Worst US **Tactical** defeat, post Africa pre Bulge?

[LongLeftFlank]

Just curious: in CM when attacking as Germans it is routine for me to utterly annihilate an entire US battalion+; I mean like even if I discount the game KIA tally (prisoner or fled) I have utterly routed them, destroyed their vehicles and taken their positions, hear the lamentation of their women etc.

I am unaware however of a German tactical attack in the above timeframe (France, Holland, Italy) that actually resulted in this "total victory" outcome. There are a lot I can think of that went the other way (US annihilating German battalions in a couple of hours).

Yes, sure, the Ranger fiasco at Anzio, Hurtgen, etc., but that's Yanks getting their asses handed to them by a skilled or lucky German **defender**. Not what I'm asking here.

Thanks in advance.

[JonS]

I can think of several during Op AVALANCHE. There's also at least one during Normandy - a US rifle bn got itself overextended at a river crossing, and subsequently wiped out during a German attack.

Although, all of those could quite reasonably be considered counter attacks, which may not fit your definition.

There's also the question of what is 'tactical.' We know it has a - somewhat flexible - upper limit, but does it have a lower limit?

FInally, what is 'defeat.' How comprehensive, and wide ranging does it have to be? Some of the actions during the Mortain attack* could be called tactical defeats for the US ... not that any of them mattered a jot**.

Jon

* or was that a counter attack?

** granted that the guys involved might beg to differ.

[womble]

LLF, are you talking about games against the AI?

[Holman]

If we can call it a tactical defeat when a goal is costlier in blood and time than it should have been, then there were lots of those. There was a lot of "pulling back and trying again" for the Allies between D-Day and Operation Cobra.

[RockinHarry]

You already named Hurtgen and the german counter attack on Kommerscheidt-Schmidt comes to mind, which although entirely successful, came to a high cost to germans as well. No easy victory for germans (at last it didn´t count much, as always) and with some better planning and precautions on behalf of the higher staffs in 28 US ID, could have been more or less avoided.

If you win easily with germans vs. US in the game, then most likely the US lack their usual bag of Arty. and FO´s.

[Bulletpoint]

Just curious: in CM when attacking as Germans it is routine for me to utterly annihilate an entire US battalion+; I mean like even if I discount the game KIA tally (prisoner or fled) I have utterly routed them, destroyed their vehicles and taken their positions, hear the lamentation of their women etc.

That's funny, I get similar results playing the US against the Germans. I think it reflects the natural limitations of computer games rather than historical accuracy

[LongLeftFlank]

My question was purely historical, not really about the game.

So I suppose the relatively small number of decisive German offensive victories (post-Kasserine / pre-Bulge) says a lot about the limitations of the Germans at that stage in the war: as Jon suggests, the bulk of their attacks were counterattacks with limited objectives (retake key OP, stabilize the front) vs. aimed at annihilation of the enemy force.

And where they did plan and execute a determined (counter)thrust: Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Arracourt, Mortain, Aachen, various Lorraine attacks Jason is so fond of, they either fizzled or withered under US arty -- Pyrrhic victories? Leaving only a handful of what we'd consider Total German Victory in game terms?

[db_zero]

If I'm not mistaken Italy is considered the toughest theater for the US Army. I don't know if Battalions got completely wiped out in some of the battles, but it sure sounds like the combat units got decimated.

A combination of politics, incompetent leadership and ill conceived operations against Germans defending in terrain that suited the defense lead to some horrific losses.

I think the 442 RCT suffered losses that pretty wiped out units in some of their battles. It wasn't called the "Go For Broke" and purple heart regiment for nothing.

[LongLeftFlank]

Agreed. But was that Germans attacking US positions, or just raining 81 and 7.92 hell on them as the poor doggies struggle to ford yet another narrow river defile?

[db_zero]

Agreed. But was that Germans attacking US positions, or just raining 81 and 7.92 hell on them as the poor doggies struggle to ford yet another narrow river defile?

More than likely on the defense, but then again if I'm not mistaken the German doctrine was to be aggressive/offensive, even while on the defense. They would counter attack whenever possible.

Even when technically on the offense, the Germans like to feign retreat and lure the opponent to attack and entice the attacking opponent into kill zone covered by 88mms and other defensive weapons.

[Michael Emrys]

Not against US troops, but I think the destruction of 1st. Para in Arnhem qualifies as a total German victory.

Michael

[Pak40]

I'm currently reading a book about the Metz operation. I'm not exactly sure if it qualifies as a defeat but I'm guessing the 3rd Army didn't expect it to be the debacle that it turned out to be.

[Michael Emrys]

I'm currently reading a book about the Metz operation. I'm not exactly sure if it qualifies as a defeat but I'm guessing the 3rd Army didn't expect it to be the debacle that it turned out to be.

Yeah, it was a mess. Siege warfare was definitely not Patton's forte.

Michael

[db_zero]

Siege warfare definitely wasn't Patton's forte. In a perfect world Montgomery would have been in charge at Metz and Patton would have been better suited to leading Market Garden than Montgomery.

Sometimes Patton like Montomery bit off more than they could chew. The Hammelburg raid wasn't one of his shining moments.

I would venture to guess if a US commander tried that sort of operation today the media throw a huge fit and Washington would come down hard.

[hobo]

Siege warfare definitely wasn't Patton's forte. In a perfect world Montgomery would have been in charge at Metz and Patton would have been better suited to leading Market Garden than Montgomery.

Sometimes Patton like Montomery bit off more than they could chew. The Hammelburg raid wasn't one of his shining moments.

I would venture to guess if a US commander tried that sort of operation today the media throw a huge fit and Washington would come down hard.

That would depend on whom was the president.

[LongLeftFlank]

The German infantry attacks in Foret de Gremecy (one of the Lorraine battles) sound like a pretty grim fight for the Yanks pre-Bulge; notice Patton had to countermand an order to withdraw by a shell-shocked command staff. But here too no rout at battalion or company scale... a company encircled and forced to break out, another platoon overrun. While the German attackers keep getting decimated by US arty.

On 28 September German attacks hit all along the 35th Division front as more of Muehlen's infantry arrived in the sector. The bulk of the 559th was thrown against the 137th Infantry in a concentric assault from the east and north. Again the Germans reached Pettoncourt with a thrust from the east, and again they were stopped by the American artillery and infantry. Toward the end of the afternoon two enemy columns marched out of Chambrey to make a last assault to the west but they were spotted at once and broken up by American planes. On the northeastern edge of the forest the German infantry and tanks were more successful in their attack against the 137th left flank. The woods screened the attackers from direct artillery fire and made it difficult for the defenders to maintain their contact with neighboring units. Early in the morning the Germans broke into the forest under cover of a barrage laid down by field guns and mortars. As the day progressed small detachments of tank-supported infantry worked their way to the rear of the 3d Battalion line, which had been reinforced on the right by the 1st Battalion of the 320th Infantry. The situation grew steadily worse and about 1500 the battalion of the 320th, hard pressed by the enemy who had circled around its left, started a withdrawal that carried it back about a thousand yards. As the infantry fell back, General Baade took countermeasures. At 1545 C Company of the 737th Tank Battalion began a sortie to mop up the enemy who had pierced through the rear. This tank drive, reinforced by infantry from the divisional reserve and supported by tank destroyers from the 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was successful. Most of the lost ground was retaken and shortly after dark contact between the front-line companies had been restored. All during this action L Company of the 137th (1st Lt. Rex Hopper) had been engaged in a lone and desperate fight at Hill 282, which rose midway between the village of Fresnes and the Forêt de Grémecey and overlooked the road leading into the woods. The German attacks, launched by small assault detachments equipped with automatic pistols, failed to break L Company; but the Americans finally were forced to fall back to the tree line at the northeastern edge of the woods.

...By 1030 several enemy groups had worked around the left flank of the 2d Battalion, 137th, where a 700-yard gap had developed in the fog and confusion. They had wiped out a platoon of E Company and were moving south along the ravine in the middle of the forest. General Baade sent a tank platoon to aid E Company and then ordered the 133d Engineer Combat Battalion forward to occupy the high ground in the open north of Pettoncourt and seal off this penetration. But inside the woods the 35th Division continued to lose ground, and by midafternoon both the 137th and the 134th were fighting with extensive gaps in their lines.

....All three regimental commanders of the 35th were there, plus General Baade, General Sebree, and members of the 35th Division staff. The officers had just gathered in the building which housed the command post when shellfire struck in the yard where the aides and orderlies were waiting. Several in the yard were killed or wounded, including some who had been with General Eddy since his days in North Africa.

....The Third Army chief countermanded the order for the withdrawal of the 35th Division: "Counter-attack with the 6th Armored and take the thing. Go in right now with the 6th Armored, that is as soon as you can. Tell them [the 35th Division] to hang on." This order was passed on to General Baade at 1650. Then Patton gave the 4th Armored commander his instructions: "The 35th will stay and fight and you will not move back."

...3d Battalion, 137th Infantry, which had suffered most heavily during the four days battle, was relieved--marching out of the woods with only 484 men of the 900 or more who had begun the fight.

[LongLeftFlank]

Sorry to keep (shamelessly) self-bumping this topic, but I just noticed that the hard hit US regiments in my post above are none other than the poor old 134th and 137th Infantry of the 35th ID, the poor Kansas and Nebraska boys who had shed so much blood already in the battles above St. Lo (my alas unlikely to be finished Le Carillon series).

I tried to get hold of the 137th Regimental history in 2012 via ILL but failed; there are very few copies available and none in digital form. And I find myself thinking what a crying shame it is that the courage of these prairie boys who seem to have drawn one of the shortest straws in Uncle Sam's roster, together with the ill fated 106th, the Italy meatground 34th and the 28th "Bloody Bucket" among others*, seem likely to vanish "like tears in the rain" as their few remaining frontline vets pass away. I wonder if Joe Balkoski could be persuaded to do for them what he did for the 29th ID (Blue-Gray) in "Beyond the Beachhead".

* e.g. 1st and 30th IDs and 4th Armored saw a pile of brutal action and shed a lot of blood - God Rest - but also largely seem to have dished out a lot better than they got. So not candidates for "short straw" IMHO. Same for the Airborne and Marine divisions. 3rd ID ("Wiilie 'n Joe's" outfit) got the gears at Salerno and Anzio and is a borderline case.

[Michael Emrys]

I wonder if Joe Balkoski could be persuaded to do for them what he did for the 29th ID (Blue-Gray) in "Beyond the Beachhead".

I don't know. It would be a worthy enough project, but the 29th. had special characteristics that might have made it especially interesting to him. It was one of the National Guard divisions, and it had a curious pre-war history dating back to the Civil War. Secondly, its initiation to battle was Omaha Beach D-Day morning. Talk about being thrown into the deep end of the pool! And Balkoski has a particular interest in D-Day anyway. It was worth following their career as their combat record was pretty good.

All that said, yes, there were also a number of divisions that went through a tough year in Italy and were then moved to the ETO where they had another tough year.

Michael

[JonS]

Above all that, he was (still is?) a member of the 29th.