Eastern Front - What's the attraction?

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Warren Peace:

According to Hart and Hart in "German Tanks of WW2" the deployments were as follows (6/15/44):

Eastern Front: 2513

Western Front: 2223

Italy: 984

Thus only 43% of German Armor was committed to the Eastern Front at the Time of Bagration.

Warren<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The above can be misleading as the only times the Westren Front tank strength aproaches the Eastren Front levels is on May 31, 1944, June 10 1944, Dec 15, 1944 & Jan 15 1945. The May return represents the Wests priority during May & early June as the Germans were building a reserve for the Allied landings they expected sometime in 1944.

Nor does the above show the German shift in priorities on armor reinforcement & replacement, begining after June 22, during Bagration in July & August, & Sept the Germans sent the bulk of reinforcments to the East.

The returns for both fronts* show below, the Bulk of German armor remained in the East throught the war. The returns only reflect tank strength not daily operational strength which would be lower, no returns for Stug's TD's etc are included.

31.05.44 status returns for the Eastren Front:

771 - PzKpfw IV

292 - PzKpfw V

307 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1370

31.05.44 Status returns for the Westren Front:

759 - PzKpfw IV

543 - PzKpfw V

53 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1355

10.06.44 Status returns for the Westren Front:

758 - PzKpfw IV

655 - PzKpfw V

102 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1515

15.09.44 Status returns for the Eastren Front:

610 - PzKpfw IV

728 - PzKpfw V

267 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1605

15.09.44 Status returns for the Westren Front:

133 - PzKpfw IV

150 - PzKpfw V

45 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 328

30.09.44 Status returns for the Eastren Front:

579 - PzKpfw IV

721 - PzKpfw V

249 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1549

30.09.44 Status returns for the Westren Front:

123 - PzKpfw IV

194 - PzKpfw V

54 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 371

31.10.44 Status returns for the Eastren Front:

707 - PzxKpfw IV

672 - PzKpfw V

278 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1657

31.10.44 Status returns for the Westren Front:

243 - PzKpfw IV

222 - PzKpfw V

49 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 514

15.11.44 Status returns for the Eastren Front:

687 - PzKpfw IV

658 - PzKpfw V

276 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1621

15.11.44 Status returns for the Westren Front:

293 - PzKpfw IV

329 - PzKpfw V

88 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 710

30.11.44 Status returns for the Eastren Front:

697 - PzKpfw IV

625 - PzKpfw V

246 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1568

30.11.44 Status returns for the Westren Front:

328 - PzKpfw IV

285 - PzKpfw V

62 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 675

15.12.44 Status returns for the Westren Front:

503 - PzKpfw IV

471 - PzKpfw V

123 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1097

15.12.44 Status returns for the Eastren Front:

704 - PzKpfw IV

737 - PzKpfw V

268 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1709

30.12.44 Status returns for the Westren Front:

550 - PzKpfw IV

451 - PzKpfw V

116 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1117

30.12.44 Status returns for the Eastren Front:

768 - PzKpfw IV

726 - PzKpfw V

261 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1755

15.01.45 Status returns for the Westren Front:

594 - PzKpfw IV

487 - PzKpfw V

110 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1191

15.01.45 Status returns for the Eastren Front:

736 - PzKpfw IV

707 - PzKpfw V

199 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 1642

15.03.45 Status returns for the Westren Front:

257 - PzKpfw IV

152 - PzKpfw V

36 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 445

15.03.45 Status returns for the Eastren Front:

1239 - PzKpfw IV

762 - PzKpfw V

208 - PzKpfw VI

Total - 2209

*See Jentz Thomas L. Panzer Truppen Vol 2. p. 202 p. 230

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-26-2000).]

[Guest machineman]

Just goes to reinforce the idea it was a team effort that won the war. What if all the resources on the German side could have been concentrated against one front, instead of the crazy 'fire brigade' stuff the Wehrmacht was forced to do?

[Grisha]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by machineman:

Just goes to reinforce the idea it was a team effort that won the war. What if all the resources on the German side could have been concentrated against one front, instead of the crazy 'fire brigade' stuff the Wehrmacht was forced to do?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

For the Germans, 1941 was about as good as it got. Aside from reserves in France, and the remnants of the Greece operation all German resources were concentrated in Russia in the summer of 1941. Add to that Soviet forces were at their worst at that time.

But I understand your point, and yes, it was a group effort. Nonetheless, I firmly believe that Russia's contribution to the struggle against Germany was the decisive element in the Third Reich's defeat.

[bcorkill]

The problem with these 'who did what' discussions is the immense amont of possible branching in 'alternate historical' paths. While I definately agree that the Soviet army was primarily responsible for turning the vaunted Wehrmacht into the '45 Volksgrenadiers, in a straight III Reich - Soviet war, Hitler has the Bomb by 47-48. Then what?

Bryan

[Guest Germanboy]

Another reason the Western Allies felt they had to launch Overlord was that they were quite afraid of a separate peace in the East. Not very likely, but it had happened before in 1939. Simply keeping the invasion force 'in being' may otherwise have been sufficient to draw strength from Germany during the Soviet summer offensive.

------------------

Andreas

Der Kessel Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 10-26-2000).]

[Holdit]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jagdcarcajou:

Hey,

Just to throw in here, since no one else seems to be looking at this angle, I believe Germany was defeated by Adolf Hitler.

Takes a German to beat a German!

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think that's a very serious point, and I've always been surprised that it isn't mentioned more often. Adolf did the Allies no end of favours.

[Holdit]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

We have said for a long time now that we will actively attempt to allow CM1's setting to take advantage of CM2's enhancements, but we will also not hobble CM2 for this to happen. The most important thing is to advance the game system, so nothing is going to stand in the way of that goal. Meaning that our good intentions of backwards compatibility might run into stiff opposition from reality Way too soon to say at this point.

Steve <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm delighted to read this. Just one thought, instead of applying aspects of the CM2 engine/gameplay to CM1, how about providing the ability to import the CM1 OB into CM2?

[Leclerc]

1) Without Soviet union USA and GB would have been unable to invade Europe.

2) The Soviet counter-offensive during Winter 41 got very few from lend-lease support. At mid-42, german army was unable to mount another attack on the whole east front and so did go for a southern effort which was possible only by depriving the AGC and AGN of any offensive capacity

3) The lend lease gave to the Soviet a way to specialize in weapon production and eliminate the 2 worst shortcomings of the Soviet industry: truck production and radios. Without lend lease, all Soviet offensives would have been very close of the Winter 41 model: a maximum of 100 km advance in a 250-300 km sectors

But the question is if without lend lease, the soviet could have produced as much tanks and artillery? I highly doubt it would have been the case. If so, the Soviet ran after 42 in manpower problems. As the 41-42 Soviet offensive operations were very costly and after 43 Soviet army relied more and more heavily on material strenght, I believe Soviet efforts would have been less numerous, peculiarly in Summer, because of a lack of aerial superiority.

By the contrary, The ability Soviet showed in deception efforts from 1942 would have certainly been there, so the German would have been in real inferiority in the key points.

4) In such a case, when germany would have fully mobilized its economy? I guess it would have been close to the real situation, ie at the start of 1943. The armored forces would certainly have in this case a less pronounced attrition rate as Soviet would have had less AT and tanks. Most Soviet efforts would have been countered by "backhand blow" german plan.

5) Obvoiusly, a milder occupation policy would have been an real advantage in Ukrain. But it was simply impossible. Hitler didn't have the possibility to do such a thing. The nazi bureaucracy had to be fed up with "lebensraum" delires.

So my conclusions: Soviet Union can't lose, but northing indicates USSR could have won by itself. Sort of stalemate is probable.

[This message has been edited by Leclerc (edited 10-26-2000).]

[Private Pike]

I'm not sure that I agree that the soviets couldn't lose. If Moscow and or Lenningrad had fallen in late 1941 there was the real possibility of another revolution with the army just quiting and the soldiers going home. This is what happened in 1917 and I've always assumed it's what Hitler was banking on happening again.

[Private Pike]

I was also interested in the figures for PIV and Panther numbers. I had always assumed that the Panther was rare on the Western front and that i was cheating abit by using them regularly in QB instead of PIVs. Looks like they were both available in roughly equal numbers.

[Leclerc]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Private Pike:

I'm not sure that I agree that the soviets couldn't lose. If Moscow and or Lenningrad had fallen in late 1941 there was the real possibility of another revolution with the army just quiting and the soldiers going home. This is what happened in 1917 and I've always assumed it's what Hitler was banking on happening again.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Entering leningrad and Moscow is one thing, conquering them another... remember Stalingrad? Even surrounded as Warsaw was in 1939 ( and Warsaw siege was really long), Both Soviet capitals would have been a graveyard for many German troops which would have to face too Soviet counterattacks during Winter.

[Snake Eyes]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Private Pike:

I'm not sure that I agree that the soviets couldn't lose. If Moscow and or Lenningrad had fallen in late 1941 there was the real possibility of another revolution with the army just quiting and the soldiers going home. This is what happened in 1917 and I've always assumed it's what Hitler was banking on happening again.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The fact is that the Soviets stopped the Germans at Leningrad and held it for two and a half years, even though surrounded and cut off most of the time. The Soviets also stopped the Germans at the gates of Moscow and pushed them back. They also crushed the Germans a year later at Stalingrad. They did all this on their own, with little help from anyone. Face it, the Germans took their best shot and the Russians beat them.

------------------

It is easy to be brave from a safe distance. -Aesop

[Spook]

To John Waters:

I found your outlay of German main battle tank (MBT) numbers for the East/West fronts, at select points of time, to be fascinating to read. However, one can infer more from your "tracking" than you might expect.

1) First off, the surveys for the East Front are interesting to note in that German MBT strength doesn't really decrease in the '44-'45 timeframe, and even INCREASES to a peak of 2200 in Mar '45. (Even after the Bagration disaster, the German tank numbers are still stable, but then again, the majority of German panzer formations weren't caught up in Bagration.) This doesn't mean that the Germans weren't losing tanks on the East Front, only that on the East Front, MBT tank production and panzer division reinforcement seemed to keep pace with losses. (Of course, with Soviet tank deployment mushrooming at the same time, "keeping pace" was still attritional defeat for the Germans.) So this links to your assertion that German MBT production had to primarily feed the East Front just for the German panzer units there to maintain their existing effectiveness.

2) While the German MBT numbers "held steady" for 1944, not so for the West Front. In June '44 your numbers show a German MBT strength of about 1500. By Sept '44, this has dropped to just over 300, until slowly rebuilt to 1000 in Dec. '44. Again, the returns don't show right off how German MBT production was proportioned to replace losses on the East Front to those on the West Front. But we do see a net LOSS of German MBT deployed strength on the West Front by Sept. '44, down to basically 20% of what it was in June. In terms STRICTLY of MBT deployment, the West Front attrition appears more catastrophic than what was suffered by the German MBTs on the East Front in the same time.

Of course, using MBT counts by themselves (or even throwing in all other armored vehicles) is hardly sufficient to assess relative "importance" between the two main European fronts. Comparison of changes in raw manpower, aircraft, artillery, & transport would also be needed only as a beginning of such a task.

But when looking strictly at your sited MBT returns, John, one can see that while the East Front maintained MBT deployment primacy, MBT attrition on the West Front certainly helped to ensure that the Germans on the East Front couldn't add much to their MBT strength in their "armor race" with the Soviets.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

To John Waters:

I found your outlay of German main battle tank (MBT) numbers for the East/West fronts, at select points of time, to be fascinating to read. However, one can infer more from your "tracking" than you might expect.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh, I know

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

1) First off, the surveys for the East Front are interesting to note in that German MBT strength doesn't really decrease in the '44-'45 timeframe, and even INCREASES to a peak of 2200 in Mar '45. (Even after the Bagration disaster, the German tank numbers are still stable, but then again, the majority of German panzer formations weren't caught up in Bagration.) This doesn't mean that the Germans weren't losing tanks on the East Front, only that on the East Front, MBT tank production and panzer division reinforcement seemed to keep pace with losses. (Of course, with Soviet tank deployment mushrooming at the same time, "keeping pace" was still attritional defeat for the Germans.) So this links to your assertion that German MBT production had to primarily feed the East Front just for the German panzer units there to maintain their existing effectiveness. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Exactly that was my point the German bulk strength and replacements went East begining with Bagration, they had no choice do to the Soviet gains, the Westren Front was neglected more & more as Soviet gains increased Ie, we see numerous reinforcments deployed East begining in June: Ie, 1/Pz.Regt 31, 1/Pz. Regt.35, Pz.Abt 301, in July: s.H.Pz.Abt.510, 6th Panzer Div, 1/Pz.Regt Grossdeutchland, 1/Pz.Regt.25, , in August: Fallschirm Panzer Div Herman Goering, 19th Panzer Division, s.H.Pz.Abt.501 1/Pz.Regt.36, Pz. Brig. 101, Pz. Brig. 102, Pz.Brig. 103, Pz Brig. 104 Pz.Abt. 302 etc. This represents 1,184 AFVs alone & doesn't even compare Infantry deployment, replacement etc.

The German armor rebuilding in the West represents the gearing up for the Ardennes, where they replenished some units and transfered Divs from the East, as soon as the Ardennes is over in Jan we see the shift back to the East, & neglect of the West, as well as a constant shift in priority in Feb till the end when many Westren units were transfered to the East, to attempt to halt Soviet drives.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

2) While the German MBT numbers "held steady" for 1944, not so for the West Front. In June '44 your numbers show a German MBT strength of about 1500. By Sept '44, this has dropped to just over 300, until slowly rebuilt to 1000 in Dec. '44. Again, the returns don't show right off how German MBT production was proportioned to replace losses on the East Front to those on the West Front. But we do see a net LOSS of German MBT deployed strength on the West Front by Sept. '44, down to basically 20% of what it was in June. In terms STRICTLY of MBT deployment, the West Front attrition appears more catastrophic than what was suffered by the German MBTs on the East Front in the same time.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Exactly yet we can track reinforcments between the 2 fronts, as I have listed above the reinforcments represent 1 reason why German AFV strength remained steady in the East, and sustained it while replacement AFVs were shipped the priority as seen is the East. The attrition level can not realy be measured by this, yes the West dids atrit from the tank totals, but at the same time the East was as well, the difrence is the East as you point out was kept somewhat stable compared to priority on equipping the West.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Of course, using MBT counts by themselves (or even throwing in all other armored vehicles) is hardly sufficient to assess relative "importance" between the two main European fronts. Comparison of changes in raw manpower, aircraft, artillery, & transport would also be needed only as a beginning of such a task. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh agreed, I was responding to a specific example. The Germans deployed a total of 85 Divisions to the Westren Front (includeing Italy) during its existance compared to 235 inthe East even after the landings in the West.

I can supply a few German manpower returns for the Eastfront in 44 & 45 these represent German forces only, Satalite contributions increase these totals.

01.05.44 - 2,460,000

01.07.44 - 1,996,000

01.09.44 - 2,042,000

01.10.44 - 1,790,000

01.11.44 - 2,030,000

01.01.45 - 2,230,000

01.03.45 - 2,000,000

01.04.45 - 1,960,000

08.05.45 - 1,510,000

If anyone can supply manpower returns for the West on these dates its a start, then we can move on to Artillery, etc.

We can also examine German ground force irreversible losses (KIA, MIA, POW) on the Eastren Front. Satalite countries totals, are not included, nor are it Luftwaffe & Kriegsmarine totals. Total ground force losses on all fronts in ( )'s:

1942 - 519,000 (538,000)

1943 - 668,000 (793,000)

1944 - 1,129,000 (1,629,000)

1945 - 550,000 (1,250,000)*

*As of 01.04.45

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

But when looking strictly at your sited MBT returns, John, one can see that while the East Front maintained MBT deployment primacy, MBT attrition on the West Front certainly helped to ensure that the Germans on the East Front couldn't add much to their MBT strength in their "armor race" with the Soviets.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed, the West certinly contributed to the defeat of Germany & thats not disputable the trouble in these debates is ppl tend to get slighted on their countries contribution being implied as smaller etc, when its realy not even an issue, as one must also accept that the Soviets, also did their share & as one author put it 'tore the guts' out of the Wermacht & thats the Soviet contribution to the Allied effort.

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-27-2000).]

[Spook]

Oops. I guess I should've clarified to say that "I myself" shouldn't try to draw frontal attrition comparisons due to main battle tank (MBT) numbers alone. That's why I was throwing MBT as an acronym all over my other post, so that my "frontal" comparisons stayed close to an apples-to-apples level.

Anyways, I would certainly agree that the greater bulk of total German losses was on the East Front, where I had often read of 80% total German losses (or close to that) happening there. Thus, the added manpower & loss tabulations you've now provided, John, are also useful as reference on this topic thread. Certainly, of all theaters in WW2, the East Front far eclipsed all others in raw attrition.

Actually, for post-Bagration, I'm a bit surprised that even the Wehrmacht's East Front manpower stayed relatively constant (near 2 million) up to Apr '45. But here again, all that says is that replacements kept close pace to losses. Thus your follow-on tabulation of yearly German losses was again good to add.

Learn something new all the time....

[Guest Big Time Software]

Warren Peace wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Steve this statement is not true. Operation Bagration started two weeks AFTER D-Day according to Both Seaton and Glantz. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Quite true. My post was done under the burden of the Flu Bagration was timed to the day (and hour?) of the 3rd anniversary of Barbarossa.

My point is still true though. The Soviet offensive demolished the German Army and Luftwaffe (what was left of it). The units being tied down in the West is not relevant to my point. I said that if Overlord had failed (i.e. the Germans defeated the Western Allies with the forces you mentioned) the fate of Germany would have still been sealed with defeat. The end result of Bagration was the destruction of 2 Army Groups (Center and South) and the surrounding of the third (North).

A quote from German General Niepold:

"The loss of the entire Army Group Center greatly accelerated the collapse of the German State. The war would have lasted much longer and the defence of the east could have continued if the divisions of Army Group Center had not been smashed."

The Germans lost about 350,000 men (irreplacable) to something like 180,000 Soviets. The middle of the front was ripped wide open and the Red Army pretty much had to stop simply because it ran out of umph. But to the south Army Group N/S Ukraine were flanked, pushed up against the Carpathians, "stabbed in the back" by the Rumanians, and pinned by the partisans in Yugoslavia. It was obvious that this Army Group was dead meat as well. And Army Group North was sealed off because Hitler did not order it to pull back as it should have been.

So... even if the Western Allies had been defeated in Normandy, the Germans had little chance of doing so much as fighting the Soviets to a standstill.

Steve

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Maxx:

Just wanted to insert into the discussion what is often forgotten when discussing the colossal land battles on the eastern front. That being the contribution of the British and American bombing campaigns on German industry. According to Albert Speer (German munitions minister) these 'raids' had a HUGE effect on Germany's ability to prosecute the war from 1943 on. By late 1944 they were literally crippling Germany's fuel (oil) industry. How often i have read a German account of running out of fuel in Russia and having to abandon ALL their vehicles. No gas, no tanks, no planes, no victory.

Ok I feel better now.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

1) Soviet archives mentioned that soviets dropped 2 times as many bombs onto Germany as Americans. Was this just a propaganda number? I don't know...

2) Vehicles were abandoned because troops were surrounded and had no way of receiving the fuel

3) Vehicles were also abandoned because during rapid retreat frequently no one was supplying retreating troops.

I don't think soviets would have defeated Germany without any help. They did not receive much help in 1941 and 1942. They started to receive large amounts in 1943.

Yes it helped - specially trucks. Rapid teritorial advances were possible thanks to them.

[This message has been edited by killmore (edited 10-26-2000).]

[Maj. Bosco]

I think the major importance of D-Day is that by liberating western Europe before the USSR the allies prevented the Eastern Bloc from being the European Bloc. Probably my American jingoism kicking in again but from everything I've read Uncle Joe's government wasn't the greatest thing in the world to live in. Being completely realistic the cheer at the end of WWII should have been "YAY! THE LESSER EVIL WON! WOOHOOO".

[Grisha]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Maj. Bosco:

I think the major importance of D-Day is that by liberating western Europe before the USSR the allies prevented the Eastern Bloc from being the European Bloc. Probably my American jingoism kicking in again but from everything I've read Uncle Joe's government wasn't the greatest thing in the world to live in. Being completely realistic the cheer at the end of WWII should have been "YAY! THE LESSER EVIL WON! WOOHOOO".<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You are most likely right, and if Roosevelt wasn't dwelling on this, I would bet money Churchill was

[Paul Lakowski]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by buddy:

OK, admittedly I am not well-versed in the history of the Eastern Front - WW2...I know that the Germans pushed pretty far into Russia - laid siege to Stalingrad, right? I know that both the German and Russian armies had a burnt earth strategy, millions died and that in the final days of the 3rd Reich 2 major Russian armies were converging on Berlin and, in their bloodlust to get there first, even attacked each other for awhile. True - saw it on a documentary once (if the documentary is to be believed).

My point is, besides having a revised and new and improved CM with new/revised AI, graphics, etc..., what is the attraction to the Eastern Front that the Western Front doesn't offer?

(Besides Russian troops/equipment?)

I need schooling.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

OK try this on for size.

WW-II was won and lost on the eastern front between 1941 and 1943, any study of WW-II out side of this area is of secondary importance.

They say the Americans suffered some thing like 300,000 casualties in the war while the Brits some what more[any one got any figures?].

But the Germans lost 250,000 in the first few months on the eastern front and the Russians probably lost that much in the first few weeks....and yet they fought on like that for another 4 years.

If the Western armies had been forced into the kind of fighting the Russians endured they'd probably have lost the war in 1941.

[Los]

"We can also examine German ground force irreversible losses (KIA, MIA, POW) on the

Eastren Front. Satalite countries totals, are not included, nor are it Luftwaffe & Kriegsmarine totals. Total ground force losses on all fronts in ( )'s:We can also examine German ground force irreversible losses (KIA, MIA, POW) on theSatalite countries totals, are not included, nor are it Luftwaffe &Kriegsmarine totals. Total ground force losses on all fronts in ( )'s:

1942 - 519,000

1943 - 668,000

1944 - 1,129,000

1945 - 550,000 "

For 1941 I have over 750,000.

As a interesting comparison the Red Army Suffered, depending on the study, anywhere fronm 27-29 million casualties (POWs that returned home not included in that number). 85% of those casualties were in the infantry (Charles B. Sharp SOviet Infantry Tactics in WW2)

Los

[GriffinCheng+]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Tiger:

soviet sled powered by surplus airplane motor/propeller with a light mg

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Cool! Now I know where those snowspeeders and AT-ST in Star Wars V came from. 8)

Well, Tiger, I don't seem to find this in the weapon encyclopedia of WW2...Any futher details?

Griffin.

------------------

"+" is just the beginning. Expect to see "GriffinCheng76", "GriffinCheng(105)" or "GriffinChengA3E8" more should Forum problems occur again

[tss]

PzKpfw 1 wrote:

We can also examine German ground force irreversible losses (KIA, MIA, POW) on the Eastren Front. Satalite countries totals, are not included, nor are it Luftwaffe & Kriegsmarine totals. Total ground force losses on all

1942 - 519,000 (538,000)

1943 - 668,000 (793,000)

1944 - 1,129,000 (1,629,000)

1945 - 550,000 (1,250,000)*

Usually only KIA and MIA are counted as irreversible losses. I have a hard time believing that the wounded are counted in those figures. As a rule of thumb, one casualty in 5 is KIA or MIA. Those figures sum to about 3 million. That would mean that the number of German KIA and MIA would be only around 600 thousand. The casualties of Bagration and the Rumanian offensive in 1944 by themselves amounted to 620000 KIA and MIA.

That 27 million figure for Soviet losses includes either wounded in addition to KIA and MIA or civilian deaths. Counting the number of wounded is pretty difficult, since some of them would remain unfit to enter the later duty and many were wounded more than once.

Krivosheev compiled the loss reports that the individual fronts sent to Stavka and reached the figure of 8668400 dead (including those who died in captivity) and 22326905 wounded. How reliable these figures are is another question, since in 1941 casualty reports were not very accurate and even later some commanders falsified them after excessively heavy losses (there's a difference of 30% between various reports of Tali-Ihantala battle June-July 1944).

However, I believe that the relative error in these figures is not greater than the relative error of Winter War casualty reports. According to the casualty reports, Soviets lost 95348 KIA and MIA. However, after the war a roll of casualties was compiled and it has 126875 names for men who didn't return to their homes. The relative error is almost exactly 1/3.

Using this figure, the number of Soviet military deaths would be at most 11.5 millions. I believe that the true figure lies somewhere between these two extremes.

Note that the ratio of KIA+MIA / WIA is particularly high for the Winter War since Soviets lost about 207000 WIA and frostbite cases, giving a proportion 126000/207000 = 1:1.6. The reason for this is that most of the wounded froze to death before they could be recovered.

- Tommi

[tss]

GriffinCheng+ wrote:

Well, Tiger, I don't seem to find this in the weapon encyclopedia of WW2...Any futher details?

There aren't too many details available for those sleds. Against Finns they were used mainly for patrolling lakes during winter. Once the Soviets planned to use 100 of them to attack Poventsa over Lake Onega. (Poventsa is the town in the northmost tip of the lake, I can't remember how its Russian name is spelled). However, that attack was cancelled for some reason soon after the sleds had started their journey.

There were few firefights between those things and Finnish ski patrols.

- Tommi

[Warren Peace]

Steve,

My point was simply that by tying down 40% or so of German combat strength in June 1944, this allowed the disaster to Army group center to happen. Much of the problem was that the German's simply had no reserve to counterattack after the initial breakthroughs.

As for the bulk of combat tank replacements going to the East, I have no quarrel with that, but the key is that the Germans had to tie down over 1/2 of all available armor to the Western Fronts in June 1944 because of the threat of invasion. This is what allowed the Russians to achieve the numerical superiority required for Bagration's success.

Just to make things clear let me summerize why I think the USA made a critical contribution to defeating Naze Germany

1) Lend lease was directly responsible for about 10% of Russian War effort.

2) Western Strategic Bombing campaign had some effect on industrial production and more importantly tied down the majority of Luftwaffe Rescources from 1943 onward.

3) Kept a substantail fraction (40% in June 1944) of German Army Strength from participating in combat on the Eastern Front.

4) Kept Rommel off Zhukov's Ass .

I guess if you really wanted me to push the issue I would suggest that without the USA's involvement the War in Russia would have been a stalemate. I don't think Western Aid was much of factor until 1943 when the counter offensive started. However, I do not think the Russians would have been successful in their counter offensive actions without the USA. (Do not underestimate the importance of the 500,000 trucks the USA sent Russia during the War.)

Warren