How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[CHARLIE43]

Did someone mention apathy?

https://kyivindependent.com/opinion-the-russian-opposition-needs-to-stop-blaming-putin-and-start-confronting-russias-violent-imperial-legacy/

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

23 minutes ago, Holien said:

You do realise that your answer above did not address how do we know that Ukrainian man power situation is not that bad?

Because the line has not collapsed?

Its bad, but its seemingly an issue of reinforcing existing brigades on the line and rotation. As Kursk shows, Ukraine does in fact have some measure of reserves. 

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, Holien said:

You do realise that your answer above did not address how do we know that Ukrainian man power situation is not that bad?

*Multi post. Lag*

Edited October 19 by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, Holien said:

You do realise that your answer above did not address how do we know that Ukrainian man power situation is not that bad?

*Multi post. Lag*

Edited October 19 by ArmouredTopHat

[Holien]

1 minute ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Because the line has not collapsed?

[mosuri]

1 hour ago, Carolus said:

 

Interview with a Finnish speaking man who fought on the Russian side and was captured. He does not have Finnish citizenship, spent some time in prison in Russia due to drug crime and then volunteered. Speaks about the conditions. Lost over 30kg of weight while on deployment because of lack of supply. The penal units / straf battalions sound truly hellish. 

Per local news articles, the guy moved from soviet union to Finland as a kid in the late 80s, which likely makes him of Ingrian descent (it was the bright idea of an ex president to allow people with Ingrian roots to apply for a residence permit back then) but he never got the Finnish citizenship - so I assume he is a russian citizen in legal terms.

He managed to get into trouble both in Finland and in russia, and landed in jail over there.

The other guy is a Finnish volunteer fighting for Ukraine.

Google translation of one article: https://www-verkkouutiset-fi.translate.goog/a/hs-suomalainen-sotilas-otti-sotavangiksi-venajan-puolella-taistelleen-suomalaisen/?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp

 

[Sojourner]

45 minutes ago, Holien said:

lol, the old tried and true, answer a question with a question.

Well, you got what you should have expected by now... just another unsubstantiated assertion.

[CHARLIE43]

Here's something that should be of interest:

"I want to come home, not as some ex-convict, but a hero."

https://kyivindependent.com/video/?slug=ukrainian-prisoners-prepare-to-fight-russians-for-a-chance-at-freedom

[dan/california]

7 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Whoa, whoa…hold on a minute here. The Japanese figures are very relevant as they outline the level of sacrifice Japan as an entire people were willing to make, even when faced with near certain defeat. 

Well that is true. But the Japanese new they were dead men walking the minute the landing fleet showed up. They were only two choices at that point, death or surrender. You are certainly correct the percentage that surrendered may be a literal all time low for a force of that size. Although it is an interesting question how much the Japanese forces on the Island knew, and perhaps more importantly believed, about the Kamikaze program. 

I was looking at the U.S. casualties because I think there are some similarities to the current Russian offensive. The U.S. had near total control of the tactical initiative. They could decide how hard to push on any given day. At the same time the Japanese defenses were extremely effective, and routinely held until the last defender died, so the price being payed for a square kilometer of ground was hideous. Despite holding the tactical initiative the U.S. ground force commander was under heavy operational and strategic pressure, due to naval losses to the aforementioned Kamikazes, and a political layer that REALLY wanted to wrap up the whole war. Anyway I was poking at whether the casualties per hundred thousand per day indicated that was some approximate limit of what you could drive a force with at least short term choices to do.

The Japanese willingness to take losses really was it own almost unique case. And you are correct that the Russians currently are sometimes much more willing to act that in a similar way than anybody thought they would be. The Russians seem to send a battalion into  an assault, or even a frontline defensive position, and just assume that virtually nobody is coming back. There are also a lot of differences in that that the Japanese troops were considered the flower of the nation, where the Russian meat waves are almost regarded as a method of relieving themselves of undesirable people. Anyway. like I said it was an attempt to move the argument along to somewhere new.

 

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, Holien said:

I mean...would you like to point out where the line has collapsed?

Steady pushing is NOT a collapse of the line. Are the AFU under immense pressure and facing difficulties? Absolutely. Are they losing ground? Sure. 

Is their line on the verge of collapse entirely? Heck no. The Russians simply do not (as of yet) have the ability to turn tactical advances into operational gains or collapse of theatres. Their gains are at stupidly inefficient cost and at current rates of advance it would take them literal decades to get anywhere substantial. We all know they do not have that time. 

If Ukraine was having its units encircled and destroyed, that would be a collapse. Time and time again the Russians have proved incapable of even sealing off any cauldrons or pockets they create. In the few instances they do, the AFU have broken out and been able to pull back (though there is critique that this is left until the last moment in a few cases) This does not scream decisive offensive action to me. 

Edited October 19 by ArmouredTopHat

[dan/california]

6 hours ago, photon said:

I think that's a random coincidence. Looking at the same metric for some other campaigns in the Pacific (quick and dirty numbers that I can refine if desired):

Guadalcanal (Ground; 6 months)

US: 136 per 100k per day

Japan: 291 per 100k per day

Tarawa (3 days)

US: 5,700 per 100k per day (!)

Japan: 30k per 100k per day (!)

Phillipines (Ground Campaign; 3 months)

US: 53 per 100k per day

Japan: 672 per 100k per day

It's worth noting that Tarawa in particular is an outlier reflecting an inter service disagreement about casualty shaping: the Marines favored short violent operations and were comfortable with commensurately higher casualties-per-day while the army favored a more methodical approach that reduced casualties-per-day but took more time to execute.

Several factors make these difficult to compare to other operational contexts.

First, neither combatant was limited by manpower force generation. Both the United States and Japan could field more manpower than they could equip or bring to the line of contact. Rather, the size of the forces was shaped by the logistic requirements of moving forces across the vast distances of the Pacific ocean.

Second, because of total United States air and naval superiority by 1943, the Japanese ground forces fought in isolated pockets with no expectation of resupply, relief, or withdrawal. Each unit was (by doctrine!) expected to fight until totally annihilated.

Third, the insular nature of most of the battles means the the area of contact was very small, which denied most US army doctrinal methods of attack (there is no armored maneuver when the line of contact is bounded on all sides by ocean.

I will confess that the Russian willingness to suffer shocking casualties -- it's one thing to spike to 1k per day for a high tempo operation like an island assault, it's another thing to do that every day for months on end -- does remind me of the sort of sacrifice the Japanese were comfortable with. And it took the US reducing their economy to a pre-industrial state, imposing mass starvation conditions on the civilian population, burning down most of their cities, and nuking them twice to break the will of the leaders to continue.

If the Russian tolerance for casualties is a signal of that sort of will, we're all in trouble. But I hope that it's not? It seems like it's more apathy than fanaticism driving the Russian tolerance for mass suffering?

Tarawa is an outlier in about nine ways, not least the U.S. not having their doctrine quite worked out at that point, but having gotten SOME people to beach alive, they just kept going.

I would argue Guadalcanal was determined almost entirely by vagaries of the naval/supply side of the battle. The Japanese were starved out as much as anything else.

The Philipines I need to think about some more. My first inclination is that density lower density of defenses meant that the U.S. had a lot more options for going around things than thru them. Where in Okinawa around was simply not an option

[dan/california]

6 hours ago, Kraft said:

Btw I suspect the NKs are far more fanatical than even the most motivated Z worm, something that counts for more than purely military skills when all they have to do is run across a field and try not to die in the process.

Lets just say the actual performance of the NORKS is gong to be observed closely, and not just by the Ukrainians.

[photon]

14 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I would argue Guadalcanal was determined almost entirely by vagaries of the naval/supply side of the battle. The Japanese were starved out as much as anything else.

I think we're in broad agreement - i.e. that casualties-per-day-per-100k is not a generalizable idea. The particular circumstances of a battle matter a lot, and even the Japanese, who were as fanatical as any troops have ever been, were not regularly sustaining 1% per day losses in a durable and extended way. I don't even think they were doing that across all theaters. They took something like 87% casualties in China from '37 to '45, which is 0.03% casualties per day, and something like 31% casualties across the whole Pacific theater, which is more like 0.01% casualties per day.

If the Russians are suffering 1,000 casualties per day against a total military force of 1.3 million soldiers, they're taking about 0.07% percent casualties per day (twice Japan's loss rate in China!). How long is that sustainable? I'd've guessed less than two years and lost that bet.

[kimbosbread]

What I’d love to know is over time what percentage of their force was PMCs, prisoners, pressed-into-service-migrants, african mercs, NORKs, etc. vs VDV, conscripts, Rosguardia, Spetznatz, regular army, etc.

The question this would answer is “Is Russia running out of willing soldiers?” and thusly “How close are we to Russia pushing rope?”

[Yet]

well. there were mentioned rosguardia, conscripts, engineers and sailors of the marine.  

So that sais a bit about the availability of regular army, VDV and spetznaz, PMC, prisoners, migrants and mercs right? 

 

[Offshoot]

1 hour ago, kimbosbread said:

What I’d love to know is over time what percentage of their force was PMCs, prisoners, pressed-into-service-migrants, african mercs, NORKs, etc. vs VDV, conscripts, Rosguardia, Spetznatz, regular army, etc.

The question this would answer is “Is Russia running out of willing soldiers?” and thusly “How close are we to Russia pushing rope?”

For now the closest you might get is this analysis by the BBC (posted here about a month ago). It doesn't indicate percentage of force by type or if they are running out of soldiers, but it does show that the different types have each taken the brunt of casualties at different times and that Russia appears to have burned through each category in turn, with volunteers being the latest group. Add to this the ever increasing amount of money offered to new volunteers and the use of North Korean soldiers and it does look like available sources of manpower are being depleted.

I would also be interested to know how endemic non-payment of soldiers is. We see the occasional video of a Russian complaining about not being paid and having their contract extended, but I assume most are being paid otherwise there would surely be widespread discontent?

Edited October 19 by Offshoot

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://bsky.app/profile/wartranslated.bsky.social/post/3l6upx5w7ph23

ussian military correspondents are once again complaining that UAV operators are being sent in droves into meat-grinder assaults. They say the system is convulsing like a heroin addict in withdrawal.

 

Dmitri is cross posting to Blue Sky to my eternal gratitude. Sorry the repost is not as seamless.

 

 

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://bsky.app/profile/wartranslated.bsky.social/post/3l6ufdyhsp32y

Comments from Russian servicemen about the quality of EW systems assembly. According to them, low-quality metal is used, and the systems themselves are allegedly produced in China and then rebadged under Russian brands. Decimation is promised when they come to power.

 

There is a video if you click the link.

[dan/california]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronic plant in Bryansk City on the night of October 18 to 19.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on October 18 - the fourth exchange since the start of Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast in August 2024.
• Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office reported on October 18 that Ukrainian authorities opened an investigation into the execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) in Bakhmut Raion in September 2024.
• Russian forces recently advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

[ArmouredTopHat]

Pretty harrowing story from a Russian drone operator soldier who met his end recently. Tales of incompetence, wasteful attacks, extended contracts and him being one of the few of his original unit left from 2022 until he was killed. 

Edited October 19 by ArmouredTopHat

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-eastern-border/id1070996136?i=1000673623881

The first time I have listened to this podcast. It is a long, depressing, but informative look at how Putin keeps the meat grinder fed. The rally short version is that the "recruits" can drink themselves to death, and leave their families nothing. Or they can die in Ukraine and perhaps leave them with something. It is just easier to find people to take a bargain like this one when life for sixty or eighty percent of your citizens is utterly hopeless, always has been, and almost certainly always will be. 

To add just a bit of detail, the city of Moscow is paying five million rubles to any Russian citizen who signs a military contract. Most of the takers get off of an overnight train from nowhere and walk straight to the enlistment office. Somehow whoever wrote the article this is based on basically stood outside the enlistment office all day interviewing people on their way in, and many workers at the office. I have absolutely know idea how or why he wasn't grabbed, "volunteered", and thrown on the bus to the Donbas meat grinder with the people he was interviewing.

[Battlefront.com]

13 hours ago, Kraft said:

And while the usual voices try to spin this as the usual russia running out of men (again22, again again23, againagainagain24), using useless prisoners, low skill workers from the poorest regions in the east, african mercenaries, akhmat, forced migrant workers, muslim minorities, DNR/LNR conscripts and now North Koreans, does in fact not show weakness but an ability to circumvent the most impactful cost that has been paid in full by Ukraine for nearly 3 years, where professors, computer scientists,  accountants and healthcare workers die in battles against the lowest of the russian lifeforms.

You are missing the key component of saying "Russia is running out of men" discussions.  Putin's government has clearly shown that they don't view mobilization as being viable, so if they run out of volunteers they are effectively out of men.  Because, obviously, they could mobilize a couple hundred thousand again if they absolutely had to.

Russia has definitely come to the end of their current supply of volunteers and came up with a new source.  But each source they went to cost them more than the previous one.  Costs matter, especially over time.

The North Koreans are no exception.  Russia is paying dearly by bartering away Russian assets in exchange for cannon fodder.

So yes, each time someone (like me) has said "Russia is running out of men" they are correct as it relates to the current pool.  Tapping a new pool confirms this.  The thing none of us know is when they will run out of new pools to tap into.  Seeing NK soldiers fighting for Russia indicates the manpower situation is very desperate for Russia.

5 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

What I’d love to know is over time what percentage of their force was PMCs, prisoners, pressed-into-service-migrants, african mercs, NORKs, etc. vs VDV, conscripts, Rosguardia, Spetznatz, regular army, etc.

This is an interesting question.  Add to this BARS (volunteer battalions), what's left of the partial mobilized forces, and repurposed naval and air personnel.  Russia's forces certainly look far more like Germany 1945 than Russia 2022.

My pulled-out-of-my-butt guess is about 1/2 of the Russian forces are regular contract soldiers, including those in VDV/Spetsnaz.  The rest are the hodgepodge just mentioned.

A nation that relied upon skilled soldiers to carry out its military operations would be broken by now.  The reason Russia's military adventure into Ukraine hasn't collapsed is precisely because it uses a military strategy that ASSUMES its soldiers suck and will die in large numbers. 

This is similar to why the Soviets were able to beat Nazi Germany over time.  The Soviets recognized their limitations and (largely) played to their strengths.  The Germans, on the other hand, got weaker over time and never fully switched their military expectations.  The Soviets, therefore, had an internal consistency while the Germans progressively lost theirs.

5 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

The question this would answer is “Is Russia running out of willing soldiers?” and thusly “How close are we to Russia pushing rope?”

We will only know when they run the current pool dry and don't manage to find another pool to tap into.  This has almost happened a couple of times, with the partial mobilization being the prime example of Russia's desperation.  The multiple rounds of increasing compensation for volunteers weren't done because Russia was generous, so we can presume they did this because they were running the pool dry.  We definitely saw reporting to back that up.

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

22 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

You are missing the key component of saying "Russia is running out of men" discussions.  Putin's government has clearly shown that they don't view mobilization as being viable, so if they run out of volunteers they are effectively out of men.  Because, obviously, they could mobilize a couple hundred thousand again if they absolutely had to.

Russia has definitely come to the end of their current supply of volunteers and came up with a new source.  But each source they went to cost them more than the previous one.  Costs matter, especially over time.

The North Koreans are no exception.  Russia is paying dearly by bartering away Russian assets in exchange for cannon fodder.

So yes, each time someone (like me) has said "Russia is running out of men" they are correct as it relates to the current pool.  Tapping a new pool confirms this.  The thing none of us know is when they will run out of new pools to tap into.  Seeing NK soldiers fighting for Russia indicates the manpower situation is very desperate for Russia.

This is an interesting question.  Add to this BARS (volunteer battalions), what's left of the partial mobilized forces, and repurposed naval and air personnel.  Russia's forces certainly look far more like Germany 1945 than Russia 2022.

My pulled-out-of-my-butt guess is about 1/2 of the Russian forces are regular contract soldiers, including those in VDV/Spetsnaz.  The rest are the hodgepodge just mentioned.

A nation that relied upon skilled soldiers to carry out its military operations would be broken by now.  The reason Russia's military adventure into Ukraine hasn't collapsed is precisely because it uses a military strategy that ASSUMES its soldiers suck and will die in large numbers. 

This is similar to why the Soviets were able to beat Nazi Germany over time.  The Soviets recognized their limitations and (largely) played to their strengths.  The Germans, on the other hand, got weaker over time and never fully switched their military expectations.  The Soviets, therefore, had an internal consistency while the Germans progressively lost theirs.

We will only know when they run the current pool dry and don't manage to find another pool to tap into.  This has almost happened a couple of times, with the partial mobilization being the prime example of Russia's desperation.  The multiple rounds of increasing compensation for volunteers weren't done because Russia was generous, so we can presume they did this because they were running the pool dry.  We definitely saw reporting to back that up.

Steve

Excellent summary, I wish I could upvote. 

I would only add that Russia is going to have -significant- issues with equipment next year if losses continue at their current rates, they are running out of stuff they can refurbish fast. Which could mean their current methods of attack become even more unsustainable. Not to mention any fresh meat they raise will be further poorly equipped and thus less likely to achieve anything in the first place. 

We really are at the point of racing to the bottom here. 

Edited October 20 by ArmouredTopHat

[LongLeftFlank]

Caption contest.

(Source)

[Offshoot]

12 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Caption contest.

(Source)

Meatican wave