What were the highlights for each nation?

[Walter]

tailz said:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> I think Montgomery can take more than a little of the responsibility for the Ortona casualties.

He was incessantly pushing for the attack to hurry up.

Monty was the bottom of the 'general barrel' IMHO.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

My grandfather, who served in the Canadian army in Sicily and Italy would disagree with you....

Cheers,

Walter R. Strapps

[Skipper]

> mobilized army along the Soviet Union’s

> western borders was numerically inferior

> to the invading German Army.

In my understanding, the part of RKKA that was already present in the first strategic echelon was not inferior in pure head counts to the invading german army. However, it was inferior in mobility and heavy weapons, not to mention strategic initiative, f...d up airforce and such. Ie, deployment too late, too close to the border.

[Grisha]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

> mobilized army along the Soviet Union’s

> western borders was numerically inferior

> to the invading German Army.

In my understanding, the part of RKKA that was already present in the first strategic echelon was not inferior in pure head counts to the invading german army. However, it was inferior in mobility and heavy weapons, not to mention strategic initiative, f...d up airforce and such. Ie, deployment too late, too close to the border.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Skipper, the data Glantz presents in the appendix of When Titans Clashed includes a comparison of total mobilized combat strength in manpower for both the Soviets, her allies, and the Germans and her allies. The comparison is made through the entire war, and is eye-opening. For example, according to Glantz' research the Soviets didn't possess overall 3:1 odds until late in 1944. 2:1 Soviet odds didn't occur until late 1943 - early 1944. Until seeing Glantz' data, I would have agreed with you, but I greatly respect the work David Glantz has done in this area, and his reputation among the western historians of the Soviet military is probably only exceeded by John Erickson.

[REVS]

For some Australians, the most important moment of not only WWII, but also our 20th century history, was the day our Prime Minister John Curtin told Winston Churchill that no thanks, we're not staying over here in the Middle East defending British oil interests, we're coming home to defend Australia. That was the day we became a proper nation defending our own self-interest.

I'm sure lots of Aussies would feel that our reputation as soldiers is a well estabished fact that we can be proud of, but it took a long time for our political leaders to show a similar quality of guts.

Unfortunately, Australians are developing a strong affinity for the appalling stuff-up that was the Gallipoli campaign in WWI as some sort of worthwhile national memory, and I don't think there's anything stopping its momentum, either, but for me, telling the awful Winston Churchill to go and get stuffed is a much greater thing to be proud of in the long run.

[Skipper]

> Soviets didn't possess overall 3:1 odds

> until late in 1944.

To me it is not new at all. Moreover, all strategic successes of 1941-43 were achieved with rough equality in numbers. As for 22 June 1941 - what is Glantz's definition of "mobilised"?

[Grisha]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

> Soviets didn't possess overall 3:1 odds

> until late in 1944.

To me it is not new at all. Moreover, all strategic successes of 1941-43 were achieved with rough equality in numbers. As for 22 June 1941 - what is Glantz's definition of "mobilised"?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm sorry, but I was posting from memory(was at work at the time). Now that I'm home I can post exactly what is in this book. the title of the table is:

Table C. Comparative Strengths of Combat Forces, Eastern Front 1941-1945

On 22 June 1941, the Soviets had 2,680,000 combat forces in the Western Military Districts. Germans numbered 3,050,000 in Eastern Europe, and her allies of note were 500,000 Finns, 150,000 Romanians.

By 1 November 1941, there were 2,200,000 Soviets and 2,800,000 Germans at the front. Numbers for major allies remained the same.

Glantz' sources for this table are from both German and Soviet archival origins, and is a bit lengthy.

[CombinedArms]

I just posted this on another thread but it seems even more relevant here, so I'll pop it in, as a finest hour for American troops:

When massively outnumbered in the Ardennes counteroffensive, only one quite raw division cracked and the rest hung on tenaciously to the shoulders of what became the "Bulge" and put up an extremely stiff defense. Compare the amount of dug in firepower and ready armored reserves the Russians needed to stop the German offensive at Kursk. I'd put the defenders of Bastogne, St. Vith, ahd Elsenborn Ridge--who were a mixture of elite, veteran, and even pretty raw units, mostly understrength due to recent combat losses--up against anybody.

--Please note I'm talking about the troops and commanders from the divisional level down. On the higher command level, the best responses to the Ardennes offensive came from Ike and Patton. Patton \anticipated the attack on the 1st Army to his north and had his staff work out a plan to pull out of his local offensive and move north, even before the German attack began. That's how they got to Bastogne so fast, and that seems to me Patton's finest moment in the whole war.

[ 05-03-2001: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]