was supposed to have 27 more. Did they always have both? Or was a company at the regimental level, or a platoon at each battalion level, a deployment choice about how to use 27 ATRs? Not in the TOE, in the field, mind.

Then there is the question of ATRs in the artillery formations. The July TOE had 36 in an anti-tank battalion. It also had 4 per battery for howitzers, which is 12 per battalion, and thus 36 in a divisional artillery regiment. Were these alternate deployments (united in the AT battalion, or spread through the howitzer batteries), or always additional ones, 36 in each place? There is an additional complication in the field practice, because many units were short their authorized 45mm ATGs, and had just ATRs instead. Over the TOE strength? Or does this reflect the same 36 "artillery" ATRs? Or the AT battalion ones?

However one slices it, though, they were out in great numbers by the end of 1942, and were certainly common enough as early as the second half of the year.