How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[A Canadian Cat]

On 6/27/2024 at 5:32 PM, The_Capt said:

I have seen battlefield networks built around these little hockey puck things designed to be lobbed by guns or off aircraft like mines.  Pretty sure it is solvable.

A while back I was working on a search and rescue project we got a demo, purchased and used a bunch of really small networking radios. They were smaller than a smart phone. We were not using the radio part we were using the network part. You could send search teams in to the woods away from all tech infrastructure and with minimal training drop these guys off as they traveled and create a mesh network that our civilian version of ATAK would work over to give the search commander full awareness of everyone's position and reports along with whatever level of inter team coms we wanted.

So day long battery or more mesh networks can be deployed if someone buys some fairly simple tech and hands it out like candy. These were small and relatively cheap compared to the other networking radios we were using before that.

So air dropped, artillery lobbed or human left in a tree, a small portable mesh network can be created to replace whatever other system might have just been trashed.

[The_Capt]

6 minutes ago, A Canadian Cat said:

A while back I was working on a search and rescue project we got a demo, purchased and used a bunch of really small networking radios. They were smaller than a smart phone. We were not using the radio part we were using the network part. You could send search teams in to the woods away from all tech infrastructure and with minimal training drop these guys off as they traveled and create a mesh network that our civilian version of ATAK would work over to give the search commander full awareness of everyone's position and reports along with whatever level of inter team coms we wanted.

So day long battery or more mesh networks can be deployed if someone buys some fairly simple tech and hands it out like candy. These were small and relatively cheap compared to the other networking radios we were using before that.

So air dropped, artillery lobbed or human left in a tree, a small portable mesh network can be created to replace whatever other system might have just been trashed.

Comms nodes are just so cheap and ubiquitous now that I am not sure how we could jam them all.  I suspect Russia tried in this war but it simply was not doable.  Add in Starlink etc and you basically have to drop a giant dome on a battlefield so we can have a nice old fashion war inside it.  Great idea for a sci-fi story but not a sound foundation for future military force development.

[A Canadian Cat]

On 6/27/2024 at 5:55 PM, Vanir Ausf B said:

On 6/27/2024 at 5:42 PM, kimbosbread said:

I think we can safely assume that SpaceX can put satellites into orbit faster than Russia can stick nuclear weapons in orbit.

How many nukes would they actually need?

Nope.

Even a simple and small amount of anti satellite work can create a total no go space in orbit that no amount of "I can put my satellites up faster than you can knock them down" will overcome. We are not far away from having no satellites in the most useful orbits if someone starts attacking satellites. After that well have to put things lower and have them fall out of the sky much sooner or put them higher and use more power, more complex coverage issues.

@LongLeftFlank I think it was touched on this but the issue is even more acute than that. 

Consider this article: https://aerospace.org/article/space-debris-101

The section "Are chain-reaction collisions or cascades real?" seems ominous - because it is.

 

The section "Will space debris make it impossible to fly or operate in space?" seems kinda OK - but it's not really, because this article is talking about how things are now and assumes more of the the same.

Now consider this article: https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/debris-in-brief-factsheet.pdf

In that you can see that just one major satellite being destroyed would create as much debris as is already up there. Star-link satellites are 1/4 of a ton so that amount of debris would take the destruction of 40 of them. So, for every 40 star-link satellites that are wrecked we get and amount of debris equivalent to all that is up there already. For every 10 gps satellites the same and for each tellecom satellite the same. There are over 6000 star-link satellites up there. 

Even a few attack incidents makes things very hostile. A serious effort to disable a network would quickly lead to a cascade of debris generation in the orbits we need to use. It would not take much to leave us all blind and out launching the other side would not fix it. And EMP would not be better because all that uncontrollable stuff would eventually collide and create the same situation.

 

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

My major issue is just how inaccurate his information is at times:

A little hurtful, but lets go over it.

24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

And then there is the “it wasn’t Javelins”. Ukraine had over 5500 of those systems by May ‘22, hell they had the whole St Javelin thing.  There were dozens of Javelin strike videos…but long range ATGMs remain largely “untested”?  Yet, again, Trophy is the next best thing based on two dozen examples over nearly ten years.

They were given 5k+ missiles, not LAUNCHERS. Launcher counter is in the several hundreds at this point. Its a significant amount but it does not mean every square mile is being covered by the systems. Were talking a couple per battalion at most. I'm not distracting their effectiveness in the slightest (They are amazing pieces of kit), just pointing out the reality that these high end systems are not exactly in the hands of every company, let alone platoon or squad.  

24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

We have hundreds of videos, personal solider accounts and analysis on this forum on the impact of ISR and precision weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine…but they are all just “a fad” and we should go back to mass producing dumb rounds.

Good heavens I am not suggesting we abandon precision at all, I just point out that they are not a guarantee against an opponent that -may- have countermeasures, be it a means of disrupting the weapon, its guidance or the drone guiding it. That point was more to express that the West has been a bit too heavily reliant on small penny packets of such munitions when we in reality need plenty more. 
 

24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trophy_(countermeasure)  First off the limitations are well known and listed.  The system has been operationally used maybe a couple dozen times in its history with the IDF in largely an insurgency environment.  Yet it is “operationally proven and highly effective”.  If we tried to make case for FPV strikes in Ukraine on 24 instances over the course of this entire war no one would even take us seriously.

Pre current gaza conflict you would be right, but now there is verifiable evidence of dozens upon dozens of  visually confirmed interceptions from a variety of munitions. Its literally being used successfully in a war (I'm going to avoid the political element of this) and surely counts as a tried and tested system thats been in widespread service for over a decade by this point. This is no longer an edge case or theoretical system but now a practical system. You argue this very same point about drones. Its a reality. 
 

50 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Drones are living, breathing, systems in active use.

APS is a living, breathing system in active use. Does Gaza not count or something? The system has limitations but its value is undeniable. Why else is Israel putting it on MBTs, IFVs and even bulldozers for crying out loud. Why are next gen tanks look very likely to incorporate the system?

 

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

My point is that trying to clear ambushes along 100km when the ambushers can stand off 5000m instead of 500-1000m makes a major difference. 

Entirely agree, yet we have video evidence that a lot of those ambushes were taking place at much closer ranges. Is it not agreeable that having more infantry would of helped a lot more in those situations? Even if ambushes did happen, it could of meant Russian infantry being then able to clean up and prevent further attacks in that area. The fact they could not meant that Ukrainian squads were just able to rinse and repeat. 

Edited Wednesday at 07:15 PM by ArmouredTopHat

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

My major issue is just how inaccurate his information is at times:

Sometimes the best way to defend a position is to use alternative facts

Clearly ArmouredTopHat is biased in favor of the tank.  IIRC he even said so.  I am biased against the tank, but only because it's obvious to me that it's long standing problems have resulted in it being a very bad investment.  In that way, I am biased against the tank like I am hitting my thumb with a hammer.  Sometimes it's correct to be biased.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

APS is a living, breathing system in active use. Does Gaza not count or something? The system has limitations but its value is undeniable. Why else is Israel putting it on MBTs, IFVs and even bulldozers for crying out loud. Why are next gen tanks look very likely to incorporate the system?

Nobody here argues that APS is useless.  What is being argued is that it is irresponsible to spend billions trying to protect something that has a huge list of other reasons to be retired.  It would be good for you to stop being so focused on a single tree instead of the forest.

Quick check:

Does APS make an already heavy vehicle lighter?  No, it makes it heavier.

Does APS make an already super expensive vehicle less expensive?  No, it makes it more expensive.

Does APS make a tank have a lower logistical footprint?  No, it increases it by now demanding APS munitions be stocked and brought to the tanks.

Does APS make a tank less vulnerable to drones?  Unlikely.

Does APS do anything to make a tank less easy to spot from ISR?  No.

Does APS do anything to reduce the production timeline?  No, it increases it.

Does APS do anything to reduce the amount of dedicated personnel it takes to maintain one tank in runnign condition?  No, it increases it.

So on and so forth.  The problems with the tank are bigger than whether APS works or doesn't work to the degree you want it to work.  Therefore, it doesn't change the equation in favor of keeping tanks.

I made this same argument about a year ago in this thread.  At least I think it was a year ago!  In any case, the arguments you're making are not novel and they are not convincing.

Steve

[A Canadian Cat]

On 6/27/2024 at 7:25 AM, The_Capt said:

Hard to say when the end of the battleship was definitive, but by the early 20s most historians agree that the cheap airplane mated with the torpedo was the deal breaker (sound familiar?)  The end of the battleship as the core platform of naval power - and had been for at least two centuries - was vehemently opposed by the naval cultures of the day.  Adjusting for inflation, trillions were spent on these ships in research, design and construction.  By 1945 they were universally recognized as a niche shore bombardment platform and even that did not last.

Someone famous once said "It has been said that history repeats itself. This is perhaps not quite correct; it merely rhymes." Theodor Reik*

I feel a song coming on, except its about tanks now instead of battleships.

 

* 1965, Curiosities of the Self: Illusions We Have about Ourselves by Theodor Reik, Essay 3: The Unreachables: The Repetition Compulsion in Jewish History, Quote Page 133, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York. 

[ArmouredTopHat]

53 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

So what was the natural progress of the battleship using your logic?

Battleships were superseded in their role (Decisive battle) by other, more effective means. This has not happened to the tank for a variety of reasons. The two are simply not very comparable in terms of roles and usage, not to mention the adaptability difference. 

1 hour ago, hcrof said:

But a tank is spending 99% of it's time behind the front line. It might drive to an assembly point, wait for the right moment, then drive to engage the enemy. During that whole time, which might be hours, it can be under indirect fire or drone attack or whatever. And all of its support vehicles too. So even if it defeats 95% of threats with it's expensive and heavy APS and armour it will be neutralised one way or another before it even has a chance to apply utility to the battlefield (i.e. shoot stuff). 

From what we have seen, even with the current constraints on tanks in Ukraine, they are still getting to where they need to be a lot of the time. They are certainly surviving to some degree despite such proliferation of drones. The key seems to be not to hang around an area for too long, hence the emphasis on mobility for future platforms. 

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Pre current gaza conflict you would be right, but now there is verifiable evidence of dozens upon dozens of  visually confirmed interceptions from a variety of munitions.

You are making two separate and contradictory arguments.  On the one hand you're saying it's battle tested and doing great in Gaza, on the other hand you acknowledge its limitations and are saying they are specific to Gaza.  And nowhere have you shown any evidence of it defeating top attack or smart munitions.

You can not build a credible argument on shifting sands.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/ckem.htm

Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM)

The Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM) is a long rod, hyper-velocity anti-tank round for the Army's Future Combat System. The Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) developing the Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM) for the purposes of incorporation into the next-generation hypervelocity missile system for the Future Combat Vehicle (FCV), heavy ground platforms, and rotor wing platforms.

The missile component of the Army's (Line-Of-Sight Anti-Tank Missile) system is also known as the KEM (Kinetic Energy Missile), which should not to be confused with the CKEM program, which is essentially a follow-on to LOSAT.

 

 

 

2 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

This seems a strange argument to make. What determines a system designed to be a defence as a band aid? Does this mean that defences a ship mounts to protect against cheaper ASMs are the same thing? Do we remove chaff and flare countermeasures from planes because they are getting ever more complex to defeat smarter missiles? APS has been literally proven very effective against ATGMs. Trophy is expensive yes, but that is perhaps to be expected from a first gen iteration of the system. Isn't spending money to prevent an even more expensive piece of kit going up in smoke a worthy purchase? Does that not actually save money long term in the event of conflict?

APS being modified to include anti FPV capability does not stand to be that complicated or expensive to do, it does not require additional systems outside of a potential RWS system (which a lot of tanks mount anyway) Its literally using that is already there to help the tank detect and destroy drone munitions. It should absolutely be viewed as a last resort defence, but that does not take away its value. I would rather have less vehicles that can survive numerous ATGM strike attempts than most of my tanks being destroyed any time of the week. Its hard to perform your mission function when you are cooking off. 

So we now have tanks that cost AT LEAST thirty million dollars, and have had their armor redistributed to BARELY stop an RPG warhead. The bad guys, and anyone else who wants to win a war are now incentivized to get back to working on these little monsters. It is basically the metal dart from an tank KE penetrator on the end of a rocket motor. Velocities can actually get considerably higher than main gun rounds. Give me one really good reason you couldn't mount this on a heavy quad copter and have ten of them at once pop above a tree line five of more kilometers out. The drones could even be controlled by fiberoptic cable since all the have to do is go straight up until the missile has LOS. Or put them on a UGV.

The fact that the low speed threat has suddenly become deadly does not mean that the high speed threat can't make advances, too. APS is not dealing with three kilometers per second threats anytime soon.

I assume that the only reason this got canceled, besides Rumsfeld having a snit fit, was the fact the Javelins had proven to work perfectly against existing threats. That might have even been a good decision at the time. But the tech exists, or could be recreated.

[A Canadian Cat]

On 6/29/2024 at 7:37 PM, The_Capt said:

The lesson is not “we are right” it is really “how do we share what we have seen and experienced”?  Because not everyone has the been on the same journey.

More reason you need to write a book?

I just listened to a podcast (The Economics of Everyday Things) on the topic of ghost writers. If you need to offload the actual writing work your publisher can hire one for as little as a several tens of thousands of dollars

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

If we concede that the tank is dead then is not the IFV and APC also dead by the same measure? What about infantry? 

This is an important question and nobody has a good answer for it.  They are definitely as much at risk from the changing battlefield as tanks are.  The difference is that IFV/APCs provide a service that nothing else can provide whereas tanks are largely redundant (redundancy isn't a bad thing).  This means there is value in trying to solve for the IFV/APC rather than for the tank.  It could be that some magical solution appears to solve for both, but I doubt it because of the difference in how they are used. 

An unarmed APC can serve it's function just fine driving at top speed to a predetermined point, dropping off its infantry, and exiting the tactical battlespace quickly.  Tanks can not do that.  Therefore, if limited exposure time is part of the solution (and I believe it is), tanks are inherently not going to be able to leverage that.

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

11 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Quick check:

Does APS make an already heavy vehicle lighter?  No, it makes it heavier.

Does APS make an already super expensive vehicle less expensive?  No, it makes it more expensive.

Does APS make a tank have a lower logistical footprint?  No, it increases it by now demanding APS munitions be stocked and brought to the tanks.

Does APS make a tank less vulnerable to drones?  Unlikely.

Does APS do anything to make a tank less easy to spot from ISR?  No.

Does APS do anything to reduce the production timeline?  No, it increases it.

Does APS do anything to reduce the amount of dedicated personnel it takes to maintain one tank in runnign condition?  No, it increases it.

The question you should be asking yourself is after taking in all the above, is it worth it? I would argue that it very much is if the vehicle is protected several times from a munition that would otherwise kill it. APS protects against one of the bigger threats of tanks right now, and has shown to have potential with other threats. I simply cannot see a better solution for a lot of a tanks problems than such a system. Being this dismissive of a first gen system with this much potential is like someone in the 60s declaring an ATGM is a waste of time.

If the assumption is that tanks are now worthless. What serves as a mobile direct fire capability that militaries want instead? Lighter vehicles are even more in peril from a wide variety of threats, and UGVs remain a theoretical but still not fully practical solution. What is the alternative? Does this spread over to other vehicles on the line of contact as well? 

Edited Wednesday at 07:36 PM by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

on the other hand you acknowledge its limitations and are saying they are specific to Gaza

Where the hell did I say this?

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

The question you should be asking yourself is after taking in all the above, is it worth it? I would argue that it very much is if the vehicle is protected several times from a munition that would otherwise kill it. APS protects against one of the bigger threats of tanks right now, and has shown to have potential with other threats. I simply cannot see a better solution for a lot of a tanks problems than such a system. Being this dismissive of a first gen system with this much potential is like someone in the 60s declaring an ATGM is a waste of time.

Of the assumption is that tanks are now worthless. What serves as a mobile direct fire capability that militaries want instead? Lighter vehicles are even more in peril from a wide variety of threats, and UGVs remain a theoretical but still not fully practical solution. What is the alternative?

Just allow me to repeat. Tell a platoon from Magyars Birds that they get PAID if they can paint this new wonder weapon yellow with paintball warheads on their drones. If it can pass that test, maybe we can talk.

Edited Wednesday at 07:39 PM by dan/california

[ArmouredTopHat]

9 minutes ago, dan/california said:

So we now have tanks that cost AT LEAST thirty million dollars, and have had their armor redistributed to BARELY stop an RPG warhead.

While the cost element is true, this is being a little dismissive with regards to durability of tanks. Even tandems can be reliably stopped by the correct layout of protection. Its a question of weight and layout (Something that lighter vehicles struggle with)

There are at least ways to bring tank costs down. Smaller and lighter (than an MBT at least) with smaller crews already cuts costs significantly. 

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 minute ago, dan/california said:

Just allow me to repeat. Tell a platoon from Magyars Birds that they get PAID if they can paint this new wonder weapon yellow with paintball warheads on their drones. If it can pass that test, maybe we can talk.

I said as before that I would readily welcome such testing. I am genuinely interested in how the embryonic defence methods we are actively developing actually hold up against good drone use. It will determine quite decisively if all the trouble is worth it, or that if we really do need to start from scratch. I think it could go either way to be honest. 

[photon]

20 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Battleships were superseded in their role (Decisive battle) by other, more effective means.

Forgive the noobish question, but what is the role of tanks in the modern battlefield?

[acrashb]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

 The IDF are getting some use out of them in a very different context and even then their use was pretty limited.  APS has never really been tested in a full on peer conventional war with this many ATGM and UAS being thrown around.  I think cherry picking IDF examples and then inflating that to "very effective" as a wide metric is unfounded.

 

Building on this, IDF has already seen at least one Trophy failure in the early stages of Operation Swords of Iron.  I have not been able to find it again, but as I recall it was two ATGMs fired in quick succession, and the debris cloud from the APS interception of the first blocked APS from intercepting the second.

The maker of Trophy, Rafael, claims a >90% success rate - not comforting if you're playing Russian Roulette with a ten-chambered revolver - better than six, but still bad, and that's an old-school side-attack rate.

And Hamas is apparently in the drone business. The tank is dead - it's very concept of operations is obsolete.  It's still twitching because of all the axes embedded in its nervous system.

And that's just the kinetic threats.  The ISR and related deep battlefield and rear echelon borg spotting is the information threat, to which the MBT, by virtue of its large personal and supply chain multi-sensor-system footprint, is the most vulnerable ground object on the battlefield.

 

Edited Wednesday at 08:04 PM by acrashb

[ArmouredTopHat]

8 minutes ago, photon said:

Forgive the noobish question, but what is the role of tanks in the modern battlefield?

Mobile, direct firepower against a variety of ground targets, and being able to do so quickly and effectively with its own optics and stabilisation while also protected against a key range of threats. A key component of supporting infantry and other vehicles. 

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

6 minutes ago, acrashb said:

The maker of Trophy, Rafael, claims a >90% success rate - not comforting if you're playing Russian Roulette with a ten-chambered revolver - better than six, but still bad, and that's an old-school side-attack rate.

When the alternative is being hit with a large anti tank missiles, I would take that chance personally. Its like deciding to wear some armour on a medieval battlefield. Sure its expensive but would you rather get stabbed by a sword wearing it or not?

 

6 minutes ago, acrashb said:

Building on this, IDF has already seen at least one Trophy failure in the early stages of Operation Swords of Iron.  I have not been able to find it again, but as I recall it was two ATGMs fired in quick succession, and the debris cloud from the APS interception of the first blocked APS from intercepting the second.

There was some disbelief that some of the Merkevas had inactive trophy systems in October, the panels were covered up and Hamas were able to pelt them with AT. Seems to be tied with the poor ready rate of the IDF in that moment. 

Edited Wednesday at 08:06 PM by ArmouredTopHat

[Grey_Fox]

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

no one has “the infantry they are supposed to have” to try and secure a corridor fully illuminated by enemy ISR and harried by precision weapon systems with ranges 5-10kms.

Ah don't give me that. There's a difference between an army having less infantry than they think they might need, and a military being on the verge of not having any infantry at all.

Kofman's article gave examples of entire battalions that only had enough troops to crew the vehicles, and had zero dismounts. Other battalions demotorized in order to be able to provide at least some infantry presence.

Edited Wednesday at 08:13 PM by Grey_Fox

[Grey_Fox]

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Finally, the other big problem with this entire theory of “not enough infantry” is that the RA has definitely had plenty of infantry since Summer of ‘22.

Apologies for the double quote, on mobile and the forum isn't conducive to longer posts.

You gave a strawman about how the Russians totally didn't forget how to do combined arms warfare for 6 weeks from February 2022. When confronted with an article about how the Russians couldn't do combined arms warfare in spring 2022, you've shifted the goalposts to talking about the summer of 2022.

Edited Wednesday at 08:11 PM by Grey_Fox

[ArmouredTopHat]

2 minutes ago, Grey_Fox said:

Apologies for the double quote, on mobile and the forum isn't conducive to longer posts.

You gave a strawman about how the Russians totally didn't forget how to do combined arms warfare for 6 weeks from February 2022. When confronted with an article about how the Russians couldn't do combined arms warfare in spring 2022, you've shifted the goalposts to talking about the summer of 2022.

There was similar goal post moving here about how FPVs were the reason tanks were not doing well at all...despite their introduction only relatively recently. There are others reasons for tanks suffering, some are old and familiar problems like mines, others are tied to the age of their current designs or poor tactical use. 

[Grey_Fox]

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The BTGs as designed is basically somewhere between a western battlegroup and ACR Squadron

It's not though. The whole BTG concept was designed to allow brigades and regiments to at least be able to form at least one battalion capable of some level of combat for a short period of time. It's a peacetime formation borne from severe manning issues, and needed the conscripts to achieve full manning. Which they didn't have in spring and even summer of 2022.