Schürtzen

[ASL Veteran]

ATRs had been around before the war started (in fact, the Germans had one in 1918). If the Germans had intended to protect their vehicles against ATRs then why didn't they start hanging these skirts in 1940? It would seem that the ATR threat would have well known prior to 1943?

The Germans would have encountered the American Bazookas in Tunisia around Dec 1942. This does seem to coincide with the timeline for when the testing on the skirts began. Coincidence or Alien intervention?

Just some thoughts .....

[JasonC]

The upper side hull of the Panther is 40mm but sloped about 40 degrees, and thus in no danger from an ATR round. The lower side hull is still 40mm, but the armor is vertical. Lower side hull means below the top of the track. Because of the interleaved road wheels, however, the bottom portion of the lower side hull is not directly exposed - the wheels are in the way. Only the middle - the upper portion of the lower side hull (LOL) - is both visible from the side of the tank without a road wheel in the way, and unsloped.

This area was a favorite target, especially from the turret back to the rear - because that is where the fuel tanks are. And HE rounds fired at the tracks, trying to get an M-kill, can also hit this vertical plate, which is the weakest on the tank besides top and bottom. The short "rail skirts" for the Panther are meant to hang down enough to cover this portion of the sides, above the road wheels.

But the plates are 40mm, not 30mm. An ATR would have to be close, using improved ammo, lucky, or some mix of all three, to have a chance of punching a hole there. There would be adequate reason to want the protection from HE, however, and in addition it was not written in stone that the Russians wouldn't develop better ammo for their ATRs.

On other matters, the front of German tanks was the same 30mm thickness as their sides, originally. Over time they were uparmored to 50mm, or to 30mm plus 30mm bolted on top, and later to 50mm plus 30mm bolted on top.

First the case of the Pz IIIs.

All the Pz IIIs with 37mm guns had only 30mm of front armor. The first 50L42 armed model, the G, had the same. The first to uparmor, to 30mm plus 30mm additional bolted on the front hull only, was the H model. The turret was still 30mm, at around 15 degrees slope (the G and H mantlets were somewhat thicker, 37mm). Both Gs and Hs were made between the fall of France and the invasion of Russia, with twice as many of the G model produced as Hs.

By the time of the invasion, production of the J model with the 50L60 gun had begun, but most of the existing fleet were the older models. This model had 50mm front plates factory built, and a 50mm mantlet, but the rest of the turret front was still 30mm. The J series had the largest production run of any of the letters, as production began to ramp in 1942. They were produced from before the invasion until a year after it.

The last year of Pz III production, as tanks rather than StuG that is, were the L-N versions, from mid 1942 to mid 1943. These had 57mm turret fronts, 50mm base front armor elsewhere, and in addition 20mm additional plates bolted on to the upper front hull and gun mantlet. Through this whole uparmoring process, the turret sides and rear, and the hull sides, remained 30mm only.

The final production vehicle of the Pz III series was the StuG. The early StuG had the 75L24 gun, same as in the Pz IV, and had 50mm of front armor - like the Pz III J model - with the same 30mm sides naturally, since they used the same chassis as the Pz III tanks. By late war standards, not many of these were produced.

The first upgunned StuGs, the F models, had 75L43 guns, and originally the same armor as before. The same expedient of bolting on extra armor plate was used, to thicken the front from 50mm to 50mm+30mm (going from 2 inches up to 3 inches thick, basically). The gun mantlet was not uparmored and remained 50mm. Late model F series, toward the end of 1942, had the 75L48 and the extra bolted armor.

The last production model of the StuG III, the G model, was the type produced from 1943 to the end of the war, and in the late war by far the most common type. Everything you'd see in CMBO is this model. It had 80mm front armor factory built, and the 75L48 gun. The sides are still the same 30mm as the original Pz III had all around - plus skirts.

With the Pz IV, the unarmoring story is similar. The B-D models used in France had only 30mm of front armor. The sides were only 20mm. Ds were still being produced a month before the invasion of Russia, alongside Es. The Es added 30mm bolted on to the upper front hull, a thickened 50mm lower front hull, and additional 20mm plates bolted onto the sides. This gave it roughly the same protection as a Pz III J, though the turret sides remained weak with 20mm rather than 30mm. The early F models standardized at the factories what the Es did by bolting on additional plates - the front was now 50mm, and the sides 30mm, including the turret this time. All the while the gun remained 75L24.

Then came the upgunning to the long 75L43, with the F2 and G models. Initially these had the same 50mm front armor. The same bolting method raised it to 50mm+30mm for the hull only, especially for the Gs, while the turret remained 50mm and the sides 30mm. Some of the Gs upgraded from the 75L43 to the 75L48, a marginally better gun. This was a common type, made from mid 1942 to mid 1943, as tank production took off. The H model standardized this gun and did at the factory what the Gs did by bolting - made the front hull armor 80mm. It became the most common Pz IV model of the war. The sides, turret and hull, remained the same 30mm as the early F models and Pz IIIs had - plus skirts.

That is where the 50mm turret front of the Pz IV came from, and the standardized 80mm fronts on the StuG G and Pz IV H. Those two (along with the entirely similar Pz IV J in the last year) were the most common "vanilla" German AFVs of the late war. 13000 of those types were built, twice as many as Panthers.

The combination of the 75L48 gun and 80mm of front armor was enough to outrange the T-34/76, in distance each tank could penetrate the other. The Pz IV turret remained vunerable to the T-34/76 at longer ranges, however. The same combination does the same number on plain early model Shermans - the 75mm short will bounce off 80mm at ranges where the 75L48 can kill in reply.

Incidentally, what was the 50mm intermediate step supposed to be good enough to do? Bounce a standard Russian 45mm AP shot at medium range, or a British 2 lber a bit farther. The standard Russian towed ATG was 45mm, and their prewar tank fleet and light tanks produced in 1941 and 1942 used the gun as well.

30mm or 20+20 armor was meant to stop shell splinters and MG bullets, at most 20mm AP. 50mm or 30+30 armor stopped 45mm guns at long enough range. 80mm or 50+30 armor stopped short 75 and Russian tank 76 (also a short 75, effectively) again at medium range.

On the entirely different matter of the confusing rate of fire quote, it was obviously meant to read 70 rounds per minute, not per second.

For what it is worth.

[Mattias]

Basically because they had not been that much of a problem in the relatively short campaigns in Poland and France. The Pz I and II where recognised as being far to easy to defeat with ATR’s and German tanks where generally uparmoured when possible, but losses specific to ATR’s was not such that it warranted special attention.

In Russia on the other hand they did become a real menace. The fighting was drawn out in time so that cost of attrition by ATR’s became apparent. The enemy didn’t break and route as “quickly” (in 1942) as they had in the west, the fighting was thus closer and harder.

It is important to remember that Russia did not start the war heavily armed with the 14.5 mm ATR’s and it was not until 1942 that these became available in numbers. The solution to the ATR menace thus correlates in time with the rise of the threat.

And the ATR was definitely something that the German tank crews felt uneasy about. It was not that it spelled doom in the same way as a heavy AT gun, but on the other hand is was a threat that was extremely hard to see and and hit back at. It was down right bad for moral and the problem was made no less aggravating by the fact that it was the lacking protection of the own tank that was the reason for it.

Enemy tanks and AT guns, even if superior, can be dealt with by sound tactical deployment of the own armour, the bloody ATR where just popping up all over the place. Head shot through the cupola, shot up suspensions, damaged tracks, shrapnel and lead bleed through the vision slits and such tends to generally ruin ones day.

A swift solution was needed. And thus the Schürtzen where conceived.

Almost every surface threatened by ATR fire on every German tank intended to go toe to toe with the enemy was covered with these plates. And after action reports show that the crews where pleased with their effectiveness.

M.

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>ASL Said: ATRs had been around before the war started (in fact, the Germans had one in 1918). If the Germans had intended to protect their vehicles against ATRs then why didn't they start hanging these skirts in 1940? It would seem that the ATR threat would have well known prior to 1943?<hr></blockquote>

Although this is a valid point, I would like to point out that the numbers of ATR’s the Germans were facing prior to entering Russia were somewhat miniscule. The Soviets manufactured some ½ million PTRD’s and PTRS rifles during the war. Perhaps this nuisance really only manifested itself after Barbarossa. But than why wouldn’t schurzen start showing up in early 1942?

Regarding Bazookas in Tunisia in Dec 42, is this the time period which the first German Panzer may have been KO’d by American “bazookery”? What was the exact date of the engagement or formations involved?

[ 10-28-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[PzKpfw 1]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

I’m still a bit groggy this morning...still working on my first cup of coffee and all. What is in the gap that needed protecting from ATR fire? Or was the lower hull armor within this gap thinner than 40mm?<hr></blockquote>

The Panther Ausf.D panier side armor was sloped @ 40mm @ 40^ while the lower hull armor was 40mm @ 0^, which left it extremely vulnerable to close range, 14.5mm ATR fire.

Had the addition of schurzen not proven effective vs 14.5mm ATR & 75mm HE fire, (no tests vs SC rounds was initialy conducted), the Panther II would have entered production, with it's thicker lower side hull armor Ie, 60mm @ 0^.

Regards, John Waters

[ASL Veteran]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Although this is a valid point, I would like to point out that the numbers of ATR’s the Germans were facing prior to entering Russia were somewhat miniscule. The Soviets manufactured some ½ million PTRD’s and PTRS rifles during the war. Perhaps this nusacnce really only manifested itself after Barbarossa. But than why wouldn’t schurzen start showing up in early 1942.

Regarding Bazookas in Tunisia in Dec 42, is this the time period which the first German Panzer may have been KO’d by American “bazookery”? What was the exact date of the engagement or formations involved?<hr></blockquote>

Well, the first encounter between American and German tanks was supposedly on November 26th a few miles from Djedeida in Tunisia between a few Pz IVs and some Stuarts. One can extrapolate that where Stuarts are, American infantry can't be far behind. One can also assume that at some point a German tank may have encountered some form of Bazookery shortly thereafter. The Germans, being duly impressed by American bazookery promptly went out and copied it (creating the Shrek in 43). I would guess that they also would have recognized the threat to their armored fighting vehicles that these new fangled weapons presented and promptly found a remedy (skirts - coincidentally also in 1943). Perhaps the reason ATRs were tested against the skirts was that the Germans didn't have any Bazookas to fire at it?

Your second point is exactly what I was thinking of too - if ATRs were the threat, then why not have the skirts in 1941, or 1942? Why February 1943 - a mere three months after presumably encountering American Bazookery? By taking the February 1943 date and comparing it to the threat, you can either assume that the Germans were dense and couldn't come up with a way to stop ATRs until 1943 (after knowing about them since 1918), or you can assume that the Germans were quite clever and came up with a defense against Bazookery a mere three months after first encountering them.

A quick note to Jason's history lesson: Uparmoring of tanks throughout the war was primarily a response to the upgunning of tanks - not a response to the threat of ATRs.

On a general note - I find the argument that the skirts were only added because ATRs weren't a big enough threat prior to 1943 to be lacking. Actually, if you turn the argument on its head, then you could just as easily argue that the Germans themselves didn't see the ATR as a threat since they stopped using them prior to 1940. They also never started using them again - in spite of encountering billions of them in so called close hard fighting for an extended period of time on the Eastern Front. If the Germans never started using them again, could we not presume that they didn't see them as either useful or threatening? If the Germans didn't see them as useful or threatening then why would they create a counter measure designed specifically to counter them?

The Germans don't show a history of creating a defense against a weapon they themselves don't find useful to use. Take Zimmerit coating for example. The Germans used magnetic mines and created a countermeasure (even though the Allies didn't even use any magnetic mines). Magnetic mines were found to be useful, therefore a counter measure was created. Perhaps the answer is that skirts were originally designed as a countermeasure against Bazookery, and subsequently it was found that they were rather handy at protecting against ATRs too. A sort of unexpected bonus :cool:

[Mattias]

So, what are you saying? That it is a coincident that schürtzen where fitted to surfaces vulnerable to ATR rounds at a time when these weapons finally available in great number and the men and leaders began to be able to use them with sufficient skill and determination. A time when the fighting was going into overdrive on the eastern front and the Germans where really beginning to feel hurt being brought upon them, when every man an tank counted?

I don’t think I will ever understand why the HEAT holds such appeal

There are no contemporary sources supporting this point of view, are there? And by contemporary I mean early 1943…

All that speaks in favour of it is, firstly, the fact that the skirts may have a useful secondary effect against HEAT rounds, something that came to be the primary function after the final demise of the ATR. Secondly, the existence of a weapons employing HEAT (or rather HC) warheads at the time Schürtzen began fitting to production vehicles. And, finally, that several writers have written that this latter function was the one originally envisaged, but without substantiating that opinion further.

That, against the stacking of facts in the shape of historical documents such as battlefield reports, biographies, manuals, live fire tests and the correlation of time and place, threat and remedy.

Facts thank you

M.

Oh, P.S.

Tiger quoted "Red Army Handbook 1939-1945" by S. J. Zaloga and L. S. Ness in another of these lovely threads.

"The lack of a modern infantry anti-tank weapon was one of the singular failures of the wartime Soviet weapons industry. The Red Army was slow in adopting an anti-tank rifle but changed its mind in 1939-40 after having encountering Polish and Finnish anti-tank rifles. After several designs were tested and failed, in August 1941 the Red Army finally settled on the single-shot Degtaryev PTRD 14.5mm anti-tank rifles and the magazine-fed Simonov PTRS rifle. Of the two types, the simpler and cheaper PTRD was more common with 202,488 built through 1942, compared to 63,385 of the more sophisticated PTRS. They were both very large and cumbersom weapons, the PTRS weighing 44.7lb, and the PTRD some 35.2lb, requiring two soldiers to carry them. Their ammunition could penetrate 35mm of armor at 100 m, which made them a viable weapon for the first year of fighting. By the middle of 1942, German tanks were uparmoured to the point where the anti-tank rifles were useless in frontal engagements; however, they could still penetrate from the sides and rear, especially when used from close range. The anti-tank rifles remained the principle anti-tank weapon of the Soviet infantry through to the end of the war due to the lack of a more modern replacement; their main advantage was the sheer number available. Although not powerful enough to destroy a tank, thay were such a painful nuisance that in 1943 the Germans began to place armour skirts around the sides of the turrent and hull of their tanks and assault guns to protect against this nuisance."

[killmore]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Can that be right? That's about an order of magnitude greater than anything I could reasonably expect.

:confused:

Michael<hr></blockquote>

Sorry - 70/minute!

[Mattias]

ASL Veteran wrote

On a general note - I find the argument that the skirts were only added because ATRs weren't a big enough threat prior to 1943 to be lacking.

The threat developed throughout 1942 (Again, the 14.5 mm ATRs where not available at the start of the war in the East), it was not until early 1943 that it was addressed in a concerted manner. We are talking about a number of months here, even if there was a war on things still didn’t happen at the drop of a hat.

Actually, if you turn the argument on its head, then you could just as easily argue that the Germans themselves didn't see the ATR as a threat since they stopped using them prior to 1940. They also never started using them again - in spite of encountering billions of them in so called close hard fighting for an extended period of time on the Eastern Front. If the Germans never started using them again, could we not presume that they didn't see them as either useful or threatening? If the Germans didn't see them as useful or threatening then why would they create a counter measure designed specifically to counter them?

The reason the Germans didn’t employ ATR the way they Russians did is the same as, say, why German tanks where so radically dissimilar to French tanks, differences in doctrine.

This difference was not so great as to completely abolish the use of ATRs in the German army. They where used in the west and the desert and they certainly brought a few into Russia as well. In fact the development of new ATRs for German service continued into 1942 when they finally went out of fashion.

So, the Germans don’t feel the ATRs would enhance their fighting ability to any great extent but at the same time the crews of their armoured vehicles are getting their heads shot off by the same weapon system. Is the solution to this problem to start using ATRs too?

No, the solution is to enhance the protection of the tanks.

And even if we disregard this obvious order of priorities the question becomes a moot point when one remebers that in March 1943 we are a mere four months from troop trials of the Panzerfaust, the next generation of infantry anti tank weapons.

The Germans don't show a history of creating a defense against a weapon they themselves don't find useful to use. Take Zimmerit coating for example. The Germans used magnetic mines and created a countermeasure (even though the Allies didn't even use any magnetic mines). Magnetic mines were found to be useful, therefore a counter measure was created.

See above, all the Germans had to do was to ask their tank crews if they felt a bit of extra protection would be a good idea.

Perhaps the answer is that skirts were originally designed as a countermeasure against Bazookery, and subsequently it was found that they were rather handy at protecting against ATRs too. A sort of unexpected bonus.

Ah, yes, that must be it, I remember thinking something very similar, almost, almost the same

M.

[ASL Veteran]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mattias:

So, what are you saying? That it is a coincident that schürtzen where fitted to surfaces vulnerable to ATR rounds at a time when these weapons finally available in great number and the men and leaders began to be able to use them with sufficient skill and determination. A time when the fighting was going into overdrive on the eastern front and the Germans where really beginning to feel hurt being brought upon them, when every man an tank counted?

I don’t think I will ever understand why the HEAT holds such appeal

There are no contemporary sources supporting this point of view, are there? And by contemporary I mean early 1943…

All that speaks in favour of it is, firstly, the fact that the skirts may have a useful secondary effect against HEAT rounds, something that came to be the primary function after the final demise of the ATR. Secondly, the existence of a weapons employing HEAT (or rather HC) warheads at the time Schürtzen began fitting to production vehicles. And, finally, that several writers have written that this latter function was the one originally envisaged, but without substantiating that opinion further.

That, against the stacking of facts in the shape of historical documents such as battlefield reports, biographies, manuals, live fire tests and the correlation of time and place, threat and remedy.

Facts thank you

M.

Oh, P.S.

Tiger quoted "Red Army Handbook 1939-1945" by S. J. Zaloga and L. S. Ness in another of these lovely threads.

"The lack of a modern infantry anti-tank weapon was one of the singular failures of the wartime Soviet weapons industry. The Red Army was slow in adopting an anti-tank rifle but changed its mind in 1939-40 after having encountering Polish and Finnish anti-tank rifles. After several designs were tested and failed, in August 1941 the Red Army finally settled on the single-shot Degtaryev PTRD 14.5mm anti-tank rifles and the magazine-fed Simonov PTRS rifle. Of the two types, the simpler and cheaper PTRD was more common with 202,488 built through 1942, compared to 63,385 of the more sophisticated PTRS. They were both very large and cumbersom weapons, the PTRS weighing 44.7lb, and the PTRD some 35.2lb, requiring two soldiers to carry them. Their ammunition could penetrate 35mm of armor at 100 m, which made them a viable weapon for the first year of fighting. By the middle of 1942, German tanks were uparmoured to the point where the anti-tank rifles were useless in frontal engagements; however, they could still penetrate from the sides and rear, especially when used from close range. The anti-tank rifles remained the principle anti-tank weapon of the Soviet infantry through to the end of the war due to the lack of a more modern replacement; their main advantage was the sheer number available. Although not powerful enough to destroy a tank, thay were such a painful nuisance that in 1943 the Germans began to place armour skirts around the sides of the turrent and hull of their tanks and assault guns to protect against this nuisance."<hr></blockquote>

Your quote isn't a fact - merely an opinion put forward by a published author. Facts please. Once again, why were the skirts not placed on German tanks in 1942 or even earlier? ATRs were around since 1918 - all the great powers knew about them and had plenty of time to find counter measures between the wars. Answer that question and you might be able to collapse the Bazookery argument. If that question is not addressed, then the Bazookery argument will stand.

[ASL Veteran]

I'm not going to argue with you Mattias. I have the opinion that you are from Russia and you feel very strongly about the ATR and its effectiveness. Doubtless it was also known as the "Great Eastern Terror" to the German tank crews who feared this horrible weapon so much that they thought it would be to their advantage to put several hundred extra pounds of weight on their vehicles. We will just have to disagree on this one I guess.

[Mattias]

No problem ASL Veteran, opinions differ.

But the next time, please extend me the courtesy of not distorting my words or belittle my opinion the last thing you do before leaving the discussion.

M.

[Paul Lakowski]

The answer to why the skirts weren't mounted until '43 is easy , they weren't need until then because the germans rolled over most of their infantry opponents until then...it took until mid to late 1942 for the russians to rebuild their infantry units and supply sufficent stocks again. Since until this point Hitler perceived most german attacks were successfull it wasn't until the Stalingrad debacle that he saw any need .

You now that layered armor was shown to be particularly more effective against HEAT warheads back in 1947-48...the only reason they took so long to be developed into the standard armor for tanks was the threat didn't matured and ballon in to the RPG/ATGM threat , until the 70s.

[RMC]

I must admit that the whole ATR idea seemed specious to me for the longest time. Based on what I've seen in this thread and a closer inspection of certain parts of my own copies of sources mentioned here I now accept the ATR idea.

Hallelujah! I am born again!

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>RMC: Hallelujah! I am born again!<hr></blockquote>

Heh heh…I think the most important thing that has come out of this thread is the neologism “bazookery”. First coined by the esteemed Mr. John Salt. I am going to try and use “bazookery” whenever possible. It just sort of rolls around the tongue like a fine wine. Say it with me “B-A-Z-O-O-K-E-R-Y”

[RMC]

Yes , it is a very nice word. Let's go to Graf for our bazookery, they used to do that there. I found a subcal training device down there once that looked like it came from a bazooka but it was probably from a LAW.

[Skipper]

Hehe... 40 posts out of thin air As I said somewhere near the beginning of this, we know straight from the horse's mouth that it was a countermeasure against russian infantry AT weapons (read, AT rifles).

H. Guderian. Erinnerungen eines Soldaten. Heidelberg, 1951; quoting from russian translation Voenizdat, 1954 - Chapter VIII, Development of armored troops from January 1942 till February 1943):

"For Pz-IVs, Pantheras and assault guns, special detachable screens were introduced in order to protect them from AT weapons of russian infantry."

Anybody still wants to argue to the contrary?

[ 10-28-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]</p>

[Jeff Duquette]

Jeeze! Surely this thread isn't dying just because RMC has seen the light And Heinz G. was asleep during the "Schurzen is for Anti-Bazookery" meeting For those really interested in this topic I would strongly recommend taking a look at the original thread @

http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&threadm=9rej52%247c8%241%40thorium.cix.co.uk&prev=/groups%3Fhl%3Den%26group%3Dsci.military.moderated

I think someone posted this link earlier on this thread, as well as drug a bunch of text over here from it. The actual thread is sort of interesting. In addition John Salt provides us with many more of his "colorful" neologisms...like:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Most WW2 armour was pretty dull by the standards of today's technological

clever-cloggsery.<hr></blockquote>

Can you say “cloggsery” on the interent?

Of particular interest is the focal distances Paul Lakowski provides regarding explosive stream for HEAT weapons. Check cone diameters for bazooka rounds. This will give you a hint as to the effectiveness of schurzen as a stand-off element for protection against “bazookery”.

[mowers]

Mainly because I couldn't be bothered to read this entire thread I rang up the head of the Bovington Tank library who is a world leader on the history of WW2 tanks. His answer was simply.

Schürzen was orginally developed for turrets to protect them from high powered ATR's. ( for the reasons already discussed) It was then added to the rest of the vehicle to protect them from Heat types weapons ( for the reasons already discussed)

So everyone was kinda right really. If that doesn't settle it- ring him up. The number is UK (0044- for those abroad) 01929 462398

[Brian]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by mowers:

Mainly because I couldn't be bothered to read this entire thread I rang up the head of the Bovington Tank library who is a world leader on the history of WW2 tanks. His answer was simply.

Schürzen was orginally developed for turrets to protect them from high powered ATR's. ( for the reasons already discussed) It was then added to the rest of the vehicle to protect them from Heat types weapons ( for the reasons already discussed)

So everyone was kinda right really. If that doesn't settle it- ring him up. The number is UK (0044- for those abroad) 01929 462398<hr></blockquote>

This would have been David Fletcher, I take it?

[c3k]

Gents,

As an added ATR argument (is that alliteration?), there's a passage in Von Mellenthin's book "Panzer Battles" in which he relates an attack on a ridge/hill. An armored unit (Pz III's) with some SPW infantry swept up a grain covered hill. No problem. THEN, after they passed/got in amongst the Soviets, the Soviet ATR gunners started going to work. Apparently they were effective, especially against the thin rear armor of the various German vehicles.

Regards,

Ken

[Mattias]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by mowers:

Schürzen was orginally developed for turrets to protect them from high powered ATR's. ( for the reasons already discussed) It was then added to the rest of the vehicle to protect them from Heat types weapons ( for the reasons already discussed)<hr></blockquote>

Interesting.

Did he say how he knew this? And if the decision to mount the upper and lower skirts respectively where separated in time and/or place?

Or did all the testing and thinking take place before the production commenced? Then final product thus incorporating both the anti- ATR and HEAT concept?

Just wondering since I have seen no mention of the two parts (upper and lower skirts) being considered separately.

M.

[mowers]

How did he know this?

-Because its his job to know ridiculous technical details about WW2 tanks and the British government pays him to do this I guess. He spends all hours researching this sort of stuff for a living, after all this sort of thing is bread and butter to this guy. He seemed quite sure.

Yes (I think), the extra armour on the hull and turret was indeed placed at different places and times.

I’ve seen a Pz IV in an Israel tank museum with turret plates but no hull plates- I’ve even got a picture at home (I think) - I'll clarify in about 3 hours on that.

To be honest I’m not really an expert- I just thought that this debate needed some assistance.

Give him a call he is a really nice chap.

ben

[Mattias]

Obscure detail or not, I for one am interested in it because there seems to be diverging opinions about it. In particular it seems that this detail has become the subject of a myth, or perhaps misunderstanding more aptly describes it.

And because the “problem” is of such a, comparatively, limited scope there is actually hope of find the absolute truth about it. I guess that’s why I am being so pig headed about it.

The head librarian has his opinion but, again, the problem is that he stands opposed by other men of scholarly stature that also makes their living by knowing these ridiculous details. No doubt Peter Chamberlain thought he was right when he wrote that the HC munitions where the main motivator for developing the skirts. No doubt Spielberger too thought he was right when he wrote that HC munitions had absolutely nothing to do with it.

As for seeing tanks with turret skirts only, yes I have a few pictures of those too. In Spielbergers book covering the Pz IV there are at least half a dozen of them. The writer makes no comment on that though.

Knowing how violently the early skirts interacted with terrain it is no surprise to see tanks without them and most of the skirt-less tanks in the pictures still have the fittings. One tank is fitted with winter tracks, that looks far too wide for the skirts and there is explicit mention of the mesh skirts having the advantage of not “collecting” as much dust as the sheet style skirts. The latter possibly being the reason for not fitting them in very dusty terrain.

I just want to know what he knows, that those other fellows missed. I guess I’ll have to call Bovington

M.

[ASL Veteran]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:

The answer to why the skirts weren't mounted until '43 is easy , they weren't need until then because the germans rolled over most of their infantry opponents until then...it took until mid to late 1942 for the russians to rebuild their infantry units and supply sufficent stocks again. Since until this point Hitler perceived most german attacks were successfull it wasn't until the Stalingrad debacle that he saw any need .<hr></blockquote>

Not to pick on Paul, whose technical knowledge of armor is quite impressive, but I think that this ‘opinion’ is a gross over simplification of the event that we know as World War 2. This is also an opinion which has been repeated by others in this thread. What this assumes (or actually states in this case) is that German armor was not exposed to ATR fire in the early war period because the Germans were sweeping all before them. In Paul’s quote he actually says “rolled over” rather than sweeps, but the intent is the same. The Germans were simply too successful to bother with such things as protection against ATRs since they were a non factor. It also makes the assumption that it would require direct intervention from Hitler to get these skirts hung on the sides of the German vehicles.

From Panzertruppen Volume 1 :

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> The commander of Panzer Abteilung zb V 40 wrote a detailed 13 page report dated 18 July 1940 on their experiences and lessons learned in Norway:

As the experience in Denmark had already shown, one must continuously calculate on the enemy possessing anti tank weapons. The British anti-tank rifle and the French 25mm Hotchkiss anti-tank gun were used in Norway. The armor of all Panzers, (PzKpwI, PzKpw II, and Neubau – PzKpfw IV) was penetrated by both of these weapons.

(snip)

During battles in towns, settlements, and single farmsteads that had been occupied by the enemy, the opponent could be quickly convinced to clear out, especially when fired at by the 2 cm KwK tank gun. As a result, houses were set on fire, which couldn’t be prevented. The necessity to fire at houses that commanded the roads, even when the opponent hadn't already opened fire from them, came from the experience that occupants with anti tank weapons (British anti tank rifles and French 25mm anti tank guns) let the Panzers advance to close range before suddenly opening fire. In addition, the enemy occupying the houses with machine guns would let the Panzers pass and then open fire on the following infantry.<hr></blockquote>

Here is a quote from a Leutnant Meyer from Panzer Regiment 4.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> On 15 September 1939, I drove from Prczeworsk to Zamosc with a Pz Kpfw IV, Pz Kpfw III and two Pz Kpfw I Ausf A. About 1 kilometer west of Dachnow, I drove past the command post of Infanterie – Regiment 130 and was requested to support an infantry attack against Polish forces who had attacked the regiment from out of the woods northwest of Dachnow. I received orders from the regimental commander to leave both Pz KpfwI Ausf A at the command post and with both heavy Panzers to reconnoiter through Dachnow toward Oleszyce. Coming from there, a bicycle rider reported that Oleszyce was clear of enemy. The previous orders were dropped. With both heavy Panzer I then supported an attack of the 1 Kompanie/Infanterie Regiment 130 against the enemy occupied woods. After contact had been made with the company commander, I started to attack. But, after about 400 meters, I recognized that the infantry company wasn’t following. At the same time I cam under very strong Polish artillery fire. I decided not to advance closer to the woods but turned south and combed through the village for enemy infantry. Because of strong fire from anti tank rifles in houses and trees, I shot up the entire western part of the village, setting it on fire. <hr></blockquote>

Here is part of another combat report from Panzer Regiment 4

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> At 0110 hours on 19 September 1939, the lead platoon of the 5 Kompanie Panzer Regiment 4 with five PzKpfw II and a PzKpfw IV encountered the enemy at the entrance to the village of Narol and were shot at by machine guns, anti tank rifles, and anti tank guns. The lead Panzer, immobilized by hits in the idler wheel and track, had to be abandoned. This Panzer was rendered inoperable by a round fired from the PzKpfwIV. An attack against Narol by the 5 Kompanie was not possible at night. <hr></blockquote>

After the Polish campaign, the Germans sent a questionnaire requesting specific information on tactical problems that had been encountered. Here is a very small slice of the experience report from Panzer Regiment 8:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> II. Organization of the Panzer Abteilung:

Panzer Abteilung 66 was only outfitted with PzKpfwI and PzKpfwII. These are not sufficiently armored. Their fire power is too low. The absence of any PzKpwIII and PzKpfw IV made itself very noticeable. If only a small number of PzKpfw IV had been assigned, it would have been possible to combat enemy anti tank nests that often caused heavy losses in men and vehicles. The PzKpfw IV could quickly deal with the anti tank guns at a range at which enemy anti tank rifles would be ineffective. <hr></blockquote>

Hopefully this is sufficient to show that ATRs were indeed a recognized threat to German armor before 1943. In fact, as the report from Norway should demonstrate, ATRs were a larger threat early in the war since the armor of the German tanks was thinner back then and could be penetrated from all angles. So as German tanks became more heavily armored the ATR threat was, in fact, diminishing.