Tactical Lessons and Development through history

[Centurian52]

44 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I think this bit here is really important as a window into the mindset of a pre WW1 military. Close order drill had been the foundation of military life since rise of first the pike, and then the musket 500 years previously. It was simply how things were done, if you needed to give new orders you pulled your troops into close order to give them new orders. I strongly suspect that the use of more or less the same word for both things was not coincidental. The institutional resistance to giving up this world view was very strong. They only let it go when it became clearly suicidal.

My impression is that close order formations are not supposed to be used in contact with the enemy. They are used because command and control is far more difficult in extended order formations (remember they didn't have radios or the modern NCO corps back then). It requires giving up a lot of centralized control over the battlefield and placing a lot more trust in much more junior leaders (the devolution of command that Hapless refers to). But they recognized that close order formations were suicidal in a firefight.

So you are supposed to keep your troops in close order as long as possible, but no longer. March them into position in close order, moving along covered routes as far as possible. The furthest you go in close order is either the effective range of the enemy's weapons, or the last covered position in front of the enemy. You then deploy into extended order to conduct the attack. When the attack has been completed or repulsed you gather everyone back up in close order to get them organized and off to wherever they need to go next. Ideally, every moment under fire is spent in extended order, while every moment not under fire is spent in close order.

Of course people make mistakes, and this system lends itself to units getting caught in "inappropriate formations" (as Balk puts it). A unit may get ambushed, or a commander may keep his troops in close order a bit too long (what happened to the Highland Brigade at Magersfontein), or never stop to shake them out into extended order at all (what happened to the Naval Brigade at Graspan). And, because there isn't universal training everywhere, you will still have the occasional close order advocate who genuinely believe that combat should be conducted in close order.

I get the feeling that the decision of when to deploy from close order into extended order is not unlike the dilemma we Combat Mission players are so familiar with of when to dismount mechanized infantry. Deploy/dismount too early and you lose control/mobility sooner than you needed to. Deploy/dismount too late and you could lose entire units to devastating enemy fire.

I should note that I haven't finished Balk's 1911 manual, nor started the British infantry manual of 1914 yet. I'm still working my way through FM 100-2-2. So there is a lot I haven't covered yet, in particular how the defense is meant to be carried out in this period, and there may yet be other circumstances in which close order formations are considered useful. 

Edited July 24, 2023 by Centurian52

[chuckdyke]

23 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

close order formations are considered useful. 

I play for some time Soviet WW2 and command and control is very much like advanced WW1. I found the snipers more useful as runners with the game limitations. The Company needs to fight as a formation and contacts need to communicated asap. So with their armor the tank radio in a T34 is more important than the gun. Armor is the communication hub and the teams of the Regimental HQ also need to be attached to their armor. Maybe this is inappropriate formations but innovations work. I welcome the day that field telephones will be modelled till then I have to use inappropriate formations. I found your post interesting.

[kimbosbread]

4 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

The tank radio in a T34 is more important than the gun. Armor is the communication hub…

Is there a recommended book on the history of army or navy communications?

[chuckdyke]

2 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Is there a recommended book on the history of army or navy communications

I just use the limitations of the game. If you need to communicate climb on the engine deck of a T34 or an IS2 tank. I don't think that is written in any manual. I think the US solution was neat by picking up a telephone like device on the back of an M4 Sherman.

 

[dan/california]

On 7/23/2023 at 5:44 PM, chuckdyke said:

I play for some time Soviet WW2 and command and control is very much like advanced WW1. I found the snipers more useful as runners with the game limitations. The Company needs to fight as a formation and contacts need to communicated asap. So with their armor the tank radio in a T34 is more important than the gun. Armor is the communication hub and the teams of the Regimental HQ also need to be attached to their armor. Maybe this is inappropriate formations but innovations work. I welcome the day that field telephones will be modelled till then I have to use inappropriate formations. I found your post interesting.

I don't know if Steve thinks it is worth the time to code, but a much more detailed treatment of signals, runners, and the other nitty gritty of C&C would be great, at least at the higher difficulty levels. I realize the game actually models a lot of this under the hood now, but sometimes the way it is abstracted can make it hard to figure out what is going on. I suspect it is vastly worse for people who have never in even glanced at a field manual, or even the game manual. Just a better method to figure out why a unit is out of command, and the best way to get it back in command would be great. I am thinking as I type here, but if you click on an officer and see a circle that indicates his voice command range that would be very helpful.

[chuckdyke]

58 minutes ago, dan/california said:

but if you click on an officer and see a circle that indicates his voice command range that would be very helpful.

Lots of those problems are solved if you play on Iron. During the replay phase you can see which units can spot friendly units. Keeping units in C2 comes more natural now and fight as a formation and not as individuals. I just noticed playing as US how much better a Hellcat spots on par with infantry. He had a strong tentative contact the Sherman nearby didn't. But I let the Sherman fire at the same building as they shared the same C2. The superior 75 mm HE took out the MG42. 

[dan/california]

True but spotting and in command are not quite the same thing. I am not saying the game doesn't make a solid effort, but a lot of things that are now somewhat abstracted might benefit from being brought forward to the players attention, added in a fleshed out way. Runners and field telephones being the most obvious examples. There are vast array of factors in play when your comms depend a series of three drones forming a mesh network to get the signal back from your forward most robotic sensor systems. Combat Mission, Modern Electronic Warfare might need to be a separate stand alone game. Although there are also truly vast possibilities if they get real several people per side multiplayer worked out. 

Edit: to get back to the way doctrine has changed since 1865 we really need to play close attention to different types of command and control systems. They explain quite a few of the things that don't otherwise make sense.

Edited July 27, 2023 by dan/california

[dan/california]

https://www.audible.com/pd/The-Origins-of-Victory-Audiobook/B0BZQCPLL1?ref=a_library_t_c5_libItem_B0BZQCPLL1&pf_rd_p=80765e81-b10a-4f33-b1d3-ffb87793d047&pf_rd_r=PKF68YGNKSNBYWX5GP72&pageLoadId=WuHv9sjCUO374tV9&creativeId=4ee810cf-ac8e-4eeb-8b79-40e176d0a225

I also recommend this book, which looks at four of the big technology transitions since the U.S.Civil War.

[chuckdyke]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

https://www.audible.com/pd/The-Origins-of-Victory-Audiobook/B0BZQCPLL1?ref=a_library_t_c5_libItem_B0BZQCPLL1&pf_rd_p=80765e81-b10a-4f33-b1d3-ffb87793d047&pf_rd_r=PKF68YGNKSNBYWX5GP72&pageLoadId=WuHv9sjCUO374tV9&creativeId=4ee810cf-ac8e-4eeb-8b79-40e176d0a225

I also recommend this book, which looks at four of the big technology transitions since the U.S.Civil War.

Your link is an advertisement, possibly because I live in Australia.

[chuckdyke]

4 hours ago, dan/california said:

I realize the game actually models a lot of this under the hood now, but sometimes the way it is abstracted can make it hard to figure out what is going on.

I used a runner the funny thing was when he still had around 50 meters to go the other unit already received the tentative contact. Hypothetically it is possible that the game actually has a single runner under the hood?

[George MC]

35 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

I used a runner the funny thing was when he still had around 50 meters to go the other unit already received the tentative contact. Hypothetically it is possible that the game actually has a single runner under the hood?

I've used runners as part of an AI plan. If the player manages to kill the runner (not that they know there is a runner) before they reach the HQ can give the player an advance. If not...

I suspect in your case the runner reached shouting distance. I don't think the game engine differentiates between receiving a briefing and a shouted order.

[chuckdyke]

5 minutes ago, George MC said:

I suspect in your case the runner reached shouting distance. I don't think the game engine differentiates between receiving a briefing and a shouted order.

Could be the case, I found it not too hard to pass on tentative contacts with Soviet WW2. It is the purpose of having the Regimental HQ near the front. I think it is the spirit of the game to at least try to follow the doctrine. Would be nice if the HQ has runners and medics. Maybe for the future.

 

[dan/california]

LOOK INSIDE

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Also Available:

The Origins of Victory

How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers

by Andrew F. Krepinevich

 

https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300234091/the-origins-of-victory/

See if this comes up any better

[Centurian52]

I'm finally getting back around to Balk's 1911 manual, and I'll follow that up with the British 1914 infantry manual. I had meant to just read FM 100-2-1, but that ballooned into reading the entire FM 100-2 series, so that took me away from the pre-WW1 era for longer than expected.

I'm currently in the section where he is discussing how to employ infantry firepower. It seems he has a low opinion of volley fire.

Quote

In the days of slow loading rifles of limited range, the importance of the volley was due to the fact that it enabled the leader to develop the greatest volume of fire in tactically favorable moments, or, in other words, when large targets were visible for a short time. Modern combat is conducted under different conditions. When black powder was used the volley had the advantage of permitting the powder smoke to clear away during the pauses. This advantage has now also disappeared.

And he quotes Prince William of Germany saying the following

Quote

In his Comments on Drill Regulations (16th Nov., 1840) Prince William, subsequently Emperor William I. of Germany, says:

“I am personally opposed to volleys by battalion. I am of the opinion that in war volleys and file fire will seldom be used. Should this fire be used, however, no one will be able to stop file firing after volley firing, even though not ordered, because in my opinion it is impossible to combat human nature, which finds more security in rapid loading and firing than in awaiting the commands....”

Which rings true with my study of Napoleonic tactics a few years ago. I think a lot of people think of Napoleonic soldiers as perfectly drilled robots, but contemporary writers seemed to agree that volley fire would almost always devolve into independent fire after a while. So even in the Napoleonic era there may have been more independent firing than volley firing as a rule.

It seems that most armies have dispensed with volley fire by 1911. The exception being the Russians, who retained volley by squad as a method of fire control, to prevent soldiers from expending ammunition too rapidly (as noted by Hapless on the previous page). Balk seems to be of the opinion that even this use of volley fire may not be entirely practical.

Quote

If we use squad volleys (Russia), we approximate fire at will without any of its advantages, besides which, commands, given by so many leaders, tend to confuse the men. Moreover, it is very difficult to handle the platoon, to stop firing, to change target, and to initiate movements. Volley firing is therefore confined to the preparatory stage of combat and to rare moments in which the troops firing are not themselves under effective fire. In the defense of fortified positions many opportunities will be found for the employment of volley fire. The use of trial volleys for the purpose of testing the rear sight elevation will be confined to a few favorable cases, and it may be remarked that animated fire at will concentrated on some definite point produces the same results.

 

[The_Capt]

Damn is this thread still going strong?  A real tactics and warfare thread?  The anti-Peng?  Well done guys.