How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Beleg85]

15 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

They do have a choice. The choice is to give up ground to reacquire tactical advantages elsewhere. It becomes politically untenable to do that when you turn places like Bakhmut into your personal Stalingrads. Hence why politics should stay the hell out of military affairs. My belief is that the Ukrainians were dogwalked into this by the American generals' advice. It sorta makes sense, as American generals are all incompetent stooges completely invulnerable from accountability while they operate with one foot out the door to Boeing, GD, Lockheed, etc.

Except "American generals" (none of whom keep any, even indirect control over situation, btw.) advised precisely opposite thing to Zaluzhny - long time ago they put a cross on Bakhmut and wanted Ukrainians to switch to other places. It was Ukrainian initiative to hold the city and sorroundings. And it is as much political as cultural and humanitarian reason there (no need to tell what Russians do when they enter civilian areas). Still we don't know the situation, perhaps there is a well-grounded strategic cause of holding this terain.

https://news.yahoo.com/western-allies-advice-ukraine-switch-133550653.html

Edited February 6, 2023 by Beleg85

[dan/california]

13 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

Remove the names and characteristics. Look at it objectively. Your opponent has fire superiority. They have the high ground. They have excellent fire-control. Their military doctrine is based around artillery. You see this and you wish to stand ground? You see this and you think you're the one winning the loss-rate ratios?

The Russian's have higher volume of fire, their fire control borders on laughable, for most of their guns, most of the time. That is before we discuss that they are mostly shooting forty year old ammo out of worn out barrels. The Ukrainians are not running into anything, they are holding the front with the absolute minimum troop density they can. Precisely so they can put a force together to do some thing else. The Russians can advance over of a carpet of their own dead for this very reason. The Ukrainian system is designed to give ground under truly maximum effort attacks at just the ratio that gives them the best casualty ratio.

Yes mistakes happen, yes squads fail to get the word, it is an unpleasantly even fight and bad things happen. Occasionally the Russians spot something with a drone that is actually in communication with a battery that can hit the designated square kilometer at least. But all of that just proves that there is a war on.

Edited February 6, 2023 by dan/california

[FlemFire]

Just now, Beleg85 said:

Except "American generals" advised precisely opposite thing to Zaluzhny - long time ago they put a cross on Bakhmut and wanted Ukrainians to switch to other places. It was Ukrainian initiative to hold the city and sorroundings. And it is as much political as cultural and humanitarian (no need to tell what Russians do when they enter civilian areas). Still we don't know the situation, perhaps there is a well-grounded strategic cause of holding this terain.

https://news.yahoo.com/western-allies-advice-ukraine-switch-133550653.html

Now they are, yes. Right now a mercenary group whose mostly constituted of convicts is pushing through Bakhmut. The time to engage Russia in attritional warfare is, in actuality, never. Just like the time to engage the U.S. military in the open field is never. You do not play to your opponent's strengths. Warfare 101.

 

2 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The Russian's have higher volume of fire, their fire control borders on laughable for most of their guns most of the time. That s before we discuss that they are mostly shooting forty year ammo out of worn out barrels. The Ukrainians are not running into anything, they are holding the front with the absolute minimum troop density they can. Precisely so they can put a force together to do some thing else. The Russians can advance of a carpet of their own dead for this very reason. The Ukrainian system is designed to give ground under truly maximum effort attacks at just the ratio that gives them the best casualty ratio.

Yes mistakes happen, yes squads fail to get the word, it is an unpleasantly even fight and bad things happen. Occasionally the Russians spot something with a drone that is actually in communication with a battery that can hit the designated square kilometer at least. But all of that just proves that there is a war on.

I suppose we can just ignore basic fundamental realities of warfare. Artillery is no longer the queen of the field. Having the high ground means nothing. Capturing fire superiority is pointless. Etc.

[billbindc]

15 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

I don't watch wars. I study them. 

Remove the names and characteristics. Look at it objectively. Your opponent has fire superiority. They have the high ground. They have excellent fire-control. Their military doctrine is based around artillery. You see this and you wish to stand ground? You see this and you think you're the one winning the loss-rate ratios?

The Russian army has excellent fire control? And what do you actually know about how the UA is fighting in Bakhmut? What evidence do you have of loss ratios? Or the exact terrain advantages from place to place on that front? And what would be the precise strategy you would adopt that is superior to defending a prepared urban conurbation bisected by multiple waterways?

Objectively, please.

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

american commanders were pretty happy to have the germans out of their holes and out in the open.

Yes, we have been forwarding that as a operation idea the UA might adopt. I am not sure the extent of the internal pressures to end the war for Ukraine. I am pretty there are some. But not to the same extent as with Russia. There are always going to be scores to settle, but Ukraine has the wherewithal to ignore those until the dust is clear. We can only hope the scores are relatively minor and don't get in the way of a functioning country that will need to heal and still defend itself depending on how the peace shakes out. 

[kevinkin]

38 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

My belief is that the Ukrainians were dogwalked into this by the American generals' advice.

Dogwalked into what? Defending themselves? What do you mean? 

Is the West's military industrial complex any more incestuous than Russia's? At least the West is producing modern weapons and their post cold war hand-me-downs are better than anything Russia can field (ever). Russia has no competent navy, air force, or army. All they have is nuclear blackmail. Which is why it's imperative that WMD don't fall into the hands of state supported terrorists and non-state actors. Unfortunately, for its people, Russian already contains state supported terrorists top to bottom and a state hardly worth defending. Putin let the genie out of the bottle and Russians are now, and for years, going to pay the price. 

Edited February 6, 2023 by kevinkin

[FlemFire]

16 minutes ago, billbindc said:

The Russian army has excellent fire control? And what do you actually know about how the UA is fighting in Bakhmut? What evidence do you have of loss ratios? Or the exact terrain advantages from place to place on that front? And what would be the precise strategy you would adopt that is superior to defending a prepared urban conurbation bisected by multiple waterways?

Objectively, please.

Yes, the Russian army's artillery fire support is excellent. It's not as good as the Americans, but it is good. Take a whizz on it all you want, though, it ultimately matters little when the results come out the same. What evidence do I have for loss-rates? Nobody has any hard evidence on casualties, it's all assumptions. That I'll readily admit. My assumptions are based upon fighting on the backfoot in a fixed position against vast volumes of enemy artillery fire. They're based upon Bakhmut being dangerously close to operational encirclement for weeks now which means established bases of fire are attacking from multiple angles. They're also based upon the occasional murmur of intel coming through that Ukrainian losses are really bad. Considering the infosec on bad news is really, really high, the fact anyone is saying anything about losses means it's worse than they're even letting on. On the Russians side of things, losses in Western sources will be (and have been) grossly exaggerated, but I do assume they're ugly too. The difference is even if it's 1:1 it's still mostly a PMC eating much of it. I think it's obvious by now that the Russians are content exchanging a couple convicts for revealing Ukrainian positions and then flattening them.

 

My strategy is to fight in more open ground. Already said it. Most of the equipment Ukraine has received is no good operating in rubble strewn streets and fighting house-to-house. Numerically, it is not in sufficient quantity to go toe-to-toe with established Russian fire positions. These are basic facts, really. I don't know if you've seen the images out of these places, but these towns are being quite literally flattened. Russia has never had any qualms doing just that and they will happily keep doing that if you want to play their game. See: Grozny. Russians lose cohesion when on the move and they can be better divided and annihilated in those moments.

 

 

Just now, kevinkin said:

Dogwalked into what? Defending themselves? What do you mean? 

Is the West's military industrial complex any more incestuous than Russia's? At least the West is producing modern weapons and their post cold war hand-me-downs are better than anything Russia can field (ever). Russia has no competent navy, air force, or army. All they have is nuclear blackmail. Which is why it's imperative that WMD don't fall into the hands of state support terrorists and non-state actors. Unfortunately, for its people, Russian already contains state support terrorists top to bottom and state hardly worth defending. Putin let the genie out of the bottle and Russians are now and for years going to pay the price. 

Dogwalked into static, attritional warfare.

All military industrial complexes are incestuous, yes. American military tech is vastly superior to Russia's, yes. The Russian military is by and large incompetent, yes. Nuclear blackmail is implied whenever great powers bump into each other. I don't disagree with any of that. I don't think Russia is going to dish out nukes to non-state actors when they, themselves, have enough enemies in that sphere to see it turned around and used right against them. I think shattering Russia into a broken state, though, would hugely endanger the world to this potentiality. It was definitely a concern in the 90s.

[kevinkin]

3 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

broken state

I don't disagree. But this is largely out of the West's hands once Russia withdrawals. That will be internal palace politics. But Russia will probably coalesce around Putin or another strongman again. Lord help them.

7 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

Dogwalked into static, attritional warfare

I am not sure the UA had any options after months of fighting with flying columns of light infantry. Someone somewhere made the command decision in November that the rest of Ukraine would have to wait. I advocated at time is to maintain operational freedom and momentum - if possible. But we don't have all the facts and figures. We will never know the true body counts during this trench warfare stage, but it appears the ratio is very much in the UA's favor. 

[FlemFire]

7 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

I don't disagree. But this is largely out of the West's hands once Russia withdrawals. That will be internal palace politics. But Russia will probably coalesce around Putin or another strongman again. Lord help them.

I am not sure the UA had any options after months of fighting with flying columns of light infantry. Someone somewhere made the command decision in November that the rest of Ukraine would have to wait. I advocated at time is to maintain operational freedom and momentum - if possible. But we don't have all the facts and figures. We will never know the true body counts during this trench warfare stage, but it appears the ratio is very much in the UA's favor. 

 

It's impossible to understand the innerworkings of another country. The issue with a guy like Putin is you get, or least I do anyway, a strong sense that the figures available in the country to replace him are actually worse than him. The hard pill to swallow on Putin is that many Russians, particularly older ones, like him because he was a huge upgrade compared to the ruthless mobsters running the show prior. Yes, I understand that invites immediate statements about how Putin himself is a mobster. I get it. But there are far worse than him lingering in the dark corners of Russia. It's hard to say if the levers of power are even remotely setup to withstand his (let's say, sudden) absence. The rest we can agree to disagree. As you say, we won't really know for years, if ever. I just go off my own understandings of warfare, but those could 100% be wrong as not every case is the same.

[chuckdyke]

With this mob in the Kremlin, I am afraid it will take WW3 to get rid of them.

[sross112]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yes, this is also something I've been harping on since the beginning of the war.  There is a big difference between 100,000 casualties over 6 months vs. 100,000 over 1-2 months.  Especially if those casualties are mobiks.

I had HOPED that the tens of thousands of casualties Russia suffered in the first few months of the war would have a bigger impact than they did.  From we can tell the people predisposed to active opposition to Putin were either rounded up or were scared into silence.  The bigger impact was 1+ million young Russian men leaving Russia before they got mobilized.  Beyond that?  Nothing immediate.

Aside from all the usual Russian reasons that these shocking casualties didn't do much to shake public support (censorship, brutality, generations of brainwashing, etc.) the initial casualties were supposedly contractors.  "Hey, they signed up for it so that's their problem".  The instances of conscripts being used in Ukraine did fire up some amount of opposition precisely because "Hey, they did not sign up for it so that's your problem".  Russia has also slow walked death announcements over many months so they don't all hit at once, which helped reduce the true picture of mass casualties.  The partial mobilization's large casualties were hidden in similar ways as well as disproportionally grabbing men from poor and rural areas that won't be noticed by the urban areas which could cause Putin problems.

There's a lot of nuances to this, but it boils down to Russia being able to fairly effectively keep the scale of losses quiet.

Yes, this is a major concern and yet another reason why simply removing Putin doesn't solve anything.

For sure.  The context, though, is scaling up Wagner's tactics.  We have no reliable numbers, but I have seen from the Russian side some estimates that 40,000 have been killed fighting in the Bakhmut area since November/December.  That's a rate of something like 20,000 per month.  If we presume Russia doubles the size of its land forces and tries at least one other Bakhmut sized Human Wave battle, this could mean 40,000 per month on top of normal casualty rates.  That would be 100,000 in a couple of months as I suggested.

Yes, I think we can count on that.

Steve

The "collapse" has been talked about a lot in here for a long time. Many of you have way more insight into Russia than I do and there are a bunch of theories. Personally, I don't see Russia collapsing on the home front. I don't think any level of economic hardship or casualty counts will cause the people to rise against the government. I say this because of their social history with their government and the security apparatus of the government. The people know that if they step out of line they can and will face harsh and even fatal consequences to themselves, likely their friends and family too. This is not a western society where you can stand in front of the ruling palace and yell bad words all day long without retribution. That is pretty hard for most people in western nations to wrap their heads around and try to understand why the people don't just protest. If they do, they will lose, and they know it.

Now I do believe that a collapse is possible and it is most likely probable, but it has to come from the military. If and when the military has had enough (1917ish) then the people will fall in behind them. Until the military or the mobilized decide enough is enough, the regime can continue forever, and will. There were several instances of rulers and governments given in the last couple pages that maintained power because of these same reasons. As long as the military is with the ruler, the ruler is safe. Or at least the government model even if the ruler is replaced. 

The UA has to inflict a lot of casualties for this to happen. It also needs to inflict severe defeats. It needs to take back ground. It needs to cauldron large amounts of RA troops and equipment. It has to be much more than just suffering casualties along a stagnate front. The RA has to feel like it is losing and there is no hope of winning. Once the rank and file are convinced then they can start looking at the rulers and the system that is sending them to their deaths. Until then I don't see a collapse happening.

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, Khalerick said:

Yes, the Russian army's artillery fire support is excellent. It's not as good as the Americans, but it is good. Take a whizz on it all you want, though, it ultimately matters little when the results come out the same. What evidence do I have for loss-rates? Nobody has any hard evidence on casualties, it's all assumptions. That I'll readily admit. My assumptions are based upon fighting on the backfoot in a fixed position against vast volumes of enemy artillery fire. They're based upon Bakhmut being dangerously close to operational encirclement for weeks now which means established bases of fire are attacking from multiple angles. They're also based upon the occasional murmur of intel coming through that Ukrainian losses are really bad. Considering the infosec on bad news is really, really high, the fact anyone is saying anything about losses means it's worse than they're even letting on. On the Russians side of things, losses in Western sources will be (and have been) grossly exaggerated, but I do assume they're ugly too. The difference is even if it's 1:1 it's still mostly a PMC eating much of it. I think it's obvious by now that the Russians are content exchanging a couple convicts for revealing Ukrainian positions and then flattening them.

...

Dogwalked into static, attritional warfare.

...

So here's the thing...if you were generating forces in order to create the offensive blow or series of offensive blows in order to win the war then perhaps you might do the following: 

• hold the enemy at easily defensible points
• let him use up ammunition/materiel/men for few gains
• provide him with incentives to concentrate manpower easily visible to your ISR and deliverable HIMARS/arty
• use as few of your forces as possible as you organized other units for later offensives

I have no doubt Russia means to launch an offensive...in fact, I think it's already begun. But Ukraine has done exactly as I've described at earlier points in the war. Why are we forgetting that or (as Girkin and others have point out) that Russia has yet to show any ability to handle an offensive of any note in more than one sector at a time?

This isn't an enigma. We've actually seen several phases play out this way and those were in situations where Russia was actually better equipped than it is now while Ukraine was still scrambling for artillery shells.

Put briefly, you should be wondering who is being dogwalked in this situation...the army that's splurging it's one advantage (manpower) for an objective that is marginal at best or the army that's doing the bare minimum at that point while it trains up and arms up maneuver assault brigades? 

For example: 

https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/02/03/ukraine-forms-assault-brigades-to-liberate-crimea-donbas-from-russian-occupation/

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, Khalerick said:

Dogwalked into static, attritional warfare.

Provide some evidence please, that:

a. US generalship advised UA to fight at Bakhmut (and not the opposite).

b.That they had so much influence to enforce it (while it is widely known fact Ukrainan military to be very stubborn negotiating partner even for US; one can't simply force them to do anything).

Otherwise, it's a grass-talk based on convictions and your personal assumptions about US mil-industrial complex and supposedly "dumb" generals, which has nothing to do with Ukrainian reality anyway.

1 hour ago, Khalerick said:

It's impossible to understand the innerworkings of another country.

I genuinly don't understand this sentence, sorry. Why it is impossible? Accustomizing oneself with history, learning language and extensively educating in several other fields (like political systems and its particularities) may be a good start to know something about Russia. And Ukraine too, btw., which was Achilles heel of many western analytics and experts, and is to this day.

We don't know who may succedd Putin, he may be worse or better. Or roughly the same. Or perhaps (in most optimistic scenario) Russia may even end up with some form collective leadership. Extremely unlikely, but not impossible; there are precedents from the past.

1 hour ago, Khalerick said:

Yes, the Russian army's artillery fire support is excellent. It's not as good as the Americans, but it is good. Take a whizz on it all you want, though, it ultimately matters little when the results come out the same. What evidence do I have for loss-rates? Nobody has any hard evidence on casualties, it's all assumptions. That I'll readily admit. My assumptions are based upon fighting on the backfoot in a fixed position against vast volumes of enemy artillery fire. They're based upon Bakhmut being dangerously close to operational encirclement for weeks now which means established bases of fire are attacking from multiple angles. They're also based upon the occasional murmur of intel coming through that Ukrainian losses are really bad. Considering the infosec on bad news is really, really high, the fact anyone is saying anything about losses means it's worse than they're even letting on. On the Russians side of things, losses in Western sources will be (and have been) grossly exaggerated, but I do assume they're ugly too. The difference is even if it's 1:1 it's still mostly a PMC eating much of it. I think it's obvious by now that the Russians are content exchanging a couple convicts for revealing Ukrainian positions and then flattening them.

Bakhmut is being shelled 4 months now- if Russian advantage would be so great you described, they would take it long time ago, not wasting tons of their ammo, wearing down the barrels and suffering several munition hungers in the effect (which is not infinite as well). Lack of visible artillery advantage, both when comes to precision, ammo timing and range is one of the causes this battle is costing Russians so much. Details of it being discussed endlessly in Western, Ukrainian and even Russian channels. To the point Ukrainian artillery don't even consider now RU counterbattery fire a threat in this sector and does not even change ther stations.

1:1 lossess, while attacking by human waves for weeks if not months?? In the light of everything we know about Bakhmut- there are literally hundreds accounts and evidences scattered along this topic to prove you otherwise. Including Russian ones.

I am also not particulary hooked on 3:1 or 5:1 loss ratio in favour of Ukraine in general in this war, but this one sector of the front seem to be exception. But yeah, difficult to say with certainty. Certainly Russians did exchanged lives of freakingly many prsioners, but for what? We don't know. Perhaps nether do Prigozhin. Even if they take the city in the end.

1 hour ago, Khalerick said:

My strategy is to fight in more open ground. Already said it.

Position of Ukrainian MoD will to be open for applicants soon, perhaps you could send them your extensive CV then. You are so confident in your assumptions you would certainly do better than "dumb" folks who served for decades.

Edited February 6, 2023 by Beleg85

[cesmonkey]

Do any of the Ukrainians here have an opinion on the decision to replace your defense minister?

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, sross112 said:

The "collapse" has been talked about a lot in here for a long time. Many of you have way more insight into Russia than I do and there are a bunch of theories. Personally, I don't see Russia collapsing on the home front.

Yeah, but that's not the theory of collapse I (and others) have been putting forward as a possibility.  Your take on it here is more like what's been put forward...

1 hour ago, sross112 said:

Now I do believe that a collapse is possible and it is most likely probable, but it has to come from the military.

When the war was young it seemed like military collapse had to happen first before there was any possibility of a collapse of the homefront (short of a coup, which is a separate possibility).  I think we were close to seeing this as there were several realistic scenarios where military collapse was in the process of happening before Putin gave into his generals' advice and took corrective action.  We've talked about them at great length, but the primary one was Putin allowing his forces from the north of Ukraine to retreat and permanently cede the ground to Ukraine.  I think Russia was within days, tops a week, of an outright collapse (route) of their forces.  Now, would that have been enough to cause a collapse of the homefront and then regime?  Anybody's guess, but I think it was a plausible possibility.

Now, however, the situation has changed a bit.  The war is dragged on and it's taken Russia's economy with it.  This is putting immense pressure on Putin to create a war centric economy, which in turn puts more pressure on the homefront while (in this case) still not producing enough material to keep up with demand.  This causes resources to be diverted to things like illicit chips and acquiring munitions from abroad, which in turn puts more pressure on the homefront.  Removing another 100k or 200k working aged men from the already manpower short economy creates more headaches for the homefront. 

The combination of decreased spending, decreased economic activities due to sanctions, decreased materials for keeping the economy going, decreased manpower to keep up services, and decreased civil liberties are all bad news for any regime.  How much will Russians put up with before they revolt?  Obviously a lot, but I doubt it is endless.

I still think a military collapse is necessary before a regime collapse happens, but we have to remember the Soviet Union collapsed without an immediate military catastrophe causing it (Afghanistan was a definite factor, though).  Therefore, an economic collapse causing a collapse of the homefront is definitely more a possibility today than it was earlier in the war.  And with every day that goes by that chance increases.

Steve

[JonS]

4 hours ago, Khalerick said:

Hence why politics should stay the hell out of military affairs.

 

War is a fundamentally political activity, and when you just leave it to the soldiers all sorts of weirdness occurs (see: big chunks of WWI, Japan in WWII, Vietnam, ...). But don't take my word - I believe Clauzwitz had something to say about this, and he's generally taken as being fairly credible.

Edited February 6, 2023 by JonS

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Khalerick said:

It's impossible to understand the innerworkings of another country.

Interestingly, though, you think you have a handle on how Putin's regime works

Look, if your basic point is that a regime as strong on control as Putin's is going to be tough to bring down internally, I don't think anybody here would disagree with you.  However, it has happened to Russia before (1917 and 1990), so it is possible. 

As for analysis of what's going on at Bakhmut, I also don't think you've analyzed it very well.  Especially Russia's current artillery capabilities.  And for sure Russia's body count is MASSIVELY out of proportion to Ukraine's.  The problem with the exchange is that Ukraine is losing good soldiers while Russia's losses are a mix of decent troops and pure cannon fodder.  However, Ukraine was going to have to deal with this at some point and it seems the higher ups in Kyiv (not Washington) have decided this is the time and the place to do it.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I'm surprised this hasn't come up in today's discussions.  It even made the headlines on a radio station I was listening to while driving:

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3844737-ukraine-to-remove-defense-minister-ahead-of-expected-russian-offensive-lawmaker/

Quote

Ukraine is set to replace Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov amid a series of corruption scandals, and ahead of an expected Russian offensive, according to a top Ukrainian lawmaker. 

“War dictates personnel policy. Time and circumstances call for strengthening and regrouping. This is happening now and will continue to happen in the future,” wrote the Ukrainian Parliament’s majority leader David Arakhamia on Telegram. 

Reznikov, who has served as defense minister throughout the war with Russia, will reportedly be replaced with Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Kyiv’s military intelligence agency.

This is a major shakeup and it signals how seriously Ukraine's government understands it's obligations to confront endemic corruption.  A good sign IMHO.

Steve

[sburke]

3 hours ago, Khalerick said:

I don't watch wars. I study them. 

umm  .. so do quite a few other folks here many of whom have serious credentials on doing so.  Unlike myself who is purely a casual student and gamer.  Could you provide some credentials that would elevate yours beyond my couch potato observer level?

[JonS]

4 hours ago, Khalerick said:

Yes, the Russian army's artillery fire support is excellent. It's not as good as the Americans, but it is good. Take a whizz on it all you want, though, it ultimately matters little when the results come out the same.

I think you might benefit from defining your terms here. Like what does "excellent" mean to you, in specific, measurable and observable terms? What does "results" mean to you, again in specific, measurable, and observable terms?

What most of us have observed is the Russians dumping tons and tons (literally, tons) of shells into open paddocks. In terms of input measures, they are amazing! "We fired 20 bajillion shells! Phear uz!"

But in terms of output measures, it looks like they're ... compensating for something. Their system is slow and inaccurate (and imprecise), so they have to swamp huge areas and kind of hope something was unlucky enough to be standing in the way. It's dumb, but it's true that it can definitely kinda work in the right circumstances, but it isn't really sustainable. As we have already observed. The ammo is running low, the barrels are being shot out, and their logistics system is struggling under the strain of trying to move all that ammo AND under the direct, precise, and accurate targeting of the Ukrainians.

Basically "Hulk, smash!" vs. a rapier wielded by Syrio Forel.

That's what I'm observing. You?

Edited February 6, 2023 by JonS

[kevinkin]

11 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

major shakeup

Missed it: 

I wondered what the guy did:

https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-730694

During his tenure as defense minister, he spoke out strongly about wartime corruption, which he said was akin to "marauding." But in recent weeks his own defense ministry became embroiled in a corruption scandal over an army food contract that envisaged paying vastly inflated prices. One of his deputy ministers has been fired and named a suspect in the scandal, and another one has since resigned separately.

Maybe the tip of the iceberg. But he retains a seemingly important role. Maybe the other guy is better at procurement. A very important skill. If Reznikov fell on his sword, it was for a good cause and he remains afloat in government.  

[Simcoe]

3 hours ago, Khalerick said:

Yes, the Russian army's artillery fire support is excellent. It's not as good as the Americans, but it is good. Take a whizz on it all you want, though, it ultimately matters little when the results come out the same. What evidence do I have for loss-rates? Nobody has any hard evidence on casualties, it's all assumptions. That I'll readily admit. My assumptions are based upon fighting on the backfoot in a fixed position against vast volumes of enemy artillery fire. They're based upon Bakhmut being dangerously close to operational encirclement for weeks now which means established bases of fire are attacking from multiple angles. They're also based upon the occasional murmur of intel coming through that Ukrainian losses are really bad. Considering the infosec on bad news is really, really high, the fact anyone is saying anything about losses means it's worse than they're even letting on. On the Russians side of things, losses in Western sources will be (and have been) grossly exaggerated, but I do assume they're ugly too. The difference is even if it's 1:1 it's still mostly a PMC eating much of it. I think it's obvious by now that the Russians are content exchanging a couple convicts for revealing Ukrainian positions and then flattening them.

 

My strategy is to fight in more open ground. Already said it. Most of the equipment Ukraine has received is no good operating in rubble strewn streets and fighting house-to-house. Numerically, it is not in sufficient quantity to go toe-to-toe with established Russian fire positions. These are basic facts, really. I don't know if you've seen the images out of these places, but these towns are being quite literally flattened. Russia has never had any qualms doing just that and they will happily keep doing that if you want to play their game. See: Grozny. Russians lose cohesion when on the move and they can be better divided and annihilated in those moments.

 

 

Dogwalked into static, attritional warfare.

All military industrial complexes are incestuous, yes. American military tech is vastly superior to Russia's, yes. The Russian military is by and large incompetent, yes. Nuclear blackmail is implied whenever great powers bump into each other. I don't disagree with any of that. I don't think Russia is going to dish out nukes to non-state actors when they, themselves, have enough enemies in that sphere to see it turned around and used right against them. I think shattering Russia into a broken state, though, would hugely endanger the world to this potentiality. It was definitely a concern in the 90s.

Glad that someone is speaking facts in this thread. If the Russians were as weak as they are made out to be here then Ukraine would be liberated by now.

I want Ukraine to be liberated like everyone else but some of the propaganda here is rediculous.

[Twisk]

4 hours ago, Khalerick said:

They do have a choice. The choice is to give up ground to reacquire tactical advantages elsewhere.

I've read this repeatedly but no one actually has a good answer for where the new line is to be drawn. Looking at a map of Ukraine and they'd have to retreat past Kramatorsk to really get into open ground. The UAF could retreat 20KM and still be in the same terrain dealing with the same problems its not until they go 60KM+ that things really start to open up. Russians are also gaining the most ground in the areas 5-10km outside of Bahkmut. So is the dense urban terrain of the city itself actually more difficult to advance through than the valleys and small villages surrounding it?

Also I've asked this before but the Bahkmut direction (D2 in my image) is 50 simple KM long. While the Kherson front was 200 simple KM long. So I'd be much more inclined to agree with you if anyone could tell me where the UAF troops from that 200 KM of frontage went to? The whole fight around Bahkmut right now remindes me a lot of Izyum or Lyschansk last summer. You have UAF forces in dire straights in a small section of the front and the news from those areas sounding very bad but that didn't reflect the situation on the whole 1,000KM long front.

- Where does Ukraine retreat to that it has better odds?

- Where are the UAF from Kherson?

- Why is this current moment different than Lyschansk?

Edited February 6, 2023 by Twisk

[JonS]

18 hours ago, danfrodo said:

While we're on battle of the bulge analogies....

funnily enough, I was thinking of the Eastern Front during WWII. Yes, obviously the terrain has a lot of similarities now as then, and one of the sides is literally the same, but that's not what I mean.

In 1941 the Germans launched a strategic operation that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. It was super scary, lasted around 5 months, and led to some of the biggest individual battles ever. If it would have worked the Germans would have overrun all of western Russia and knocked them out of the war. But it didn't quite get to where it needed to. So ...

In 1942 the Germans launched an operational offensive that stretched from the Sea of Azov to, uh, some grotty town on the middle reaches of the Don. It was super scary, lasted about 4 months, ended up with one of the most recognisable battles ever. If it would have worked out the Germans would have taken control of the bit of Russia between the Black and Caspian Seas, and secured a bit of oil (which they probably wouldn't have been able to realistically move back to Germany anyway). Buuuut it didn't work out so great for the Germans,  so ...

In 1943 the Germans launched a tactical battle somewhere, uh, somewhere in the middle of of one of Russia's oblasts. It was pretty scary, lasted about a week, and metal fanboys still have wet dreams about it. If it would have worked the Germans would have secured about 100km^2 of land, and maybe eliminated a Russian Army from the orbat. But it didn't produce the results the Germans were after, so ...

In 1944 the Germans utterly had their asses handed to them.

The overarching story here is one of diminishing resources leading to diminishing options, prospects, and aspirations. Meanwhile the opposition, although taking some hefty blows, was rebuilding with the assistance of the rest of the world, and after being on the receiving end for a while landed a couple of roundhouse blows to the nuts and, well, that was the ballgame.

I'm hearing echoes? Is anyone else hearing echoes? It does sound a bit like someone is playing a 33 1/3 LP at 45rpm, but I'm definitely hearing echoes.

Edited February 6, 2023 by JonS

[Battlefront.com]

44 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Glad that someone is speaking facts in this thread.

Huh?  Most of what he just stated is opinion, some of which he has failed to back up and some of it completely contradictory with observable reality.  Have you even read the rebuttals to his supposed facts?

44 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

If the Russians were as weak as they are made out to be here then Ukraine would be liberated by now.

Riiiiight.  So how did Germany and Japan wind up losing the war?  I mean, they both looked pretty damned strong in 1944, didn't they?

Further, look at your argument with three words swapped:

"If the Ukrainians were as weak as they are made out to be here then Ukraine would be conquered  by now."

What this indicates is that reality is more complicated than just simple if/then logic.

44 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

I want Ukraine to be liberated like everyone else but some of the propaganda here is rediculous.

And some of the "devil's advocate" posts here are also ridiculous.

Steve