How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[poesel]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

That is a bit simplistic as well. If an order for 100k Bradley’s was placed one could expect economies of scale, this is true. But a Bradley is made of a lot of stuff and an order that big could actually drive prices up as the Bradley is competing with a global supply chain. 

...

If (!) someone ordered 100k Bradleys then the capacity of the supply chain would become larger, too. Don't assume production to be static.

Depending on how fast you want those Bradleys, you may or may not make a dent in the global supply chain. I admit that sometimes stuff becomes rare that nobody thought of (masks...). But then my half priced 100k Bradleys order just amounts to about $150B, so I guess the purchasing department can move one thing or the other.

 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I had a more detailed paragraph in that spot, but I deleted it because my post didn't need to be larger Now I'll be more specific.

What you say is theoretically true, but it isn't practical.  The reason Bradleys are made by hand is because the number purchased is very low.  The number purchased is low because of the cost and because it is a niche market.

...

You look at it from a sales view, and I did from the production view. I never said that anyone would really want to buy 100k Bradleys.

That is your original quote:

10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Bradleys have low rates of production because they are inherently complex and expensive to make.  Making more of them would not significantly change that fact.

You said that Bradleys have a low rate of production because they are complex & expensive, and making more of them does not change this equation significantly.

I disagree because if that what you said would be true, then mass production would be pointless. Prices per piece come down the more you produce. That is a very basic law of economics and is also true for military vehicles.

This is not about selling or demand - just the production.

[Battlefront.com]

56 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

In his update today, Mashovets describes the Russians as still advancing but every more slowly and painfully:
https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2041
 

He ends with:

 

Fortunately this is fitting in with a long established pattern with the Russians that is strategically in Ukraine's favor.  Specifically, the Russians expend heavily in order to get some motion on a sector of front, they wear out Ukraine enough to gain the immediate ground they were fighting over, then they make a little more progress at even higher cost as Ukraine solidifies the front, and finally Russia just runs out of resources to keep the drive going.

There's danger in all of this for Ukraine, no doubt, but time and time and time again we've seen people get into a bit of a panic over the earlier stages and not recognizing what is likely to follow.

And every time this sort of offensive peters out we are reminded that Russia does not have endless resources.  This is especially important to make note of because the amount of reserves Russia would need to do a proper exploitation is well within their theoretical capacity.  Even 25,000 could make a difference, and yet Russia just doesn't have it.  This shows that Russia is constantly running on empty when it comes to offensive capacity.  If they waited a full year and attacked at once I think Ukraine could be cooked, but Russia can't do that for a variety of reasons and this is good for Ukraine.

Steve

[kimbosbread]

14 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Its a big chonky vehicle for one, with top of the line equipment, though I suspect what is most expensive is that modularity component so inherent to its design. I am pretty sceptical about such designs in the first place. You can achieve a modularity of spare parts across a family of vehicles for a much cheaper cost. Being able to plug in various different mission capsules is actually relatively limited in overall practical function on the field. At least its not having procurement woes unlike Ajax…

I too am extremely skeptical of the modular designs. I think it’s much better to have common interfaces and modular components:

• Sensor packages
• Turrets
• VLS for missles and drones
• Engine/power pack

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, poesel said:

If (!) someone ordered 100k Bradleys then the capacity of the supply chain would become larger, too. Don't assume production to be static.

Depending on how fast you want those Bradleys, you may or may not make a dent in the global supply chain. I admit that sometimes stuff becomes rare that nobody thought of (masks...). But then my half priced 100k Bradleys order just amounts to about $150B, so I guess the purchasing department can move one thing or the other.

 

Entering into angels on heads of pins territory. Production would expand… pretty dramatically.  That means significant startup costs and risk, which would be passed directly back to government.  You are right if those 100k are delivered over a century (so 1000 per year versus 15) existing chains may be able to absorb but I would not bet on it given the cultures of “just in time” in manufacturing.

In reality you may see cheaper priced Bradley’s but it may take some time or massive up front costs - meaning those Bradley’s are really not cheaper.  Short of a Soviet style pivot in western economies, military technology remains increasingly more expensive over time.  And this in the face of components getting cheaper.  The way to break that cycle is likely not to order 100k of expensive stuff in the hopes we get discounts. It is to find cheaper solutions on Day 1.

Edited July 18 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

51 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Fortunately this is fitting in with a long established pattern with the Russians that is strategically in Ukraine's favor.  Specifically, the Russians expend heavily in order to get some motion on a sector of front, they wear out Ukraine enough to gain the immediate ground they were fighting over, then they make a little more progress at even higher cost as Ukraine solidifies the front, and finally Russia just runs out of resources to keep the drive going.

There's danger in all of this for Ukraine, no doubt, but time and time and time again we've seen people get into a bit of a panic over the earlier stages and not recognizing what is likely to follow.

And every time this sort of offensive peters out we are reminded that Russia does not have endless resources.  This is especially important to make note of because the amount of reserves Russia would need to do a proper exploitation is well within their theoretical capacity.  Even 25,000 could make a difference, and yet Russia just doesn't have it.  This shows that Russia is constantly running on empty when it comes to offensive capacity.  If they waited a full year and attacked at once I think Ukraine could be cooked, but Russia can't do that for a variety of reasons and this is good for Ukraine.

Steve

My sense is we are watching a war of exhaustion unfold before us.  Both sides are on a race to the bottom. Russian major strategic mistake - compounding the many that got them here - is that they see, to believe one last hard burn will break Ukraines back.  The more they do this their own burnout point is accelerating towards them.  Neither side really knows when they will hit the exhaustion point but both sides have one.

The only good news is that I suspect Ukraine has a better sense of where their breaking point may be…or at least I hope so.

[hcrof]

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-ukraines-offensive-operations-2022-23

A good summary of the failed summer offensive, with some thoughts on future challenges for offensive operations going forward. Very technical and I know some people won't agree with all of it, but some of the best analysis out there IMO 

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, kimbosbread said:

I too am extremely skeptical of the modular designs. I think it’s much better to have common interfaces and modular components:

• Sensor packages
• Turrets
• VLS for missles and drones
• Engine/power pack

Pretty much my exact take on it.

That and Europe really needs to work on getting a better defence economy set up that is not so limited and subject to intercountry diversity of vehicles. Seems I am not the only one saying this at least...
 

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Sure, if you just gave me a Ferrari I would be thrilled with it and would be happy to say so.  But if I had to pay to buy it, pay to keep it running, and require a new one every couple of days because the old one wasn't functional... well... not so much because what I want and need is something to get me from A to B.  I'd rather stick with my Honda, thank you very much.

Finally, you are still dodging the main point, which is that IFVs (as with MBTs) are not being used in the roles for which they were intended because the battlefield has fundamentally changed.  As impressive as those videos of Bradleys are, it should be pointed out that most show them being used as light tanks, either because they don't have MBTs available or because they have found IFVs to be more useful than MBTs.  Which reinforces my point that an IFV is not what Ukraine needs, they need better APCs.  Wheeled, tracked, or otherwise.

I think the solution is what the Ukrainians are doing, which is obtaining a mix of vehicles to satisfy requirements (even if its not enough) 

I do have to disagree quite strongly that IFVs are not being used in their role though, the whole point of an IFV is to support the infantry with direct fire. That is literally what we see Bradleys do near all the time, either as a primary mission or part of unloading or loading infantry / supplies, something a light tank cannot do. This is not something that an APC can nearly as effectively either. 
 

Does not detract that Ukraine needs lots of Mraps and APCs as well of course!

But if your assaulting a position, you want an IFV for that firepower, accept no substitutes:
 

I simply cannot accept the argument that the IFV is not performing its role when it very much is on video. The cost is reflective of capability. 

[The_Capt]

18 minutes ago, hcrof said:

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-ukraines-offensive-operations-2022-23

A good summary of the failed summer offensive, with some thoughts on future challenges for offensive operations going forward. Very technical and I know some people won't agree with all of it, but some of the best analysis out there IMO 

Quick scan and worth the read.  My issue with it and few other assessments like this is that the logic does not fully align well.  The ghist of operational failure was poor western support integration and failure of the UA to sustain tempo, instead relying on a single shock action on what they hoped was a collapsing RA.

But then when you read the “emerging tactical challenges” we are faced with a lot of reasons why the UA would never be able to sustain tempo - lack of surprise, vulnerability of critical enablers (eg breaching) to precision weapons and vulnerability of logistics lines. Operational tempo relies on more than training and doctrine - which can always be better.  It relies on tactical momentum which this document lays out some very good reasons on why that was impossible in summer of ‘23.  My point being even if the UA was fully equipped and trained, the resources needed to sustain tempo are unknown at this time. The assumption that 12 Bdes could have done the job is based on old metrics that the document itself challenges.

I have seen this before, especially after the initial invasion failed.  Analysis wrestles with itself as old metrics that fail very often can be explained by emerging phenomena but the analysts never quite make the link. This document clearly spells out that large conventional concentrations are nearly impossible without capabilities that we simply have not invented yet - like c-recon. It admits that one has to effectively create a “snow dome” of protection (see pg 37) yet how that can be accomplished is not clear given the laundry list of challenges. 

To my mind western doctrine is in a tactical and operational dilemma.  We rely on fast moving fluid concentrations of force to achieve manoeuvre in dislocation of an opponent. And while it is clear the UA had shortfalls, the emerging realities highlight that concentration is not viable for: surprise, critical enablers, and sustainment. Further as remote precision continues to accelerate, protection of concentration of force is getting harder and harder to do.  Concentration as we knew it has become toxic in this environment…hence the rise of denial.

This really comes down to the weaponization of friction.  We saw elements of this in the opening of this war. The RA did not over extend…it was overextended by the UA. In reality it came damn close to pulling it off so we know that use of mass was technically possible in ‘22.  However by ‘23 it became more problematic as the RA began to catch up with respect to ISR integration.  ISR and long range precision are projecting friction onto an opponent, and as such is making use of mass harder…and in many cases fatal.

As to so what for this war?  Well unless the UA can figure out how to project a “snow dome” forward while essentially sanitizing the RA in front of them, we are likely looking at more static attrition warfare.  Further any snow dome must be “logistics lite”.  Long LOCs, highly visible are not working (see pg 21.) I do not believe that better training and planning alone can solve for this. Nor can more conventional equipment. They are not bad nor a bad idea but we cannot throw enough training, planning and western equipment at this problem to solve it.  We need something fundamentally different.  Or a Russian collapse…that would be good too.

[A Canadian Cat]

Nice summary and connecting the dots that the author lays out but cannot connect themselves. It is an interesting moment when you can see a report like this that simultaneously understands the short comings for why the offensive failed.  At the same time also see what caused those short comings be effectively unsolvable (at last by more of same) and yet not connect those together in a meaningful away.

13 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well unless the UA can figure out how to project a “snow dome” forward

It strikes me that the dome needs to be mostly drone based. After all drones are at the root of what is grinding this all to a halt. So, here are a proposed set of steps:

1. Precision artillery using your own eyes in the sky targeting artillery and air defenses further back from the attack point

2. Allow for some local air support to counter the enemy air

3. AFU needs anti drone drones to hurt the enemy's eyes in the sky and fight their FPV drones which then allow some activity on your own side of the start line

4. FPV drone attack on strong points, enemy drone operators, ATGM sites, local ammo and other supplies

5. Small infantry infiltration activity to push the line forward with some IFV support or perhaps just taxiing in the beginning

6. Repeat 3-5 while 1 and 2 have never stopped

7. Clear some mines

8. Repeat 3-7 while 1 and 2 have never stopped until

9. You have a whole in the mine field, no enemy recon drones, no enemy FPV drones able to operate, no enemy ATGMs in front and no ability for air to come to assist

10. Maybe you can use some mech force to push forward or maybe you just move the lines and setup to do it again except next time #7 is less

The missing piece is an excellent anti drone drone and masses of precision (artillery, drone, missiles)

I don't feel like that is anything new - I am just repeating what we have been talking about really.

[hcrof]

I agree with you both, it's almost as if the authors are deliberately stopping short on connecting the dots there. 

To play devil's advocate, maybe russian use of drones and ISR was still unsophisticated enough at the time that the conventional reasons for why the offensive were a failure were still valid at the time, but they have certainly improved since so those emerging tactical challenges have very much arrived already!

[dan/california]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Good points about there being some issues with supply and demand that complicate the "more means less cost" thinking.  Sometimes "more means less availability, which means higher cost".

There is also the pragmatic issues of outstripping the labor pool.  Business state, very frequently, that expansion is held back by the inability to find the right workers for the job.  The workers needed for Bradley manufacturing are not easy to find.  The various manufactures and subcontractors would most certainly have to increase pay, benefits, and training in order to fill out an expanded workforce.  That cost would eat away at cost efficiencies elsewhere.

And of course there is the risk, and it is a big one, that the mass produced version of the Bradley would be worse than the hand built one.  Corners would be cut, features would be removed/downgraded, quality would likely suffer, etc.

Mass producing a niche product is not easy.  I say this as a guy who is in a niche market making niche products

Steve

The thing about setting truly mass production for something like an IFV is that you don't design and build the same vehicle. If you are planning on building enough of them up front, and are willing to spend the LARGE amount of money involved in getting a modern line set up a great deal of the hand work goes away. Much larger pieces of the thing are produced as single parts that barely ever get touched by a human hand. I am not in any way saying this would make them cheap, but it would certainly make them much cheaper on a per piece basis. That is separate from the argument of how valuable a top of the line IFV is versus a de-minimus armored box.I think the basic armored box is showing vast utility in this war.

 This is the kind of thing that definitely needs to be done with drones, UGVs, and artillery shells. Commit up front to a plan to simply bury the other guy in them.

[ArmouredTopHat]

To be clear with Steve, I fully agree that cheap APCs with an emphasis on protection (though I dont know just how well protected the M113 is really) are most certainly useful, so long as they are used in their proper role. Different tools for different roles I suppose.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, A Canadian Cat said:

Nice summary and connecting the dots that the author lays out but cannot connect themselves. It is an interesting moment when you can see a report like this that simultaneously understands the short comings for why the offensive failed.  At the same time also see what caused those short comings be effectively unsolvable (at last by more of same) and yet not connect those together in a meaningful away.

It strikes me that the dome needs to be mostly drone based. After all drones are at the root of what is grinding this all to a halt. So, here are a proposed set of steps:

1. Precision artillery using your own eyes in the sky targeting artillery and air defenses further back from the attack point

2. Allow for some local air support to counter the enemy air

3. AFU needs anti drone drones to hurt the enemy's eyes in the sky and fight their FPV drones which then allow some activity on your own side of the start line

4. FPV drone attack on strong points, enemy drone operators, ATGM sites, local ammo and other supplies

5. Small infantry infiltration activity to push the line forward with some IFV support or perhaps just taxiing in the beginning

6. Repeat 3-5 while 1 and 2 have never stopped

7. Clear some mines

8. Repeat 3-7 while 1 and 2 have never stopped until

9. You have a whole in the mine field, no enemy recon drones, no enemy FPV drones able to operate, no enemy ATGMs in front and no ability for air to come to assist

10. Maybe you can use some mech force to push forward or maybe you just move the lines and setup to do it again except next time #7 is less

The missing piece is an excellent anti drone drone and masses of precision (artillery, drone, missiles)

I don't feel like that is anything new - I am just repeating what we have been talking about really.

The only thing new in all this might be the levels of FPV in motion at the same time.  You are really describing “mass precision” which we are seeing on defence but have not really seen on offence.  My guess is like everything else for offence they will need 3-4 times as much as they did for defence.  The scale of UAS required to sanitize an area large enough is something we have not seen yet. 

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, hcrof said:

I agree with you both, it's almost as if the authors are deliberately stopping short on connecting the dots there. 

To play devil's advocate, maybe russian use of drones and ISR was still unsophisticated enough at the time that the conventional reasons for why the offensive were a failure were still valid at the time, but they have certainly improved since so those emerging tactical challenges have very much arrived already!

Maybe, however, they really do lay them out very well in the document itself.  Maybe last summer the dots were not quite bright enough, but they definitely are highlighting them.  Last summer though we know the RA relied more on ATGMs and Tac Avn as well.  Their ISR had improved but was not equal to the UA.  That, plus training and planning failures may have compounded to lead to failure.

I tend to believe that if not for those minefields the UA would have been successful.  Maybe not all the way to Crimea but they would have advanced.  Regardless, as you note, the situation has gotten more challenging, not less.

[poesel]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Entering into angels on heads of pins territory.

...

Yes, probably. I have to admit that my production number of 100k Bradleys was badly chosen. I wanted a high number, but wasn't aware then that I was off by a factor of 15! Not only that, but I was even more surprised when I learned that less than 50k Shermans were made. I totally overestimated the number of existing vehicles.
So I should rather have said 20k Bradleys to stay in the realm of possibility.

[The_Capt]

Further on the RUSI piece - I am interested as to why the authors did not frame their analysis in terms of relative combat power: https://www.thelightningpress.com/about-the-elements-of-combat-power/

They really have many of the elements in their analysis.  To my eyes, the environment of ‘23 caused at least three pillars of UAs combat power to collapse.

 

Namely, protection, sustainment and manoeuvre.  They did have effective Intelligence and fires.  Command was spotty according to the authors but if those other three pillars are essentially neutralized, no amount of leadership, command or training are really going to be able to make up for that.

[Battlefront.com]

Just now, poesel said:

Yes, probably. I have to admit that my production number of 100k Bradleys was badly chosen. I wanted a high number, but wasn't aware then that I was off by a factor of 15! Not only that, but I was even more surprised when I learned that less than 50k Shermans were made. I totally overestimated the number of existing vehicles.
So I should rather have said 20k Bradleys to stay in the realm of possibility.

Tying this back to my comment that you took issue with... you compared the Bradley with Sherman.  The thing is, the Sherman, from a technological standpoint, was simple.  Metal stuck to metal for the most part.  Bradleys are far more complicated than that and so trying to scale up production would be so much harder to do.  And therefore, as both The_Capt and I pointed out, very expensive upfront. 

The number you cite doesn't really matter so I didn't pay any attention to it   What you were saying is "if there were a lot more produced the price would come down".  My previous clarification post says why that is to simplistic.  When expanding from a niche to mass production you have to hit a specific number to make it viable.  And yes, if governments flooded industry with cash then that number could be much lower.  Governments don't seem interested and private sector is not incentivized, therefore it won't happen. 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I think the solution is what the Ukrainians are doing, which is obtaining a mix of vehicles to satisfy requirements (even if its not enough)

That is not a strategy, that is a reactive acceptance of reality.  Nobody is making the vehicles we have been debating about being useful in Ukraine today, therefore they can't have them as part of their mix.

2 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I do have to disagree quite strongly that IFVs are not being used in their role though, the whole point of an IFV is to support the infantry with direct fire. That is literally what we see Bradleys do near all the time, either as a primary mission or part of unloading or loading infantry / supplies, something a light tank cannot do. This is not something that an APC can nearly as effectively either. 

But are we really?  We do not know how much they are being used, we only seen confirmation bias videos of them being used.  I'd also argue that Bradleys roving around forward of the infantry they are supporting is not how they were intended on being used.

Regardless, there are other things to do what the Bradley is doing that either exist now or could exist within the next few years.  So in the future, instead of the past, the IFV might not be all that useful.  Especially when costs are factored in.

We have exactly one video of a Bradley engaging a T-90 and people go kerbonkers over it.  We have dozens of videos of homemade UAS destroying or damaging T-90s and it's met with "so what else is new?"

I have said it dozens of times and will keep repeating it... if I were a battlefield commander, not to mention a senior commander, I would rather drones equal to the value of a Bradley any day of the week, month, or even the year.  They'll be there for me, they'll be there for me.  (let's see how long it takes for a comment).

What really is needed is a way to protect infantry AND have enough available to absorb very high losses in short or long timeframes.  The Brad mostly has the first one satisfied, but falls very short of the latter.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Quick scan and worth the read.  My issue with it and few other assessments like this is that the logic does not fully align well.

I have not read the RUSI report yet, but this sounds like the same thing we experienced by people like Kofman at the start of the war.  To paraphrase, he might have said:

1.  Russia is a corrupt country with a lot of waste

2.  Training is poor compared to the West, treatment of conscripts remains horrible

3.  Readiness rates are likely overstated due to under funding and lack of accountability

4.  The core of Russia's military is based on legacy Soviet equipment, some of which is barely modernized

5.  The annual exercises are scripted performances that provide minimal experience for officers to learn their skills.

6.  Their fires are still overly centralized and burdened with inadequate communications equipment or flexible doctrine

7.  The VVS is not well situated to provide CAS, from equipment to doctrine, yet Russian offensive doctrine has an important carve out for CAS.

8.  Russian logistics are relatively poor, especially when compared to NATO countries.  This has been a traditional weakness since before WW2.

9.  The system for appointing and vetting qualified officers for key positions is largely political positioning rather than merit based.

etc.

Yet after able to list all this stuff, and talk about it in granular detail, would then say "but I don't understand the incredibly poor tactical, operational, and strategic performance we saw in February and March."

I mean gosh... talk about not connecting dots.

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

52 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The thing is, the Sherman, from a technological standpoint, was simple.  Metal stuck to metal for the most part.

While a Sherman was not as over-engineered as a lot of German models, it was anything but just metal to metal, certainly not to the degree of a T-34 was in 1942. There was plenty of novel features in the tank that were advanced for the time, such as the electronics, radio equipment and the gyro stabilisation system (even if it was rarely used) 

The key difference was that American production was truly insane, taking the principles of automotive industry and applying them at scale instead of the artisan approach of the Germans. This mass production was of quality as well (look at the welding points of your typical Sherman vs a T-34 and you can see what I mean) The Americans were able to literally have their cake and eat it really. 

The point I am trying to make is that you can manufacture complex machines at a decent cost provided you scale appropriately. F-35 for instance is a great example of this. Bradley might be more complex than a Sherman, but at the same time our capacity to build complex machines has only increased. Our factories are more productive when pushed to the max ect. The difference is of course that NATO is not on a wartime footing, hence the 'lazy' production of current inventories. Small orders of vehicles ensures that the cost of these platforms are going to be expensive, as that cost per unit reflects the setting up of a production line and its investment more than simply paying for the vehicle itself. Its probably an attitude we need to change to ensure security in our time. We need to be thinking thousands of a certain platform to equip NATO forces really. 

[poesel]

30 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Tying this back to my comment that you took issue with... you compared the Bradley with Sherman.  The thing is, the Sherman, from a technological standpoint, was simple.  Metal stuck to metal for the most part.  Bradleys are far more complicated than that and so trying to scale up production would be so much harder to do.  And therefore, as both The_Capt and I pointed out, very expensive upfront.

You need to compare relative complexity, not absolute. In today's terms, a Sherman is mostly welded metal. Back then, it was (nearly) the best they could do.

However, we can compare prices. A Sherman cost about $60k in '45 a piece. That is roughly $1m in today's money.
A Bradley sets you back about $3m. So same ballpark range. The factor 3 may very well be the difference between a mass product and a small batch.

Don't forget, we are all sitting on the shoulders of giants. Try to think about the amount of technology necessary to read these very words that have appeared on your screen. This is mind-boggling and yet, literally in everybody's hands.

A Bradley is more complex than a Sherman, but the effort to make one (in its time) is roughly the same. All the improvements in productivity make this possible.

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

54 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

But are we really?  We do not know how much they are being used, we only seen confirmation bias videos of them being used.  I'd also argue that Bradleys roving around forward of the infantry they are supporting is not how they were intended on being used.

Regardless, there are other things to do what the Bradley is doing that either exist now or could exist within the next few years.  So in the future, instead of the past, the IFV might not be all that useful.  Especially when costs are factored in.

We have exactly one video of a Bradley engaging a T-90 and people go kerbonkers over it.  We have dozens of videos of homemade UAS destroying or damaging T-90s and it's met with "so what else is new?"

I have said it dozens of times and will keep repeating it... if I were a battlefield commander, not to mention a senior commander, I would rather drones equal to the value of a Bradley any day of the week, month, or even the year.  They'll be there for me, they'll be there for me.  (let's see how long it takes for a comment).

What really is needed is a way to protect infantry AND have enough available to absorb very high losses in short or long timeframes.  The Brad mostly has the first one satisfied, but falls very short of the latter.

There are more than a few videos of the Bradleys in close cooperation with infantry, I would not say its exactly a rare thing. They really do seem to be used in a variety of roles, from transporting sections into combat to acting as 'fire brigade' units with the firepower to blunt attempted mechanised assaults. We see enough footage from the 47th to know they seem to be the vehicle of choice to go after the small assaults made on their line. We also know how quickly and efficiently the Bradley can deal with them. I dont see even a platoon of M113s with open top 50 cals doing the same thing. 

This is not to take away from FPVs or their effectiveness, but the infantry ultimately seem to appreciate what an IFV can do for them. I would argue the troops on the ground would probably prefer a Bradley to drones, if only so they dont have to walk everywhere! I think the solution is using both really.  Why cant they utilise both to their effective capacity?

As for losses, the 47th seems to be running them consistently despite losses and the modest number delivered. (Bulk of losses were during 2023 as well) This is after months on the field with a lot of FPVs and lancets in the air. I figured if the drones were so effective that there would be no vehicles left. Yet this seems not to be the case (though we of course dont know readiness numbers)

[FancyCat]

Tbh looking at the miniaturization of computing and how technologically we have advanced, I’ve been unable to really articulate it, so I appreciate this production discussion, but what prevents us from lowering the cost of anti-Uav systems thru sustained production? A lot of price tags for anti-uav stuff is based on lowered military budgets, lack of urgency, lack of needed production. I think it might be reasonable to say a restarted Gepard production would lower costs to be worth it.

[Haiduk]

About effectiveness of shotguns vs FPV from Russian point of view (spoiler - they missed)