Separatist push/Ukraine shove back

[IMHO]

1 minute ago, Haiduk said:

Really ? Сount my political posts and posts of your three.

Hmmm... Quite fair approach to comparison

[DMS]

Just now, Haiduk said:

I think, some pro-Russian guys have turned this topic about tactical questions in field of useless political flame and whataboutism. And continuing to do that even after administrator's warning. Alas, typical picture for discussion boards and social networks, when Russians are appearing.  

Okey, I won't write any political post here. (I mean 100% political, as some part of politics is in any question about Ukraine)

[IMHO]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

As for the BBC article, you still don't get it.  Russian media and government policies, going back 100+ years, have created these tensions.

Well... I believe I'm not qualified enough to go that far

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

given the choice between living there and living in Russia... they chose to live there

Steve, we're kind of speaking different languages  I believe it makes more sense to look at numbers and hard facts rather than waste time on their passionate interpretaion  As for the Baltics - you're not absolutely correct  A hell of people left the Baltic states - both of Russian and Baltic descent. We'll never know the precise breakdown between political and economic reasons as they don't ask. By proxy numbers my guess would be a prevalence of "Suitcase! Station! Russia!"  migration during the first years of independence then, after this movement exhausted itself, - economic. Kudos to Haiduk for very telling terminology 

PS BTW, getting proxy numbers straight on reasons to emigrate from Baltics requires some time and effort. The guys didn't want it to look like a textbook case of ethnical cleansing - however soft methods they used - so they did a funny exercise of playing with methodology. But it's a very telling sign in itself when quite intelligent people find it necessary to fudge the numbers

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Oh, and nice dodge for my response to your question about selective facts and logic.  It did not go unnoticed.

Nope it's not dodging - I'm just trying to disengage and go over to the dark side of jokes and humour 

Edited February 8, 2017 by IMHO

[IMHO]

37 minutes ago, DMS said:

Okey, I won't write any political post here. (I mean 100% political, as some part of politics is in any question about Ukraine)

[In a raspy Darth Vader voice] Fall back! Let 'em conquer the thread!

Edited February 8, 2017 by IMHO

[IMHO]

May I add some more humour to the thread?  Friends sent me a clip from Russian main state TV channel. The broadcast claims there are foodstuff shortages in the UK because of Brexit, prices grew fourfold and sales limits were put in place  Kim Jong-un bites the dust royally. Seems like Recreational Santa of The Great State of California came to Russian propaganda people one year early

Edited February 8, 2017 by IMHO

[Kinophile]

@IMHO you've helped badly derail this thread and distract Haiduk from providing a very Interesting source of information. 

All of you,  please quit it. C'mon,  guys.... 

And to be clear, I count myself in that also. 

Small Wars Journal has this intriguing suggestion for how Ukraine can eventually win back the Donbass. A primary military component is to flood the region with SOF to (1)relentlessly decapitate the Separatist leadership AND (2)destroy it's heavy artillery, the actual guns. Both targets would tie down a disproportionate number of Sep/Russian units...for a time, at least. This campaign would draw in more and more Russian forces,  not a bad thing politically for the Ukies. 

Consider the recent increase in Sep leader deaths -  Motorola,  Givi, Ananschenko. As Haiduk says this could just be the Kremlin "cleaning house"  of troublesome leaders or a reflection of Kremlin internal politics. His first point could be  most accurate, as the BBC and others suggest Givi pushed to hard to use the Somali battalion in this Avdiivka fight. 

I've previously suggested  a similar strategy, minus the extra focus on artillery :-)

The idea is an interesting one, but barely scratches the surface of what a Russian counter-campaign would be like. 

@Haiduk (and anyone else) -  Luhansk has always seemed the weaker of the two separatist states,  militarily)/economically/politically.

Why has Ukraine not pressured that northern flank,  before and now? Rougher/open terrain? Long logistics tail? 

Edited February 8, 2017 by kinophile

[Haiduk]

12 minutes ago, kinophile said:

 

 Luhansk has always seemed the weaker of the two separatist states,  militarily)/economically/politically.

Why has Ukraine not pressured that northern flank,  before and now? Rougher/open terrain? Long logistics tail? 

If you will look on the map you will see that frontline in Luhansk sector mostly passed along Siversky Donets river. Not suitable place for advancing for both sides. Though NE part of Svitlodarsk bulge is a "zone of responsibility" of LNR forces. Now in area of Popasna town continues active artillery exchanges and positional clashes - we are trying to push off enemy from Kalynove village, but further advanse will have a problems, because on our way in that place is agglomeration of towns Pervomaisk - Irmino - Kadiivka (old name Stakhanov) - Almazna - Brianka. Also minor clashes are continuing along so-called "Novobahmutka road" 

Edited February 8, 2017 by Haiduk

[Kinophile]

Just now, Haiduk said:

If you will look on the map you will see that frontline in Luhansk sector mostly passed on Siversky Donets river. Not suitable place for advancing for both sides. Though NE part of Svitlodarsk bulge is a "zone of responsibility" of LNR forces. 

I did note the river,  I wasn't sure how much of an obstacle it is. 

Even so,  LNR has always seemed.. Brittle...to my untrained, non-military eye. Vulnerable. 

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Marwek77 aka Red Reporter said:

Sorry Haiduk, but most flame was brought here from you...

Wow.  But to be expetced

1 hour ago, IMHO said:

Well... I believe I'm not qualified enough to go that far

I guess I have an advantage... my university degree is in History and I've spent the better part of 30 years studying this topic in some form or another.  I've also spent probably spent an average of 1-2 hours per day for 3 years studying this war.  I consider myself at least decently qualified to have such discussions in depth

1 hour ago, IMHO said:

Nope it's not dodging - I'm just trying to disengage and go over to the dark side of jokes and humour 

 

I'm happy to move on.  Just remember that if you want to have a serious discussion again, please start by addressing my previous response to your question.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

42 minutes ago, kinophile said:

@IMHO you've helped badly derail this thread and distract Haiduk from providing a very Interesting source of information. 

All of you,  please quit it. C'mon,  guys.... 

It seems we can move on from the distraction, so the thread stays open

Quote

And to be clear, I count myself in that also. 

Small Wars Journal has this intriguing suggestion for how Ukraine can eventually win back the Donbass. A primary military component is to flood the region with SOF to (1)relentlessly decapitate the Separatist leadership AND (2)destroy it's heavy artillery, the actual guns. Both targets would tie down a disproportionate number of Sep/Russian units...for a time, at least. This campaign would draw in more and more Russian forces,  not a bad thing politically for the Ukies. 

Consider the recent increase in Sep leader deaths -  Motorola,  Givi, Ananschenko.

There's been at least another dozen that we know of as well.  Late last year there was multiple murders within the LPR leadership.  Which is to be expected from criminal operations such as these.  And yes, they do fit the definition of criminal more than they do government

Russian "purges" were especially big in the first year, which had several high profile Russian military actions (notably with the use of Wagner Group, which is illegal under Russian law yet armed and paid for by the Russian government).  But for the most part Russia said "you guys are out, you guys are in" and the change of power happened without armed conflict.  The famous actions of Wagner Group (a quasi Russian government special forces unit that is in violation of the Russian Constitution) are the ones most of us Ukraine watchers are most familiar with.  This was what I refer to as the "Cossack purge" of late 2014 and early 2015.

Quote

As Haiduk says this could just be the Kremlin "cleaning house"  of troublesome leaders or a reflection of Kremlin internal politics. His first point could be  most accurate, as the BBC and others suggest Givi pushed to hard to use the Somali battalion in this Avdiivka fight. 

Givi is pretty much the last of the "independent" leaders from the original armed militias.  The only high profile one left is Khodakovsky.  Unlike Givi, Motorola, and Mozgovoy I can't think of any failed assassination attempts on him.

Quote

@Haiduk (and anyone else) -  Luhansk has always seemed the weaker of the two separatist states,  militarily)/economically/politically.

Why has Ukraine not pressured that northern flank,  before and now? Rougher/open terrain? Long logistics tail? 

The original Russian strategy was to get a "land bridge" to Crimea and (in their wildest fantasy" Moldova.  That required expanding from the direction of Donetsk, not Luhansk.  The Russian counter offensive of August/September 2014 involved expanding in that direction at the expense of Luhansk.  The fighting in the north was therefore less of a priority for both sides.  This was compounded by the much smaller and weaker militias that were the bulk of the Russian fighting force at the time.  The seizure of Debaltseve was a limited objective to straighten out the line and deal Ukraine a big military defeat rather than expanding territory.

Since then Russia has shown little interest in expanding its footprint in Ukraine because there is no advantage to come from it and the expense of the operation (militarily and politically) would be high.  Russia will only engage in large scale military activities in Ukraine only if its current holdings are seriously threatened.

Steve

[IMHO]

42 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'm happy to move on

Thank you for understanding. And despite the supercharged nature of the discussion I honestly want to thank both people who shared common point of view and those who do not - you, Haiduk, Juan Deag and others. There's no better way to learn what's on people's minds than hear it directly from them.

Edited February 8, 2017 by IMHO

[Kinophile]

Nicely said @IMHO. 

Steve,  I was looking at Luhansk from the angle of a Ukrainian push. 

ie, what are the reasons for not pushing hard on what, to me, seems to be the weaker NOF the two separatist "states"? 

Is it terrain? Supply Distance? Lack of supporting military infrastructure? Difficulty of defending new gains? Stronger local anti-kiev sentiment? Greater vulnerability to a Russian invasion into the flank/rear from the north? Simply I wrote extending Ukr forces? Would not highly mobile BGs wreak havoc in Thunder run style raids,  strike in and back,  falling away from RUS counter strikes? 

Edited February 9, 2017 by kinophile

[DMS]

2 hours ago, kinophile said:

ie, what are the reasons for not pushing hard on what, to me, seems to be the weaker NOF the two separatist "states"? 

They are afraid that Russia will really start the war. Look at their norhern flank at Charkov. Good strike from Charkov to Dnepropetrovsk will cut the whole "ATO" group.

[Battlefront.com]

29 minutes ago, DMS said:

They are afraid that Russia will really start the war. Look at their norhern flank at Charkov. Good strike from Charkov to Dnepropetrovsk will cut the whole "ATO" group.

The first part is the most important part.  There are a couple of reasons that Ukraine is refraining from a full offensive, but the primary one is Russia can not allow Ukraine to liberate the Donbas from Russian occupation.  This would have massive geopolitical and domestic problems that would likely be the worst thing Putin has ever had to face.  Putin's position of power is tenable only if the various power blocs that keep him in place are sufficiently satisfied with him.  Losing the Donbas would cause a loss of support and that in turn could produce a coup (even an unsuccessful one would be very damaging) or a "heart attack".

This is where things are very different on the Russian side compared to the Ukrainian side.  If things go badly for Ukraine, Poroshenko will likely be kicked out of office.  However, he expects this will happen sooner or later anyway since previous presidents (Kuchma being the sole exception) have only stayed in office for one full term.  Likewise, the government is not built around any one president and therefore the transition to another president doesn't put the state at automatic risk of anarchy.  This is absolutely not the case with Russia because Putin is Russia and Russia is Putin.  Take away Putin and Russia's future is much less certain.  Take away Putin under disgraceful circumstances and the future of Russia is likely to be very bleak.

Therefore, it is pretty much a 99% certainty that if Ukraine goes on the offensive Russia will invade Ukraine openly and with absolutely no regard for the negative consequences.  If Ukraine is not reasonably certain it can come out ahead of a Russian counter offensive, then it is better off staying put.

As for where to attack, in previous discussions I've advocated concentrating on one place until gains are made then switching to another.  I would start with the Debaltseve area then switch to south of Donetsk.  I've found it interesting that on a very small scale attacking in the Debaltseve area.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, IMHO said:

Thank you for understanding. And despite the supercharged nature of the discussion I honestly want to thank both people who shared common point of view and those who do not - you, Haiduk, Juan Deag and others. There's no better way to learn what's on people's minds than hear it directly from them.

Yup, which is why I don't shut down discussions like this even when the go down very familiar paths.  Unlike many here, I've been doing this consistently for 3 years now and there's not much I haven't already heard before.  Cripes, I think Kievan Rus was even brought into things more than once

Steve

[IMHO]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Cripes, I think Kievan Rus was even brought into things more than once

Sure, I put it on purpose. It was a popular stock of Russian vs. Ukrainian nationalist discussions of 1.5-2 years ago. Either borders of Kievan Rus' as "original" borders of Ukraine and which side holds an "eternal lease" to various provinces of Ukraine or who owns "copyright" to the name Rus' / Russia and the origins of Russia itself. As if some dukes of 800 years ago rise from the dead and start laying out maps for the action of today 

 

Edited February 9, 2017 by IMHO

[IMHO]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

...Russia can not allow Ukraine to liberate the Donbas from Russian occupation.  This would have massive geopolitical and domestic problems that would likely be the worst thing Putin has ever had to face.  Putin's position of power is tenable only if the various power blocs that keep him in place are sufficiently satisfied with him.

1. Would you name those "various power blocks", the sources of their influence and their views on Donbass?
2. If I start reposting Ukrainian war forums here, you'd see a much worse picture than "Station, suitcase, Russia" and obviously that's what people really feel and intend to do should they overrun DNR/LNR. Don't you think Putin may truly believe he's saving the people of Donbass and that's not that far from reality?

PS I don't want to argue "Station, suitcase, Russia" in itself I only want to understand why you believe Ukrainian nationalists' actions and intents have no bearing over Russian leadership.

[IMHO]

8 hours ago, kinophile said:

Nicely said @IMHO

Thank you so much

8 hours ago, kinophile said:

ie, what are the reasons for not pushing hard on what, to me, seems to be the weaker NOF the two separatist "states"?

It looks illogical because you try to apply the reasons of war where the rationale is political. To understand why it's Avdiivka industrial zone - the concentration of the initial Ukrainian attack - you can just look at the map. How this sector differs from a middle of nowhere in Luhansk? Middle of nowhere: less protected, less population - just an open field. Avdiivka industrial zone: no man's zone holds Avdiivka Coke Plant - the only source of heating and means of existence for Avdiivka of 250 thousand people, the line of control cuts right through populated Donetsk metropolis - so any lower caliber artillery support should originate from there due to range, and the sector poses highest danger to DNR as it allows shortest path to Donetsk center.

So if one wants more land at lowest risk then it's logical to attack at Luhansk or at a less populated area in Donbass. If one wants to put as much population in danger as possible and wants a violent and emotional response from the opposition one should attack at Avdiivka. Shelling Donetsk puts the in danger the lives of wives and daughters of people who literally hold the trigger. High command may issue any order of restraint but the actual decision is made by those people.

And to this you may add, after the Avdiivka industrial zone was taken by Ukraine with no proportionate response from DNR, the action took over wide swaths of the front, Ukrainian press started the talk about opening a second front from Mariupol, OSCE was allowed to make pics of Ukrainian tanks standing at Avdiivka residential area. After all OSCE reported shelling from Ukrainian high caliber artillery but somehow was not able to photograph them, yet easily locatable pictures of Ukrainian tanks inside the residential area quickly made it into the public view.

I don't want to argue the morality of it - clearly opinions differ here - just the logic.

Edited February 9, 2017 by IMHO

[Kinophile]

Still,  to flog a dying horse, putting pressure on Luhansk could yield useful results. 

Avoid overtly using Mech units, use SOF instead to strike at valuable Russian kit (radar, SAMs, EW),  keep killing Sep leaders and Sep artillery. Ambush with IEDs on HV Russian kit retreating/incoming to/from Russia.

Use MI to extricate SOF but otherwise stand back.

You'd get maybe a week of fun times before Russia went full-Putin on you. So you advance recon/sabotage teams first, deep towards the border with Donetsk and Russia. Then a second wave of teams begin the rapid-fire decapitation/kit strikes,. Your advance teams hit initial responding Sep units,  Russian HV kit then break for their own lines. 

You avoid infantry battles,  focussing on targets that are expensive,  difficult to replace (EW gear,  good local Leaders).

By initiating the campaign you can "harden" /prep your own rear units and infrastructure for the inevitable Russian counterstrike. 

Probably a laughable plan/idea to anyone here with mil experience :-)

 

Edited February 9, 2017 by kinophile

[Haiduk]

7 hours ago, kinophile said:

Still,  to flog a dying horse, putting pressure on Luhansk could yield useful results. 

Avoid overtly using Mech units, use SOF instead to strike at valuable Russian kit (radar, SAMs, EW),  keep killing Sep leaders and Sep artillery. Ambush with IEDs on HV Russian kit retreating/incoming to/from Russia.

Russia will sent other - this is fighting with windmills. We can't risk with own SOFs only for searh&destroy operations if its hasn't any operative points.

Luhansk sector almost hasn't strategical key points. We control energy plant in Shcastia town wich supplies Luhansk and almost all Luhansk region with electricity and heating. What other reason can be to advance in vicinity of Luhansk in this time ? Siversky Donets riverbanks in many places are quite steep and overgrown with dense tree-plants sometime passing in forests - not too much usable places for crossings. Also banks filled with mines and booby-traps. Ok. We will attack in Stanytsia Luhanska area, cross the river (under arty fire) advance some forward to cut a road Luhansk - Sukhodilsk.. And what ? Our troops turn out between Luhansk and Russian border (18-25 km). Russians can even not to cross the border, just set artillery/MLRS and repeat border fights of 2014 year. Our troops never will receive order to open return fire through the border.

Well, let try in other place - we atteck in Triokhizbenka - Slovyanoserbsk direction to cut R-66 and M-04 roads. We are advancing and... turned out between Luhansk and big agglomeration Kadiivka-Brianka-Alchevsk. All our suuply of troops will be conduct only via pontoon bridges - all enemy artyllery and MLRS will work to destroy it.

So, remains just one part of Luhnsk region - NE part of Svitlodarsk bulge in area of Troitske village - Popasna town - Novozvanivka village. In that area we have seized some grey zone and now approaching to Kalynove village. I don't know for why this, I doubt we will assault or block Pervomaisk - Kadivka - Brianka agglomeration, though some guys, which served there say, that Pervomaisk can be taken relatively easily. But other problem, by Minsk-1 these cities are behind of demarkation line.  

In Mariupol sector marines shot down (or EW unit have jammed) Russian-produced UAV. I have forgot it name, one such model was shot down in 2014 over Donbas and one Russians lost in Syria. I have read this is some new model, which teststing in combat conditions and can not only transmit video and data in real time, but also has functions of cartography. In front part of UAV looks like a hole from bullet. 

Edited February 9, 2017 by Haiduk

[Kinophile]

Very interesting breakdown, thank you. 

However, you are still thinking in terms of a military,  set piece,  brigade+ scale operation. 

I am thinking of an SOF heavy, semi-guerilla campaign aimed at the Separatist morale/leadership and supporting valuable Russian gear. Preferably long term (1 year). 

The strategic objective is to weaken Luhansk further and draw in/tie down Russian forces. 

It could be used as a immediate precursor to or diversion from a larger engagement further south. 

Edited February 9, 2017 by kinophile

[Kinophile]

re drone,  what do you mean by "has functions of cartography"? Mapping radar? FLIR? Mapping laser? 

[Battlefront.com]

14 hours ago, IMHO said:

1. Would you name those "various power blocks", the sources of their influence and their views on Donbass?
    

Like all government leaders/movements, Putin relies upon a web of support to maintain his position.  Or do you think that a single man relies on nobody but himself to maintain control of an entire government?   The more autocratic a government is, the more powerful are the blocs that keep the leader in power.  Those groups almost as a rule have competing interests with other power blocs.  The ones that are least favored are always looking for advantage over the ones most favored.  Coups occur when the less favored group thinks it has a window of opportunity to switch positions with the more favored ones.  Or the ones currently favored fear losing their status unless they take some sort of corrective action.  In modern Russia we have seen this happen at least three times;

1.  The coup attempt against Gorbachev 1991

2.  The rise of Yeltsin 1991

3.  The White House challenge against Yeltsin 1993

Lately Putin has had some problems internally.  For 10 days in March of 2015 he disappeared and there is still only speculation, but most of it suggests he had to deal with keeping power balances in check.  Some speculation is it was tied in with Nemtsov's murder and Kadyrov's involvement in it.  Since then there's been a number of incidents of arrests, "heart attacks", and demotions which have been seen by many to be signs of internal power struggles.  There's also been an increasing amount of evidence that the traditional Putin "power vertical" is showing signs of strain as regional leaders and oligarchs are taking steps to strengthen their own positions.

Putin is still very secure for the time being.  But there are many that are not happy with his leadership as of late.  If things go really wrong there's a good chance that the power balance will change.  Even if Putin ultimately survives, his position as undisputed leader of Russia will be... er... disputed

Here's some recent writing on the subject of power plays within Russia:

https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/its-the-end-of-the-world-as-the-russian-elites-know-it-57036

Quote

1. If I start reposting Ukrainian war forums here, you'd see a much worse picture than "Station, suitcase, Russia" and obviously that's what people really feel and intend to do should they overrun DNR/LNR. Don't you think Putin may truly believe he's saving the people of Donbass and that's not that far from reality?

Bunch of BS   Sure, the ones in the DPR/LPR that have been fighting against Ukraine and carrying out criminal activities and treason should be concerned about being held accountable.  That is only correct as they are criminals guilty of major crimes.  They put themselves in that position willfully and therefore they should accept the consequences of their actions.  If they are lucky Ukraine will engage in a South African or Rwandan "truth commission", but I expect it will be more like after the Balkan genocide where the perpetrators "station, suitcase, Serbia".  As we say in English, "they made their bed, now they must lie in it."

So yes, just like the Russians who in 1990/1991 left the Blatics and Eastern Europe after actively or passively participating in the repression and misery of the local populace for 40+ years, I do expect the pro-Rusians in the Donbas will want to run away from accountability.  Especially since Russia has already shown it has no problem harboring criminals and protecting them from taking responsibility for their actions.

As for Putin's beliefs, I think he is as pragmatic as he is cynical.  He doesn't care one iota at all about the plight of the people of Donbas or anywhere else.  What he does care about is using them to further his own goals, some of which are aligned with traditional Russian national goals.  But the people themselves?  Nope, not one bit of concern for them.

Quote

PS I don't want to argue "Station, suitcase, Russia" in itself I only want to understand why you believe Ukrainian nationalists' actions and intents have no bearing over Russian leadership.

Because the Russian leadership will throw the people of Donbas under a bus in a heartbeat if it thought it was the best solution to the mess they got themselves in.  The Russian people have always been a tool to be used and abused by the Russian government.  It is not so much different elsewhere when talking about the elites of the elites, so Putin is in some ways no different than any other head of an elite.

Steve

[Haiduk]

8 hours ago, kinophile said:

re drone,  what do you mean by "has functions of cartography"? Mapping radar? FLIR? Mapping laser? 

No information about this drone. It has massive block with 12 hi-res cameras

This is article in Russian about all known this type UAVs, which were shot down  - 2 over Ukraine (now already 3) and one over Turkey - http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1529603.html

Edited February 10, 2017 by Haiduk

[DMS]

On 09.02.2017 at 9:04 AM, Battlefront.com said:

Therefore, it is pretty much a 99% certainty that if Ukraine goes on the offensive Russia will invade Ukraine openly and with absolutely no regard for the negative consequences.  If Ukraine is not reasonably certain it can come out ahead of a Russian counter offensive, then it is better off staying put.

True. Any pragmatic reasons (more sanctions, cold or not cold war with NATO) don't worth sitting and watching how Ukrainian nationalists "put their feet on the chest" of Russians and pro-russian Ukrainians. We know, what both sides do with POWs, And just imagine, what will they do without a risk of revenge to their own POWs. Without a need to look good for public. (For what, if war is won?) What they will do with locals. Dozens of video with punishing of "terrorists" will be published in youtube. Many thousands of refugees will be driven to Russian territory. ("Suitcase, railway station, Russia" as they say) Some men in Russian goverment and in Russian buisness would want to stop and give up everything that west demands, as they loose money. But goverment won't survive giving up Donbas, it would be "political death" of the whole rulling class, not just Putin.

So, Ukrainian leaders clearly understand, that Donbas won't be given. Their task is to provoke Russia's help to Donbas army and to loudly shout about Russian agression, demanding funds to a victim. Question is not about capturing Donetsk, but about provoking of Russian regular units to enter DNR and LNR territory. But they also don't want to suffer heavy losses, and don't want to move far from their well built defensive positions.

Edited February 10, 2017 by DMS