Tactical Lessons and Development through history

[Flibby]

Can anyone recommend any reading on the reality of tactics in ww2 versus the textbook visions as set out in the various handbooks one sees?

I've got a good stackpole book on the battle of Sedan but it's less nitty gritty than I'm looking for.

I do get the impression that the Allied campaigns from 44 to 45 and the Russians from 43 onwards were not really examples of manoeuvre warfare in any way shape or form. Quite rightly we didn't want to risk men when we had such a materiel advantage and could simple attrit away the Germans.

I don't want to get into a JasonC type argument, but examples of Fuller esque manoeuvres seem scant after 1941.

[The_Capt]

On 6/24/2023 at 6:52 PM, Flibby said:

Can anyone recommend any reading on the reality of tactics in ww2 versus the textbook visions as set out in the various handbooks one sees?

I've got a good stackpole book on the battle of Sedan but it's less nitty gritty than I'm looking for.

I do get the impression that the Allied campaigns from 44 to 45 and the Russians from 43 onwards were not really examples of manoeuvre warfare in any way shape or form. Quite rightly we didn't want to risk men when we had such a materiel advantage and could simple attrit away the Germans.

I don't want to get into a JasonC type argument, but examples of Fuller esque manoeuvres seem scant after 1941.

In many ways JasonC is not wrong (as much a it pains me to admit it).  I never really got the western cult of manoeuvre once I got out of my 30s and really looked at how many times it was effectively used.  I am more convinced that during the Cold War, and definitely after the Cold War, Manoeuvre warfare doctrine was more about military funding and procurement than actual battlefield experience.  A small high speed low drag (read cheap) force able to “out tempo” on an opponents “schwerpunkt” sounds really good…but how many times did we actually do it?  Everyone points to Gulf War ‘91 but after that air campaign of complete supremacy I am not sure this is a good data point.  I think manoeuvre warfare can work but it is part of a larger tactical system that includes attrition (and now corrosion) warfare, layered over even more obscure stuff like subversive warfare.

A good book I read quite sometime ago on the myths around the Blitzkrieg was The Blitzkrieg Legend by Karl Hans Frieser - https://www.amazon.ca/Blitzkrieg-Legend-1940-Campaign-West/dp/1591142954/ref=asc_df_1591142954/?tag=googleshopc0c-20&linkCode=df0&hvadid=292929366843&hvpos=&hvnetw=g&hvrand=18155534866616673969&hvpone=&hvptwo=&hvqmt=&hvdev=c&hvdvcmdl=&hvlocint=&hvlocphy=9000683&hvtargid=pla-459632923113&psc=1

He challenges the entire notion of a German grand plan and makes a solid argument that a lot of May-Jun 1940 was accidental or at least a surprise to a large part of the German military.

[Artkin]

It was certainly an experimental time for the Wehrmacht. 

[Flibby]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

In many ways JasonC is not wrong (as much a it pains me to admit it).  I never really got the western cult of manoeuvre once I got out of my 30s and really looked at how many times it was effectively used.  I am more convinced that during the Cold War, and definitely after the Cold War, Manoeuvre warfare doctrine was more about military funding and procurement than actual battlefield experience.  A small high speed low drag (read cheap) force able to “out tempo” on an opponents “schwerpunkt” sounds really good…but how many times did we actually do it?  Everyone points to Gulf War ‘91 but after that air campaign of complete supremacy I am not sure this is a good data point.  I think manoeuvre warfare can work but it is part of a larger tactical system that includes attrition (and now corrosion) warfare, layered over even more obscure stuff like subversive warfare.

A good book I read quite sometime ago on the myths around the Blitzkrieg was The Blitzkrieg Legend by Karl Hans Frieser - https://www.amazon.ca/Blitzkrieg-Legend-1940-Campaign-West/dp/1591142954/ref=asc_df_1591142954/?tag=googleshopc0c-20&linkCode=df0&hvadid=292929366843&hvpos=&hvnetw=g&hvrand=18155534866616673969&hvpone=&hvptwo=&hvqmt=&hvdev=c&hvdvcmdl=&hvlocint=&hvlocphy=9000683&hvtargid=pla-459632923113&psc=1

He challenges the entire notion of a German grand plan and makes a solid argument that a lot of May-Jun 1940 was accidental or at least a surprise to a large part of the German military.

Really interesting points and I will have to pick that book up. I also have this on my ever-growing wish-list.

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Blitzkrieg-Reality-Hitlers-Lightning-France-ebook/dp/B01FTAPZUA/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=

I read manoeuvre warfare as a way to defeat a large force with brains rather than brawn. Does it apply in practice on either a tactical or operational/strategic level?

Tactically much of the army handbooks in the UK and US focus on attacking an abstract isolated enemy. Manoeuvre warfare principles work fantastically here. You can fix a unit with a support section, run around the back while they are suppressed and run into them with your bayonets fixed flinging in grenades with gay abandon. 

In practice, in a peer to peer conflict, if you come across an isolated squad it's going to be a sentry or OP. Sure you can attack it in the way described above but where does it take you? In a conflict like this you are far more likely, such as at Goose Green for want of a better example, to find a mutually supported position where any attack is going to have to start of life as a frontal attack. You mass firepower at the weakest point you can find, with the best covered approaches, but realise that any obvious approach path is going to be obvious to the opponent.

You have to create any sort of flank with overwhelming fire power at a point, but a manoeuvreist view of this isn't going to work unless you're also stopping the enemy from reinforcing this position, therefore a broad front is essential.

Ultimately you are going to be smashing into a prepared line and it's not going to be pretty (I am more than open to someone telling me this is wrong!)

Likewise on a larger scale, Market Garden sounded fabulous on paper, but the obvious logistical issues (in hindsight) sacrificed a lot of blokes when a more traditional 'steel not flesh' approach would have been just as successful.

[domfluff]

On 6/24/2023 at 10:52 PM, Flibby said:

Can anyone recommend any reading on the reality of tactics in ww2 versus the textbook visions as set out in the various handbooks one sees?

I've got a good stackpole book on the battle of Sedan but it's less nitty gritty than I'm looking for.

I do get the impression that the Allied campaigns from 44 to 45 and the Russians from 43 onwards were not really examples of manoeuvre warfare in any way shape or form. Quite rightly we didn't want to risk men when we had such a materiel advantage and could simple attrit away the Germans.

I don't want to get into a JasonC type argument, but examples of Fuller esque manoeuvres seem scant after 1941.

The absolute best book for this kind of thing, especially on a tactical level, is Closing With The Enemy. This is about the US army in WW2, and each chapter is essentially "This is the doctrine for X we started the war with, this is how it developed, and this is where we ended up".

[Centurian52]

I think maneuver is essentially correct, but incomplete. It is a phase of operations that it makes sense to strive for, if practicable, but it can't be the only option in your toolbox. I think for maneuver to work your opponent needs to have an exploitable weakness of some sort, such as an open flank or a gap or weak point in the line. Maneuver by itself will work just fine on a low density battlefield or against a weak enemy. But if the enemy doesn't have an exploitable weakness then you need to fall back on attrition until you've weakened them enough to enable maneuver. On a high density battlefield with a peer opponent you'll need to grind then down in attritional battles until some part of their line is weak enough to enable a successful breakthrough battle, and only then can you engage in classic maneuver. Attempting a breakthrough battle before the enemy has been weakened enough will just result in heavier casualties.

So I don't think its a choice between either attrition or maneuver. I think attrition enables maneuver.

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Centurian52 said:

I think maneuver is essentially correct, but incomplete. It is a phase of operations that it makes sense to strive for, if practicable, but it can't be the only option in your toolbox. I think for maneuver to work your opponent needs to have an exploitable weakness of some sort, such as an open flank or a gap or weak point in the line. Maneuver by itself will work just fine on a low density battlefield or against a weak enemy. But if the enemy doesn't have an exploitable weakness then you need to fall back on attrition until you've weakened them enough to enable maneuver. On a high density battlefield with a peer opponent you'll need to grind then down in attritional battles until some part of their line is weak enough to enable a successful breakthrough battle, and only then can you engage in classic maneuver. Attempting a breakthrough battle before the enemy has been weakened enough will just result in heavier casualties.

So I don't think its a choice between either attrition or maneuver. I think attrition enables maneuver.

And vice versa.  Maneuver and attrition are both sub-strategies of Annihilation according to Randal Bowdish, and that resonates.  They are sides of a coin, as are the command methods that tend to be employed for each - Mission and Detail (sometimes called Task) Command.  The art of warfare is the employment of these two methods in synchronicity, or more importantly at the right time and place. 

What we have seen in Ukraine (and not wanting to hijack this thread…go to Hot Thread for more) is a new hybrid form of attrition referred to as “corrosive warfare”.  This is essentially a form of manoeuvre-by-ISR&Fires.  An opponents entire operational system is rapidly attrited on key nodes along its entire length faster than it can be shored up.  The end result looks like that system collapses under its own weight.  However, this is really a hypothesis at this point and needs verification.  Weirdly some of this is shifting C2 methods as well as we see an almost inverted C2 type approach at times in support of corrosive warfare…and Amazon-like distribution of violence-typo-order.

We also see elements of Subversion strategies at play in warfare in combination with the others - forms of Reflexive Control.  And even Deterrence at play.  In short, warfare has a lot more going on than “Manoeuvre…yay!”  Our failures in the west to really embrace it and widen the education of our officer corps is a key shortfall in the modern era…in my opinion.

[Centurian52]

So I've gotten far enough into Balck's 1911 manual that he is starting to talk about extended order tactics. He describes two historical examples, one from the 2nd Boer War and one from the Russo-Japanese War.

Quote

 [86]Four battalions of the 6th Division advanced at Paardeberg on February 18th, 1900, on a front of 2000 m. with 800-1000 rifles, in two lines of equal strength and separated by a distance of 300 m., the remainder following at 400 m. Three battalions of the Highland Brigade even advanced on a front of 4000 m. See my lecture: Lehren des Burenkrieges. Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 33, pp. 43 and 67.

For the Japanese procedure see v. Lüttwitz, Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, pp. 44 and 66. Bronsart von Schellendorff, Sechs Monate beim japanischen Feldheer, p. 217.

 [87]In regard to the advance of the 6th Reserve Regiment against Husanta-Kantsy at Mukden, on March 5th, 1905, Bronsart von Schellendorff (Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, p. 225), says: “Some 500-600 m. from the Russian position, individual men sprang out of the shelter trench at intervals of 10-25 paces, rushed forward for about 30 m., or perhaps farther, where they threw themselves down and fired. This procedure was repeated until a new skirmish line, with the men approximately 3 paces apart, had been formed about 100-150 m. in front of the trench mentioned. The rest of the men, who until this moment had remained in the trench, now rushed forward in groups of 5-10 men for distances of 30 m., for the purpose of reaching the advanced line.”

In the first of these it sounds like there are 1000ish riflemen formed in two waves, with a separation of 300 meters between the waves, on a 2000 meter front. With 500 men per wave, that's about 4 meters between each man in the line (3.5 meters if you account for the fact that each man is probably about 0.5 meters wide). Those intervals are still a little short for modern sensibilities, but they are better than the 1 or 2 meters I was crediting European armies with in earlier posts.

In the second instance it sounds like an unspecified number of men trickled out of a trench in small groups to form a single skirmish line with intervals of roughly 3 paces between each man. I believe 3 paces comes out to a bit above 2 meters. 

A little further he provides this detail about how skirmish line is formed.

Quote

Skirmish line with intervals of two paces between the men is formed at the command, “As Skirmishers.” (Pars. 142 and 174-180 German I. D. R.). The skirmish line may be deployed from any formation, in any direction, either with or without first changing front. (Par. 177 German I. D. R.). A greater interval than two paces must be specifically ordered.

So it sounds like, at least in the German army in 1911, 2 paces is the default interval. I think that comes about to about 1.5 meters. Far too dense of a formation for my taste.

And some details for other armies.

Quote

The Austrian deployment is similar to the German, the intervals between skirmishers being about two paces. In Italy the skirmishers are posted at intervals of 1.5 m. (catena ordinaria), but this interval may be increased by order up to three paces (catena rada). The interval between squads in extended order is 4-5 paces to facilitate volley fire by squad. The French deployment is similar to the German. An intermediate extended order formation is that in which an advance is made in line, the files at extended intervals. In England skirmishers are placed at intervals of 5-15 paces during the initial deployment. At short ranges where the decision is sought, one rifle per 2-3 yards of front (1.8-2.7 m.) is the rule, one rifle per yard of front (0.90 m.) being the maximum. In Russia and Japan the intervals are as ordered. In Switzerland skirmishers are posted at intervals of 1-2 paces; when a greater front is to be covered the intervals between squads are increased. The length of the rushes depends on the ground, the effect of fire, and the endurance of the men. In exceptional cases an advance by rushes, by squads or single men, is authorized.

So the British have by far the largest intervals, which makes sense given their Boer War experience. The Swiss interval of 1-2 paces is interesting, since at 1 pace we are practically talking about a single rank close order formation (though the same goes for the densest permissible British skirmish line of 1 rifle per yard of front).

The Italian interval of 1.5 meters appears to be the same as the German interval, but with the interesting caveat that there is an extra 4-5 pace interval between squads (the squad is already showing up as a meaningful organizational unit more often than I was expecting for 1911, though it isn't actually doing anything that modern squads do yet). Not sure why they think they need volley fire by squad on the books now that they have bolt action magazine rifles though. Firing volleys by subunits such as this (half-companies, platoons, ranks, files, etc...) was very useful back when infantry firearms were considerably slower, since it permitted the formation to put out continuous fire.

Moving on from intervals to movement techniques, there seems to be a recognition that one does not simply walk into the enemy positions. Advancing by rushes seems to be the accepted way of advancing under enemy fire. It fits neatly into my narrative of pre-WW1 tactics being something in-between Napoleonic and modern tactics. Advancing by rushes is a vastly more tactically proficient way of closing with the enemy then simply marching forward, and it represents a clear attempt to minimize the infantry's exposure to enemy fire. But it is not going to be as effective as the modern technique of bounding overwatch. It does a decent job of minimizing friendly infantry's exposure to fire, but, unlike bounding overwatch, it does nothing to draw or suppress the enemy fire. It is an intermediate step between the old Napoleonic way of doing things, in which "movement under fire" is the same as movement in all other circumstances, and the modern way of doing things, in which every step imaginable is taken to protect the elements that are moving forward.

Quote

In the absence of cover, an advance in quick time will be possible only at long ranges unless the hostile fire can be kept down by fire from enfilading or commanding positions. Skirmish lines advancing without fire support over ground devoid of cover, begin to suffer appreciable losses at 1000 m. The more effective the hostile fire, the more pressing the necessity of diminishing, as far as this is possible, the periods of time during which the skirmishers present their whole[82] bodies as targets to the enemy. This leads in itself[88] to an advance by rushes, since the whole distance separating the advancing line from the enemy cannot be covered in one rush. Double time may be employed by a skirmish line when it becomes necessary to reinforce an advancing firing line quickly, to forestall the enemy in reaching a certain point, or in moving under fire, from the covered fire position occupied, to another position. It is impossible to prescribe definitely and for all cases at what ranges the advance by rushes should be taken up and when fire should be opened in advancing by rushes, since it depends upon the intensity of the hostile fire.

The picture that is emerging for me is that you will march to the battlefield in a close order formation (I'm reading close order formations as having roughly the same role as the Soviet "prebattle" formations described in FM 100-2-1), deploy into skirmish line to conduct the attack, walk forward until you are forced to ground by effective enemy fire, and then advance by rushes to close with and destroy the enemy.

Edited June 27, 2023 by Centurian52

[Hapless]

2 hours ago, Centurian52 said:

Not sure why they think they need volley fire by squad on the books now that they have bolt action magazine rifles though.

At this point, it's usually a worry that trigger happy soldiers will splurge all their ammunition if left unsupervised. Aside from the fire control element, some military rifles around the turn of the century had magazine cut-off devices, which mechanically prevented the use of the magazine and forced soldiers to load and fire one round at a time. The concept was that the cutoff could be disengaged on order when rapid fire was necessary.

I can't find a link to the Brit's "Infantry Training, 1914" but a couple of interesting snippets about the attack (original bold):

Quote

"5. The main essential to success in battle is to close with the enemy, cost what it may... The object of infantry in the attack is therefore to get to close quarters as quickly as possible..."

Immediately followed by (more original bold):

Quote

"6. The object of fire in the attack... is to bring such a superiority of fire to bear on the enemy as to make the advance to close quarters possible."

Leading to the, surprisingly modern (my bold this time):

Quote

"7. The action of infantry in the attack must therefore be considered as a constant pressing forward to close with the enemy. Owing to the effect of the enemy's fire, however, this onward movement can rarely be continuous, and when effective ranges are reached there must usually be a fire-fight... in order to beat down the fire of the defenders. During this fire-fight the leading lines will be reinforced; and as the enemy's fire is gradually subdued, further progress will be made by bounds from place to place, the movement gathering renewed force at each pause until the enemy can be assaulted with the bayonet."

A quick, generalised guide to infantry attacks in this period is that they consist of waves:
1. The first wave advances and- at some point- is forced to stop by enemy fire. They go to ground, form a firing line and return fire.
2. Following waves reinforce the firing line, increasing the number of rifles and thus weight of fire until the attack gains fire superiority.
3. At this point, the line resumes the advance, this time by short rushes with supporting fire, until they reach the enemy position and can get stuck in with the bayonet.

This is not a million miles away from something like a current section attack (right down to fixing bayonets and fighting through). The tricky part is how you mass and control firepower when all you have is riflemen. The more riflemen you have in the firing line- ie. the denser the firing line is- the more, better controlled firepower you can put out and the better chance you have of achieving fire superiority.

Right until you get shelled or you can't win fire superiority, or you can't spot/engage the enemy riflemen effectively, at which point things start to go all Spion Kop.

Edited June 27, 2023 by Hapless

[chuckdyke]

22 minutes ago, Hapless said:

One of the critical issues is how you mass firepower when all you have is riflemen.

Basically in the game Soviet Tactics in CM. 

[Centurian52]

1 hour ago, Hapless said:

At this point, it's usually a worry that trigger happy soldiers will splurge all their ammunition if left unsupervised. Aside from the fire control element, some military rifles around the turn of the century had magazine cut-off devices, which mechanically prevented the use of the magazine and forced soldiers to load and fire one round at a time. The concept was that the cutoff could be disengaged on order when rapid fire was necessary.

I can't find a link to the Brit's "Infantry Training, 1914" but a couple of interesting snippets about the attack (original bold):

Immediately followed by (more original bold):

Leading to the, surprisingly modern (my bold this time):

A quick, generalised guide to infantry attacks in this period is that they consist of waves:
1. The first wave advances and- at some point- is forced to stop by enemy fire. They go to ground, form a firing line and return fire.
2. Following waves reinforce the firing line, increasing the number of rifles and thus weight of fire until the attack gains fire superiority.
3. At this point, the line resumes the advance, this time by short rushes with supporting fire, until they reach the enemy position and can get stuck in with the bayonet.

This is not a million miles away from something like a current section attack (right down to fixing bayonets and fighting through). The tricky part is how you mass and control firepower when all you have is riflemen. The more riflemen you have in the firing line- ie. the denser the firing line is- the more, better controlled firepower you can put out and the better chance you have of achieving fire superiority.

Right until you get shelled or you can't win fire superiority, or you can't spot/engage the enemy riflemen effectively, at which point things start to go all Spion Kop.

The obvious danger of discussing pre-WW1 infantry tactics of course is that my itch to see them in action has been reignited. It's a shame that CM is never going to go as far back as WW1, and there are no devs out there making tactical level wargames set from 1870-1914 to CM levels of realism. At this point I'm seriously starting to think that my only option is to start dedicating a portion of my study time to programming.

[The_Capt]

13 hours ago, Hapless said:

The tricky part is how you mass and control firepower when all you have is riflemen. The more riflemen you have in the firing line- ie. the denser the firing line is- the more, better controlled firepower you can put out and the better chance you have of achieving fire superiority.

Right until you get shelled or you can't win fire superiority, or you can't spot/engage the enemy riflemen effectively, at which point things start to go all Spion Kop.

So this right here is where I argue that western militaries should have seen this coming.  Perhaps it is unfair and overly hindsight driven but the fundamental issue was the massing of fires was no longer with the riflemen.  It was with artillery and machine guns.  The firepower reality changed however military doctrine had not - and no small part of this was cultural bias.  The battlefield was no longer one of superiority but mutual denial.  Advantage went to who ever could deny the longest hardest.

I fully agree that European militaries were kind of half way there by WW1 but they had failed to make the critical leap to realizing that the fabric of warfare had changed.  We are possibly living through another version of it today.  Mass and control of firepower may no longer be with mechanized combined arms.  It may have shifted to PGM and unmanned.

[chuckdyke]

He said Spion Kop it was the terrain and the Boer Marksmanship which decided the tactics. 

[Centurian52]

16 hours ago, Hapless said:

1. The first wave advances and- at some point- is forced to stop by enemy fire. They go to ground, form a firing line and return fire.
2. Following waves reinforce the firing line, increasing the number of rifles and thus weight of fire until the attack gains fire superiority.
3. At this point, the line resumes the advance, this time by short rushes with supporting fire, until they reach the enemy position and can get stuck in with the bayonet.

So the advantage I see with this style of attack is that it allows you to have a relatively smooth transition from a thin skirmish line, to minimize casualties, to a thick skirmish line, to maximize firepower (Balck has talking about the tradeoffs between thin and thick skirmish lines, and this seems like a decent attempt at a compromise). Each wave can be very thin, with wide intervals between troops, which will minimize casualties while the advancing line is still too far away to return effective fire. After the first wave is forced to ground by enemy fire, and the successive waves merge with the first wave, you get a much thicker skirmish line that is able to put out considerably more firepower. Of course it might not work out like this in practice if most armies have a default interval of only 2 paces (unless specifically ordered to use a larger interval), meaning that they will probably be starting with a thick skirmish line.

The disadvantage I see with this style of attack is that there seems to be no way to prevent units from getting mixed up. If you advance a regiment with the battalions forming the waves then all of your battalions will be mixed up by the end of the attack. It might be better to keep your battalions on line with each other, and have them array their companies into waves. But then all of the companies become mixed up by the end of the attack. The best approach might be to have all the companies on line with each other as well, and have them array their platoons into waves. That still gets all the platoons mixed, but at least everyone is still with their companies and battalions by the end of the attack.

[Centurian52]

Quote

(c) Reinforcing the Firing Line.

If the fire power of the firing line is to be maintained after heavy losses, or the intensity of its fire is to be augmented, or when it finally is to receive the impulse for making a further advance, it must be reinforced. (Pars. 226, 227 and 341 German I. D. R.). This may be done by prolonging the line (platoons abreast at well defined intervals), or, when space is lacking and after losses have occurred, by putting men in the intervals (i.e., increasing the density of the line and filling it up). When the firing line is prolonged, tactical units are not broken up, and this facilitates fire control. Whenever practicable, the firing line should be reinforced by prolonging it, although the other method, that of placing men in the intervals and gaps of the firing line, is more frequently used and more practical because the arrival of fresh men and the replacement of incapacitated officers occasioned thereby renews the strength of the firing line (replenishment of ammunition). The breaking up of platoons is unavoidable, and on that account platoon and squad leaders should be trained in time of peace to form new units at once so that control is not lost. In order to prevent the mixing of units, so far as this is possible, and to keep the firing line filled up with skirmishers, even during an engagement entailing heavy losses, it is indispensable that the fighting front should be limited, that of a company in attack to 150, in defense to about 200 m. The unit designated to reinforce the firing line endeavors to approach that line under cover, forms skirmish line at any rate before leaving the last cover and advances by rushes, or, if directly in rear of the firing line and under a heavy fire, even by crawling.

So it looks like there are a few recognized ways of reinforcing the firing line, with the preferred method (when possible) being to have the reinforcing units extend the line. But the feeling seems to be that it will usually be more practical to fill in the firing line directly, though it is recognized that this will inevitably break up the units. The advice about the reinforcing units forming skirmish line at the last available cover reminds me of the advice for modern mechanized infantry to dismount at the last available cover before their objectives. The general guidance for modern mechanized infantry to move mounted and fight dismounted becomes, for pre-WW1 infantry, move in close order and fight in extended order.

[holoween]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So this right here is where I argue that western militaries should have seen this coming.  Perhaps it is unfair and overly hindsight driven but the fundamental issue was the massing of fires was no longer with the riflemen.  It was with artillery and machine guns.

Quote

5. When once the firing line comes under effective fire its further advance will be assisted chiefly by the covering fire of artillery, machine guns, and special detachments of infantry detailed for the purpose, and every advantage of this covering fire must be taken by all attacking troops to gain ground.

P 143 of the british infantry manual

Tbh the more i read of it the more it seems like they got most things correct in concept but not the specifics on how that would look.

 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, holoween said:

P 143 of the british infantry manual

Tbh the more i read of it the more it seems like they got most things correct in concept but not the specifics on how that would look.

 

I am not so sure.  The overall concept was that offence could be sustained through supporting fires.  The problem was fires were not integrated nor mobile enough to make that happen. They had entered into an age of Defensive primacy and did not adapt their doctrine to match.  The infantry role of "take and hold ground" was reduced to "hold" but that did not stop them from throwing away thousands on the first part.  I strongly suspect at the highest levels they understood this and recognized that this had become a war of exhaustion, as wars of Defensive primacy become (e.g. Sieges).

[cyrano01]

On 6/22/2023 at 8:18 PM, The_Capt said:

 

I too continue to search.  The conversation has me wondering about the naval forces in the same era.  Unlike land forces, navies of the world appear to have evolved apace with the times.  What functions allowed them to do this?  In fact one could argue that naval power development and evolution allowed the Entente to ultimately win the war.  Nor does naval power appear to have the same offence/defence dynamics over time despite also having vast increases to range and lethal in the same time periods.  In many ways land warfare was a poor cousin to the efforts in naval power and I am curious if the priority may have also made a difference.

I'm not entirely convinced on this one. I was going to mention Gordon's 'Rules of the Game' but Hapless beat me to the punch. It's a fascinating insight into how organisational culture interacts with technology to affect operational methods. The level of factionalisation in the pre-WW1 RN is quite imrpessive. 

 

The other WW1 naval example that springs to mind is the length of time it took the Admiralty to adopt convoys as a defence against the U-Boat threat to merchant vessels. At times there seemd an almost wilful determination not to consider it as a viable approach. I feel there is even less excuse here since convoys have existed in naval warfare since time immemorial; so it wasn't as if any great, conceptual leap of imagination was required.

Edited June 28, 2023 by cyrano01

[cyrano01]

Double post

Edited June 28, 2023 by cyrano01

[Duckman]

Interesting discussion. The armies of 1914 have gotten too much stick, for reasons that have been mentioned in the thread. Pre-WWI armies did understand firepower and had by and large drawn the correct lessons from previous wars, most of all the Russo-Japanese War which was the real dress rehearsal for WWI (including the naval part).

There were some hard to solve problems though:

- Artillery firepower was well understood but supporting the advance was not. There was too much reliance on the infantry doing it alone.

- The armies of 1914 dwarfed all previous ones and were largely composed of reservists. Tactics suffered and prewar obeservers commented on clumsy tactics during maneuvers. This was probably the source of a lot of the mindless rushes.

One major problem was that the lessons of recent wars were mixed. In Manchuria the Japanese attacks had succeeded in the end despite horrific losses, which led to the not unreasonable conclusion that offensive tactics won battles and wars if you simply had the guts. However unlike may other theorists who were proven wrong (remember the many deaths of the tank?) the assumptions of the pre-WWI generals were put to the most brutal test of all.

 

[Centurian52]

4 hours ago, Duckman said:

(remember the many deaths of the tank?)

Yes. I remember that the tank became obsolete in 1918, because the conditions that made it useful in WW1 were unique and would never be repeated. And then in 1945 the tank was obsolete because infantry carried HEAT weapons meant that any old infantryman could defend themselves against a tank. And then in 1973 the tank was obsolete (for realsies this time) because Isreali losses against Egyptian AT-3 Saggars proved that tanks could not survive on a battlefield dominated by ATGMs (which side won that war again?). And then in 2022 the tank was obsolete because...the Russians lost a lot of tanks (has there ever been a war involving tanks in which a lot of tanks weren't lost?).

[kimbosbread]

On 6/22/2023 at 12:18 PM, The_Capt said:

Unlike land forces, navies of the world appear to have evolved apace with the times.  What functions allowed them to do this?  In fact one could argue that naval power development and evolution allowed the Entente to ultimately win the war.  Nor does naval power appear to have the same offence/defence dynamics over time despite also having vast increases to range and lethal in the same time periods.  In many ways land warfare was a poor cousin to the efforts in naval power and I am curious if the priority may have also made a difference.

Navies are very different than land armies in any number of important respects. Several critical ones:

• Expeditionary nature means that sailors need to be competent not just at fighting but also maintenance and operation of a very expensive vessel, in addition to navigation and general sailing skills. The vessel itself needs to be well constructed so it doesn’t just fall apart in a year or two, and the vessel needs supplies for maintenance (ie paint, spare sails) and the sailors need food, rum, anti-std medications, ammunition etc. So, regardless of the tactics used there’s a huge level of organization needed to support a navy, plan everything and keep it operating. You can’t just have your navy pillage the country side for rum, spanish women, cannons, hemp, sails etc. like an earlier army would for food.
• Because an ocean-going vessel is technologically sophisticated and expensive, the people involved in building and managing these vessels are interested in new technology. This sort of behavior drove critical inventions like the marine chronometer and the difference engine.
• Communication is very different. On land your officers could walk or ride over and yell orders, or have a trumpeter, or flags, or rockets. At sea, especially over normal distances, it is much harder without radio. Hence rigid formations in large fleet actions for many years.
• The ocean is very different than land in terms of defensive features. Critical of course is not being observed, but there’s no ability to entrench yourself or fortify a position, and you are always moving. You can advance, retreat or evade, but there’s no digging in.

[dan/california]

On 6/26/2023 at 4:21 AM, The_Capt said:

 I am more convinced that during the Cold War, and definitely after the Cold War, Manoeuvre warfare doctrine was more about military funding and procurement than actual battlefield experience.  A small high speed low drag (read cheap) force able to “out tempo” on an opponents “schwerpunkt” sounds really good…but how many times did we actually do it?

You Gentlemen have filled out my reading list for approximately forever. I think The_Capt is making a key point here. Grinding, attritional, trench warfare is is perhaps the least pleasant activity humans have ever thought up. Literally no one would commit to a course of action they understood in advance would wind up like the Western Front in 1916, or the front line in Ukraine today, no one sane anyway. Putin was selling a a three day walk over, not a couple of years of ruinous trench warfare with high tech extras. The only time I can think of where they admitted it was going to wind up in trench warfare is the Maginot Line, and of course then it did't work out that way at all. Although the people who built the Maginot also sold the idea that doing it their way would be more efficient with both money and lives.

 

You Gentlemen have filled out my reading list for approximately forever

[dan/california]

On 6/20/2023 at 3:46 PM, Centurian52 said:

Another cause of defensive primacy was that armies had gotten so much larger. That, plus the increased dispersion of troops necessary to survive modern firepower, meant that armies could hold an unbroken frontline along an entire border. So you can't attack the flank of an army the way you might in the Napoleonic wars, because there are no flanks. It's frontal attacks or nothing.

It worth pointing out that on the Eastern Front in WW1 There were not enough bodies to man continuous trench lines, and the Germans used maneuver warfare to beat the Russians like a drum.

[dan/california]

On 6/23/2023 at 12:35 AM, Hapless said:

In order to keep troops well in hand and to deploy them quickly in any direction, it is requisite that close order formations be retained as long as the terrain and the hostile fire permit. After an action, in order to make a renewed employment of the troops possible, they must be assembled[104] in close order without regard to the previously existing organization."

I think this bit here is really important as a window into the mindset of a pre WW1 military. Close order drill had been the foundation of military life since rise of first the pike, and then the musket 500 years previously. It was simply how things were done, if you needed to give new orders you pulled your troops into close order to give them new orders. I strongly suspect that the use of more or less the same word for both things was not coincidental. The institutional resistance to giving up this world view was very strong. They only let it go when it became clearly suicidal.

Edited July 23, 2023 by dan/california