Does Soviet tactics work in Combat Mission?

[Rinaldi]

14 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Soviet doctrine focused on simple well rehearsed drills to keep high momentum tactically and operationally. Their focus was not on defeating their opponents man to man but using numbers and momentum to catch combat units off guard and overrun command and control. 

Yes, that's succinct and, generally, accurate. I would agree. You could nitpick or call it a generalisation but I think that would be ungenerous given this a forum.

14 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Have videogames portrayed this accurately on the tactical level? 

Video games are generally player driven, so a good one will give the individual the tools to portray it accurately when they are the Soviets. This has been a source of fierce debate, mainly started by the OP of this thread (who, I note, has been conspicuously absent). He believes, among other things, that the ingredients are inadequately modelled, and therefore the recipe cannot be recreated. Tamping down his actual point is difficult, as he simply changes the topic of debate as and when he sees fit. No matter, there's a lot of evidence from other players that playing the Soviets as expected can produce results. That, of course, isn't as simple as "evolve from platoon columns to line 1 kilometer from enemy position" - though it often sounds like it is. It requires heavy dosages of common sense and understanding of the American way of war to create an effective fires plan to build that momentum. 

That's the first half of the equation. The second half is when the Soviets are AI. Now, is that up to the scenario designer. This is, again, realm of opinion, but we can object some objectivity into it. The campaigns' AI are basically textbook Soviet tactical evolutions (as we understand them): people lose these campaigns, and hard at that, routinely. So something must be right. Standalone scenarios are, in my view, a mixed bag. Some are excellent, others border on absolutely shambolic (Czechmate is a standout example of the latter). 

14 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Are people having issues with the Soviets because the type of engagements Combat Mission depicts does not emphasize their strengths?

I would argue CW (and RT) do indeed depict their strengths, as much as their limitations. It is no different than people (correctly) despairing in CMBN that their American rifle company in, let us say, Road to Monteburg only has a few 60mms for a particular mission. The objective likely could justify more fire support. Well, that wasn't always an operational reality, and the Western allies often had to tighten their belts in the early part of the campaign re: ammunition supplies. The point, of course, is that the Soviets do very well when they can judiciously support an appropriate amount of force (or force multipliers) to the objective to hand. I don't think that is particularly unique; just that their equations are perhaps less optimistic, or more realistic, than others. 

14 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Am I wrong? Did the Soviets think they could fight "toe to toe" and win each engagment?

A question of definition. Fighting 'toe to toe' insofar as fighting on qualitative or quantitatively equal terms would be considered foolish and likely to result in defeat. However, in short, and generally: Absolutely. Of course they believed they could win, and not without merit. They did not plan around winning every engagement, is the point. Only the engagements that mattered. I know that sounds trite, but its the shortest way to say it. 

 

[Simcoe]

2 hours ago, Rinaldi said:

Yes, that's succinct and, generally, accurate. I would agree. You could nitpick or call it a generalisation but I think that would be ungenerous given this a forum.

Video games are generally player driven, so a good one will give the individual the tools to portray it accurately when they are the Soviets. This has been a source of fierce debate, mainly started by the OP of this thread (who, I note, has been conspicuously absent). He believes, among other things, that the ingredients are inadequately modelled, and therefore the recipe cannot be recreated. Tamping down his actual point is difficult, as he simply changes the topic of debate as and when he sees fit. No matter, there's a lot of evidence from other players that playing the Soviets as expected can produce results. That, of course, isn't as simple as "evolve from platoon columns to line 1 kilometer from enemy position" - though it often sounds like it is. It requires heavy dosages of common sense and understanding of the American way of war to create an effective fires plan to build that momentum. 

That's the first half of the equation. The second half is when the Soviets are AI. Now, is that up to the scenario designer. This is, again, realm of opinion, but we can object some objectivity into it. The campaigns' AI are basically textbook Soviet tactical evolutions (as we understand them): people lose these campaigns, and hard at that, routinely. So something must be right. Standalone scenarios are, in my view, a mixed bag. Some are excellent, others border on absolutely shambolic (Czechmate is a standout example of the latter). 

I would argue CW (and RT) do indeed depict their strengths, as much as their limitations. It is no different than people (correctly) despairing in CMBN that their American rifle company in, let us say, Road to Monteburg only has a few 60mms for a particular mission. The objective likely could justify more fire support. Well, that wasn't always an operational reality, and the Western allies often had to tighten their belts in the early part of the campaign re: ammunition supplies. The point, of course, is that the Soviets do very well when they can judiciously support an appropriate amount of force (or force multipliers) to the objective to hand. I don't think that is particularly unique; just that their equations are perhaps less optimistic, or more realistic, than others. 

A question of definition. Fighting 'toe to toe' insofar as fighting on qualitative or quantitatively equal terms would be considered foolish and likely to result in defeat. However, in short, and generally: Absolutely. Of course they believed they could win, and not without merit. They did not plan around winning every engagement, is the point. Only the engagements that mattered. I know that sounds trite, but its the shortest way to say it. 

 

Great reply! Could you elaborate on what you mean by 

"though it often sounds like it is. It requires heavy dosages of common sense and understanding of the American way of war to create an effective fires plan to build that momentum."

Also, what is your issue with the Czechmate scenario?

I think two things that would greatly improve the Soviet faction is greater control of artillery with full fire plans (If we had the Steel Beasts artillery system I would be in heaven) and larger maps with multiple battalions. I know both of these aren't feasible but a man can dream.

[chuckdyke]

7 hours ago, Simcoe said:

Would it be possible to make a Combat Mission campaign following a unit that DID make the breakthrough I described?

It would be a campaign based on pursuit, would make it enjoyable. The emphasis would be maintaining contact.

[Simcoe]

8 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

It would be a campaign based on pursuit, would make it enjoyable. The emphasis would be maintaining contact.

That's an interesting idea. Imagine a scenario where you have made a breakthrough and need to assault 4-5 supply/command posts before reinforcements arrive and extract your unit out.

[Grigb]

On 6/11/2022 at 7:45 PM, Simcoe said:

Am I wrong? Did the Soviets think they could fight "toe to toe" and win each engagment?

Yes. They thought they were much superior at least with land forces until middle of 80s.

[domfluff]

I think in reality that superiority might have faded faster than that - perhaps they had the edge in the seventies, and they probably did have the edge in the sixties.

CMCW represents this inflection point well - in 1979 the Soviets have some significant advantages, which are being eroded on a tactical level by 1982. Clearly the tiny number of Abrams, Bradleys and M60 TTS wouldn't have been *everywhere* in 1982, so the actual inflection point would have a longer tail in practice, even if the frontline would have been gnarlier than anticipated.

As an aside, I did come across an amusing/weak argument that the notable wargamer Paddy Griffith may have actually averted WW3.

He was a military historian, and participated in numerous wargames, both hobby and professional. A notable number of these professional, classified games were about Cold War doctrine, particularly with the US and modelling their policy of Active Defence - in particular the concept of an up-front defence, not giving up miles of West Germany to gain depth, as that wouldn't be politically viable.

We don't know the results of these games, or how extensive they were, but we do know that shortly afterwards the dial started to move, and the US policy position began to change (culminating in what became known as AirLand battle, but even changing the policy before that). This change in policy was then matched by a change towards a more defensive doctrine from the Soviet Union.

So... weak argument, but if we tentatively assume a direct line connecting all of the above, it's not impossible that a bespectacled British academic prevented an all-out nuclear war.

[Simcoe]

10 hours ago, Grigb said:

Yes. They thought they were much superior at least with land forces until middle of 80s.

Even more reason we need a 1979 Soviet campaign! Let the glorious communists dominate the capitalists for once!

Edited June 13, 2022 by Simcoe

[Rinaldi]

On 6/11/2022 at 8:28 PM, Simcoe said:

"though it often sounds like it is. It requires heavy dosages of common sense and understanding of the American way of war to create an effective fires plan to build that momentum."

Also, what is your issue with the Czechmate scenario?

It means that the Soviets studied the Americans (and NATO) as much as the Americans et al studied them, and much of their operational thought was bent to getting inside the decision loop of their likely opponents and staying there. Tactically that meant they had ostensibly sophisticated fires plans based on how they figured we would fight. It wasn't just "Hill is objective: plaster Hill with HE and WP." 

That gets lost on a lot of players. Not only do you need to put yourself in the Soviet commanders shoes when planning a Soviet scenario, but you also need to think backwards and go "how would the Americans fight this battle?" You should be doing that regardless of the situation, but its especially paramount for the Soviets. You rarely get a chance to redouble your artillery efforts in a timely manner. 

As for Czechmate, that's an entirely separate discussion. Suffice to say its not a particularly good illustration of what it claims to be trying to do. The map itself is a work of art, and luckily has been repurposed to my knowledge. 

Edited June 13, 2022 by Rinaldi

[Grigb]

4 hours ago, Simcoe said:

Even more reason we need a 1979 Soviet campaign! Let the glorious communists dominate the capitalists for once!

I said they though they were much superior only to start realizing around 1985 that something is wrong.  Thermal sights shocked them. Also they were butthurt over stingers in Afghan. That and overall USSR and Army state in the late 80s forced them to start reevaluating their superior attitude.

[Grigb]

14 hours ago, domfluff said:

I think in reality that superiority might have faded faster than that - perhaps they had the edge in the seventies, and they probably did have the edge in the sixties.

It is unlikely they ever had any superiority except numbers. 

It was based solely on their racial superiority attitude + relentless propaganda of their superiority which they believed.

For example, during Damansky Island conflict in 1969, Soviet officers were told that their new secret T-62 had superior armor protection compared to other tanks. So, they attacked poorly equipped Chinese infantry without infantry or pretty much any support. Outflanking they arrogantly presented their sides to Chinese positions and Chinese infantry promptly took out leading T-62 with simple RPGs and forced other two to retreat. After a while Chinese took it out of the river (it was battle on river ice around river island) and now it is in China museum.

AFAIK Soviet infantry officers were also butthurt over claimed Soviet BTRs bulletproof protection after using BTR-60 in battle. They were told BTR-60 is bulletproof but were not told that it depends on the distance and angle. 

14 hours ago, domfluff said:

As an aside, I did come across an amusing/weak argument that the notable wargamer Paddy Griffith may have actually averted WW3.

I am of impression that US analysis 1973 Judgment day war pushed US Forces to revaluated their position - Syrian assault was pretty much done according to Soviet doctrine. Against modern but modest Israel Anti-tank defense it failed spectacularly. It showed to US that soviet numerical superiority good on paper but does not work in real life.

15 hours ago, domfluff said:

This change in policy was then matched by a change towards a more defensive doctrine from the Soviet Union.

Soviets switch to a more defensive doctrine was more of reaction to the threat of high tech weapon fielded about that time which Soviets could not realistically counter (Contemporary Soviet joke - soviet electronics are the best in the world. They are the biggest and the heaviest!). Also given aggressive rhetoric of Reagan-Thatcher and failing economy, home pressure due to Afghan war/Chernobyl disaster and absolutely rotten state of Soviet governmental apparatus they realized they will need soon western help and decided to play nice.

[Grigb]

2 hours ago, Rinaldi said:

It means that the Soviets studied the Americans (and NATO) as much as the Americans et al studied them

Sort of. The issue was that soviet generals rarely understood western tactical/doctrinal thinking. And did not care much because westerners were dumb coward capitalists.

I doubt that the top even knew about US AirLand Battle in 80s because in 90s they were scratching their heads over Desert Storm. They later declared that US pursues new Contactless War doctrine [fighting without close battles relying on in shooting from a far with high tech weapons] and that was what they taught us in the late 90s, early 00s. Obviously, they declared that doctrine was dumb because it could work only against primitives like Iraqis, but it is ok for US because we are friends now and they do not need to worry about us.

[Rinaldi]

I have no idea what you are talking about. 

[chuckdyke]

I met a brigadier general once in a third world country. He was more concerned with his side-line that was in the building industry. I think the same takes place in Russia. Their generals don't enjoy a six-figure salary like they do in the US. I think it is nearly $200,000 annually. 

[Simcoe]

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

I said they though they were much superior only to start realizing around 1985 that something is wrong.  Thermal sights shocked them. Also they were butthurt over stingers in Afghan. That and overall USSR and Army state in the late 80s forced them to start reevaluating their superior attitude.

Gives us a chance to find out for ourselves at least.

[Grigb]

4 hours ago, Rinaldi said:

I have no idea what you are talking about. 

Me? Many westerners refused to believe that RU army is a clown show until war started.

Let me remind you that epic fail with Grozny New Year assault happened just 3 years after USSR dissolution. It was the same Soviet commanders that NATO faced in 80s who did it. It is just they duped naive western experts in to believing that it was a fluke or Yeltsin fault but USSR army was not like this!

If you are not aware of Contactless War bull****, then let's read some Russian related papers:

Quote

Russian military thinking – a new generation of warfare by peter Mattsson (Swedish national defense college)

The Russian  military theorist  Sliptjenko’s  theory of sixth generation warfare (Slipchenko   1999) deals with long-range, high-precision weapons that can be launched from various weapon platforms on land, sea, in  the air and in  space.  New technology is crucial to this type of warfare, particularly electronics, and information and communications technology. Sometimes this type of warfare is called ‘contactless war’ and has its conceptual basis in modern missile wars:  the 1973  Arab Israeli War, the Falklands  War in 1982 and the First Gulf  War in 1991.

This swedish guy got confused a timeline a little bit regarding origins of Contactless War - Russian publications appeared right after Gulf War. I remember them.

Quote

Armament and Economy magazine No. 3 (15) 2011 (Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Academy of Problems of Military Economics and Finance)
About some aspects of information wars by Burenok V.M. Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor

After the first war against Iraq ("Desert Storm") and the war in Yugoslavia ("Indestructible Freedom"), many [Russian Military] publications describing the concepts of contactless wars appeared.

In these publications RU military tried to make sense of what they saw in Gulf War (and later in Yugoslavia) because US ALB doctrine flew completely over their heads. So, they decided that US was pursuing new Contactless War doctrine which they thought was US illusion and stupid (because Americans are stupid.)

Quote

Military-civil relations in non-military operations by Stepanova E.A. ("Human rights", 2001)

A peculiar manifestation of the modern edition of the "revolution in military affairs" was the operation of the anti-Iraqi coalition in the Persian Gulf in 1991, which was an example of achieving a quick victory at the cost of minimal casualties. The absolute incompatibility of the technological capabilities of the parties turned into an almost one-sided nature of the armed struggle and completely unequal damage suffered by the parties during the hostilities. The unprecedented low level of military losses of the forces of the anti-Iraqi coalition led by the United States created the illusion of a new era of "contactless", or "remote", war.

 

Tactical and Doctrinal study of West in USSR was in complete shambles.

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

Gives us a chance to find out for ourselves at least.

You can do it right now - take CMCW and assign either zero or negative modifiers for Leadership, Experience and Moral. That's a real Soviet Army for you.

Soviet Army never was a capable force. My father was in the Soviet Army during Cuban crisis. He was right there (I saw his documents signed by Raul Castro). He told me American-trained Cubans were shocked to see how bad Soviet Army really was. But it was too late for them, we were already there.

Then I asked how he was going to fight Americans - I wasn't, Americans would **** us, so as soon as command put us on high alert I laid down on arty ammo boxes to die instantly at least. 

[Simcoe]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

You can do it right now - take CMCW and assign either zero or negative modifiers for Leadership, Experience and Moral. That's a real Soviet Army for you.

Soviet Army never was a capable force. My father was in the Soviet Army during Cuban crisis. He was right there (I saw his documents signed by Raul Castro). He told me American-trained Cubans were shocked to see how bad Soviet Army really was. But it was too late for them, we were already there.

Then I asked how he was going to fight Americans - I wasn't, Americans would **** us, so as soon as command put us on high alert I laid down on arty ammo boxes to die instantly at least. 

That's interesting that the Soviet army had deteriorated that badly even in the 60's. Figured there would still be some discipline left over from WW2.

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

That's interesting that the Soviet army had deteriorated that badly even in the 60's. Figured there would still be some discipline left over from WW2.

Western history books about Red Army and real Red Army are two different things. 

I will quote Russian translation "Conversations with Stalin" by Milovan Djilas

Quote

I probably wouldn't have had to go to Moscow for the second time and meet Stalin again if I hadn't become a victim of my straightforwardness.

The fact is that after the breakthrough of the Red Army into Yugoslavia and the liberation of Belgrade in the autumn of 1944, there were so many serious - single and group attacks by the Red Army against Yugoslav citizens and military personnel that it turned into a political problem for the new government and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav Communists imagined the Red Army to be ideal, and in their own ranks they mercilessly dealt with even the smallest robbers and rapists. Naturally, they were amazed by what was happening... And also by the fact that the higher headquarters of the Red Army were deaf to complaints and protests, and it seemed that they were deliberately turning a blind eye to violence and rapists...

During the conversation I said:

- The difficulty also lies in the fact that our opponents use it against us, comparing the attacks of the Red Army with the behavior of British officers who do not make such attacks...

The Communists also felt this problem as a moral one: is this really the ideal Red Army that we were waiting for with such impatience?

..... I myself understood that in the Red Army, despite the fact that it is the army of a "classless" society, there "still" cannot be complete order, that there must still be "remnants of the past" in it. The internal contradictions in me were generated by the indifferent, if not approving attitude of the Soviet leadership and the Soviet headquarters to violence, especially the unwillingness to recognize them - not to mention their indignation when we pointed it out. Our intentions were sincere - we wanted to preserve the authority of the Red Army and the Soviet Union, which the propaganda of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had been creating for many years. And what did these good intentions of ours come across? To rudeness and rebuff, typical of the relations of a great power with a small one, of the strong with the weak.

Robbing, raping, attacking civilians while lying and denying everything. That is real Red Army discipline. 

[Simcoe]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

Western history books about Red Army and real Red Army are two different things. 

I will quote Russian translation "Conversations with Stalin" by Milovan Djilas

Robbing, raping, attacking civilians while lying and denying everything. That is real Red Army discipline. 

I've been reading Antony Beevor's Fall of Berlin and he goes into great detail about the war crimes of the Red Army but you're saying military discipline and fighting power had deteriorated in the 60's?

[Grigb]

7 hours ago, Simcoe said:

I've been reading Antony Beevor's Fall of Berlin and he goes into great detail about the war crimes of the Red Army but you're saying military discipline and fighting power had deteriorated in the 60's?

I am saying there was nothing to deteriorate neither in 60s nor in 50s because there was nothing in the first place in the 40s. Red Army power is invention of Soviet propaganda and ignorant western historians/apologists.

Let me remind you that during 40s Fins defeated Red Army twice. And RU officers admitting Ukraine debacle resembles Finish war debacle.  

With the Germans Red Army was throwing bodies and crappy tanks at them trying stay in the fight until allied pressure distracted enough German forces from eastern front for their defenses to start collapsing in 44.

Do you know that did not have adequate AT gun until 45? Do you know that their main 76mm gun of their main tank T-34 had pathetic penetration (much worse then 75mm of Sherman) because they screw up production of AP shells and then they screw up their quality? More or less they managed to overcome that problem in 44 by starting to replace it with 85mm gun. Or that their infantry did not have close range AT weapons until they captured enough panzerfausts by the end of 44? That they were literally defenseless against prevalent at that time night bombers raids? 

Red/Soviet/Russian army was always clown show hidden under thick layer of propaganda and western apologia. 

 

 

 

 

[Grey_Fox]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

I am saying there was nothing to deteriorate neither in 60s nor in 50s because there was nothing in the first place in the 40s. Red Army power is invention of Soviet propaganda and ignorant western historians/apologists.

Let me remind you that during 40s Fins defeated Red Army twice. And RU officers admitting Ukraine debacle resembles Finish war debacle.  

With the Germans Red Army was throwing bodies and crappy tanks at them trying stay in the fight until allied pressure distracted enough German forces from eastern front for their defenses to start collapsing in 44.

Do you know that did not have adequate AT gun until 45? Do you know that their main 76mm gun of their main tank T-34 had pathetic penetration (much worse then 75mm of Sherman) because they screw up production of AP shells and then they screw up their quality? More or less they managed to overcome that problem in 44 by starting to replace it with 85mm gun. Or that their infantry did not have close range AT weapons until they captured enough panzerfausts by the end of 44? That they were literally defenseless against prevalent at that time night bombers raids? 

Red/Soviet/Russian army was always clown show hidden under thick layer of propaganda and western apologia. 

 

 

 

 

For 50 years after WW2 the only history of the eastern front available in the west was written by the Nazis. You seem to be repeating a fair chunk of that here. It was only after the fall of the Soviet Union that we got to examine Soviet records.

[George MC]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

Red/Soviet/Russian army was always clown show hidden under thick layer of propaganda and western apologia. 

 

Yeah.... No.

Don't confuse the current war in Ukraine with the Red Army in the SWW.

[Grigb]

8 minutes ago, Grey_Fox said:

For 50 years after WW2 the only history of the eastern front available in the west was written by the Nazis. You seem to be repeating a fair chunk of that here. 

• Oh, it was Nazies who hid the fact that Soviet infantry division had no adequate AT guns and no AA defenses to speak of whole war?
• Oh, it was Nazies who hid the fact that T-34 gun and Zis-3 guns either hand no AP ammo (41-42) or it was of bad quality (43-44) ?
• Oh, it was Nazies who hid the fact USSR was defenseless against night Bomber raids even in 44?

8 minutes ago, Grey_Fox said:

 It was only after the fall of the Soviet Union that we got to examine Soviet records.

No, you didn't. You got access to little bits Military was comfortable to open.  Tell me - when did you got to know about infamous Tiger penetration test which showed Red Army has no defense against Tiger?

[chuckdyke]

8 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Red Army has no defense against Tiger

Oops I think it was a Panther.

 

[Grigb]

1 minute ago, chuckdyke said:

Oops I think it was a Panther.

 

You do know that Panther had around 30mm sides vulnerable to about anything Soviets had? Tiger tank on other hand had 80mm and was almost completely invulnerable to majority of Soviet gun until summer 44 where t-34-85 started to appear in numbers. 

You guys are funny. You believe I am wehraboo. But in reality you are redaboo with little knowledge about Red Army.

My point is very simple - unlike Allies Red Army lacked several important capabilities and was much weaker than western public believe. But Due to uncritical acceptance of Soviet propaganda Red Army is seen as unstoppable Juggernaut.

That unstoppable Juggernaut run away from Finns with tail between legs twice.