Schürtzen

[Charlie Rock]

I would like to point out that it would be possible for the Germans to have a faster than usual reaction to shaped charged warheads, due to the following:

The first tactical use of shaped charged warheads was NOT on the bazooka.

The first tactical SC munitions were developed by the Germans, and used by glider-borne assault engineers at Eben Emael, in May 1940. The smaller ones were approx. 28 lbs, and I believe they had one that was closer to 110 lbs, that came in two sections. They were used to blast holes in the concrete roofs of the fort. LT Witzig, the German assault commander, trained his soldiers on its use in January 1940. They carried in 28 110lbers and 28 25 lbers, 5 per glider.

I do not know off the top of my head when german magnetic and sticky AT mines were developed, but I believe they were before the bazooka.

While the bazooka may have been employed shortly before the schurzen, it is safe to assume that when German engineers examined the first one, they were well aware they were looking at 2-3 year old ordnance technology. The Monroe effect, that explosives when hollowed out could achieve this focused effect, was first discovered in 1888.

While schurzen may have been developed for ATRS, it is worth noting that 25 years later, the US Army was still using chain link fences for AT defence. In this case it was to defeat the piezo-electric fuse of the RPG-7 round. This technique is still to be found in the field manuals.

Shot over.

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Paul Said: No Jeff it was a WW-II warhead, they refer to german and american steel lined shaped charges along with a diagram of what looks like the Bazooka's M6A3 warhead in American Arsenal.<hr></blockquote>

Paul: I can't figure why you are being mysterious about the actual reference name. Is this based upon work by G. Birkoff for Aberdeen? What is the name of the reference you are relying on?

You refer to a test being conducted at 6 cd stand-off against mild steel…was this production quality ammunition…or was it a precision made test charge? Was testing conducted @ 12 cd stand-off as well, or was this extrapolated?

[Jeff Duquette]

Presumably the 700 produced in 1941 was a typo on your part? Or do you have a reference suggesting otherwise?

It should be obvious without undue elaboration that TO&E and field strength are not typically one and the same. However, what the TO&E should tell us is that a large boost in ATR strength is occurring only after the war is underway, and that adoption of counter measures would not be likely for some period after that flux in avg. ATR strength. In and of itself this does not imply that schurzen was developed as anti-ATR or anti-HEAT, however it is sufficient information for me regarding why Schurzen didn’t become standard equipment on Panzers and assault guns in 1942.

One more bit of evidence that – IMHO – indicates that ATR’s were becoming a perceived threat to PanzerTruppen only after mid-1942. This is an excerpt from a report regarding combat experiences on the Eastern Front from 3rd Panzer Division. This report was apparently being circulated to all Panzer Divisions just prior to the commencement of Case Blau:

"New Weapons that have appeared are the British Mark II tank and an American tank [stuart no doubt]. The 7.62cm anti-tank/anti-aircraft gun was widely used. A Russian 12.7mm anti-tank rifle with a two-man crew has newly appeared. It is recognizable by its very long barrel with a lifting support about 1.5 meters high. The bullet penetrates the sidewalls of our Pz.Kpfw.III and IV. Ranges at which it can be fired are not known. The gunners have been instructed to fire at the glass blocks in the commander's cupola. Panzer-Regiment 6 lost six Panzer Commanders because of this during its last battles."

(Jentz, Panzertruppen 1, pg 230 - 235)

[JasonC]

The 700 figure came from the Russian Battlefield site, for the two 14.5mm models (they give 600 and 77 for the 2 types). But it is probably wrong. The difference may be time of reports, made vs. fielded, or it just may be a simple error on their part. Since 1942 production was 247,000, your 17,700 figure is about a month's worth at that rate, so just missing a month or two in late 1941 could account for the difference.

[Amedeo]

Krivosheev (Soviet casualties and combat losses in the 20th century) gives the following figures for ATR production during the GPW:

1941 17,000

1942 249,000

1943 164,500

1944 37,700

1945 800

(actual timeframe 22.06.41 - 10.05.45)

BTW it's worth noting that for some strange translation error the entry in the aforementioned table is given as 'AT rocket launchers' instead of 'AT rifles'.

Regards,

Amedeo

[JasonC]

The Russian battlefield site says this about early Russian ATR production -

"in the course of combat operations it became clear that the majority of German tanks did not have thick armor and could be defeated even by the armor-piercing bullets of the 12.7-mm DShK machinegun. In connection with this, in July 1941 many designers received the tasking to develop antitank rifles in the shortest possible time. Simultaneously an attempt was made to put into production the 7.92-mm German PzB-39 rifle as a temporary measure. A month later (August therefore) the design bureaus of V. A. Degtyarev and S. G. Simonov presented their own rifles for range testing, designed around the 14.5-mm cartridge. Because neither rifle was substantially better than the other, both were adopted for general use.

"The Degtyarev rifle was quite cost-effective to produce. Some 600 rifles were produced in 1941, and 184,000 units in 1942. The production of the PTRD was halted in January 1945. As a consequence of its more complicated design, the Simonov antitank rifle was not produced in as rapid a manner as the PTRD. Thus, only 77 Simonov rifles had been produced by January 1942, but this figure had risen to 63,308 units by the end of that year. The total number of antitank rifles of both systems produced during the course of the war is now calculated at 400,000 units."

If both reports are literally true, then the Russians would have made 17,000 copies of the German 8mm ATR, or of some other minor types, by the end of 1941, and around 1700 more of them in early 1942. It seems to me just as likely there were some Deg ATRs out before the end of the year in greater numbers than the above claims (since they had 4 months to work on them, apparently, from August to through December), and that the small total above is just wrong.

Perhaps the figure behind the "600 in 1941" claim made above as dated before the actual end of the year? But frankly I don't know which is correct. One missing item that might resolve the issue would be the total Russian production of 7.92mm ATRs copied off the German PzB-39, if indeed that was anything more than "an attempt" (all it says above). I don't know if there were other minor types in 1941.

Incidentally, because of the "rockets" translation issue, I looked up Russian rocket launcher production in 1941. It was only 1000 launchers, so a confusion between items summed in the report there, will not account for the discrepancy.

As for the unrelated issue of infantry HEAT weapons and dates of development, the US was stockpiling shape charged warheads (first bought in Switzerland) in the late 1930s, but without any obvious means of delivering them. The bazooka solved that problem by late 1941. Skinner

s first trials used a 60mm mortar tube turned sideways for the rocket he had been developing since the late 30s; he didn't get together with the shaped charge warhead guys until 1941. By early 1942 the M1 model bazooka was out, ready before any US troops saw action in Europe. The first confirmed use of the German magnetic AT mine was in the summer of 1942. They had flare-pistol fired "spigot" type AT grenades in 1941, but innaccurate and with small warheads.

Incidentally, I consider it fascinating that everyone seems to think only -infantry- HEAT weapons could be a motive for the skirts. I know from the documents, timing, placement, and abilities that the skirts were developed to defeat two threats - the Russian 14.5mm ATR, and Russian 76.2mm HE (not HEAT, just HE) - neither of them HEAT. But it is a little funny that no one seems to think a HEAT threat might include guns, rather than infantry weapons.

It is a bit inconvenient for the HEAT view that even just a bazooka, as well as any HEAT firing cannon (the 76.2mm being the smallest plausible threat) will KO from the -front- the very vehicles the Germans were putting skirts on the sides of. Somehow it was very important to have 5mm more plate where there was 30mm to start with, but unimportant to do anything more about 50mm-80mm plates. Yet a bazooka, a 76.2mm HEAT round, or a 82mm HEAT rocket (the supposed HEAT threats mentioned as motivators) will all penetrate even 80mm.

Why weren't there "skirts" on the front? In fact, they were adding bolted metal plates to Pz III, Pz IV, and StuG fronts, but not at stand-off, spaced armor distances. Because those were meant to defeat AP (45mm with 30+30, and 76.2mm with 50+30), not HEAT. The bolted additional armor was a temporary expedient, and the subsequent models used factory made 50mm or 80mm plates instead, because a uniform plate gives greater resistence to AP, for the weight, than bolted armor.

It is amazing to me that anybody still backs so thoroughly refuted a thesis, which evidently originates in nothing more than combat reports in 1944 of bazooka rounds frustrated by skirts, with officers who didn't know a thing about when or why the skirts were introduced, just plain guessing, as a result, that since they accomplished X, they must have been meant for X. As though no one had ever heard of serendipity. I can only put it down to man's native stubbornness and refusal to admit any past error, even an inconsequential one.

[Jeff Duquette]

Amedeo…thnx for the second reference. I went through my own copy and it is interesting regarding the use of “Anti-Tank Rocket launcher’s for Anti-Tank Rifles. Krivosheev also indicates a production figure of 17,700 ATR’s for 1941

The 1939 Soviet Rifle Division TO&E is worth some additional pondering. Rifle Divisions were -- “on paper” -- equipped with 60ATR’s. In 1940 the allotted ATR TO&E drops to zero. One has to wonder where all these pre-1941 ATR’s disappeared to. The Red Army apparently had a habit of hording obsolescent equipment and ammunition…”In Case of Emergency Break Glass”. I wonder if these depot stashed ATR’s began making there way into Infantry Units prior to the official TO&E change in December of 1941? Than again maybe these thousands of pre-1940 ATR’s were dumped into the Black Sea to form new reefs and fish habitats for sturgeon.

[ASL Veteran]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mattias:

Now, your contribution to this subject so far is duly noted but lets take it one step further.

Lets, for sake of argument, say that the Soviet ATRs were not the threat that skirts were suppose to counter. Then what was that threat? It has been my impression that you favour HC munitions as that threat in this case. If this is indeed the case could you please “provide actual facts that back that assertion”.

Do not try to make ATRs improbable any more, make HC munitions a certainty instead.

<hr></blockquote>

Mattias my good friend, apparently you have mis interpreted my ... limited interest in this topic. Perhaps my points were to subtle. I was never out to prove that the Bazooka was the only reason skirts were developed. Clearly if the Bazooka was the only reason, there would be very little reason to mount skirts on tanks fighting on the East Front. If you check my ... I think my second post ... you will find at the end that I say the skirts may have been motivated by Bazookas but also were found to be handy against ATRs. In other words, my position was that the skirts handled a variety of threats - not just the ATR to the exclusion of all others. I interpret your position to be that the skirts were meant to combat ATRs only - thus you become an ATR advocate. This is also the reason I found no point in discussing the topic with you earlier since I already knew the direction any discussion with you would take. It would take on the form of ATR vs Bazooka rather than a more rational examination.

No, the topic prior to my entry was long on advocacy and short on rational discussion. Thankfully Jeff, and yes Jason and a few others have stepped to the plate to provide a more compelling case for the ATR being part of the motivation. Jason even raises the issue of HE and HEAT rounds (along with ATRs) which falls more in line with my thinking. My position has been that the skirts were meant to combat more than just ATRs, and may have been originally motivated by Bazookas. The reason for this position? The timeline. My interpretation would be something like this:

Fritz: "Wow, those Americans have this wierd Bazooka thingy that they are using in Tunisia - we better do something about that."

Hanz: "Yeah, let's think of something that will defeat the Bazooka"

Fritz: "Wow, you know those darn Soviet ATRs are a big pain in the arse too - maybe we can do something about those too?"

Hanz: "Yeah, that would be ideal."

This position was never strongly held by me, and I only raised it because nobody had, or has, completely disproved it. This position is miles away Bazookery advocacy. Discussions have many shades of grey, and in this case you are asking me to prove something about a position I do not hold. I could just as easily ask you to prove why German tanks had skirts in the west in 1944 since the ATR threat in the west was probably non existant by that time. Incidentally, does anyone know where the first skirts were deployed? The East Front, or the Italian Front? Was it simultaneous to both fronts?

Okay, onto the German ATR. You make it sound as though these things are all over the place! I just happen to have some figures for the numbers of Panzerbuchsen 38 & 39s delivered to the troops.

9/1/1939: 568; 4/1/1940: 1,118; 6/1/1941: 25,298.

When these figures are compared to the Soviet production figures they are a drop in the bucket. Note that none are produced after 1941 and that many of them would have been converted into grenade launchers. As far as development goes:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

The antitank rifles, intended for use by rifle companies against tanks, had already proved to have too - meager penetration (except against light enemy tanks) when the war began. Since they could not accomplish anything against the Soviet tanks from the beginning of the eastern campaign, they quickly went out of use. Further types were not developed.

<hr></blockquote>

From Alex Buchner "The German Infantry Handbook". I've never heard of the Panzerbuchse 40, although there is a so called "Heavy Antitank Rifle 41" which really isn't an antitank rifle at all if you actually look at it. It is more like a small AT gun - 28mm taper bore down to 20mm.

Here is what Ian Hogg has to say about the Panzerbuchse 39:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

Since the barrel was almost the same length and the ammunition was the same, the performance of the PzB 39 was equal to that of the PzB 38. But apart from very limited use in the 1940 campaign in France, the PzB saw practically no action.<hr></blockquote>

Here is what he says about the Granatbuchse 39:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

Once the anti-tank rifle's usefulness was put to an end by the increasing armor of tanks, the German Army very ingeniously converted numbers of the PzB 39 rifles into grenade dischargers.

<hr></blockquote>

Perhaps I am mistaken, but if a nation is converting a weapon to perform another function they must question its usefulness. Then there is the 20mm Panzerbuchse S 18-1000:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

It would appear that the number bought by Germany was relatively small and that the weapon was adopted largely on an extended trial basis; it never acheived the distinction of a model number or a vocabulary identification number and it was rarely seen in action.

<hr></blockquote>

I suspect that you will continue to argue these points ad infinitum, but I am afraid that my interest in this topic at this point does not surpass that of lurker status.

[Paul Lakowski]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Paul: I can't figure why you are being mysterious about the actual reference name. Is this based upon work by G. Birkoff for Aberdeen? What is the name of the reference you are relying on?

You refer to a test being conducted at 6 cd stand-off against mild steel…was this production quality ammunition…or was it a precision made test charge? Was testing conducted @ 12 cd stand-off as well, or was this extrapolated?<hr></blockquote>

Jeff not mysterious , just haven't had enough time to respond...These days with work and the family I have to steal time to be here! I posted the reference on the Google Sci Military thread, so I assumed that you read that. If you'd like I'll copy the article and mail it to you.

The figures refer to two different papers one in 1948 and the other a couple of years ago . In the J of Applied Phys paper the warhead was a simulated warhead that was fired at varoius standoffs out to ~ 8Cd standoff , but the regression line is very flat at that point and predictions out to ~ 12Cd are still possible.

[ 11-03-2001: Message edited by: Paul Lakowski ]</p>