What were the highlights for each nation?

[Stalins Organ]

Rather than harp on about how my boys were better than your boys, what were those moments that defined the best and worst about each nation's military in WW2?

I'm not after a rose-tinted view of each nationality - war was hell, and many, many unspeakable things were done and witnessed.

I guess we all know enough about German attrocities and some of the major allied ones (mg'ing Jap sub survivors and the like) - but did you know about some others?

For example New Zealand soldiers managed a couple of noteworthy crimes - during an attack by Italians a grenade was thrown into a hut containing wounded NZ soldiers. Outraged by this the NZ'ers took no prisoners when they retook the position - witnesses describe at least 1 Kiwi soldier throwing an Italian off a cliff.

During a break out by a surrounded NZ Bn the troops formed in close order and charged out - they took no prosoners, and many germans weer bayoneted multiple times, shot when clearly wounded adn thrown into burnign vehicles.

One officer reported that he saw a soldier shot a captured German in cold blood and did nothing about it.

Yet Kiwi's had a pretty good rep in WW2.

It just goes to show that people are people - they react in extraordinary ways given extraordinary circumstances.

[ 05-01-2001: Message edited by: Mike the bike ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Canada had several defining moments - with regards to land forces, I would have to say Ortona, and the Moro River campaign, showed that Canada could fight well on a divisional level (though Vokes' handling of teh campaign has been criticized heavily, the courage of the troops was exemplary).

D-Day - and having our own beach to assault - plus having the most success of the 5 beaches - is a shining moment.

The Scheldt fighting - a dirty job that Canadians did well - ranks up there. But it will be outshone by the "glamour" of D-Day - and always by the tragedy of Dieppe, Hong Kong, Verrierres Ridge.

With such an (understandably) poor performance in Normandy, Canadian feats of arms tended to even out over the course of the war - many lowlights, but also many highlights.

The Hitler Line is also a stellar moment in Canadian military history.

None of them were easy.

[Guest Babra]

In addition to Michael's comments, which are restricted to land forces, I would add the CATP as Canada's single greatest contribution to the war effort.

[Bruno Weiss]

Well, Finland fought the Battle of Lappland, or was it lappdance.

[Wesy]

For the Japanese (Navy) that is:

Savo Island - Probably one of the worst defeats for the US Navy in its history. Showed Japanese Naval skills in night action.

4 CA's in the course of the evening to no IJN losses.

[JasonC]

I am certainly not interested in revisiting war crimes which is only an invitation to restarting the war. But feats of military prowess and ineptitude are another matter, and a fine historical subject. Here are my picks.

Country Best

Worst

Germany Sedan to Dunkirk 1940 Stalingrad 1942

UK Battle of Britain 1940 Knightsbridge 1942

US Utah Beach to Cherbourg 1944 Hurtgen 1944

USSR Bagration 1944 Winter War 1940

Japan Singapore 1942 Great Marianas Turkey Shoot 1944

Reasons - for the Germans, one was a great mobile breakthrough pressed to decision. The other was head-in-the-noose stubbornness in siege fighting for a prestige objective, leading to encirclement and total defeat.

For the UK one was a high tech, well run campaign alone against daunting odds, and a complete success. The other was a frontal charge of unsupported tanks on a PAK front and a complete fiasco.

For the US one was an example of true combined arms, air sea and land, that secured the penisula with minimal losses rapidly. The other was mindless straight ahead slogging in the worst terrain with no plan and to no real purpose.

For the USSR one was a massive coordinated ground offensive employed concentric attack and combined arms, and totally destroyed the largest army group in the German army in a matter of months. The other was mindless straight ahead slogging along a restricted frontage, at horrid cost and to little effect.

For Japan one was a true combined arms operation not merely reliant on surprise, but on execution and use of all arms, that rapidly led to the surrender of a garrison larger than the beseiging force and secured Japan's position in all of South Asia. The other was a fiasco of untrained pilots sent piecemeal on miscoordinated but large airstrikes, that destroyed what was left of Japanese naval aviation forever, without scoring a single hit.

[ 05-01-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Michael Dorosh]

I would say the worst campaign for the Americans and British would probably be Sicily. It took them 38 days to secure the island, the two forces did not co-operate, the airborne drops were a disaster, and the bulk of the enemy was permitted to escape with little loss.

[Ellros]

I think the Battle of the Bulge was a big German mistake, at least in some parts.

Yes, it was a success in some areas, but in the end it was a waste of men and material.

Second... Hitler's insistence on building Me262's as bombers. If production had concentrated on fighters, some things may have been different.

[BloodyBucket]

Interesting picks by JasonC, and I can't argue with them.

I would add that the lowlights mentioned reflect on the leadership and not the men involved.

[Skipper]

For Soviets there may be many contestants for the best moment (Bagration is a good choice, too), but the worst is undoubtedly the summer 1941.

[Skipper]

> I would add that the lowlights mentioned

> reflect on the leadership and not the men

> involved.

There are two versions: "You are the boss, you are a fool" and "You are the boss, I am a fool". Both are wrong. Leadership is also "the men involved".

[ 05-02-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]

[Grisha]

Being a russophile my picks for the Soviet Union would be:<UL TYPE=SQUARE><LI>High Point: Vistula-Oder - I pick this operation over the Belorussian operations, because of a few things. One, The entire operation began from three bridgeheads during winter, and it was started prematurely to complicate German planning during the Ardennes offensive. Two, the Soviet were no longer on Soviet territory, thus they no longer had the benefit of partisan intelligence. Due to excellent maskirovka the German defenses were quickly penetrated to operational depths, and excellent ongoing razvedka insured no surprises from German reserve counterattacks.

<LI>Low Point(other than Winter War): Kharkov '42 - What a waste of armor, and men. Stalin was still obsessed with attacking and overriding his generals' advise. And it could have been avoided really.

[JasonC]

Speaking of Sicily - (almost left that out)

I'll take "failures" like that all day long. When the problem is the enemy "got away", it can't be all that big a disaster - LOL.

I understand your point, that coordination was at a low and large advantages were not prosecuted well. But there are bigger fiascos to choose from, methinks.

[ 05-02-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[tss]

Mike the bike wrote:

Rather than harp on about how my boys were better than your boys, what were those moments that defined the best and worst about each nation's military in WW2?

I have two candidates for the high point of Finnish army:

1) The defence of Mantsi Island during Winter War (1939-40). Initially there were only a two-gun coastal artillery battery (150 mm) and one infantry company. The Soviets had a full infantry regiment in the area. The island held to the end of the war, after being reinforced several times.

Several years ago the minutes of RKKA's high-level conference on April 1940 were published here in Finland. One of the most entertaining parts was when the commander of the said Red Army regiment tried to explain to Stalin why he couldn't capture the island when having more than 10:1 superiority. (Also, he had to answer to difficult questions about getting his regiment later encircled by a single batallion).

2) The two-week long Tali-Ihantala battle (June-July 1944) that was the largest battle ever fought in the Nordic countries. A major Soviet armored spearhead was stopped with heavy casualties.

From a large-scale military point of view, I'd put the Finnish low-point to the offensive of Ryhmä O ("Group O") to Kuolismaa area in 1941. Colonel (or was he a General-Major, I can't remember) Oinonen conducted a series of frontal assaults against heavily-fortified and well-motivated Soviet troops, losing heavy casualties. What made this attack particularly boneheaded was the fact that the flanks of the defending 126th Infantry Regiment were wide open because of vast wildernesses of the area.

However, the Soviet defensive victory was not so impressive as some Soviet sources claim. Jaakko Rugojev's "Majuri Vallin rykmentti" ("The Regiment of Major Valli") claims that Finns had three attacking regiments and one brigade against the Soviet 126th, while in truth there were only one brigade and two cavalry regiments, and the cavalry regiments were smaller than infantry batallions. So in practice, there were five Finnish batallions against three Soviet ones.

Another good candidate is the stubborness of General Laatikainen when he steadfastly refused to believe the evidence that Soviet major offensive was coming in summer 1944.

In the smaller scale there were many unimaginative company-level frontal assaults that caused heavy casualties with no results.

Perhaps the worst one happened at the Rukajärvi sector but I can't remember which unit it was.

A Finnish company had arrived at the edge of a kilometer-wide marsh with a high forested hill on the other side. The company commander sent a scout patrol that established that the hill was defended. The commander then sent out for reinforcements and artillery support (the guns had fallen behind because of difficult terrain). The infantry reinforcements came before artillery spotters. The commander of the new company immediately ordered an attack over the marsh. The commander of the old company who had

the seniority specifically ordered to stop the attack but the new commander didn't listen and attacked anyway. His company lost over 90 men KIA, WIA, and MIA. The worst thing is that the lieutenant in question survived and wasn't even court-martialled.

- Tommi

[ 05-02-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

[Skipper]

On Kharkov and Rzhev. A fighting force that had a lot of low mobility formations and suffered from the opponent's air superiority probably had no better choice than offensive operations, even at a cost of many lives. Otherwise, it would be encircled and destroyed in piecemeal fashion by the more mobile opponent, exactly as it had happened to RKKA in 1941. Which would cost more lives and a lost war in the end of the day.

This is not to say that these meatgrinders were planned as such from the start, just that soviet high command fully realised that these operations were very risky.

By the way, how many people here know that the first German version of "Not a single step back" order was issued to the german troops defending around Rzhev?

[Jeff Heidman]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

For Soviets there may be many contestants for the best moment (Bagration is a good choice, too), but the worst is undoubtedly the summer 1941.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I would say that Operation Mars represents the worst blunder for the USSR.

The summer of '41 was bad, but at leastr that was osmething that the Germans were doing to them.

Mars was a disaster from start to finsih that the Soviets initiated.

They have done a relatively decent job of covering up just how nad the Mars debacle was, basically by claiming it was a "feint".

Jeff Heidman

[Skipper]

> I would say that Operation Mars represents

> the worst blunder for the USSR.

That's where my wife's granddad was killed. Regimental HQ bombed out by Stukas.

[tailz]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Canada had several defining moments - with regards to land forces, I would have to say Ortona, and the Moro River campaign, showed that Canada could fight well on a divisional level (though Vokes' handling of teh campaign has been criticized heavily, the courage of the troops was exemplary).

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think Montgomery can take more than a little of the responsibility for the Ortona casualties. He was incessantly pushing for the attack to hurry up.

Monty was the bottom of the 'general barrel' IMHO.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tailz:

I think Montgomery can take more than a little of the responsibility for the Ortona casualties. He was incessantly pushing for the attack to hurry up.

Monty was the bottom of the 'general barrel' IMHO.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Perhaps - but once the Seaforths and Edmontons were in the city, there was no hurry up about it - it was out of both Vokes' and Monty's hands, and firmly up to the troops as to what would transpire.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

The summer of '41 was bad, but at leastr that was osmething that the Germans were doing to them.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Jeff, you hit the nail on the head - there is a big distinction between doing poorly because of what the enemy is doing to you, and doing poorly because of your own plan. That is why I include Sicily as being at the top of the list of botched Allied operations.

[Scott B]

Have to say for the USSR I'd say their crowning achievement was not a single operation, but the strategic coordination of all the major operations from Bagration onward-- they showed at Bagration that they had the operational situation under control, but their strategic level momentum in 1944 was unmatched by any other major power in the war, hands-down.

Their biggest failings, in my opinion, were not failed offensives, but the "stand and die" orders of the early war that caused horrendous casualties in German encirclements. Major offensive operations against a prepared combined arms defense are HARD-- the Soviets did not have the luxury of working their way up the ladder like the Western allies did; they had to hit the ground running and spent a lot of lives doing so. And even so, they were lucky that they got the breaks that they did.

On a non-Eastern Front note... Singapore, for both Japan and the United Kingdom.

Scott B.

[Grisha]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

On Kharkov and Rzhev. A fighting force that had a lot of low mobility formations and suffered from the opponent's air superiority probably had no better choice than offensive operations, even at a cost of many lives. Otherwise, it would be encircled and destroyed in piecemeal fashion by the more mobile opponent, exactly as it had happened to RKKA in 1941. Which would cost more lives and a lost war in the end of the day.

This is not to say that these meatgrinders were planned as such from the start, just that soviet high command fully realised that these operations were very risky.

By the way, how many people here know that the first German version of "Not a single step back" order was issued to the german troops defending around Rzhev?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Regarding Kharkov '42, I would say that the Soviet skill at escaping encirclement during Operation Blau is a good indicator of why Kharkov '42 was so wasteful. After that fiasco, there were no other encirclements of note during '42. Had the STAVKA resorted to a fighting retreat from the start, rather than a blind offensive who's to say if the Germans would've reached the Caucasus, or even Stalingrad? Of course, there would've been losses and air superiority would've taken its toll on the Soviets, but there is nothing quite as destructive as an encirclement, because when done correctly, there is, quite simply, nothing left.

[Skipper]

> I would say that the Soviet skill at

> escaping encirclement during Operation

> Blau is a good indicator of why

> Kharkov '42 was so wasteful.

I dont understand this phrase. Must be the bloody flu getting to my brain. Could you elaborate?

> Had the STAVKA resorted to a fighting

> retreat from the start

With hindsight 20:20? Maybe. Or maybe not.

You do know, I suppose, that despite numerical superiority of RKKA, nearly every big engagement during Barbarossa had German numerical superiority? In an oversimplified way, to play fighting retreat one needed a lot of trucks.

[Warmaker]

Well, being more steeped in U.S. history, three highly significant events/images capture me.

1.Pearl Harbor-Drawing the U.S. into the war. I don't want to get into a discussion though of some "theories" out there of allowing the Japanese to bomb PH to gain public support.

2.D-Day-For America, a significant event/image. One of the most standout moments in the 20th century for the USA.

3.The Flag Raising Atop Mt.Suribachi, at Iwo Jima-This has become the very symbol for victory in WWII with us. Let it also be known that among those men was a Navy Corpsman in the flag raising, symbolizing the close relationship of the Navy-Marine Corps.

[Grisha]

> I would say that the Soviet skill at

> escaping encirclement during Operation

> Blau is a good indicator of why

> Kharkov '42 was so wasteful.

I dont understand this phrase. Must be the bloody flu getting to my brain. Could you elaborate?

Sorry for the confusion, Skipper. If we don’t include the Kharkov encirclement, Operation Blau did not result in any further encirclements of note. The Soviets were finally conducting a fighting retreat, having learned from their mistakes in ’41. It wasn’t pretty, and was very close to becoming a strategic rout at times, but it was a fighting retreat. All the way to Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

> Had the STAVKA resorted to a fighting

> retreat from the start

With hindsight 20:20? Maybe. Or maybe not.

You do know, I suppose, that despite numerical superiority of RKKA, nearly every big engagement during Barbarossa had German numerical superiority? In an oversimplified way, to play fighting retreat one needed a lot of trucks.

It's true that not only Stalin, but most of the Soviet General Staff believed the next German thrust in 1942 to be directed at Moscow. However, it was Stalin who demanded a limited offensive in the south in May. By and large, the Soviet General Staff was opposed to this, recommending instead a strategic defense overall. Regarding Barbarossa, while the Soviets had millions of unmobilized reserves, in the summer of 1941 the actual standing, mobilized army along the Soviet Union’s western borders was numerically inferior to the invading German Army. This ratio wasn’t reversed until October-November 1941. At one point even, the Germans had a numerical advantage of 1.9:1. My source for this is When Titans Clashed by Glantz & House.